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The psychological movement known as behaviourism has a unique
importance as a case study in scientific methodology. Although the
movement was founded in large part upon an aggressively objective
approach to the problems of psychology; received the allegiance, research
efforts, and personal sympathy of the majority of psychologists and
logicians who came in contact with it; continued both to attract new
adherents and to develop its investigative methodology throughout the
period of its chief influence; and, most important, served in one way or
another as the basis for a truly enormous amount of careful and
sophisticated resoarch, it nonetheless never managed to produce a
significant and v/orkable body of scientific knowledge at all comparable
to that available in most other scientific disciplines. In order both
to shed some light on the movement's relative scientific failure and to
determine some of the implications of that failure for the further
systematic development of psychology, the present study traces and
analyses the characteristics of and background to behaviourism as a
self-conscious movement in psychology.
Tho study alternates between historical and broadly logical
analysis. Chapter 1 documents the current decline of behaviourism and
introduces the problem of determining what it was that led to its decline.
Chapter 2 considers and rejects the thesis that behaviourism v/as (or had)
a substantive 'paradigm' and that it is currently undergoing the kind
of scientific revolution described by T. S. Kuhn; instead, it is
suggested that what was central to behaviourism was methodological
objectivism, the conviction that methodological insights, rather than
theoretical or substantive ones, are most important for ensuring
scientific advance. Chapter 3 extends this last point and shows how
the methodological conception of science typical of behaviourism can
be described generally as a 'positivist* one. This chapter then
analyses the characteristics, potentialities, and limitations of
positivist approaches to science, and concludes that such approaches
are appropriate when the focus of scientific interest is on the terms
and concepts of a scientific theory as such (the 'context of
reconstruction'), but are not appropriate when the focus of scientific
interest is on the problems and phenomena which the theory attempts to
explain (the 'context of construction'). Chapter k examines in some
detail the circumstances of the founding of behaviourism and of its
acquiring a positivist orientation; these circumstances were related
to the insuperable difficulties involved in doing animal behaviour
research on the introspective model characteristic of functionalist
comparative psychology. The rejection of consciousness and introspection
in comparative psychology was an appropriate response to these
difficulties; however, the generalization of this response to the rest
of psychology was based on an entirely unwarranted appeal to the
standards of objectivity thought characteristic of the natural science.
It was this appeal, and the results of its enormous success, that
determined the subsequent methodological constitution of behaviourism.
Chapter 5 begins by tracing the gradual transformation of this
methodological constitution from its initial, almost implicit version
in oarly or classical behaviourism to its eventual sophisticated and
oxplicit version In neobehaviourism. Thin chapter then makes a general
analysis of methodological approaches to scientific inquiry, at a
somewhat more technical level than was done in Chapter 3, and attempts
to show that such approaches are necessarily unsuccessful in the long
run, because methodological rules, or decision procedures, cannot be
made to apply satisfactorily to many of the types of problems
characteristic of scientific research. This analysis is then applied
specifically to some of the characteristics of behaviourist research.
Chapter 6 concludes the study with the judgment that the fundamental
systematic contribution of behaviourism to the ongoing development of
psychology liec in its demonstration that the methodological principles
on which it was largely based are untenable, but as a consolation
suggests that behaviourism's unsystomatic contributions, relating to the
training of psychologists in ways of seeing, are greater than have been
appreciated.
Chapter 1
The Decline of Behaviourism
Whether behaviourism is considered to be a psychological
system, a scientific methodology, a set of psychological theories, a
group of orienting assumptions, or a metaphysical commitment about the
nature of man, it is clear that it is gradually losing whatever pre¬
dominance it once had in psychology. Since behaviourism has always been
a loose coalition of interests rather than (or as well as) a specifiable
body of theory and research, it is difficult to document its decline
with any precision. Several indicators stand out relatively clearly
nevertheless, although some of them are admittedly impressionistic and
almost all are somewhat overlapping. We may list five that seem to be
among the most important ones. First is the publication, in growing
numbers, of increasingly sophisticated methodological and conceptual
critiques of behaviourism. Second is the loss of external philosophical
support for behaviourism. Third is a tendency towards attrition in the
ranks of both well-known and unknown behaviourist psychologists. Fourth
is the resurgence of interest in various kinds of explicitly 'mentalistic1
psychology. Finally, fifth is a gradual change in the kind of articles
published in the hitherto mainstream behaviouristic journals.
The refutation or rejection of systematic theories associated
with behaviourism is not separately mentioned in this list. Criticism
of the approaches or orientations exemplified by the theories can be
subsumed under the other headings, while the theories themselves,
particularly the more comprehensive and systematic ones, were for the
most part abandoned long ago.
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The present chapter will briefly examine each of these
indicators in turn, not with any intent of making a comprehensive
survey or assessment of them, but merely to give some picture of the
overall pattern of behaviourism's decline as it has emerged in recent
years. The chapter will conclude with a preliminary discussion of
the significance of behaviourism's decline, and of the relevance of a
detailed historical and critical appreciation of it, for the develop¬
ment of post-behaviourist psychology.
I. Indices of Behaviourism's Decline.
General Methodological and Conceptual Critiques.
First, the level of methodological and conceptual critiques
of behaviourism is considerably higher than it used to be. During the
early heyday of behaviourism, unsympathetic general critiques of it
tended—with some notable exceptions—to be naive and overly simplistic.
They often did not attempt to assess behaviourism within its own, or
even a common, frame of reference, but argued instead that behaviour¬
ism was simultaneously undesirable and inconceivable. They thereby
left themselves open to charges that they were a priori positions and
as such not to be taken seriously. More recent critiques take behav¬
iourism's empirical findings and methodological import much more ser¬
iously and examine them in much greater detail; they thereby focus their
criticisms on precisely those aspects of behaviourism which its chief
proponents have always, quite rightly, claimed to be central to it.
These critiques have as a result been considerably more effective than
the earlier ones.
Peters (1958), for instance, has made a closely focused
examination of the internal structure and empirical findings of some
modern psychological theories of motivation, especially psychoanalytic
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theory and certain behaviourist (mainly Hullian) theories. He shows
that a careful examination of the structure of Hullian theory reveals
that the theory is inconsistent specifically as a formal hypothetico-
deductive theory. This purported feature of the theory had always
been taken to bo one of its major virtues, because it facilitated
unequivocal tests of the theory's validity. Furthermore, Peters shows
that if predictions from tho theory are derived rigorously, the
empirical findings provide, at the very best, equivocal support for it.
Concerning his insistence in his monograph, on treating psychological
theories for better or worse as rigorous systems, Peters notes:
Some psychologists have praised the Monograph for discussing
psychological explanations with much more knowledge of
theories actually advanced by psychologists than is usual
with philosophical critics of psychology. But they have
suggested that I have taken such theories too seriously!
They are to be seen as moves in a game, not as ex cathedra
pronouncements (Peters, 1958; I960 ed., p. viii).
The implication is that motivational theories, including Hull's
vauntod hypothetico-deductivo theory, are capable of hanging together
only if one does not look at them too closely. However, as Peters
continues:
I am well aware that psychologists are very critical of
ambitious theories like those of Freud and Hull and
that these have been replaced by a bewildering amount
of piecemeal theorizing.. .But I think that these
theories are still very influential. For though they
are outmoded as Grand Plans, their concepts still
persist in the fragments of their monolithic structures.
And the new piecemeal theories, because they employ
many of the old concepts, still carry with them many of
the more general and more unacceptable implications of
the ambitious theories in which these concepts had a
natural homo (ibid., p. viii).
Potors' own position is that the plurality of types of
motivational constraints and directives on behaviour—criminal and civil
iaw, tissue need satisfaction, desire for self-consistency, self-
actualization, Oedipal conflicts, phobias, other fears, long-term
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goals, etc .—have logically different statuses and thus cannot be
reduced to one single principle. Hence, any all-embracing motivation¬
al theory with universally applied explanatory principles is logically
barred from success. Nevertheless, a major proportion of human
behaviour can be subsumed under a purposive, rule-following model, of
a sort which has been almost totally neglected in most major motivation¬
al theories.
Psychology has not soared into its Galilean period as is
often thought, through lack of bright ideas, experimental
ingenuity, or methodological rigour. It has remained
earthbound in mazes and Skinner boxes because the highly
general theories which, it was hoped, would emerge, are
logically impossible. The fundamental mistake of
theorists like Lewin and Hull was to assume that what
psychology requires is a Galileo . What would be much
more salutary would be a more careful scrutiny of the
conceptually illuminating start made by Aristotle (ibid.,
pp. 1%-157).]
Taylor (196^), like Peters, favours replacement of the loose¬
ly mechanistic and non-cognitive explanatory schemes typically favoured
by behaviourists with an Aristotelian kind of explanation. Such an
explanation would emphasize the roles of purposes, intentions, and
expectations—explicitly teleological factors—as determinants of
behaviour, or at least of normal, non-pathological behaviour. Taylor
stresses that, contrary to the frequent claims of behaviourist
psychologists and positivist philosophers, the relative merits of
teleological and mechanistic explanation can be assessed empirically.
Teloological explanation does not, as is frequently alleged, depend
upon a causative action being oxercisod by a future event. It merely
relatos present behaviour to a future goal or end stato by character¬
izing the behaviour as a sufficient condition for the attainment of
that end state. The behaviour can then be 'explained' as a function
(but not specifically as a backwards causal function) of the goal to
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which it leads. The choice of variables in terms of which to account
for behaviour is a broadly empirical question; the variables chosen
can be prior to, concomitant with, or subsequent to the behaviour to
be explained without the explanation in any case involving the action
of a causative factor independent of observable phenomena.
With this defence of teleological explanation Taylor neatly
turns the tables on those 'hard-headed' psychologists and philosophers
v/ho maintain that teleological explanations are inadmissible in
principle, because they involve backwards causation, animism, and other
occult fancies. The proper response, which Taylor illustrates but
does not explicitly state, is that this objection applies equally to
any attribution of causal agency over and above observed phenomena.
The Humean strictures against causality per se do not provide an
exclusive warrant for explanations in terms of "constant conjunctions
of events" that are related in one temporal direction rather than the
other. Taylor analyses the structure of teleological explanation in
some detail in order to justify his use of it in this way, and then
focuses on the problem areas and empirical findings of behaviourist
learning theories. He concludes that, if teleological explanations
are granted an initial credibility equal to that automatically given
to mechanistic explanations, then even in the problem areas most
intensively studied by behaviourist psychologists, the empirical find¬
ings support teleological explanations at least as well as, and some¬
times better than, mechanistic ones.
Toleological explanations have provided a favorite alterna¬
tive to behaviourism, particularly for British philosophers, for many
years. Tho significance of critiques such as Peters' and Taylor's is
that they make detailed contact with fully developed behaviourist
theories and, particularly in the case of Taylor's, advance a well
thought out alternative that applies to the very problems which
behaviourist psychologists have most intensively investigated.
Apart from a teleological orientation, another profitable
basis for criticism of behaviourism has been (Chomskyan) psycho-
linguistics and generative grammar. Chomsky's review (1959) of
Skinner's Verbal Behavior (1957) is the prototype of this kind of
criticism. In his review, Chomsky argues convincingly that whatever
may be the utility of 5-R and reinforcement models for explaining some
instances of animal behaviour, application of these models to most
human behaviour has received almost no experimental justification.
On the contrary, there are strong empirical, logical, and epistemo-
logical grounds for concluding that they are inapplicable to most
behaviour that is distinctively human. The most compelling of these
grounds is that the properties of language, and the patterns of
typical language use, are such that the system in which they are
embedded must be partially non-deterministic (at least in any simple
sense) and stimulus-independent (see Chapter 2, pp. /f0-if2). Fodor's
well-received book, Psychological Explanation (1968), is based largely
on Chomsky'c formulations. Fodor concentrates on what he considers
the fundamental logical assumption of behaviourist psychology, that of
the necessary validity of logical reduction of mental predicates to
behavioural ones. He concludes that as a logic claim this assumption
is question-begging, since it provides a rationale for ignoring
empirical data both selectively and a priori; and as an empirical
judgment it is simply false.
From a third perspective, von Bertalanffy (1970, 1971) has
argued that behaviourism, psychoanalysis, and much of cybernetic theory
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are equally objectionable in that they all rest on the gratuitous
assumption that the human organism is a passive reactor to external
stimulation. He maintains that general systems theory, if it is not
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misinterpreted , provides a validated scientific concept of man that
does justice to the scientifically observed data and the phenomenal
experience of personal autonomy, personality integration, creativity,
etc., and that does so without a retreat into vitalism or any kind of
mind-body dualism.
Sophisticated modern critiques of behaviourism may be said
to have had their start v/ith publication of the cooperative volume,
Modern Learning Theory (Estes et al., 195^) . This volume was not meant
to be destructively critical. Instead, its purpose was to provide a
...critical examination of contemporary learning theory
which sought to make the best use of past experience as
a basis for evaluation, and to draw some lessons for
the further development of learning theory...to clarify
difforences among current theories and to abstract
features which they hold in common (Estes et al., 195'f,
pp. xi-xili).
However, the enterprise led to somewhat different results from those
optimistically expected of it, particularly in the volume's longest
essay, Koch's analysis of Hull's learning theory. While he initially
undertook the assignment in all good will, Koch eventually came to
demonstrate that a) there were systematic contradictions in Hull's
theory, in that different predictions for the same behavioural
situation could be derived from different combinations of theorems;
b) Hull's hypothetical constructs (e.g., 'rG', 'SD') had an irreducible
und unadmitted ontological import, in that they had an independent
explanatory function but wore fully specifiable neither as postulates
nor in physiological or behavioural terms; and c) the numerical
values of the parameters in the theory were insufficiently determined
and were in some cases almost arbitrary.
Koch's essay was the first full-scale, internalist, formal
analysis of a major behaviourist theory. He has recently described
it, somewhat immodestly, as "probably the most mercilessly sustained
analysis of a psychological theory on record (Koch, 1971, P- 2)."
Since then, analyses in a similarly critical spirit have become some¬
what more commonplace, but Koch's original analysis has become out¬
dated only in the mildness of its tone. Succeeding analyses of
behaviourism, including Koch's own, have become far more trenchant.
Indeed, Koch has established what amounts almost to a second career
in his criticisms and eventual denunciations of behaviourism (e.g.,
Koch, 195^, 1959, 1962a, 196if, 1969, 1971). He describes his own
relationship to the movement as one of apostasy (Koch, 1969). The
pattern of his analyses of behaviourism is much the same as that of
the others described hero: logically, behaviourism doesn't hold
together, and empirically, it doesn't work. Koch has concentrated
much of his attention specifically on a criticism of operationism and
of the intervening variable paradigm. In regard to operationism and
related meaning criteria, he makes the point which will be further
developed below, that the epistemological basis for these positions
has been refined out of existence by the same philosophers who develop¬
ed them, due to the inherent difficulties and implicit contradictions
within the positions as originally formulated. Concerning the inter¬
vening variable paradigm, he demonstrates that contrary to the early
belief that its rigorous application would constitute a relatively
easy means of ensuring objectivity in theories, intervening variables
are in fact almost impossible to establish empirically in any way that
will guarantee their trans-situational applicability. Furthermore, even
in the rare cases in which they can be unambiguously defined, the
definition imposes such constraints on them that while they possess
some trans-situationality, they have little real generality, and
consequently far less utility than was once supposed. In terms of
general orientations, Koch's analyses differ from the others mentioned
here mainly in that he is writing very explicitly from within the
tradition which he is criticizing, and in that he is not trying to
expound a systematic alternative^.
Loss of External Philosophical Support.
In addition to more effective activity on the part of its
philosophical enemies, behaviourism has also suffered the loss of itc
philosophical friends. The quite extensive logical and philosophical
support which it once enjoyed has by now almost entirely evaporated.
Logical positivists such as Bergmann, Carnap, and Feigl all made im¬
portant contributions to the logical foundations of behaviourism (e.g.,
Bergmann, 1951; Bergmann & Spence, 1941; Carnap, 1936; Feigl, 1934,
1945) • The physicist Bridgman (1927) made what was perhaps an even
greater contribution in formulating the principles of operational
analysis or definition, principles which became very influential in
behaviourist experimentation and theory construction—notoriously, much
more influential than they wore in physics.
However, as part of the general decline of logical positivism
and related positions in recent years, all of these philosophers have
more recently taken positions which are incompatible with, or at best
irrelevant to, behaviourism. Bergmann's latest book (Bergmann, 1967)
formulates a realistic ontology of acts and processes that has close
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affinities with the intensionalism of Brentano and Meinong . Carnap's
later attempts to construct criteria for meaning and theory construe-
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tion (Oarnap, 19%) have been described by Koch (196^, p. 22) as "so
liberalized.. .as to make them compatible with certain classes of meta¬
physical statements." Feigl (1967, p. 60) cites this same paper by
Carnap, as well as several others including some of his own recent
ones, as jointly establishing that "the thesis of the translatability
of statements about mental states (in phenomenal language) into state¬
ments about peripheral behavior.. .must also be repudiated."'' Feigl
himself has, in addition, come to insist on the significance of the
problem of other minds, the importance of the mind-body problem, the
necessity for consideration of purely private experience, and the
validity and value of careful introspection.
Introspection, though admittedly often unreliable, does
enable us to describe elements, aspects, and configura¬
tions in the phenomenal fields of direct experience.
When the doctor asks me whether I have a pain in my
chest, whether my mood is gloomy, or whether I can read
the fine print, he can afford to be a behaviourist and
test for these experiences in a perfectly objective
manner. But I_ have (or do not have) the pain, the
depressed mood, or the visual sensations; and I can
report them on the basis of direct experience and intro¬
spection (Feigl, 1967, p. 5).
Bridgman (1959) has continued to maintain the value of operational
procedures in science, but now promotes them primarily as a loose
heuristic, so that one can know what one is doing. He has rejected
altogether his earlier position that their function was largely to
make science a purely public activity, and now insists that no_ set of
procedures can make science public, that scientific activity is
necessarily private and even subjective.
The evolution of and changes in British analytic philosophy
are of loss importance in this context, because behaviourist psycho¬
logy never rolled on analytic philosophy to anything like the extent
to which it relied on logical positivism and operationisrn. It may be
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of interest in passing, however, at least as a reflection of the
Zeitgeist, to contract Ryle's The Concept of Mind (1949), which more
or less proved the validity of behaviourism on loosely analytic grounds,
with Winch's The Idea of a Social Science (1958), which more or less
disproved it on much the same grounds. The 'behaviourisms' discussed
in these two books are not quite the same, however, and neither makes
very much contact with the behaviourism of American experimental
psychology.
British analytic philosophy aside, the significance of this
loss of philosophical backing for behaviourism cannot be overemphasized.
While it is an exaggeration to see behaviourism as nothing more than a
logic claim, logical analyses were of central importance to it. In the
first place, the logical positivist analyses established, or wore held
to establish, the practicability and necessity of basing scientific
formulations strictly on publically observable events. This demonstra¬
tion was of great utility in providing an independent justification
for a psychology based entirely on observations of behaviour rather than
of, say, states of consciousness. Second, the analyses specified the
ways in which complex theories, inevitably containing terms which did
not have an immediate observational referent, could be devised without
sacrificing the commitment to observable behaviour. Hence they enab¬
led behaviourism to go beyond mere descriptive formulations (which were
the main product of its first fifteen years), and construct, or attempt
to construct, genuinely explanatory theories. Third, and less formally,
the incorporation of rigorously scientific logical analyses—which
were held to derive from and relate to the practices of the physical
sciences—served to guarantee behaviourism's own rigorously scientific
character. Now, however, all three of these important supports for and
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justifications of behaviourism have been withdrawn. Furthermore,
they have been withdrawn precisely because the philosophers who
formulated them, and later philosophers who extended them, have
almost without exception concluded that they are invalid as they stand,
and that it is practically impossible to make them both consistent and
workable (these matters will be discussed at length in Chapter 5).
Attrition in the Ranks of Behaviourists.
The third indicator is a slight but clearly discernible trend
for behaviourists to stop being behaviourists and to start being some¬
thing else . Since this process is visible only when the behaviourists
concerned are very well known, and since well known and productive
scientists of any persuasion tend to have a strong commitment to the
systematic orientations which were the basis for their achievements,
the few behaviourists who have explicitly changed their orientation to
psychology have a significance beyond their small number. There are
strong factors which might be expected to prevent any behaviourists,
or other scientists of major stature, from changing their allegiance.
The most vociferous of those who have recanted is Koch,
whose career of self-styled apostasy was mentioned above. Palermo
(1970, 1971) has also made a public conversion. He considers that
behaviourism is a scientific system that has had a good and productive
run, but has now run its course and is due to be naturally replaced by
a successor. He sees his own position as part of this general shift,
moving along with the rest of experimental psychology from behaviourism
to a broadly conceived Chomskyan mentalism^.
The first prominent behaviourist to make a radical change in
orientation was perhaps Mowrer (if we discount figures such as Lashley,
who moved from vigorous S-R formulations to equally vigorous S-S form-
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ulations). In Mowrer's case, however, the change occurred so gradually
that it is impossible to specify just when or how it happened. It
clearly did happen, nonetheless. Mowrer achieved prominence in
psychology originally with his extension and later adaptation of
Hullian learning theory. His 'two factor* theory proposed, basically,
that emotional (autonomic) responses are learned through a process of
classical conditioning, and motor responses through a process of
instrumental conditioning (Mowrer, 19'+7). His more recent work has
emphasized personal accountability and responsibility in neurosis, and
the validity of the concept of 'sin* in psychotherapeutic self-evalua¬
tion (Mowrer, I960, 1966). He now sets himself explicitly against
what he sees as the trend of modern behaviourism in his uncompromising
emphasis on individual autonomy and the potentials for self-direction
of behaviour (Mowrer, 1972).
Meehl, while never a whole-hearted behaviourist, was very
sympathetic to the movement. He was the author of an influential
paper justifying the logical status of the law of effect (Meehl, 1950),
and the co-author of an even more influential paper on the logic of
psychological theories—the theories in question being exclusively
behaviourist ones (MacCorquodale & Meehl, 19^+8). He has since concerned
himself, while staying active as a methodologist and clinician, with
formulating an empirically meaningful concept of the evolutionary
emergence of mental properties (Meehl & Sellars, 1956), and with
attempting to demonstrate the possibility and resulting efficacy of
free will and faith on the basis of sophisticated philosophical
analysis (Meehl et al., 1958).
Three other major figures may be mentioned who have not
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abandoned their behaviouristic stand, but who have tacitly minimized
its importance in their thinking to a greater or lesser extent. Cofer
has recently judged that drive-reduction varieties of motivation
theory—with which he was long associated—are about to be replaced by
explicitly cognitive theories, and he implies at least that he approves
of the change (Cofer, 1972; see p. 18 below). Finally, Krech and Miller
—who were at one time seriously engaged in extension and elaboration
of the theories of Tolman and Hull, respectively—have made no compro¬
mise in their aggressively hard-headed objectivist orientation, but
seem to have abandoned their hopes for profitably applying their exper¬
imental rigour to the construction of behavioural systems as such, and
are now concerned primarily with psychobiology.
The Resurgence of Mentalism.
'Mentalism' is a word used disparagingly by behaviourist
psychologists to refer to any psychological theory or orientation that
places central importance on conscious experience or mental events,
especially when these are conceived of as determinants of, and prior to,
observable behaviour. Tolman, while referring particularly (although
not explicitly) to the introspective structural psychologies of Wundt
and Titchener, provides a good example of such usage.
The mentalist is one who assumes that 'minds' are
essentially streams of 'inner happenings.' Human beings,
he says, 'look within' and observe such 'inner happen¬
ings.* And although sub-human organisms cannot thus
'look within,' or at any rate cannot report the results
of any such lookings within, the mentalist supposes that
they also have 'inner happenings.' The task of the
animal psychologist is conceived by the mentalist as
that of inferring such 'inner happenings* from outer
behavior; animal psychology is reduced by him to a
serios of arguments from analogy (Tolman, 1932, p. 3).
As such, 'mentalisra' has close functional connections (for behaviourists)
with other favourite pejoratives such as 'animism' and 'mysticism'''7.
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The minimal behaviourism-oriented characterization of 'mentalism'
that opened this paragraph is apposite however, because it applies to
a large and increasing proportion of contemporary psychology, the
different segments of which often have little in common apart from
g
their non- or anti-behaviourist 'mentalism' as so conceived .
Much of this resurgence of mentalism is associated with a
loose cluster of movements or schools comprising existential psychology
in all of its ramifications, humanistic psychology, and phenomenology.
Existential psychology ranges over the anti-cultural indictments of
Laing (1962; Laing & Esterton, 1965) and, less directly, Szasz (1961,
1970), the descriptive psychopathology (daseinanalyse) of Binswanger
(1958), the normative existential Marxist idealism of Fromm (196k),
the later personalistic developments of client-centred therapy (Rogers,
1961, 1964), the organismic theories of Maslow (1962) and May 1953),
and many others (for a survey and guide to the literature, see May,
Angel, & Ellenberger, 1958). Most formulations of existential psycho¬
logy are based on clinical insights, but are intended, like Freudian
theory, to have valid application far beyond the bounds of clinical
practice. Humanistic psychology is similarly a mixed bag, and is if
anything even more diverse in its manifestations. The best introduc¬
tion to the range of humanistic psychology is the anthology edited by
Bugcntal (1967), with representative essays by Bugental, von Bertalanffy,
Koectler, J. R. Royce, Lifton, and a number of others, including some
of thoso identified above as existontial psychologists. Psychological
phenomenology is less diffuse than the other two, although it overlaps
considerably with existentialism. The classic modern works in the
field are those of Merleau-Ponty (1942, 1945); recent representative
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examples from it include Giorgi's introductory text reinterpreting
psychology on the basis of phenomenological principles (Giorgi, 1970),
Wilshire's phenomenological interpretation of James* Principles of
Psychology (Wilshire, 1968), and the ongoing series of Duquesne Studies
in Phenomenological Psychology (Giorgi, Fischer, & von Eckartsburgh,
1971). Somewhere in the middle of these three movements, themselves
not always clearly separable, are activities such as transactional
psychotherapy (Berne, 1963), Gestalt therapy (Perls, Hefferline, &
Goodman, 1965), and, more broadly, encounter groups, sensitivity
training, etc. The purpose of this parade of sources is simply to
suggest the range and diversity of modern existential types of psycho¬
logy. Existential psychology and its allies are certainly not new, but
the extent of interest in them is greater than ever before, and is
continuing to increase. What unites all of these disparate positions,
and justifies mentioning them together, is their shared conviction
that close study of the contents and structures of conscious experience,
including (or especially) one's own conscious experience in real-life
situations, is the single most essential requirement for understanding
both the human mind and human behaviour. Other varieties of mental-
istic psychology rely much less on immediate experience, and often
tend to treat mental entities as loosely inferred constructs .
Non-existentialist varieties of mentalistic psychology are
in some ways more relevant here, as they fit more neatly into the kind
of 'acadomic psychology' classification dominated for many years by
behaviourism. As such, they are more direct competitors of or alter¬
natives to behaviourism. The most important development in this field
may indeed be Chomskyan psycholinguistics, which Palermo (1970, p. qi6)
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tentatively identifies as central to the more "mentalistic and ration¬
alistic orientation" that is about to replace behaviourism. However,
while Chomsky's inspirational value for those who are searching for
an alternative to behaviourism may be indeed great, the direct relevance
of Chomsky's generative grammar to the construction of a general psycho-
g
logy has yet to be shown, and may reasonably be doubted . Other
varietios of mentalistic psychology are often loosely called 'cognitive',
another usage stemming from Tolman, although there is little continuity
between Tolman's views and contemporary cognitive theories. Personal
construct theory (Kelly, 1955; Bannister & Fransella, 1972) is a good
and currently popular example . Another, although as yet more limited,
is intentionalist motivational theory of the sort elaborated by Irwin
(1971). Irwin makes a formal analysis of intentional (consciously
chosen) behaviour in terms of preferences and differential outcome
expectations. He maintains that drive reductionist and similar theories
of learning and motivation are not so much false as grossly irrelevant
to all but a tiny fraction of human behaviour. A survey by Ryan (1970)
indicates that intentionalist approaches comparable to Irwin's are
becoming increasingly popular.
In addition, there has been a mentalistic or cognitive under¬
current active on the fringes of experimental psychology for some
years. Perhaps the best example of such a fringe activity is the
series of studies by Spielberger and his associates purporting to show
the necessity for awareness of reinforcement contingencies on the part
of subjects undergoing verbal conditioning (e.g., Spielberger, 1952;
Spielborger & DeNike, 1956). Such activities, and instances could be
multiplied (e.g. studies of perceptual defence), remained firmly anchor¬
ed to the typical bohaviourist emphases on reinforcement, parametric
18.
measurements, operational definitions, etc. Thus, while in their
very respectability they undoubtedly eased the way for mentalistic
formulations to become more acceptable in the mainstream of American
psychology, they were never productive of wide-ranging, uncompromising¬
ly mentalistic theories, as in their different ways the researches of
Kelly, Irwin, Maslow, Chomsky, etc., have been.
Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, Riecken, & Schacter,
1956; Festinger, 1957) and some aspects of achievement motivation
theory (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953) could also be
described as more or less mentalistic fringe activities. Their inclu¬
sion is more tenuous, however, inasmuch as they are more a part of
social psychology, which was never dominated by behaviourism to quite
the extent typical of learning and motivation theory.
It is very difficult to assess other than impressionistically
the significance and extent of the new mentalism, and impossible to
predict whether some of it, and if so which part, will develop into a
viable general psychology. That it is indicative of widespread and
lasting changes, however, seems to be agreed by many psychologists1^.
Cofer, in reviewing Irwin's book on intentional behaviour cited above,
observes that drive reductionist and similar theories of motivation
...make the organism like a ship tossed at sea by winds
and waves while various explosions occur in its hold. A
cognitive psychology, however, places agency in the hands
of the helmsman or engineer, who perceives alternatives
and chooses that one whose outcome he prefers, the one
that he anticipates will enable the vessel to ride out
the storm and the internal stress...It looks as if an era
has ended, and a new one, involving notions like choice,
intention, and volition, is beginning to emerge (Cofer,
1972, p. k7k)
But the new era, if there is indeed going to be one, has not yet quite
arrived. A recent book by Lohr (1971) maintains a sophisticated form
of neobehaviourism, equally Hullian and Hebbian; Lohr attempts to
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account for all cognition, affect, and behaviour, on the basis of drive
reduction and the action of cell-assemblies in the brain. In commenting
on Lohr's book, only a few pages after Cofer's resignedly optimistic
judgment just quoted, Rychlak concludes:
...it is ironic to recall the day when an eminent scientist
like Robert Oppenheimer Gtood before us at an APA conven¬
tion and said 'in so many words' that he wished we psycho¬
logists would stop basing our fledgling science on the
rapidly fading Lockean-Newtonian models of yesteryear. He
hoped we would soon begin thinking of human behavior in
purposive terms, even though we could not weigh, measure,
or 'see' such sublime aspects of the human condition. Many
other equally sophisticated empiricists in our sister
sciences are waiting for psychology to make this effort.
Best of luck to Lohr and others in psychology who wish to
go on arbitrarily taking intention and self-direction out
of man's mind. But where are our innovators? When will
our Kuhnian revolution begin? (Rychlak, 1972, p. *f91)
Change in the Contents of Journals.
The significance of the mainstream American psychological
journals such as the Psychological Review, the Psychological Bulletin,
and the Journal of Experimental Psychology, is that they are jointly
the main vehicle of that mainstream, and as such provide reliable
information about its direction. It is much easier to have wayward
theoretical and experimental papers published in relatively minor
journals such as Psychological Reports or the Psychological Record--
and this fact is hardly to their discredit—than in the major journals
mentioned. These major journals are slow to change, sometimes frus-
tratingly so, and as a result changes in the types of articles which
they accept for publication provide a conservative but reliable
indication of basic changes in American psychology itself. Thus, the
changes in journal contents described in this section do not constitute
a separate index of the decline of behaviourism, or a separate set of
criticisms of behaviourism. Rather, they are a microcosm of the trends
already discussed, insofar as these trends have already changed the
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course of American experimental psychology.
The main change in the contents of these journals has been
a result of what both Koch (1964) and Smith (1969) have called the
'return of the repressed', the renewed consideration of complex
human functioning, conscious processes, and higher activities such
as love and curiosity, all of them put off until an indefinite time
in the future early in behaviourism's career. Some of the background
to these developments should be mentioned. The 'repression' of these
higher processes in American psychology was carried out as a result
of the early behaviourist rejection of their status as autonomously
real functions or events, and of the substitution for study of them of
a faith that the behaviour traditionally taken as indicative of them
could eventually be accounted for in a scientific way, once behaviour¬
ist psychology had fully investigated the simpler functions from which
they were held wholly to derive. The 'return' of these repressed
problems was occasioned initially by the gradual realization that the
very great progress which had been made in laboratory studies of
restricted animal and human behaviour, and in the construction of
theories based on such studies, had been accompanied by no comparable
progress in relating the laboratory findings to accounts of the higher
and specifically human functions as traditionally conceived. Hence,
the research programme of much of what Koch (1964) calls 'neo-
neobehaviorisra' was devoted to investigating these problems ac far
as was possible with the theoretical and explanatory tools already at
hand. This programme thus constituted an application of current
restricted methods and limited theories to complex human functioning
rather than, as had originally been predicted and hoped, an experi¬
mentally warranted extension of established principles to the explana-
21 .
tion of higher behaviour.
Tho significance of this shift in emphasis, and the tenuous-
ness of it, is highlighted by tho fact that the higher processes and
complex functions investigated or explained in this way comprise
almost the entirety of human and animal behaviour in ordinary life
situations. That is, the experimental studies on which the theoreti¬
cal extrapolations were based were themselves directly applicable to
the explanation of practically no real-life behaviour. Peters under¬
scores this point in discussing Hull's motivational theory.
Hull (19^+3) boldly proclaimed his programme of starting
from 'colourless movements and more receptor impulses
as such* and eventually explaining everything in terms
of such concepts—
'familial behaviour, individual adaptive effic¬
iency (intelligence), the formal educative pro¬
cesses, psychogenic disorders, social control
and delinquency, character and personality,
culture and acculturation, magic and religious
practices, custom law and jurisprudence, politics
and government and many other specialized fields
of behaviour.'
In fact Hull developed some simple postulates which gave
dubious answers to limited questions about particular
species of rats. He never asked, let alone tried to ans¬
wer, any concrete questions about human behaviour. He
was in love with the idea of a science of behaviour; he
was not acutely worried about concrete questions of ex¬
plaining human behaviour (Peters, 1958, pp. 2-3).
However, the 'neo-neobehaviourists' took it as their role to answer
many of these same questions that Hull, perhaps wisely, left to the
indefinite future; and they did so with very little more in the way
of established behavioural principles than those which were known to
Hull11. As a result, the neo-neobehaviourist programme was marked by
much looser use of typical learning-theory concepts than was character¬
istic of their use in the animal laboratory, to the extent that the
terms used often seemed to have little more than analogical or even
metaphorical significance, bollard's and Miller's Personality and
Psychotherapy (1950), Skinner's Science and Human Behavior (1953),
and Staats' and Staats* Complex Human Behavior (1963) nay he cited as
among the more fully developed attempts at such universalization of
very limited behaviourist theories. A more recent attempt in the same
vein, one that attempts to make a behaviourist translation of avowedly
mentalistic concepts, is Smith's Behavior and Conscious Experience
(1969; see Mackenzie, 1971, for critical comments).
Thus, consideration of consciousness and other 'higher'
processes was originally, and at times is still, cast in a loosely
behaviourist mold. The very looseness, however, facilitated the devel¬
opment of a diversity of viewpoints, some of which came to pay no more
than lip service to the behaviouristic presuppositions which were their
original basis, while otherwise proceeding quite independently. The
studies of Harlow (1953) and Berlyne (I960) on curiosity, and Harlow's
later research on love (1958, 1962), are examples of such divergent,
if still barely, behaviourist-style formulations. Others include the
classic studies of P. T. Young (1955, 1959) on the strong taste prefer¬
ences in rats, sufficient to lead to the abrupt reorganization of
major patterns of behaviour. Other research programmes became formally
opposed to the contents of theories identified as behaviourist, although
they continued to conduct their research according to the methodologi¬
cal precepts, and in terms of the theoretical variables, originally
devised out of and for behaviourist research. Spielberger's research
on awareness in verbal conditioning, mentioned above, is an example
of such work.
Finally however, this developing pluralism of research
orientations has come to facilitate consideration of higher processes
in quite an autonomous manner, with even in the major journals no
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more than a fleeting backwards glance at behaviourism. Thus,
Huttenlocher (1968) has proposed a model intended to account for
syllogistic reasoning, according to which subjects solve syllogistic
problems relating to class-inclusion by a three stage mental operation.
They first translate the syllogistic relationships into perceptual
ones (e.g., relations of larger-smaller); then form mental images
corresponding to the terms of the syllogism (e.g., images of beakers
or Venn diagrams); and finally order the mental images according to
their perceptual relationships. None of the mental operations between
receipt and solution of the problem are expressed behaviourally;
support for the theory is derived from predictions (which by and large
are confirmed) concerning the relative difficulty of different prob-
12
lems . As another example, Shallice (1972) has proposed a model of
consciousness and conscious processes that attempts to link phenomeno-
logical insights with computer-based information processing models of
cognition. Sperry (1969, 1970) has developed a model of consciousness
as an emergent and functionally significant gestalt property of neural
circuits. Perhaps most remarkable, because it represents a confluence
of several independent and well-developed research programmes, is a
symposium on the extent, dimensions, and functional significance of
mental imagery in children's learning, recently published in the
Psychological Bulletin. D.S. Palermo, one of the symposium partici¬
pants, emphasized the significance of the symposium as an indication
of changing priorities in experimental psychology.
Some fifteen years ago, when I was a year from completing
my graduate work...proposing a symposium on imagery at a
psychological convention might have been considered a
joke. Most hard-nosed experimental psychologists probably
would not oven have set aside their copies of Modern
learning theory.. .long enough to notice such a symposium
(Palermo, 1970, p. ^15).
2k.
II. The Significance of Behaviourism's Decline.
The Present Status of Behaviourism.
The trends discussed above jointly give a picture of a
science that has seen its systematic theories long since rejected or
abandoned, its methodological base seriously eroded, many of its
ablest practitioners lost to other fields or orientations, and its
hegemony over the practice of experimental psychology effectively
curtailed. So far, no attempt has been made here to make any original
criticisms of behaviourist psychology, because the concern has been
specifically to review the scope and influence of previous criticisms
and other trends that reflect on behaviourism's status. Behaviourism
can at present be judged fairly to have failed, for whatever reasons,
in its systematic attempt to develop a comprehensive, consistent, uni¬
fied, and workable psychology. Behaviourism is by no means dead of
course, but it is now what it has never before been since it achieved
its early prominence--merely one way of doing psychology among many
others, and no longer even the obviously most progressive, dynamic, or
important way. For an approach to psychology that was long proclaimed
to be the only scientific way of doing psychology, that was at least in
experimental psychology typically accepted as such, and that was often
considered in fact to be synonymous with scientific psychology—for
such an approach all of this marks a serious comedown. The comedown
is sufficiently serious that it can be taken to mark the end of behav¬
iourism as a systematically accepted rationale for experimental psycho¬
logy, the end, if one likes, of behaviourism as experimental psychology's
•paradigm' (although the term can only be used loosely; see Chapter 2).
The fact that there are still many behaviourist psychologists who are
still very active does not affect this conclusion. Behaviourism
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as a way to do psychology is, if in decline, still viable; behaviourism
as the way to do psychology is finished.
The fact that, in this sense at least, behaviourism is
finished, makes it possible for the first time to regard behaviourism
as a whole. That is, behaviourism can now be seen as one chapter in
the ongoing history of psychology, even if a chapter which is not
quite completed, rather than as the plan and goal for the entire story.
The main threads of that chapter, the outlines and climax of its plot,
can now be disentangled from their primary sources in the recent history
of psychology. Only the denouement of the chapter is not yet visible,
thereby placing one limitation on any attempt to characterize behaviourism
as a whole. Any such attempt must proceed on the assumption--which seems
a safe one but is inevitably subject to some risk—that the denouement
will not carry with it any great new achievements and consequent rebirths
of behaviourism that will require reinterpretation of the systematic
status of the whole movement.
What We Can Learn from Behaviourism's Decline.
It might seem to smack of indecent haste (to change the
metaphor) to attempt a dissection of behaviourism before the patient
has properly expired. But it is important that the attempt be made,
and preferably that it be made several times independently, before
psychology finishes moving on to whatever comes after behaviourism.
It is important because it is primarily through such attempts that the
systematic failure of behaviourism has the potential to provide speci¬
fic lessons for post-behaviourist psychology.
It is possible to make a number of general characterizations
of behaviourism and of the reasons for its decline, and at least some
of these will load to differential predictions for the future course of
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psychology. Furthermore, and more Important for actually determining
that future, they will lead to different choices of action on the
part of psychologists who accept them. As more and more psychologists
become disillusioned with whatever they see as the behaviourist ortho¬
doxy, their conception of what behaviourism is—that is, of what they
are reacting against—will be of considerable significance in influenc¬
ing what they will do next. This consideration applies not only or
even primarily to the relatively small number of disenchanted eminent
behaviourists who leave the fold. It applies even more to the large
number of young and presently unknown psychologists who have been ex¬
posed to a behaviourist orientation in their graduate training and early
professional careers, who are dissatisfied with behaviourism, and who
are looking for an alternative. Some of these psychologists will pre¬
sumably become eminent themselves in another ten to twenty years. The
choice of alternatives which they make, which will be in part founded
on what they see their choices as alternatives t£, will be a major
factor in determining the direction which psychology takes in the
future.
Already, it is possible to see some of the different courses
of action to which different conceptions of behaviourism have led.
These different alternatives are at present visible only in the actions
of the eminent former behaviourists discussed previously, and hence may
not be typical of those which will be adopted in the future. Neverthe¬
less, they clearly show the extont of differences which may occur.
?Coch (1969, 1971) believes that behaviourism is a fully dev¬
eloped scientific system, and that its lack of systematic success
should be taken as strong evidence against the possibility of develop¬
ing psychology as a viable systematic science of any persuasion. He
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recommends the removal of almost all constraints on theorizing oxcopt
for that of Gimplo rationality (although it is not always clear how
much or how little that minimal constraint would involve in Koch's
analysis), and the abandonment of the fiction that psychology is or
should be a single discipline. His own role is in part that of a
gadfly, bringing his philosophical and historical sophistication to
bear in the criticism of attempts to make psychology more than it can
reasonably hope to be.
Palermo (1970, 1971) sees behaviourism, and its decline, as
having somewhat more specific and limited significance. He maintains
that behaviourism is a limited set of theories and assumptions centred
on S-H and reinforcement models, and that most of these have been ren¬
dered untonable. He forecasts the emergence of a more "mentalistic
and rationalistic orientation (1970, p. ^16)" which will replace the
fading behaviourist one. However, he does not feel that this 'para¬
digm shift' limits the prospects for scientific psychology. On the
contrary, it is fully consistent with his analysis to interpret his
recent work on rule-governed learning (e.g., Palermo & Parrish, 1971)
as the beginning of his own contribution towards systematizing object¬
ive research in an emerging post-behaviourist tradition.
Mowrer's conception of behaviourism is more specific still.
He apparently feels that what is central to behaviourism is a denial
of the self-directcdness of behaviour, a denial that leads to an over¬
ly rigid dotorminism and a resulting unwarranted abrogation of person¬
al responsibility (e.g., Mowrer, 1972). His response, as described
above, is to v/age a rather lonely campaign directed at re-establishing
concepts indicative of personal responsibility (such as 'sin' and
'integrity') to a more central and respectable role in psychological
description and theory.
Each of these threo theorists agrees that there is a lesson
to be learned from the decline of behaviourism, and they are undoubt¬
edly right. Their work is directed to redressing what they each see as
the chief inadequacies in behaviourist psychology, and such pluralism
is certainly justified. Different modes and foci of inquiry are
appropriate in attempts to correct the various imbalances to which
behaviourism led, and it is no part of a critique of behaviourism to
suggest that everybody should do the same thing as an alternative to
behaviourism. Still, it would be most desirable if at loast the nega¬
tive lesson to bo learned from the failure of behaviourism were one on
which most psychologists could reach some agreement. That is, it would
be desirable if they could agree on whether there was something about
behaviourism in general which eventuated in its different, specific
inadequacies in different problem areas within psychology; and if so,
then what that general something was. This negative lesson is not
simply a subjective or personalistic one, and while it may certainly
be compatible v/ith a pluralistic post-behaviourist practice in psycho¬
logy—it would be of dubious utility if it were not—it can not be ex¬
pected to be derivable from ouch practice, kather, the lesson, if
indeed there is one, will have to be derived from detailed interpre¬
tive analyses of behaviourism's central systematic characteristics.
This point can be elaborated somewhat. It is at least
possible, and may be quite likely, that the failure of behaviourism to
issue in a comprehensive and workable psychology can be accounted for
in part on the basis of some few of its central characteristics. That
is, there may have been certain determinable features of behaviourism—
what Popper (19o3>) would in a constructive spirit describe as mistakes—
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that prevented it from achieving success consonant with its expecta¬
tions. If so, then it is worthwhile to try to discover what these
mistakes were, in order that they might be avoided in the future with¬
out implying a wholesale rejection of everything associated with be¬
haviourism. The goal of identifying and hopefully avoiding such mis¬
takes is sufficiently worthwhile that it justifies making attempts,
even if they are bound to bo premature, to understand the movement's
systematic character and limitations.
To recapitulate, different psychologists will inevitably draw
different morals, learn different lessons, from the decline of behav¬
iourism, and this is surely appropriate and desirable. But there may
be, in addition, a potential lesson to be learned from the decline of
behaviourism which can be of general use to the growing number of dis¬
enchanted behaviourist psychologists. If so, and if that lesson is to
contain more than (while perhaps including also) a reaction against
whatever about behaviourism has particularly displeased them, and a
legitimation of their alternate personal preferences, then it will
have to be based on frankly interpretive analyses of what it was about
behaviourism which prevented it from being fully successful.
These considerations have a particular application to, and a
particular cogency on account of, behaviourism's expressly and aggress¬
ively scientific character. Whatever else behaviourism was, it was
the most sustained attempt ever made to develop an explicitly and self¬
consciously 'scientific' psychology, along the lines of 'science' as
detailed in the most precise, comprehensive, and sophisticated formu¬
lations of the logic and methodology of science ever available. Never¬
theless, despite or—perhaps--evon in part bocauso of its forcefully
scientific orientation, it failod in its attempt to develop a consistent,
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unified, and workable psychology. Since we are still concerned to
develop a psychology that is in some meaningful sense scientific, it
is important to us to understand what it is about behaviourism that
led to its failure, and particularly, what relationship that failure
had to its scientific orientation.
There are several possible ways in which behaviourism's
'scientificness' might have been implicated in its failure. Did it
fail because psychology cannot, by its very nature, be a science? Or
was the conception of science implemented by behaviourism an erroneous
one, not really characteristic of science at all? Or was the conception
of science implemented by behaviourism appropriate only to some
sciences, such as physics, and inappropriate to others, such as psycho¬
logy? That is, are there perhaps fundamental differences between what
constitutes a science of the physical world and what constitutes a
science of mind or behaviour, with behaviourism ignoring these differ¬
ences to its peril? Or was there something left out so that despite
all the methodological trappings of science, behaviourism was not
really scientific at all? Or did it not really fail at all but, as
Palermo (1971) suggests, achieve all that could reasonably be expected
of it before it was replaced by a successor? These are all more or
less open questions and, especially in psychology's present transi¬
tional situation, worthy of consideration. They may not all admit of
a final answer, but it is clear that if one or another of the possi¬
bilities they point to should turn out to be the case, it would have
significant implications for what we can expect psychology to be like,
and what vie can expect it to amount to, in the future. In this way,
the systematic status of psychology as a science is itself brought
under scrutiny through a study of behaviourism's scientific career.
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The present essay does not attempt to answer all of these
questions, or to give a final answer to any of them. What it will do
is to examine the scientific character of behaviourism, and on the
basis of that examination develop an analysis of the foundations of
behaviourism. The analysis of the foundations will, in turn, hope¬
fully cast some light on the movement's rise to prominence and its
later disappointing decline.
Chapter 2
Two Views of Behaviourism
I. Behaviourism and Kuhnian Paradigms.
In reviewing a book that described cognition as S-R circuits
in the brain, Rychlak (quoted above, p. 19) concluded by offering best
wishes to the remaining drive reductionists and any others who continue
trying to implement a behaviourist conception of psychology. "But
where" he lamented "are our innovators? V/hen will our Kuhnian revolu¬
tion begin?"
According to Palermo (1970, 1971), that revolution has al¬
ready begun. Palermo analyses the recent history of psychology within
the framework of Kuhn's elegant treatise, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (Kuhn, 1962). Palermo does not accept Kuhn's claim that
since psychology and the rest of the social sciences are in a ' pre-
paradigm' stage of development, his (Kuhn's) analysis does not apply
to them1 . Instead, Palermo claims that psychology has already had two
paradigms, the Wundtian (or structuralist) and the behaviourist, with
a scientific revolution between them. Furthermore, he holds that the
behaviourist paradigm has been in a steadily mounting crisis state for
about twenty-five years, that this crisis state has engendered the be¬
ginnings of another scientific revolution in psychology, and that a new
paradigm based on Chomskyan psycholinguistics and described as "mental-
istic and rationalistic" seems the best bet to replace behaviourism and
become psychology's third paradigm. Palermo's analysis is an elegant
one, and while some tentative attempts have previously been made to
2
apply Kuhn's insights to psychology , Palermo's is the first full-scale
analysis of behaviourism based on Kuhn's thesis. In fact, Palermo's
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is one of the first detailed attempts of any sort to account for be¬
haviourism with the interpretive historiographic tools developed by
professional historians of science. For these reasons, his account
deserves respectful consideration. In addition, an examination of
Palermo's analysis and of the reactions to it will provide an excel¬
lent introduction to some of the critical and theoretical themes
central to this essay.
The Elements of Kuhn's Analysis.
The outlines of Kuhn's account of the development of science
are familiar and need not be recounted in detail, but the relation¬
ships between his central concepts—'paradigms', 'normal science',
'anomalies', 'crises', and 'revolutions'—should be briefly specified.
Furthermore, the concept of a 'paradigm', at least, needs to be brief¬
ly clarified.
'Paradigm' is the moot central and basic concept in Kuhn's
account . It is also the vaguest . The initial characterization of
paradigms given by Kuhn is that of "universally recognized scientific
achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a
community of practitioners (Kuhn, 1962, p. x)." Kuhn extends and ela¬
borates this characterization in discussing the embodiment of paradigms
in textbooks and classic scientific treatises. Such works
...served for a time implicitly to define the legitimate
problems and methods of a research field for succeeding
generations of practitioners. They were able to do so
because they shared two essential characteristics. Their
achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract
an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes
of scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was suffi¬
ciently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for
the redefined group of practitioners to resolve. Achieve¬
ments that share thcso two characteristics I 3hall hence¬
forth refer to as 'paradigms,' a term that relates close¬
ly to 'normal science.* By choosing it, I mean to suggest
that some acceptod examples of actual scientific practice
—examples which include law, theory, application, and
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instrumentation together—provide models from which
spring particular coherent traditions of scientific
research (ibid., p. 10).
Kuhn further stresses the character of paradigms as specific achieve¬
ments in emphasizing that "...the concrete scientific achievement, as
a locus of professional commitment, [is] prior to the various concepts,
laws, theories, and points of view that may be abstracted from it
(ibid., p. 11)."
The conception of a paradigm as an exemplary, concrete
scientific achievement may thus be taken as basic, but Kuhn goes on to
use the term in a range of varying, though related, ways at different
points in his argument. The varying usage serves to focus attention
not only on the scientific achievement itself but also on the general
effects upon and implications for the discipline which it justifies at
various removes from itself. Such effects are 'abstracted* from the
paradigm achievement by processes of loose implication or of direct
modelling. They include the codification of the achievement in text¬
books, the principles which the achievement adduces, the methods for
the study of nature which the achievement illustrates, and ultimately
the conceptual framework within which the problem field is subsequent¬
ly seen and interpreted as a result of repeated focusing on the
achievement's role as an exemplar for the further conduct of science.
All of these derived effects are at different points included by Kuhn
in the concept of a 'paradigm'"^.
The rest of Kuhn's central concepts are less problematic,
even if no less contentious. The paradigm, in the extended sense, or
the paradigm and its implications, determine the framework for the prac¬
tice of normal science. Normal or everyday scientific activity is a
process of extending the insights provided by the paradigm to cover the
rest of the field of inquiry. It consists largely in "an attempt to
force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the
paradigm supplies (ibid., p. 2.1+)." Restricting attention to those prob¬
lems and foci of inquiry suggested by the paradigm leads to two cen¬
tral characteristics of normal science. First is its specificity and
depth.
By focusing attention upon a small range of relatively
esoteric problems, the paradigm forces scientists to
investigate some part of nature in a detail and depth
that would otherwise be unimaginable.. .during the per¬
iod when the paradigm is successful, the profession
will have solved problems that its members could scarce¬
ly have imagined and would never have undertaken with¬
out commitment to the paradigm (ibid., pp. 21+-25).
Second is its character of puzzle-solving rather than of problem-
solving. Puzzles, unlike problems, have an assured solution, and a
more or less known set of procedures for obtaining the solution. The
theoretical and experimental investigations undertaken in normal science
are puzzles because their solution, and the appropriateness of the estab¬
lished procedures for obtaining their solution, are assured by their
relation to the paradigm; it is just such investigations, serving to
consolidate and extend the paradigm's insights, that are chosen for
study in a period of normal science. Since it is implicitly assumed
that correct answers are available, it is in effect taken to be the
scientist's ingenuity that leads to successful normal-scientific exper¬
imentation, and his lack of ingenuity that leads to failure. That is,
failure to achieve results consonant with the paradigm-derived expect¬
ations tends to reflect on the scientist rather than on the paradigm.
As contributions to the body of knowledge, failures are not taken as
seriously as are successes. In this way, the continuity of scientific
research can be maintained in the face of evidence that is prima facie
anomalous for the paradigm-dorived principles of the discipline.
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But normal science is not simply an exercise in self-
congratulation and self-deception. The paradigm serves to devalue
individual failures only so long as these are relatively isolated.
Eventually however, and precisely because of the depth and intensity
of normal-scientific research, the paradigm is extended as far as it
can fruitfully go. Thereafter, anomalous results and phenomena become
widespread, and are recognized as genuinely problematic because they
occur where the paradigm's guiding force should be most reliable, that
is in the investigations which are in the mainstream of normal science.
The recognition of the central significance of these anomalies provokes
a crisis in scientific research. In a period of crisis, attention is
focused on the anomalies. Attempts are made to fit them into the para¬
digm-based theory by patching up the latter with ad hoc additions.
Ad hoc additions to theory cannot command general allegiance however,
unless they lose their ad hoc character by being promulgated through¬
out the theory. In addition to patching up operations, therefore,
there are both attempts to account for the anomalies with whatever
conceptual schemes are available, and also searching critical examin¬
ation of the conceptual scheme associated with the paradigm. The para¬
digm itself comes to be severely questioned.
Finally, an important set of the anomalous problems is
accounted for by a new scientific achievement that has little contact
with the principles and concepts related to the old paradigm. This
achievement ushers in a scientific revolution, in which the old para¬
digm is overthrown and a new one replaces it. Insofar as the new
achievement accounts for important anomalies and also seems general
enough that it can account for many of the successes of the old paradigm,
and insofar as the crisis state of the discipline has relaxed adherence
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to the old paradigm sufficiently that scientists can consider alter¬
natives to it, to that extent the new achievement may be able to form
the next paradigm.
Once the new paradigm has become established, normal science
can begin once again. The field has become significantly different
however. The new paradigm achievement has its own implications for con¬
ceptual structure, problem selection, methodology, etc. In consequence,
there is never complete continuity or mutual comprehensibllity between
successive eras of normal science.
Palermo's Kuhnian Analysis of Psychology.
Palermo uses Kuhn's analysis to interpret the careers of
both Wundtian structuralism and behaviourism. As a basis for defini¬
tion of the concept of a paradigm, Palermo focuses on its secondary or
derivative usage, originally abstracted from the concept of a paradigm
as a concrete scientific achievement (see pp. 33-3A- above). This choice
of focus, as will be seen below, is crucial to his analysis; it dir¬
ects attention to the methodology and conceptual framework of a field
as primarily constitutive of the paradigm, rather than as derivative
of the initial exemplary achievement. Thus, in Palermo's formulation,
a paradigm is
...the consensually agreed upon modus operandi of a mature
scientific discipline. It consists of the conceptions of
the nature of the theory to be used in guiding research,
the types of problems worthy of investigation, the re¬
search methods appropriate to investigating those prob¬
lems, and even, on occasion, the instrumentation which
is required. These conceptions.. .determine the way in
which the world of that discipline is viewed, and make
it difficult for alternative conceptions to be considered
(Palermo, 1971, p. 136).
Wundtian structuralism, according to Palermo, was psycholo¬
gy's first paradigm, and thus marked the emergence of experimental
psychology as a mature science. Consistent with his interpretation
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of a paradigm as tho "modus operandi" of a science, Palermo sees
tho Introcpoctlvo method as central to the structuralist paradigm.
The introspective method in turn determined the scope of experimen¬
tal psychology, by excluding animals, children, and the insane from
study. The normal science associated with the Wundtian paradigm con¬
sisted in the detailed introspective experiments in the laboratories
of V/undt, Titchener, and their associates.
This structuralist paradigm entered a crisis state as a
result of the unreliability of the introspective method (i.e., the
lack of replicability of experimental findings across laboratories),
and tho inappropriateness of that method for the study of animal be¬
haviour, mental illness, and developmental and educational psychology
—all of considerable interest at the time, particularly to American
psychologists. It should be noted, however, that all of these factors
except the first are external to the structuralist paradigm. The
crisis engendered a revolution sparked off by Watson's (1913a) famous
polemic, "On psychology as the behaviorist views it", which abjured
the introspective method and the study of consciousness in favour of
objective methods for the study of observable behaviour. The revolu¬
tion ended with the general adoption throughout American psychology
of tho behaviourist method and orientation toward psychology.
As Palermo describes it, the behaviourist paradigm had five
main components, which together defined the common framework for the
practice of experimental psychology. The first was the choice of sub¬
ject matter and problems; the study of learning constituted the domin¬
ant subject matter of tho field, almost entirely through the methods
of classical and instrumental conditioning. Second was a concentra¬
tion on simple forms of behaviour as the experimental preliminary to
study of, and as tho actual basis for, more complex behaviour.
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The argument runs as follows: behaviour is learned;
the simplest form of learning is conditioning; all
other complex laws of learning derive from condit¬
ioning; once we know the basic laws pertaining to
simple conditioning, we will be able to study more
and more complex forms of behaviour which will in¬
volve the laws of conditioning related by various
composition rules; the composition rules will be de¬
termined once the simple laws are known (ibid., p. lifif).
Third was a related but less consistently applied emphasis on animal
studies, that is on the study of simpler organisms as a preliminary
to study of more complex ones, eventually including man. Fourth was
a commitment to a position of anti-emergentism.
The behaviour of human organisms was considered bas¬
ically no different from that of the chimpanzee, the
dog, or the rat. It was accepted that the behaviour
of these various species differs in complexity, but
not in terms of the basic underlying mechanisms
(ibid., p. 145).
Fifth was a commitment to a position of anti-nativism, or more
positively to environmentalism—a belief that hereditary influences
on behaviour were relatively unimportant and therefore that "Primary
attention should be directed towards the effects of environmental
factors in the determination of behaviour (ibid., p. li+5)."
Palermo briefly mentions two other characteristics of the
behaviourist paradigm which in part serve to sum up the five previous
ones. First is that behaviourism was an S-R psychology: "The laws of
behaviour were those which showed the relationships between variations
in stimulus input and variations in response output (ibid., p. li+6)."
Second, and as a result, any autonomous or stimulus-independent
character of the organism or of its behaviour could safely be minimized.
...the organism is a passive receiver of stimuli which
produce in a mechanical fashion, particular responses
determined by tho past history of the organism.. .The
concept of motivation provided for an active organism,
but tho particular actions wero determined by the sti¬
muli prosont and by the past learning of the organism
(ibid., p. 1^6).
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Palermo mentions only in passing the normal science trad¬
ition within behaviourism, but affirms that it exhibited the cumula¬
tive and progressive pattern described by Kuhn.
The theory of learning was elaborated from the simple
classical conditioning model from which it began. Sig¬
nificant variables were isolated and related in mathe¬
matical forms to characteristics of the response. The
theory was extended, at first gradually, to related
problems such as transposition and then, more broadly,
to new areas such as social behaviour and personality
(ibid., p. 1^-6 ).
But as could be expected, serious anomalies eventually be¬
gan to appear in the mainstream of behaviourist normal science. Pal¬
ermo cites as the first serious anomaly a study by Kuenne (19^6), in
which she found that the well-developed Hullian theory of trans¬
position could not account for significant parts of transposition
behaviour in human children. Theoretical attempts to resolve this
anomaly led to a good deal of subsequent research, but were of an in¬
creasingly ad hoc character and served to diminish the customary pre¬
cision of behaviourist theorizing. Additional anomalies soon began
to appear in diverse areas, in sufficient numbers that the paradigm
began to come apart at the seams. Palermo cites the research of Harlow
(19^9, 1953, 1958) on learning sets, curiosity, and love, of Gibson
(1969) on perceptual learning, of Bower (1967) on innate visual organ¬
ization in infants, of Olds (Olds & Milner, 195*f) on brain stimula¬
tion, of Rock (1957) and Estes (Estes, Hopkins, & Crothers, I960) on
one trial learning, and of many others as jointly causing psycholo¬
gists "to become disillusioned with the adequacy of the paradigm (ibid.,
p. 1^9)
However, Palermo feels that the most serious problems for
the behaviourist paradigm come from Chomskyan psycholinguistics.
Chomsky's work (e.g., Chomsky, 1957, 1965) first occasioned a revolu-
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tlon and paradigm shift within the already crisis-ridden field of
linguistics, "changing that science from the behaviourist paradigm
structured by Bloomfield to a rationalist approach with a transforma¬
tional generative theory applied to the newly defined subject matter
of that field (ibid., p. 151-152)." The implications of Chomsky's
work concern psychology as well as linguistics, and indeed Chomsky
feels that linguistics is properly a part, although by no means a sub¬
ordinate part, of psychology.
There are two features of Chomsky's work that are of part¬
icular relevance to and significance for psychology. The first, and
the more basic, is Chomsky's emphasis on the open-endedness or 'creati¬
vity' of language use. As one of Chomsky's expositors explains,
By this is meant the capacity that all native speakers
of a language have to produce and understand an inde¬
finitely large number of sentences that they have never
heard before, and which may indeed never have been
uttered before by anyone. The native speaker's 'creat¬
ive' command of his language, it should be noted, is
in normal circumstances unconscious and unreflecting.
He is generally unaware of applying any grammatical
rules or systematic principles of formation when he
constructs either new sentences or sentences he has
previously encountered. And yet the sentences that he
utters will generally be accepted by other native
speakers of the language as correct and will be under¬
stood by them (Lyons, 1970, pp. 2Z+-25).
Since the range of sentences generated in a language is open-ended in
this way, language use is not entirely under stimulus control. It
follows that, even in principle, "S-R analyses of language behaviour
can never adequately account for the acquisition and maintenance of
language (Palermo, 1971, p.152)." Thus, Chomsky's emphasis on the
creativity of language use both implies a severe critique of behav¬
iourist models of language, and indicates the kind of alternative,
less deterministic model which is necessary.
The second relevant feature of Chomsky's account stems
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from the general mentalistic features of the alternative model which
he provides. If it is accepted that language use cannot be accounted
for solely in terms of stimulus control, then an analysis of language
development and use must incorporate an analysis of the formal struc¬
tures within the organism which are responsible for such language
development and use. In this way, an analysis of language necessitates
an analysis of mind.
The endeavour of the linguist provides the abstract
characteristics of the mind of a person who speaks
the language. The characterization of the language
gives a characterization of the human who speaks
the language. A person who speaks and understands
the language in some sense knows the structure of
the language which makes it possible for him to
comprehend and use the language. It is in this
sense that Chomsky is mentalistic (ibid., p. 152).
Those characteristics of Chomsky's programme, Palermo
suggests, may make it suitable to become psychology's next paradigm.
They make contact with many of the points of greatest current dis¬
satisfaction with behaviourism—particularly with concern over the
appropriateness of S-R formulations, passive organism models, anti-
nativism, and anti-emergentism. It is an open question as to whether
Chomsky's approach will in fact find such widespread applicability,
but so far at least it seems to be the best candidate for a sorely
needed new paradigm in psychology.
Criticism of Palermo's Analysis.
Palermo's analysis makoc an impressive fit to many of the
events and trends associated with behaviourism, and thuG has at least
a strong prima facie plausibility. Nevertheless, it has received
sharp criticism in three articles, somewhat overlapping in their criti¬
cal content, by Warren (1971), Briskman (1972), and Mackenzie (1972).
All three maintain that behaviourism was not, or did not have, a para-
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digm, and that behaviourist research when it was dominant could not
be considered normal science in anything like Kuhn's sense. The
reasons for the objections were somewhat different, although in part
again complementary, and will be considered individually (the last
article listed will be covered in the next section).
Warren: behaviourism as school. Warren (1971) emphasizes
that behaviourism could be called a paradigm, if at all, only by
arbitrarily restricting attention to those parts of psychology in
which it was in fact dominant. Behaviourism, that is, succeeded only
where it was successful. Those parts of psychology in which behav¬
iourism was successful never comprised all of psychology, and can be
separated from the rest, Warren maintains, only by a process of post
hoc selection abetted by parochialism. Behaviourism never provided a
paradigm for Freud, Rorschach, Janet, or Jung; for Spearman, Binet, or
Piaget; for German dynamic psychology or Gestalt psychology: it
triumphed only in the U.S.A. Even there, behaviourism never became
promulgated throughout the whole of psychology. Gestalt psychology,
psychoanalysis, and most of clinical and factor analytic psychology
thrived in America independently of and frequently in opposition to
behaviourism. These psychological movements often disagreed violently
with behaviourism, and among themselves, about what problems psycho¬
logy should investigate, how they should be investigated, and in
general what was to count as a scientific explanation in psychology.
Insofar as a paradigm-based science has reached agreement on such fun¬
damental issues, then bohaviourism never provided a paradigm for all
of psychology. Warren concludes that the Kuhnian analysis most appro¬
priate to behaviourism and its competitors is that of competing schools
in the pre-paradigm stages of scientific development. This conclusion
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reflects Kuhn's own views, at least in his original treatise, on the
status of psychology in this century (see footnote 1 to this chapter).
While Warren's point is well taken, it is not clear how
much weight it should be given. The attitude of behaviourists
towards many other approaches in psychology was often, at its most
charitable, similar to Wundt's judgment of James* Principles: "It is
literature, it is beautiful, but it is not psychology (Steffens, 1931;
1958 ed., p. 124)." For the behaviourists, as for Wundt, real psycho¬
logy was scientific psychology. Non-behaviourist (like non-Wundtian)
approaches to psychology might have many virtues, but being scientific
was not usually one of them. Behaviourism was explicitly an attempt
to recast psychology along what its proponents regarded as rigorously
scientific lines. The fact that many persons who called themselves
psychologists chose not to join in the attempt does not itself mili¬
tate against behaviourism's paradigmatic status.
The achievement of paradigmatic status in a science, as Kuhn
describes it, serves to differentiate that science from its diffuse
background, not to assimilate the background completely into the new
orientation. For a science to be acknowledged as having a paradigm,
it is not necessary that overybody flock to the new banner. What is
necessary is simply that there be a new banner, that it stand for some¬
thing positive, and that an enduring group of scientists flock to it.
After all, in other fields besides psychology, philosophical and
variant empirical approaches continue to be operative even after a
dominant paradigm has been established. Such variant approaches how¬
ever, unlike one based on a paradigm, remain tied to their particular
Zf
foundations and do not make continual, cumulative progress .
Thus, the question of whether behaviourism is best regarded
as a paradigm—based science or as a school is not settled by the fact
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that there were many non-behaviourist psychologists. What is nec¬
essary instead is to examine the relationship between behaviourism
and the other approaches. When this is done, it is clear that behav¬
iourism was not merely one school among many, or even a primus inter
pares. Rather, behaviourism to a considerable extent established the
scientific standards, the level of aspiration, and the model of rig¬
orous scientific theories for all psychology that attempted to have
any scientific credibility (see Mackenzie & Mackenzie, 1974, for
elaboration of this point). Behaviourism's putatively paradigmatic
status, therefore, is not critically affected by the existence of non¬
adherents (although the scope of its paradigm is, as Palermo acknow¬
ledged). Questioning of that status must concentrate on the foundation
and tho scientific practice of behaviourism itself.
Brlskman: behaviourism as research programme. Briskman
(1972) shares some of Warren's reservations concerning the scope of
behaviourism, but focuses attention primarily on the characteristics
of behaviourism itself. Even within behaviourism, he argues, there
was nothing corresponding to a paradigm or to normal science. Brisk-
man maintains that the components of the behaviourist paradigm des-
scribed by Palermo (see pp. 38ff.above) were variously methodological
strictures and metaphysical beliefs. The methodological strictures
"specify how one ought to go about tho business of psychology; they
tell one, in rough outline, how one is to proceed (Briskman, 1972,
p. 91)." The metaphysical beliefs amount to "a faith that certain
types of theories will be capable of accounting for all behaviour,
from the simple to the complex, but [they are] certainly not powerful
enough to actually generate those theories (ibid., p. 91)." Since
the metaphysical beliefs were insufficiently powerful to generate any
*f6.
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specific theories , the theories eventually developed within behav¬
iourism were at wide variance with each other, and typically disa¬
greed over fundamental issues concerning what is learned and how
learning occurs. Much of behaviourist research in the period which
Palermo felt characterized behaviourist normal science was directed,
not to articulation of a paradigm (as in normal science), but to the
refutation or discrediting of rival theories. Thus, Briskman argues,
if behaviourism was a paradigm, it must have been in a crisis state
from the beginning. Briskman maintains that behaviourism is best con¬
sidered instead as a "methodological-cum-metaphysical research programme
(ibid., p. 92)"—a concept adapted from Lakatos' (1968, 1970) general
analysis of scientific progress—that has degenerated, or become less
informative or generally viable, as a result of repeated refutations
of specific behaviourist theories.
Briskman's point about the dubiousness of the status of be¬
haviourism's paradigm is a good one. Unless the criteria for attri¬
bution of a paradigm are explicated more clearly than they are by
Palermo, and unless the content of behaviourism's particular paradigm
is described more specifically, then it is difficult to decide whether
the characteristics of behaviourism as described by Palermo should be
related to a paradigm, a research programme, or something else again.
Furthermore, Briskman's contrast between typical behaviourist research
and Kuhnian normal science is an illuminating one. Even in the ab¬
sence of a clear definition of a 'paradigm', this contrast reveals a
difficulty in applying a Kuhnian analysis to psychology (both of these
points will be further developed below).
Unfortunately, Briskman's analysis has in some respects the
same weakness as Palermo's, in that he does not make clear the meaning
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of a 'paradigm' or of a 'research programme', or describe in suffi¬
cient detail the differences between them. He obviously regards the
two as significantly different, but does not systematically contrast
them to show where their differences lie. Indeed, on the basis of his
description alone, it is difficult to see just where they might lie.
Half of Briskman's research programmes consist of methodological
strictures, and Palermo explicitly regards methodological consider¬
ations as central to both the behaviourist and the structuralist
paradigms. The other half of his research programmes consist of meta¬
physical beliefs, and these, too, seem on most interpretations entire¬
ly compatible with the set of loose implications typically derived
g
from a paradigm . Metaphysical beliefs, for instance, make up one of
the three classes of use of the term 'paradigm' discovered by Master-
man (1970) in her textual analysis of Kuhn (cf. footnote 3 to this
chapter).
Briskman indicates at some points that his conception of
research programmes is intended to apply to all scientific activity,
as is certainly the case with the original from which his conception
is adapted. If so, then research programmes must constitute a general
alternative to Kuhnian paradigms as an account of the basis of science.
Otherwise, Briskman would be constrained to show why research programmes
and paradigms are significantly divergent in psychology but not else¬
where. Certainly, criticisms of and alternatives to Kuhn's account of
scientific activity are germane to an attempt to understand both the
history and the present practice of science. But Briskman does not
document his case for science in general, and gives no account of his
profferred alternative except in the context of behaviourism. In be¬
haviourism at least, he says, there was no paradigm; instead there was
a research programme. He does not explicitly consider whether there
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are paradigms anywhero, but implies at least that there are research
programmes everywhere in science.
As a result, it is "everywhere in science" that the validity
of the conception of research programmes needs to be assessed, and not
specifically in psychology. Briskman's error lies in presenting as an
alternative to Palermo an account which makes sense only as a general
alternative to Kuhn, while offering evidence for his account only with¬
in psychology, where in isolation it cannot be adequately assessed.
It cannot be adequately assessed there, partly because any such gen¬
eral conception needs to be tested in a wider context, but partly also
because the general question of the relative merits of paradigms and
research programmes in the rational reconstruction of science is not
entirely relevant here. Psychology is a special case, purposefully
not covered in Kuhn's original analysis, in which the question at
issue is precisely whether a Kuhnian analysis is as applicable as it
is to other sciences. Briskman does not address himself to this
question. His contention that a Kuhnian analysis is inapplicable to
psychology is based on a model of scientific advance which, if applied
consistently, would seek to show the insufficient applicability of a
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Kuhnian analysis everywhere . But Briskman presents no evidence for
the latter position, and even within psychology does not differentiate
his model sufficiently from the Kuhnian one that a clear choice can be
made between them.
II. Behaviourism and Methodological Objectivism.
Palermo and Briskman agree in principle that the same analy¬
sis can be applied to the development both of psychology and of the
natural sciences; their disagreement is over what that analysis should
be. By contrast, I would claim along with Kuhn (1962), although for
different reasons from his, that the development of psychology has
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been systematically different from that of the natural sciences, and
that the same analysis cannot therefore be applied to both. In this
section I will begin to develop an alternative historical and critical
analysis of behaviourism, one which I believe does greater justice to
the circumstances of its founding, the spirit of its most mature
formulations, and the pattern displayed in its decline. First, I will
explicate further the notion of a paradigm, and attempt to show how
the notion cannot profitably be applied to behaviourism. Next, I will
develop a 'low level' descriptive account of the objectivist frame¬
work which I hold served as the basis for behaviourism, and show how
the course of subsequent research based on this framework can be diff¬
erentiated from research based on a paradigm. This descriptive account
will serve as the basis for a 'higher level*, more strongly interpre¬
tive account of the foundations of behaviourism, which will be develop¬
ed in succeeding chapters.
The Content and Concreteness of Paradigms.
In an article (Mackenzie, 1972) that began with a short dis-
g
cussion of Palermo's position , I agreed that behaviourism was, in much
the way that Palermo describes, the dominant movement in American
experimental psychology. Since it had a clear and self-consciously
revolutionary beginning, and at least a certain amount of cohesiveness,
there is some apparent justice in attributing to it a Kuhnian paradigm.
However, while behaviourism displayed certain of the features normally
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derivative of a paradigm, it did not have the paradigm itself ; and
this lack rendered its subsequent development quite different from
the expected pattern of normal science.
The point to be made here was discussed very briefly in the
article referred to, where it received some criticism for its lack of
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clarity and detail. Therefore, it will be developed in more detail
here; it will require further consideration of the notion of a para¬
digm. In contrast to Palermo, I wish to focus attention on Kuhn's
initial meaning of 'paradigm' as a concrete scientific achievement,
and to show that this is a root meaning indispensable to any further
elaboration of the concept.
Whether one accepts that a paradigm must be based on a con¬
crete scientific achievement or not, it will not be denied that in
Kuhn's analysis each paradigm which he considered was in fact based on
such an achievement. Examination of the way in which such achievements
come to have the status of paradigms indicates that the concrete achieve¬
ment itself, including its specific content and its substantive signi¬
ficance in its historical context, is necessary to the composition of
a paradigm. Other bases for achieving a "consensually agreed upon
modus operandi" may certainly exist, but unless it was clearly shown
how they could have the same implications for the practice of science
as a paradigm would, they could not legitimately be assumed to do so.
When it is first advanced, the scientific achievement that
eventually becomes a paradigm is a major substantive contribution to
knowledge in the discipline in which it appears. Its initial import¬
ance is that it has solved a problem that was generally recognized
throughout the discipline as both important and intractable; it was
the existence of such generally recognized problems that put the
previous paradigm-based tradition into a crisis state. This 'paradigm
achievement' serves as the basis for a new scientific tradition by
stimulating the development of a new conceptual framework, a new set
of problems (or rather puzzles) to solve, a new methodology for solving
them, etc. The connection between all of these metascientific develop-
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ments is that they are all justifiable by reference to the paradigm
achievement in which they were, in preliminary form, first embodied
or suggested.
This point can be extended. A paradigm achievement is
initially advanced in the context of a period of crisis affecting the
previous paradigm-based tradition. Thus, the paradigm achievement is
both prior to and partly independent of the subsequent tradition which
it inaugurates. It is incorporated into that tradition as an exemplar,
but it makes sense, that is it can be examined and assessed as signi¬
ficant, outside of its subsequent incorporation. The context which
is necessary for recognition of the significance of the achievement
is a minimal one; it corresponds to the comparative anarchy of theore¬
tical and conceptual frameworks that is typical of scientific research
during a crisis state. While there are of course still standards for
the assessment of scientific achievements during a crisis, these
standards are not nearly so theory-dependent or paradigm-linked as
they are during a period of normal science. A major scientific achieve¬
ment accomplished during a period of crisis thus has greater generality
of application than does one accomplished within the context of normal
science.
The important point in this is that the substantive signifi¬
cance of the paradigm achievement is such that it can be recognized and
referred to as justification for later research based on it, indepen¬
dent of the standards for the conduct of such research subsequently
derived from the achievement itself. Normal science is justified by
its relation to the paradigm, but the paradigm achievement must be
capable of justification in some other way, that is, by criteria other
than those which it newly establishes. Thus, there are some standards
for evaluation of scientific work which are paradigm-independent, or
at least relatively so, and which come to be emphasized when the para¬
digm-derived standards are in question (cf. below, footnote 10). It
is for this reason that there is at least some continuity and cumula-
tiveness in science, even across revolutions. It is for the same
reason that Kuhn describee communication across revolutions as being
partial, rather than nonexistent (as some of his critics interpret
him to claim) or total (as some others might wish to claim).
To recapitulate, the paradigm achievement can be specified
and examined as existing distinct from the subsequent tradition which
incorporates it as an exemplar. It is independent of that tradition
both through its temporal priority and through its autonomous substan¬
tive merit1^. These two factors make the paradigm achievement able to
provide justification, based on its already demonstrated success, for
all of the developments in methodology, problem selection, and concep¬
tual framework that are abstracted from it. Conversely, in a new para¬
digm-based tradition, only thoso developments in methodology, etc.,
occur, which can be abstracted from and justified by reference to the
paradigm achievement.
These considerations make it clear that the content and the
substantive significance of the paradigm achievement are central to
the constitution of that achievement as a paradigm. The content of
the achievement is what stimulates and directs further scientific
activity, and provides the basis for consensus on what research is to
bo done and how. The substantive significance of the achievement is
what draws attention to the achievement and provides justification
for making it the basis for further practice. These two features—
direction and justification—comprise the functional significance
53.
of the paradigm in the course of science. It is on their account
that the postulation of 'paradigms' as the basis of science can be
claimed to be more informative about the process of scientific
activity than can the postulation of alternative, more general method¬
ological or epistemological conceptions, such as 'objectivity' or
'falsification'.
In short, the functional significance of a paradigm is
based upon its content and upon its substantive significance. It is
for this reason that I reject Palermo's characterization of a paradigm
as "the consensually agreed upon modus operandi of a mature scientific
discipline." Palermo affords the paradigm neither any defining sub¬
stantive content nor, following from this, any possibility of an inde¬
pendent directive influence over the tradition which supposedly makes
the paradigm the basis for its further practice. Instead, for Palermo
the paradigm functions only as embodied in the ongoing course of
scientific activity, in the form of what I have described as the devel¬
opments in methodology, problem selection, etc., stimulated and just¬
ified by it. Hence, for Palermo the paradigm itself reduces to an
abstraction from whatever pattern can be discerned in scientific
activity, and it is impossible to distinguish methodological and other
developments which are based on a paradigm from those based on some¬
thing else. Indeed, on Palermo's account there could be by definition
nothing else on which they were based. His conception of a paradigm
would allow any organized or systematic activity to claim a paradigm
as long as it has a "consensually agreed upon modus operandi."
This minimal version of a paradigm could not be assumed to have the
functional significance attributed to paradigms by both Palermo and
Kuhn. For that purpose a stronger version is required. Palermo's
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conception, for instance, would not make it possible to distinguish
between a mature, paradigm-based science, and one of a number of com¬
peting schools in the pre-paradigm stage of scientific development
(in Kuhn's thesis). It is certainly conceivable that something other
than a paradigm as concrete achievement could have a similar functional
significance, but any such alternative would require a detailed descrip¬
tion and demonstration which Palermo does not provide.
Palermo's restriction of his characterization of a paradigm
to "mature scientific disciplines" is of little help in limiting its
diffuse applicability, because he dees not give any independent criteria
of what constitutes a mature science. The term is taken from Kuhn's
treatise, but there Kuhn means by a mature science only a science that
displays the pattern of scientific activity associated with dependence
on a paradigm. This characterization of a mature science is trivial
if 'paradigm' is used in Palermo's sense, but not if used in Kuhn's
root sense of a major scientific achievement^ ^ .
In the stronger or more restricted sense in which I will
henceforth use the term then, a paradigm may be characterized as a major
scientific achievement that comes to serve as an exemplary source of
principles, concepts, methods, problems, and 'goggles' (or conceptual
frameworks) for practitioners in a scientific discipline. This char¬
acterization accords well with Kuhn's original basic use of the term,
and I have Indicated why this sense must be taken as fundamental. Mak¬
ing it explicit serves to eliminate, at least in the present context,
12
much of the ambiguity that has surrounded the notion of a paradigm
Methodological Objectivism as the Basis of Behaviourism.
Now, it is clear that behaviourism never had a paradigm in
this sense. That is, it was not based on or initiated by one or a
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linked set of scientific achievements of demonstrated and continuing
substantive significance for psychology. Instead, it was based on a
dissatisfaction with the way that psychology was being done by those
who still dominated the field, and on a promise that a new way of
doing things would bring important and scientifically respectable
results.
There are three publications or researches that can be taken
jointly as the foundation of behaviourism: Thorndike's early animal
researches, Pavlov's investigation of the conditioned reflex, and
Watson's polemical announcement. This is not to say that these three
provided a complete basis for behaviourism, but that insofar as be¬
haviourism was founded on specific achievements in psychology, these
were the ones. The first two provided the models for almost all be¬
haviourist experimentation on learning—the models of instrumental
(Thorndikian, operant) conditioning and classical (Pavlovian, respon¬
dent) conditioning. The last signalled the start of behaviourism as
a self-conscious movement. None of these three, however, constituted
a major and substantive scientific achievement, at least not for be¬
haviourism .
The qualification, "at least not for behaviourism", is im¬
portant. Both Thorndike's and Pavlov's early researches were address¬
ed to important questions in their respective fields and made some
progress in answering them. Thorndike (1898) attempted to demonstrate
that, in learning to escape from puzzle boxes, his subject animals
acquired their responses solely on a basis of trial and error. He
advanced the major substantive hypothesis that all learning might con¬
form to this pattern displayed by animals in his experimental situation,
that is that all learning might proceed by trial and error without any
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efficacious exercise of insight or conscious reflection. In pro¬
posing this hypothesis, he was setting himself explicitly in oppo¬
sition to the broadly cognitive hypothesis of Romanes (1882) and Lloyd
Morgan (18%). His use of puzzle boxes was a relevant and useful
method of experimentation precisely because of the new light which
it was able to throw on the contentious current issue which he was
investigating.
However, Thorndike's major hypothesis and the evidence on
which it was based—which might have constituted a paradigm in the
strong sense—did not in fact constitute an agreed upon basis for be¬
haviourism. On the contrary, it was the source of one of the most
intensive theoretical controversies for behaviourism. Lashley,
Krechevsky, and Tolman (to cite some of the major figures only) main¬
tained that some sort of insight or hypothesis testing or central re¬
presentation—these terms defined objectively of course—had to be
attributed to organisms in a learning situation in order to account
for their learning. Their position was almost the precise opposite of
Thorndike's, and was much the same position that Thorndike had been
attempting to discredit in its earlier less objective formulations
by Romanes and Lloyd Morgan. In contrast, Watson, Guthrie, Hull, and
Skinner agreed that no such attribution of insight, etc., was necessary
or relevant to an account of the learning process. They disagreed
among themselves otherwise, and Watson and Guthrie, at least, insisted
that 'trial and error* could no more serve as a first approximation
to a description of what went on in learning than could 'insight'. In
short, behaviouristic psychologists as a group never agreed on accept¬
ance of Thorndike's results and his systematic hypotheses as the basis
for their subsequent practice. What they did agree on, and almost all
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that they agreed on, was that Thorndike's use of puzzle boxes was a
good way to answer questions about animal behaviour. They agreed
that it was a good way, not primarily because Thorndike's experiment¬
al technique was finely suited to the problems which he was investi¬
gating, but because it was a reliable and objective method for the
study of behaviour. It is noteworthy that this agreement on the
worth of Thorndike's method persisted despite the fact that it never
proved sufficient to secure any agreement on the answers themselves.
The case with Pavlov is similar but even more pointed, for
the theory and the problems to which Pavlov's method was connected
never made a major entry to behaviourist psychology at all. Originally,
the conditioned reflex was discovered and used by Pavlov in the study
of digestive processes. Its properties were sufficiently remarkable
that Pavlov and his co-workers began to give it very serious consider¬
ation in its own right, and came to use it as the basis for study of
higher nervous activity (e.g., Pavlov 1927). The conditioned reflex
was not treated by them as a tool, separate from the problems which
it was used to investigate, but as a fundamental manifestation of
nervous excitation. In investigating the conditioned reflex, they
felt that they were necessarily investigating nervous activity. As
a result, for Russian workers use of the conditioned reflex was in¬
separable from Pavlov's theory of nervous excitation and inhibition.
This coalescence of Pavlovian theory and method, each dependent on
and supporting the other, has continued to be typical of Russian
psychology, in which a vigorous theoretical and experimental programme
is still extending Pavlovian theory to cover more and more aspects of
human behaviour. It is thus likely that a Kuhnian analysis could be
profitably applied to the development of Russian psychology after
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Pavlov, for Pavlov's early work would seem to constitute a paradigm,
and subsequent Russian psychology was certainly based on it1 .
By contrast, in behaviourist psychology, the only acknow¬
ledged and enduring merit of the conditioned reflex, which was never¬
theless sufficient to stimulate its widespread experimental use, was
that it was an objective method for the study of behaviour. The
Pavlovian theory of cortical excitation was regarded by most American
psychologists, and continues to be regarded, as either preposterous
or, at best, ill-founded. As with Thorndike's method of animal exper¬
imentation, the conditioned reflex received general approval predicated
almost solely upon its objectivity, and hardly at all upon its presumed
unique appropriateness for answering certain specific questions asked
in certain specific ways. The use and extension of Pavlov's method of
classical conditioning, like the use and extension of Thorndike's
method of instrumental conditioning, has been piecemeal, general, and
not closely related to a specific theoretical matrix.
Finally, Watson's polemic was not intended to advance serious¬
ly any specific hypotheses, nor even primarily to advance any specific
methods as appropriate for the study of then current problems. Rather,
its positive intent was to stipulate that psychology could and should
be exclusively the objective study of observable behaviour, to main¬
tain that a certain class of methods—those which were objective or
which abjured any form of mentalism—were the appropriate ones for
studying such behaviour, and to argue that psychology as so conceived
and practiced would become a successful scientific enterprise.
In summary, two of the founding achievements of behaviourism
had considerable substantive significance in their own context, but in
the form in which they were incorporated into behaviourism they were
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shorn of their content and adopted solely for their methodological
import, that is, for their objectivity. The third, Watson's polemic,
made little in the way of substantive claims at all but merely advanced
the cause of objectivity per se. Thus, none of these three achievements
answered any major questions—for behaviourism—or solved any longstand¬
ing problems in psychology—for behaviourism. Instead, they were taken
by behaviourist psychologists to proclaim that human and animal func¬
tioning could be understood in a particular way (the way of objective
experimentation), and to promise that the use of a properly objective
methodology would make psychology into a genuine science. It is for
this reason that Thomdike's and Pavlov's results were never of princ¬
iple importance; instead it was their techniques, and the methodologi¬
cal principles abstracted from their techniques, that were valued and
that became central. The revolution that produced behaviourism was a
methodological, or even a meta-methodological, revolution.
The foundation of behaviourism may thus be characterized at
least in part as methodological objectivism, that is, as the pursuit
of objectivity through the exclusive employment of methods which were
themselves known to be objective. This pursuit of and emphasis on
objectivity undoubtedly filled a need that was felt in American psych¬
ology at the time. As Boring explains it, "Psychology was all ready
for behaviourism.. .the times were ripe for more objectivity in psych¬
ology, and Watson was the agent of the times (Boring, 1950a, p. 6^2)."
But just what is this touchstone of 'objectivity' by which
experimental techniques were assessed? Why, when it was discovered
in them, did it suffice for their adoption independent of any regard
for the theoretical context in which they were developed and embedded?
These may seem like odd questions; surely 'objectivity', in a minimal
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sense that implies an absence of bias and a concern with observable
events, whatever they might be, is basic to any scientific enterprise.
And perhaps it is, but this minimal sense of •objectivity' does not
differentiate behaviourism from Wundtian structuralism. In this
minimal sense, the introspective method of V/undt and Titchener also
was, or was at least intended to be, thoroughly objective. Watson
acknowledged at least this intended character of Wundt's programme
in stating that "Wundt, the real father of experimental psychology,
unquestionably wanted in 1879 a scientific psychology (Watson, 1924;
1961 ed., p. 3)."
The introspective method was judged to be unreliable of
course, since results obtained with it were not always replicable at
different laboratories, and this unreliability provided justification
for rejecting it. Equally, the desire to use methods that had high
inter-experimenter reliability was a factor in the adoption of Pavlov's
and Thorndike's methods. However, the question of the objectivity of
these methods was not subordinate to the question of their reliabili¬
ty; instead the converse was true. Watson was quite clear that the
introspective method was unreliable because of the crippling flaws
inherent in it from the beginning. The lack of objectivity in that
method was not simply discovered as a consequence of its unreliability;
rather its unreliability might have been predicted in advance because
of its lack of objectivity. Again, when Watson first advocated use
of the conditioned reflex for the study of behaviour (Watson, 1916),
that method had been used in a few preliminary studies in Watson's own
laboratory, but otherwise had received almost no trials or applications
outoido of Pavlov's laboratory. It had thus not been shown to have
precisely that inter-experimenter reliability, the absence of which
was the ostensible justification for rejecting introspection. The
objectivity of Pavlov's method, nevertheless, provided a sufficient
guarantee that it would be reliable, and made experimental confirmation
1 k
of its reliability not really necessary
Obviously, therefore, the objectivity which behaviourism
required, and which it found in the methods of Thorndike and Pavlov,
was something other than or additional to the objectivity that was
supposed to be (even if it was not sufficiently) characteristic of
Wundt's method. The additional element lay, on the one hand, simply
in the rejection in principle of any concern with mental events, on
the basis that these were, by their very (alleged) nature, impossible
to investigate objectively. The failure of the introspective method
was due simply to the fact that it was attempting to investigate some¬
thing that could not be investigated. Thus, Watson characterized
introspection and its downfall as follows:
[Wundt] grew up in the midst of a dualistic philoso¬
phy of the most pronounced type. He could not see
his way clear to a solution of the mind-body prob¬
lem. His psychology, which has reigned supreme to
the present day, is necessarily a compromise. He
substituted the term consciousness for the term
soul. Consciousness is not quite so unobservable
as soul. We observe it by peeking in suddenly and
catching it unawares as it were (introspection)...
In 1912 the objective psychologists or behaviorists
reached the conclusion that they could no longer be
content to work with Wundt's formulations. They
felt that the 30 odd barren years since the estab¬
lishment of Wundt's laboratory had proved conclus¬
ively that the so-called introspective psychology
of Germany was founded upon wrong hypotheses—that
no psychology which included the religious mind-
body problem could ever arrive at verifiable conclu¬
sions (Watson, 192^; 1961 ed., pp. 3-5).
Both points are brought out clearly in this quotation: that Wundt's
programme was scientifically sterile from the beginning, and that its
sterility was a necessary result of its concentration on mind and con¬
sciousness .
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The objectivity which behaviourism sought was thus one
which from the beginning excluded the mental from the domain of
science, and did so independent of purely evidential considerations.
This a priori character of the exclusion of the mental is sufficient¬
ly indicated both by the explanation given to the failure of intro-
spectionism and by the reception afforded to Pavlov's method. The
demonstration is reinforced, furthermore, by consideration of the
specific issues which, more than anything else, are taken to have
sparked off the behaviourist decision to repudiate introspection in
general as both unreliable and untenable.
The most important of these issues was the 'imageless thought'
controversy raging between Wundt's school and the Wurzburg school.
This controversy, over whether or not thought could in principle be
reduced to trains of images, occasioned a large amount of contradictory
research and polemic on both sides. The dispute was never resolved
altogether, although the Wurzburgers had somewhat the better of it.
The dominant reaction to the controversy among American psychologists,
at least those not involved in it, was that if the introspective
method could not even begin to settle so apparently basic a question
as to whether or not thought is made of images, then what good was it?
The answer seemed plainly to be, not much. Boring writes that shortly
before behaviourism was launched, "Watson had just seen introspection
fail at Wurzburg—that is what most Americans in 1910 thought had
happened there (Boring, 1950a, p. 642)."
However, the introspective method used at Wurzburg was very
different from the one used in Wundt's laboratory; the two were rela¬
ted to quite different theories of mental functioning. That the re¬
sults obtained with the two methods wore not identical was no more a
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methodological failure of introspectionisra than the inability to ob¬
tain many responses equally well with both classical and instrumental
conditioning is a methodological failure of behaviourism. Furthermore,
the Y/urzburg results were not merely the (possibly artifactual) pro¬
duct of a single laboratory. The imageless thought hypothesis was
independently confirmed by Binet in France, Bovet in Switzerland, and
Woodworth in America. The findings from Titchener's laboratory,
against imageless thought, might however have been artifactual in this
sense, as they were never independently confirmed at another labora¬
tory (Wundt never performed any Wurzburg-type experiments)1^.
This is not to underplay the importance of the imageless
thought controversy. The dispute between the Wundtians and the Wurz-
burgers was a very major theoretical and experimental problem for both
of them, and had it been resolved would probably have led to a serious
modification of one or both methods and theories. But the dispute did
not constitute a methodological failure generally of all introspective
methods, at least not for introspectionists, including those who were
uncommitted in the controversy. It could be seen as a general failure
only by those who were already prepared to repudiate introspection
on other grounds. The two introspectionist methods could be treated
as equivalent, and their divergent results attributed to the unrelia¬
bility of introspection in general, only by treating the differences
between tho two methods as insignificant; and that in turn could be
done only by contrasting both methods indifferently with an already
favourod alternative conception of scientific observation in which
introspection of any sort is excluded from the beginning. In short,
interpretation of the imageless thought controversy as showing the
unreliability of 'the' introspective method, or of all of them, was
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possible only within a framework which was already more narrowly
objectivist or proto-behaviourist.
Neither, it may be worth mentioning, can the rejection of
the mental be justified as some sort of extreme but inevitable reaction
to a rigid introspectionist orthodoxy, as the only way in which 'ob¬
jective'—non-introspective—methods could gain any hearing at all.
Introductory students sometimes gain the erroneous impression that the
behaviourist revolution was necessary in order newly to establish non-
introspective methods as permissible and appropriate in psychology;
and they are not totally corrected of their error if they read Watson's
own statements on the subject. In fact there was a wide diversity of
methods in use in experimental psychology—particularly but not solely
in human experimental psychology—before 1913; introspective and non-
introspective methods of investigation were employed, side by side
and independently, with greater flexibility and tolerance than has
been characteristic of psychology since that date. Woodworth (1931),
who was himself very active in the period, addresses himself to the
question of the amount of objective or non-introspective research
carried out before 1913. Prior to that date
...there had been a large amount of objective experimental
work by those who were interested in what I have been call¬
ing the psychology of performance. Watson alludes to some of
it [1914] .. .when he speaks of experimental pedagogy, the
psychology of tests, etc. He leaves the impression that all
such objective work was very recent, as well as being par¬
tially vitiated by introspection. Tests, completely object¬
ive and free from introspection, go back to Galton in about
1880. Objective study of the learning process was active
in the nineties, and may be dated back to Ebbinghaus's
celebrated study of memory in 1885, a purely objective study.
But even Galton and Ebbinghaus are not entitled to rank as
the originators of objective psychology, for still further
back we find the purely objective beginnings of work on re¬
action time; and much of the work on sense perception,
carried on by the method of impression, can perfectly well
be considered as an objective study of an individual's
accuracy of observation. Thus the objective method was in
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use from the very beginnings of experimental psychology,
and the amount of research carried on by this method, up
to 1900 or 1912, was very large indeed. As we saw before
psychology was not at all limited in practice to the
study of experience. The study of performance was in
full swing, and even those psychologists who made great
use of introspection, like Muller and Kiilpe, used it
largely for the light it threw on performance (Woodworth,
1931, p. if8).
During this period there were, of course, a great number of experi¬
ments carried out with introspective methods that might better have
been conducted with non-introspective ones. The point is merely
that non-introspective methods were firmly enough established in
psychology that there was little in the way of entrenched social
forces that could have been expected to prevent their further system¬
atic application.
Again, therefore, behaviourism's initial and central rejec¬
tion of the mental and exclusive concentration on objectivity cannot
legitimately be justified, as they are often purported to be, by
reference to the state of introspective psychology of the time—as
being of demonstrated scientific worthlessness or as exercising an
oppressive scientific hegemony. The behaviourist stance was taken
largely in self-conscious opposition to introspective psychology of
course, but not in response to the inadequacies of the latter. In¬
stead, the factors responsible for the emergence of behaviourism were,
as we shall see in Chapter *f, unrelated to most of the career of
introspective psychology, and totally unrelated to the problems intro¬
spective psychology was facing at the time.
The negative characterization of behaviourism's brand of
objectivity, that it was in principle anti-mentalistic, is an obvious
and familiar point, even a trivial one. What is not so trivial is the
demonstration that the 'principles' involved, and the grounds for the
66.
adoption of an anti-mentalism, were a priori ones; or at least ones
not dictated by experimental evidence. To sum up the point once
more: 'objective psychologists' rejected introspectionism because they
were anti-mentalistic; they did not become anti-mentalistic on the
basis of having had to reject introspectionism.
The converse of the rejection of mentalism, and the affirma¬
tive side of behaviourism's quest for objectivity, was the acceptance
of a loose 'physicalism'. Behaviourism's methodological objectivism
was of a sort that related the methods and scope of psychology to
those characteristic of the natural sciences. Wundt's distinction
(also accepted by Titchener) between 'mediate experience' and 'immediate
experience* an the basis for demarcation between physics and psychology
was to be abolished1The same logical methods, the same observa¬
tional techniques, the same standards of evidence, and the same
criteria of validity were to apply to psychology as to physics. Hence,
the kinds of things that psychology was to study were to be at the
most general level the same kinds of things as physics studied—bodies
in motion. Applying this precept to psychology dictated a restriction
of concern to publically observable behaviour. Thus, that behaviour
alone is the proper subject matter for psychology was indicated by the
example of successful sciences as well as by the example of what was
defined as an unsuccessful one, Wundtian structuralism.
The insistence that the canons of science for psychology were
to be the same as, and where necessary taken over from, those of the
natural sciences was a feature of behaviourism from the beginning. As
Watson put it, the behaviourists
decided either to give up psychology or else to make
it a natural science. They saw their brother-scientists
making progress in medicine, in chemistry, in physics.
Every new discovery in those fields was of prime im-
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portance; every new element isolated in one laboratory
could be isolated in some other laboratory; each new
element was immediately taken up in the warp and woof
of science as a whole. One need only mention wireless,
radium, insulin, thyroxin, to verify this. Elements so
isolated and methods so formulated immediately began
to function in human achievement (Watson, 192ifj 1961
ed., p. 5) .
The behaviorist asks: Why don't we make what we can
observe the real field of psychology? Let us limit our¬
selves to things that can be observed, and formulate
laws concerning only those things...You will find,
then, the behaviorist working like any other scientist.
His sole object is to gather facts about behavior-
verify his data—subject them both to logic and to
mathematics (the tools of every scientist) (ibid.,
p . 6 .).
It may never make a pretense of being a system. Indeed
systems in every scientific field are out of date. We
collect our facts from observation. Now and then we
select a group of facts and draw certain general con¬
clusions about them. In a few years as new experiment¬
al data are gathered by better methods, even these
tentative general conclusions have to be modified.
Every scientific field, zoology, physiology, chemistry
and physics, is more or less in a state of flux. Ex¬
perimental technique, the accumulation of facts by
that technique, occasional tentative consolidation of
these facts into a theory or an hypothesis describe
our procedure in science. Judged upon this basis, be¬
haviorism is a true natural science (ibid., p. 18-19).
The tendency toward aggressive self-assimilation into the
natural sciences remained much the same as behaviourism developed.
Weiss (1925) went considerably farther even than did Watson, in a
surprisingly detailed and sophisticated attempt to show that both the
methods and the content of psychology could be formulated in terms
appropriate to atomic physics. Eschewing Weiss' reductionism, Skinner
was the first psychologist to concern himself with the recasting of
psychology according to Bridgman's operationist principles (in 1929;
see Skinner, 19/+5). Hull chose detailed examples from the history of
physics and astronomy to provide illustrative examples of how science
should be carried out (e.g., Hull, 1939).
It is relevant to note that the adoption of a natural-
science based orientation in behaviourism was itself, strictly speak-
ing, a priori, just as was the rejection of mentalism; although the
former provided much of the basis for the latter. The rejection of
mentalism was justified by appeal to the practices of physics, but
the appropriateness of these practices for comprising the entire basis
for psychology had by no means been demonstrated at the time when they
were first advocated. However, the general validity of basing psycho¬
logy in some way on the natural sciences, and particularly on physics,
was an assumption that had rarely been questioned in any kind of empir¬
ically oriented psychology, or more generally in any which had claims
to being scientific. Behaviourism, in searching for a lead from the
natural sciences, was at least in this respect only following a
respected tradition.
The Contentual Pluralism of Behaviourist Research.
The foundation of behaviourism, then, was an anti-mentalist
methodological objectivism adopted largely on a priori grounds. Just
what these grounds were will be discussed in detail in the following
chapters. By way of preview they may be briefly mentioned here. The
first, already partly discussed, involved the tendency endemic to
psychology at least since Locke, to attempt to base psychology on the
methods and models of the physical sciences; the advent of behaviourism
was signalled by a new turn in this longstanding trend. The second
was an entirely legitimate dissatisfaction with the way in which intro¬
spective psychology was closely associated with comparative psychology,
a dissatisfaction that might have led quite reasonably to a separation
of the two .
It remains to consider the character of the research based
on the objectivist foundation of behaviourism. It should be kept in
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mind that what differentiates the foundation of behaviourism from a
paradigm is not merely that it was a priori, but that it was method¬
ological and non-specific. The faith in the power of an objective
methodology was not closely tied to any concrete achievement in psycho¬
logy, nor even to a particular methodology. The faith was a general
one, repeatedly affirmed on the basis of the promise which it issued
for future success, and justified by appeal to other 'objective'
sciences which were already successful. Keeping the faith, therefore,
was fully compatible with the development of numerous diverse formu¬
lations of the scope, methods, and theoretical orientation most
appropriate to psychology, with the different viewpoints connected by
little more than their anti-mentalism and their pursuit of objectivity.
And indeed, in just such a way did behaviourism develop. What was most
vigorously 'articulated' in behaviourist research was this very object¬
ivism, through the development of a multiplicity of methods and models
for investigating behaviour in the newly objective manner.
There were two factors which were responsible for that degree
of cohesiveness which existed in behaviourist research and theory. The
first was the agreement on objectivism itself, an objectivism which had
as its central tenet the repudiation of unobservable internal agents
or substances. It implied, therefore, at the very least a severe
distrust of alleged internal influences on behaviour. A partial excep¬
tion could be made for physiological internal factors, since these
were both physical and, in consequence, observable in principle. Even
so, the fact that such physiological factors were usually not obser¬
vable in practice precluded the attainment of any unanimity on the
value of implicating them in psychological theories. Physiological
references wore admissible in behaviourist theories, but were not
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crucial. Other internal factors received considerably shorter shrift.
Instincts, desires, expectations, affects, etc., were afforded little
credence unless they were reduced entirely to either physiological or
behavioural measures.
The other factor accounting for some cohesiveness in behav¬
iourist research was its continuity with pre-behaviourist animal
psychology. That psychology, in both Britain and America, was based
largely on Darwinism evolutionary theory, and was concerned with the
adaptive capacities of behaviour as a reaction to changing external
circumstances. While behaviourism gradually cast off almost all
traces of a Darwinian orientation (see Chapter 4), the tradition of
experimentation on animal learning was sufficiently well developed
to continue as viable. Indeed, it was in the context of this tradi¬
tion that the demand for greater objectivity emerged. This continuity
was largely responsible for the original channelling of interest into
problems of learning; smd conversely, experimentation on learning was
the context most suited to the newly defined or refined requirements
of objectivity.
Within the limitations produced by these two factors, which
were not very restrictive at least as far as the content of theories
was concerned, behaviourist theories developed in wide divergence and
often in basic conflict with each other. Watson's original programme
was mechanistic, elementaristic, associationistic, peripheralistic,
environmentalistic—and correspondingly anti-teleological, anti-
purposive, anti-nativist, and anti-emergent. None of these features
received full assent from later behaviourists.
Tolman's re-introduction of purpose into behaviourism took
place only six years after Watson began promoting conditioning
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principles (Tolman, 1922). In his fuller theory, Tolman (1932)
continued to abjure mentalism as such, but made free use of cognitive
concepts such as expectancy. In doing so, he repudiated elementarism
by insisting on tho primacy and irreducibility of molar behaviour,
and minimized the implication of asoociationistic and mechanistic
linkages between stimuli and responses by stressing the organism's
selective control over its environment. Krechevsky, who studied
under Tolman, continued in a similar vein, hypothesizing hypotheses
in rats (e.g., Krechevsky, 1932). The theoretical concepts intro¬
duced by Tolman and Krechevsky were not formally mentalistic ones,
despite their appearance, because they were classed strictly as inter¬
vening variables, with no assumed functional significance or existence
1 7
apart from that which they openly displayod in behaviour . Neverthe-
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less, or rather as a result , emphasis on such concepts made a break
with the mechanistic features of Watson's programme inevitable.
Watson's peripheralism—which was, it is true, never un¬
ambiguously formulated—was shown to be wholly untenable by Cannon, in
his The Wisdom of the Body (1932), a work which gave the conception of
homeostatic mechanisms a wide currency among psychologists, and there¬
by re-introduced the inside of the body into psychology in the same
year in which many felt that Tolman had re-introduced the mind. Hull
made a detailed attorapt to ground all of his major theoretical post¬
ulates in physiological mechanisms (e.g., Hull, 19h3), an attempt
later shelved by his student and colleague Spence (1950). Spence
also hedged hie bets, at least, with regard to the question of anti-
1 9
emergentism, particularly as related to human language behavxour
Hull also accepted, with reservations, Tolman's emphasis on
the molar characteristics of behaviour, and postulated mechanisms to
72.
account for the teleological and purposive features of behaviour
(these, however, did not constitute an admission of purpose as such,
but were rather an attempt at an experimentally based translation of
•subjective' concepts into mechanistic 'objective* ones). In addition,
Hull (19^3) postulated a fairly long list of inborn drives, including
drives for hunger, thirst, maternal behaviour, air, pain avoidance,
maintenance of body temperature, defecation, micturition, rest, sleep,
and activity, and judged that additional ones might well prove necess¬
ary. While not all of these drives played a major part in Hull's
theory, the inclusion of all of them served to weaken considerably
the presumptions of anti-nativism and environmentalism. His activity
drive, in particular, foreshadowed the curiosity and exploratory drives
which, because of their implications for behavioural autonomy, later
became a major embarrassment to drive-reduction varieties of behaviour¬
ism .
20
Elementarism, environmentalism, 'mechanicism' , and the
rest: the significance of theso features was not just that they were
included in Watson's position, but that they continued to be implicated
in the popular (and even the professional) stereotype of behaviourism.
The significance of their modification or tacit dismissal by later be¬
haviourists was not just that it happened, but a) that it happened
relatively easily, with no 'agonizing reappraisals* concerning their
validity, and b) that different behaviourist psychologists chose
altogether different theoretical features to retain, change, drop, or
newly invent. Specific content was no more a defining characteristic
of behaviourism's theories than it was of behaviourism's foundation.
Corresponding to the two sources of cohesiveness in behaviour¬
ist theories, the defining characteristics of behaviourism described
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by Palermo (1971; see pp. 38-40 above) can be grouped into three
classes—those determined by the rejection of the mental and other
hypothetical internal factors; those derived from the continuity
of behaviourist research with pre-behaviourist animal psychology;
and those not in fact accepted by all of the major behaviourist
theorists. Continuity with the earlier tradition in which behaviour¬
ism had its beginnings was responsible for the original emphasis on
problems of learning and for the use of animal subjects. The demand
for objectivity justified the pro tern concentration on relatively
simple behaviour and the general distaste for emergent and nativistic
factors in behaviourist theories (it is significant that these latter
two were somewhat qualified by Hull and Spence). Finally, adherence
to S-R formulations was rejected, and the 'passive organism' model
was severely weakened, by Tolman and by those who followed his lead.
Nevertheless, most of the major figures associated with
behaviourism—-Guthrie, Hull, Krechevsky, Lashley, Miller, Skinner,
Spence, etc.—continued to regard themselves as behaviourists, and
felt that there was a definite continuity in behaviourist research.
The question that arises is, are the divergent theoretical positions
which they established sufficiently similar that they can profitably
be viewed as various programmes in behaviourist normal science? But
although this question is an obvious one, it cannot be given an un¬
equivocal answer. It is to some extent an ambiguous matter, just
how much cohecivonecs is necessary for a scientific tradition to be
considered as normal science. This is particularly the case when,
as implied by the question just asked, •cohesiveness' is assessed in
terms of the similarity of theoretical positions and presuppositions,
indenendent of the use to which these positions were put. Behaviour-
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ist psychologists in general shared a common conception of objectivi¬
ty, an emphasis on problems of learning, and a willingness to investi¬
gate these problems with animal and human subjects indifferently.
They did not share any agreement on what is learned, how it is learned,
or what class of theoretical conceptions (e.g., teleological, mechanis¬
tic) were most appropriate to account for the learning. Should greater
emphasis be placed on what united behaviourists or on what divided
them?
For some purposes, to do with determining just what it was
that made behaviourism a recognizable orientation, it is obviously
proper to emphasize what united them. But for others, and particularly
for assessing the degree to which behaviourist research can be des¬
cribed as normal science, it is proper to emphasize what divided them,
for the following reasons. Normal science, as Kuhn describes it, is
such that it can be almost entirely cumulative. It consists in build¬
ing up the body of science by accretion, by adding more and more bits
to what is regarded as the common store of knowledge. While different
normal scientists may disagree on particular theoretical matters,
they agree on what they regard as fundamental and background matters.
The issues on which they agree comprise the bulk of what they see as
their science, and are always their starting point in conducting
further research.
By contrast, behaviourism never included an agreed upon body
of background knowledge in this sense. The various behaviourist
theories each commenced with definitions of the subject matter of
psychology, with statements of the classes of problems to be consider¬
ed, and with an indication of how these problems were going to be
approached. The whole scientific matrix was built from the ground up
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each time. As a result, the theories advanced by different behav¬
iourist psychologists were not merely different, they were also—for
their proponents, who comprise the context in which it matters—
fundamentally different.
While behaviourist theories of learning had some common
ground, as described above, it was not their similarities that served
as the basis for experimentation and theoretical development so much
as their differences. The answers to questions such as: What is
learned? (responses, S-R associations, expectations, relationships);
How is it learned? (reinforcement, contiguity, confirmation); What if
anything is reinforcement? (drive reduction, tissue need satisfaction,
change in the stimulus array, a particular kind of stimulus, a parti¬
cular kind of response)—these and a number of other contentious
issues defined the principal differences between the major behaviour¬
ist theories. They also determined the course and direction of most
behaviourist research. Each theory had answers to these questions,
and a major part of the theoretical and experimental work performed by
the proponents of each theory constituted an attempt to show that
their theory's answers were right and that a competing theory's answers
were wrong. The attempt to do in a rival, or to avoid being done in,
was often the principal factor behind the introduction of new apparatus
(e.g., the Lashley jumping stand), the demonstration of new experimen¬
tal phenomena (e.g., sensory preconditioning, the reward values of
saccharin), and modifications to existing theory (e.g., Hull's rQ,
Tolman's 'motor pattern' learning). None of this is characteristic
of normal science.
It in certainly true, nevertheless, that many behaviourists
performed minute and intricato experiments specifically in order to
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fill in the details in an accepted theoretical schema, and hence
acted in a way unquestionably typical of normal science. The way in
which they did this, however, reveals differences from paradigm-based
normal science that are as instructive as are the similarities. The
context in which any behaviourist psychologists were able to work in
this way, and the background which they could take as established,
were specific to the particular theoretical tradition within behav¬
iourism (e.g., Hullian or Tolmanian) with which they were affiliated;
they were not ones shared by all or even by most behaviourists. There
was something like normal science going on in behaviourist psychology,
but it was Hullian normal science, Tolmanian normal science, Guthrian
and Skinnerian normal science—all of them different—and not simply
behaviourist normal science. Similarly, there was something like a
paradigm directing research in each of these mini-traditions, but it
was a Hullian paradigm, a Tolmanian paradigm, etc., and not simply a
behaviourist paradigm.
The difference is an important one. Since each group of
behaviourist practitioners—whom we may loosely designate as a school-
had to build up their science from its theoretical foundations, and
spent much of their scientific energy in inter-school rivalry, the
practice of behaviourist psychology never became genuinely cumulative.
No theory was able to progress with any degree of scientific certainty
very far beyond its particular laboratory base . Each was prevented
from doing so, first by the existence of the others as serious rivals
and hence as foci of attention; and also by the consideration that
made the multiplicity of schools possible, that is, the absence of a
major scientific achievement that they could or would jointly accept
as providing the basis on which to build their theories. Instead,
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each theory, consistent with Kuhn's description of a pre-paradigm
school, handled a certain class of problems particularly well. Tol-
man's theory was most suited to accounting for the determinants of
behaviour at a choice point; Hull's to relating response strength to
drive level and to the interrelationships between drives in a single-
response experimental situation; Guthrie's to accounting for changes
in behaviour as a function of arbitrary changes in the stimulus array;
Skinner's to controlling the detailed topography of isolated responses
of any desired degree of complexity.
Extensions of the theories were often directed towards
accommodating some of the phenomena emphasized by a competing theory;
Palermo's example, the extension of Hullian theory to cover transposi¬
tion behaviour, was of this sort. Such kinds of extension were appro¬
priate to the competitive scientific climate of the times, but made
problem selection a relatively ad hoc procedure. More general exten¬
sions of theory to complex human behaviour—the ostensible goal of
most behaviourist theories—were typically not genuine extensions of
theory at all, but schematic applications, often resting heavily on
analogy, of existing theoretical concepts to the description of social
situations. As Koch points out (Koch, 196^; cf. p. 20, above), such
•extensions', far from being stimulated by an appreciation that the
experimentally based theories were sufficiently far advanced to deal
with extra-laboratory behaviour, were rather prodded by the realization
that such theories had in their laboratory context made no significant
progress in approaching such real situations. As a result, the later
theoretical extensions arising from more fully matured behaviourist
theories (e.g., Dollard & Miller, 1950; Skinner, 1953, 1971) have been
as programmatic and unspecific as were the recognizably premature but
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optimistic earlier ones (e.g., Dollard et al., 1939).
In short, the plurality of schools, and the resulting
necessity for each to address much of its research to the others,
defined a situation in which long range, unidirectional, cumulative
development was impossible. Behaviourism as a whole never possessed
the unanimity of outlook necessary for the practice of normal science,
and the individual schools within behaviourism were never sufficiently
free of serious external challenges to devote themselves without dis¬
tractions to articulation of their various theoretical positions.
Their attempts to generalize their positions outside of their labora¬
tory context were, in the absence of a developed scientific tradition
sufficiently viable to provide detailed empirical foundations for them,
fated always to be premature.
III. Conclusion.
The exposition in this chapter has proceeded largely by con¬
trasting Palermo's view of behaviourism with mine, in order to high¬
light some features of both views. This procedure is convenient for
expository purposes, and it is also appropriate, since the differences
between our views are in certain respects very important. However,
placing emphasis on our differences may serve to conceal the extent
of our agreement, and it is necessary to put both into perspective.
Palermo and I, along with many other psychologists, would
agree on all the following statements. Behaviourism has been a domin¬
ant but diffuse movement in American experimental psychology for at
least the past fifty years. During approximately the past twenty of
those years it has been confronted with a growing number of unresolved
conceptual, methodological, and empirical difficulties. Attempts to
meet these difficulties have not been altogether successful, and have
79.
resulted mainly in the movement's growing even more diffuse. These
unresolved difficulties have been instrumental in leading to a rejec¬
tion of behaviourism on a scale which by now could be described as
revolutionary.
What divides us is the interpretation of these events, based
on our different assessments of the foundations of behaviourism. I
maintain that while experimental psychology may be said to be undergoing
a revolution, it is not a Kuhnian revolution. The conclusion following
from the analysis presented so far is that a Kuhnian interpretation
cannot profitably be applied to the career of behaviourism; behaviour¬
ism was not based on a paradigm, and consequently it did not have the
means to settle what were taken to be fundamental substantive issues,
in the way necessary for the practice of paradigm-based normal science.
This difference in interpretation is, however, only of narrowly academic
interest unless it leads to different predictions, interpretations, or
recommendations for post-behaviourist psychology. To employ the prag¬
matic criterion, it is a difference that makes a difference only if
it has implications that go beyond psychology's past history.
And, as we shall see, the difference does make a difference
in precisely that way. Palermo makes no critical mention of what I
take to be the fundamental methodological error of behaviourism, its
methodological objectivism as such. Methodological objectivism and
Kuhnian paradigms are incompatible, not only as interpretive schemas
for the rational reconstruction of science, but also as different
bases for practice within a science.
A brief clarification is in order, both of how these two are
incompatible and of what it means to say that methodological objectivism
is an error. Mention was made previously of what could loosely be
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called competing schools within behaviourism. This plurality of
schools did not arise sui generis. It was closely linked, as indi¬
cated, to the absence of a paradigm that could function effectively
for all of behaviourism. To generalize the point beyond a specific
concern with Kuhnian paradigms as such—as will be done throughout
the rest of this essay—it was linked to the absence of any kind of
defining contentual base for behaviourism. It is of crucial impor¬
tance, furthermore, that this absence of a defining content in be¬
haviourism was quite intentional. There were, as we have seen,
scientific achievements that might have provided the basis for be¬
haviourist research in such a way that that research would have exhi¬
bited the Kuhnian pattern. Either Thorndike^ researches or Pavlov's,
or a combination of them, were likely candidates for a paradigm in
this sense.
However, it was no part of—it was incompatible with—the
objectivist and aggressively scientific programme of behaviourism to
go any farther than rigorous logic required in accepting a shared
commitment either to a concrete achievement or to a specific set of
systematic hypotheses. Any shared commitment of that sort would
violate what behaviourists did share, which was their conception of
science. What united behaviourists was their conviction that the
methodology of science, rather than its content, was what constituted
an activity specifically as scientific; and that methodological con¬
siderations provided a sufficient basis on which to build scientific
systems. Commitment to a theory or to a point of view was, at the
very most an individual matter. Commitment to the procedures of
science was the main shared characteristic of tho group. The behav¬
iourists came to agree, that is, that a set of decision procedures
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for evaluating research, appropriate to all sciences indifferently,
was the principal requirement for the constitution of a science;
that with these decision procedures determined the content of
scientific theories would be self-correcting; and that once their
science possessed these it would as a result acquire continually
increasing systematic validity as it continued to develop; and in
all this they were wrong. Why they were wrong, that is, why their
conception of science was such that its implementation could not
fulfill their aims, is the major part of the subject of the follow¬
ing chapters.
Chapter 3
Positivism, Realism, and Behaviourist Psychology
As we have seen, behaviourism consisted largely in an
attempt to base psychology on the practices of the physical sciences.
As ouch, there is nothing very new in this attempt; for centuries,
it has been quite typical for psychologists and mental philosophers
to try in one way or another to base their discipline on the practices
of physics and related sciences. The trend towards not merely re¬
lating physics and psychology but explicitly basing the latter on
the former has been a strong, even the dominant one, since the beginn¬
ing of modern science in the seventeenth century. Hobbes (1655) and
Gassendi (1658), for instance, began implementing the trend in its
modern and systematic form by making thorough analyses of perception,
cognition, and memory as purely material processes, thereby translating
the mind into a physical system operating according to the principles
of Galilean dynamics. Their theories were thus marked by a simple
equation of mental and physical, or assimilation of the former to the
latter, of a sort which, because of the sharp epistemological distinc¬
tion between knower and object of knowledge required by the new sciences,
appeared unnecessarily crude1 . This crude materialism of their theories
was, accordingly, decisively eliminated by Locke, who declined to
"meddle with the physical consideration of mind; or trouble myself to
examine wherein its essence consists; and whether.. .ideas do in their
formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not (Locke, 1690,
I, 1,2; Fraser ed., p. 26)," and substituted for an avowed materialism
an autonomously mental atomism, explicitly analogous to Newton's physi¬
cal atomism. It is with Locke, in fact, that mental elements, separate
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from but having properties derived from those of physical atoms or
particles, may be said to have become influential in modern (i.e.,
post-Renaissance) psychology. To cite a somewhat later example,
Hume declared on the title page of his Treatise of Human Nature
(1738) that it was "an attempt to introduce the experimental method
of reasoning into moral subjects." The description indicates the
ideal he was following even although, as a later commentator observed,
"In following this line Hume reveals how little he realized what is
meant by experiment (Drever, 1968, p. lh)." Klein (1970), in his
history of psychology, cites further examples; the quotation is taken
from a commemorative article on Alexander Bain.
It may be affirmed generally that the advance in psychology
in our land has very much followed the advance in physical
research. The theory of sound, for instance, was the out¬
standing physical theory in the time of Hartley. Conse¬
quently, he proceeded to interpret mind according to the
analogy, and represent the nervous processes as simply pro¬
pagations of vibrations as in sound. Chemistry, in like
manner, came to the front in the days of [J. S.] Mill.
Consequently the process of Association was interpreted
in terms thereof—it was set forth as a kind of mental
chemistry. So, in Dr. Bain's time, physiology was attract¬
ing much attention, and the work of Johannes Muller, in
particular, was greatly in evidence, and there was also
an awakened interest in biology. Hence the physiological
reference became prominent, and the method of natural
history pointed the way to Dr. Bain's mode of procedure
(Davidson, 19CH+; quoted in Klein, 1970, p. 803).
And Klein adds later:
Just as the chemists of Wundt's era regarded chemical
elements as irreducible units of chemical analysis, so
Wundt regarded sensations as irreducible units of psycho¬
logical analysis. As elements, they could not be analyzed
into still simpler units, but they could interact with
one another to form chemical and psychological compounds,
respectively (Klein, 1970, p. 853).
Still further examples could be mentioned, to show how even
the fine structure of psychological and physical theories have been
2
related . The point which they jointly establish is that the content
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of psychological theories, particularly in traditions continuous
with that of British empiricism, has in large measure consisted in
the analogical application of principles and concepts derived from
currently popular physical theories.
This kind of attempt to base psychology on physics by
making an analogical application of physical theories is not, how¬
ever, of principal interest here. It is certainly true that behav¬
iourist psychology has not been free of this practice of borrowing
its concepts and models from the physical sciences. As mentioned in
the last chapter (p. 67), Weiss (1925) attempted a reduction, equally
logical and theoretical, of psychology to atomic physics. The out¬
standing contemporary example of borrowed concepts, popular for the
past twenty years or more, is that of cybernetics and information-
processing models of perception and cognition. The practice of borrow¬
ing models has never been applied systematically within behaviourism,
however, and has never been a central characteristic of the movement.
Instead, what was explicitly taken as the basis of behaviourism, and
what thus marked a new or relatively new turn in psychology's scientis-
tic history, was a strict commitment to scientific method, with rela¬
tively little prior commitment to particular types of scientific
theories. This emphasis on scientific method shows clearly in the
examples given in the preceding chapter—Watson*s emphasis on observ¬
ation and verification, logic and mathematics ("the tools of every
scientist"), Skinner's early espousal of operationism, Hull's seek¬
ing a methodological paradigm in Galileo's astronomical theories, etc.
An emphasis on scientific method, as abstracted from the
practices and methodological analyses of the physical sciences was,
if not altogether new in psychology, at least new in the extent of its
85.
systematic application and in its clear demarcation from concern
with physical theories. The adoption of both the observational proce¬
dures and the logic of physics, without any corresponding systematic
adoption of the theories of physics, was unprecedented. Wundt, and
following him Titchener, attempted in their theory construction to
mirror the logical procedures of the physical sciences—and, as
suggested in the quotation from Klein, above, also adopted a conceptual
scheme based on that of chemistry—but they made a sharp distinction
between the observational procedures appropriate to such sciences and
those appropriate to psychology. Hume, perhaps, may be said to have
attempted to implement in his Treatise a methodological programme
similar to that which we are considering here, but he failed actually
to Implement either the observational or the logical aspect of
experimental scientific inquiry as it was practiced at the time.
Scientific method, however, is itself a concept or proce¬
dure that is hardly free from ambiguity. The systematic results of
physical scientific enquiry have made those 'senior' sciences objects
of emulation for centuries—much as geometry was in Francis Bacon's
time—but the systematic methods for obtaining those results have been
the subject of nearly as many divergent formulations as there have
been theorists to formulate them. The problems of explicating and,
where appropriate, formalizing these methods in their most general form
(apart, that is, from specific questions of instrumentation, etc.)
have comprised nearly the entire subject matter of the philosophy
of science, considered as a discipline, and the philosophy of science
has long been as heterogeneous a discipline as one could hope to find.
Whether the route to knowledge is held to pass through induction,
deduction, or intuition; falsification, hypothetico-deduction, or
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empathic projection; abstraction, picturization, or concretization,
there have been theoreticians to argue convincingly the merits of
their favoured route and, frequently, to relate it to a general epi-
stemological theory (a neat summary of the historical panoply of
methodological views advanced from Aristotle to Popper is given by
Losee, 1972).
Even to say, therefore, that behaviourism consisted largely
in the adoption of a rigorous scientific method is insufficient to
characterize the movement, for the conception of scientific method
adopted within behaviourism was only one of many possible ones. It
is not hard, nonetheless, to delimit the kind of conception which was
implemented. That conception was of course hard-headedly empiricist,
and correspondingly anti-rationalist and anti-intuitionist. It was
indifferently inductivlst and deductivist, in that it encompassed
both procedures without strain. All of this, behaviourism shared
with various forms of introspective psychology. What differentiated it
was, again, the rejection of unobservables, a rejection explicitly
implemented as a methodological maxim. Behaviourism, in short,
adopted—and in large measure defined itself by adopting—a conception
of scientific method that involved a strong commitment to observations
and logical analyses, a rejection of any concern with unobservables,
and a corresponding unwillingness to extrapolate beyond observables
in the systematic interpretation of data. In Chapter k it will be
shown how this conception was initially developed, in a piecemeal
fashion, in behaviourist and immediately pre-behaviourist psychology.
Considered as a systematic conception, as it eventually came to be
considered within behaviourism, it was one which had close affinities
with the methodological programme advanced by Karl Pearson in his
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The Grammar of Science (1895) and also, with some reservations, with
that defended by Ernst Mach in his The Science of Mechanics (1883)--
a conception of science, that is, that can generally be described as
positivistic.
The implication of positivism enables the discussion to
become more specific. To speak of behaviourism as being founded on
a positivistic methodological orientation toward the practice of
psychology is of course to make a descriptive generalization about
the movement, just as it was a descriptive generalization earlier to
describe the movement as being founded on a position of methodological
objectivism. The present one is, furthermore, a generalization that
would have received willing assent from many prominent behaviourists
during the movement's heyday (cf. Stevens, 1939). But in this case,
more is involved than simple description; it is a description with
explanatory power. It is a theme of central importance in this mono¬
graph that the label 'positivism' denotes a recognizable natural
family of approaches to science, and that much of the career of behav¬
iourism, its successes and failures alike, is interpretable specifically
through an analysis of the implications and consequences of adopting
such an approach within psychology. That is, the career of behaviour¬
ism is intimately bound up with the potentialities and limitations of
a positivistic orientation toward science. It therefore follows, at
least on the account which will be presented here, that it is impossible
fully to understand the former without having some comparable under¬
standing of the latter.
In modern times, both in science and in the philosophy of
science, 'positivism' or 'logical positivism' usually refer to such
things as the veriflability criterion and other techniques, or decision
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procedures, which have been developed and used for the rigorous
evaluation and testing of scientific statements, hypotheses, and
theories. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the systematic use
of such procedures sufficiently identifies and characterizes the
implementation of a positivist orientation in modern science. Adher¬
ence to such decision procedures was, furthermore, characteristic of
much of behaviourism, and was explicitly invoked as ensuring the
scientific cast of mature behaviourist theorizing. A major part of
the examination of positivism will, correspondingly, involve the
analysis of the viability and effectiveness of these procedures for
the purposes for which they were developed. Adherence to such explicit
decision procedures is not, however, all there is to positivism. Such
adherence merely constitutes the way in which a positivist orientation
has most recently been implemented, in behaviourism as elsewhere,
just as it was previously implemented mainly through the repudiation
of unobservables as such—again, in behaviourism as elsewhere (e.g.,
by Mach and Pearson). But however a positivist orientation is imple¬
mented in science, it has certain general functions which it usually
performs. Analysis of the role of positivism within behaviourism
thus requires a prior consideration of what these general functions
are. It is necessary first of all, therefore, to consider the general
characteristics of positivism as such, particularly as it relates to
the practice of science, and to illustrate the kinds of problems
which arise in the course of such practice for which the rigorous
implementation of a positivist orientation can be advanced as a
legitimate solution.
Gaining this understanding of the characteristics and po¬
tentialities of positivism in the conduct of scientific enquiry will
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require a rather extended excursion into matters which are usually
considered to form part of the philosophy of science. It is an excur¬
sion, therefore, which will at times seem to have only the most
tenuous contact with psychology as we know it. It cannot legitimately
be avoided, nevertheless, primarily for the reason already given, that
behaviourism cannot be understood apart from an analysis of the role
that positivism played in it. More generally, in addressing scientific
questions or those pertaining to the history of science, we can ignore
what is considered the philosophy of science only so long as we have
a consensus about those questions which the philosophy of science tries
to answer—questions about how, in the most general terms, the science
is to be practiced. Such a consensus existed for some time in behaviour¬
ist psychology, as we saw in Chapter 2, and was closely, related to
developments in positivist philosophy. As we saw in Chapter 1 however,
that consensus is now in the midst of crumbling, both in psychology
and in philosophy; but in psychology at least it has not yet shown
any signs of being replaced by another. Analysis of the characteris¬
tics of the previous consensus may be a relevant procedure on the way
to developing a successor.
The remainder of the present chapter will therefore discuss
the general character and significance of positivism in science, con¬
sidering its potentialities and limitations in as informal a manner
as possiblo. Later chapters, on the basis of the description to be
developed here, will consider how positivism came to be associated
with behaviourism in the first place, and will present a somewhat more
technical review of the decision procedures characteristic of modern
logical positivism and of neobehaviourism alike.
First, however, it will be well to gain some perspective by
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stating in a nutshell the conclusion to which the account will event¬
ually lead. It is that the positivistic conception of science imple¬
mented within behaviourist psychology is generally appropriate at
certain stages in the development of specific sciences—appropriate,
that is, in the sense of facilitating the systematic development of the
science—but that it is not appropriate at other stages; and particu¬
larly, that it was not fully appropriate throughout psychology at
the time when behaviourism gained prominence. It will be argued that
positivism is most capable of serving as an appropriate basis for
ongoing scientific enquiry when it arises as a result of internal
developments within a scientific discipline, and that it usually tends
to do so when the experimental findings and conceptual analyses advanced
within the discipline have carried that discipline into a state of
turmoil of much the sort that Kuhn (1962) describes as a pre-revolu-
tionary crisis state. However, positivism did not become involved in
behaviourism in quite this way, but arose largely, and was maintained
almost entirely, through an explicit copying of the autonomously pos¬
itivistic orientation that was seen as dominant in the natural sciences
at the time.
I. Positivism and Pealism
as Contrasting Orientations tov/ard Science.
By 'positivism' is not moant anything radically different
from that torm's customary usage. Such usage, however, is often
vague and ambiguous, and the first task in relating positivism to
behaviourism is therefore that of malting a systematic characterization
of positivism.
As a beginning, positivism is certainly a tough-minded atti¬
tude towards science ana philosophy. It rejects all or most metaphysics
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as scientifically sterile and advocates the restriction of attention
to publically observable data. Beyond this basic characterization,
however, there is room for question as to just what positivism is and
v/here it comes from. In one sense, positivism originated with
Auguste Comte, who coined the term and made it the basis for his
mildly scientistic social philosophy. In another sense, quite opposed
to Comte's, positivism is a very general and very ancient way, common
since the time of Aristotle or, at the latest, that of Ptolemy, of
being cautious about claims of scientific validity or, in general,
statements of supposed fact. In yet a third sense, most familiar today,
positivism is a kind of technical philosophical analysis for distin¬
guishing between meaningful and nonsensical statements. It is therefore
at least slightly arbitrary just what we choose to call 'positivism' .
Nevertheless, the last two descriptions, and perhaps even all three,
have enough points in common that a useful general characterization
might be attempted.
A good starting point for such a general characterization
is the treatment of positivism in Kolakowski's thoughtful little book,
Positivist Philosophy from Hume to the Vienna Circle (Kolakowski, 1972).
Kolakowski outlines four maxims or rules which he suggests are generally
typical of positivist thought. The first, and the basis for all the
rest, is the rule of phenomenalism, which states that "there is no
real difference between 'essence' and 'phenomenon' (Kolakowski, 1972,
o. 11)." Anything that cannot be manifest in a purely phenomenal way,
such as the Kantian ding an sich or the scholastic essences, has no
place in scientific thought.
.'..cording to positivism, the distinction between essences
ar.d pnenomena should be eliminated from science on the
ground that it is misleading. We are entitled to record
only that which is actually manifested in experience;
92.
opinions concerning occult entities of which exper¬
ienced things are supposedly the manifestations are
untrustworthy. Disagreements over questions that go
beyond the domain of experience are purely verbal
in character (ibid., pp. 11-12).
The second is the rule of nominalism, which states that "we
may not assume that any insight formulated in general terms can have
any real reforents other than individual concrete objects (ibid., p.
13)." Since it is only such "individual concrete objects" that can
ever be phenomenally apparent, this rule obviously follows from the
preceding one. However, the emphasis is somewhat different, and in
addition, the intensity of the venerable debate over universals and
particulars—which is historically somewhat separate from that over
phenomena and essences—makes it advisable that this rule be formu¬
lated separately. There is no such thing—or we should not assume
that there is any such thing—as mankind over and above all indivi¬
dual persons; the inverse square law does not apply (or should not be
considered to apply) except between specific, particular bodies, etc.
It is true that while perfect circles, perfectly uniform accelera¬
tion, etc., are never encountered in experience, we are nevertheless
justified in assuming them as limiting or ideal cases in our equations
and theories. But we should not assume on that account that they
exist or occur somewhere in reality.
A system ordering our experiences must be such that it
does not introduce into experience more entities than
are obtained in experience. But since it inevitably
uses abstractions among its means it must also be such
that we do not forget that these abstractions are no
more or less than means, human creations that serve to
organiso experience but that are not entitled to lay
claim to any separato existence (ibid., p. 13).
The third rule of positivism is the rule that refuses to
ca value judgments and normative statements knowledge, or in short,
a rule expressing the fact-value distinction.
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Experience, positivism argues, contains no such qualities
of men, events, or things, as •noble', 'ignoble1, 'good*,
'evil', 'beautiful', 'ugly', etc. Nor can any experience
oblige us, through any logical operations whatever, to
accept statements containing commandments or prohibitions,
telling us to do something or not to do it (ibid., p. 16).
This rule can also be shown to follow from the rule of phenomenalism.
Moral and aesthetic qualities may be considered to be exemplified by
a thing or event—that is, a thing or event may be taken as an
exemplar for the attribution of a moral or aesthetic quality—but
such qualities are not phenomenally manifest in the thing or event as
anything distinguishable from its other, unambigiously phenomenal
qualities.
For on the phenomenalist rule we are obliged to reject
the assumption of values as characteristics of the
world for they are not discoverable in the same way as
the only kind of knowledge worthy of the name. At the
same time the rule of nominalism obliges us to reject
the assumption that beyond the visible world there
exists a domain of values 'in themselves', with which
our evaluations are correlated in some mysterious way.
Consequently, we are entitled to express value judg¬
ments on the human world, but we are not entitled to
assume that our grounds for making them are scientific;
in other words, the only grounds for making them are
our own arbitrary choices (ibid., p. 17).
In effect, this rule constitutes a warning against committing the
naturalist fallacy, that is, against assuming that goodness and beauty
are properties of things or events rather than simply judgments about
them cr, more unequivocally, reactions to them. Moral and aesthetic
questions are clearly "questions that go beyond the domain of exper¬
ience" and are henco "purely vorbal in character"—or at most,
psychological.
The fourth rule, somewhat tenuously connected with the rest,
is a belief in the essential unity of the scientific method.
In its most general form it expresses the belief that
the methods for acquiring valid knowledge, and the main
ccages for elaborating experience through theoretical
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reflection, are essentially the same in all spheres of
experience. Consequently we have no reason to assume
that the qualitative differences between particular
sciences come to anything more than characteristics of
a particular historical stage in the development of
science; we may expect that further progress will grad¬
ually eliminate such differences or even, as many auth¬
ors have believed, will reduce all the domains of know¬
ledge to a single science (ibid., pp. 17-18).
This belief in the eventual unity of science, and particularly the
faith or assumption that the qualitative differences between sciences
can be accounted for in terms of their stages of historical development,
is the main link between Comtean positivism and the other two types
mentioned. However, this belief is a central guiding assumption for
Comtean positivism, while for the others it is at best tentative and
programmatic, arising purely as a consequence of the demarcation of
science as that body of systematic inquiry that adheres to the other
three rules. In particular, for modern logical positivism, the unity
of science is based on almost purely logical considerations, with
historical analysis given at best peripheral status.
Phenomenalism, nominalism, the fact-value distinction, and
belief in the eventual unity of science: how far do these go towards
providing a general account of positivism? It is certainly true that
identifiably positivist thought often reflects these features, and
that consequently they convey much of the flavour of positivism; and
Kolakowski was initially trying to do no more than provide such a
summary characterization. But to consider those features as jointly
essential to positivism, or as constitutive of it, would lead to grave
difficulties. In defending these features as definitive of positivism
later on, Kolakowski recognizes some of these difficulties and attempts
to deal with them. Galileo, Descartes, and Leibniz, for instance,
...shared the positivist conviction that interpretation
of the world in terms of unseen faculties or forces, in-
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accessible to empirical investigation, is absurd...
Though ,oe clung to the concept of substance, Descartes
tried to characterize it in such a way that it lost its
old mysteriousness; matter, or extended substance, is
nothing but extension, and the soul, or thinking sub¬
stance, is nothing but thinking. There is no 'nature*
hidden behind the actually observed qualities of things,
reference to which accounts for anything! whatsoever...
Although Descartes did not carry this position to its
ultimate consequences, and was not perfectly consistent
in asserting it, it certainly is in line with the posi-
tivist programme (ibid., p. 5'h).
However, Descartes' position is similar to that of posi-
tivist thought only in the one, certainly important, respect that
both positions involve an attempt to demystify metaphysical concepts.
More important than this similarity is that the methods and the reasons
for doing so have practically nothing in common in the two positions.
Descartes, like Galileo and Leibniz, was a realist, a rationalist, and
at least half a Platonist. All three attempted to intuit non-phenomenal
reality of some sort, had little faith in the capabilities of empirical
investigations unless they were guided by independent intuitions of
the truth, and shared with identifiably positivist thought little more
than a distaste for the obscurantism of the later scholastics. But if
this distaste is expressed, as Kolakowski expresses it, as a denial of
•essences' which lie behind and support phenomena—if it is described,
that is, without the qualification that the 'essences' thus adjured
were not identical with non-phenomenal reality in general but were in¬
stead the focal point of one particular sterile system of metaphysics-
then it does indeed seem to marl: these otherwise very un-positivistic
thinkers as strangely sympathetic to the central phenomenalistic tenet
of positivism.
Kolakowski attempts to minimize the paradoxical consequences
of considering Descartes as a positiviet by suggesting that ho was only
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partly a positivist.
Thus, if mere denial of non-phenomenal 'essences' sufficed
to earn a thinker the title 'positivist•, Descartes (like
Leibniz) would be a fully-fledged representative of the
tradition. But because, at least in the light of the dev¬
elopment of positivism in the last two centuries, this
criterion can hardly be considered sufficient, Descartes
can be called a positivist only v/ith serious reservations
(ibid., p. 39).
The reservations concern the distinction between analytic and synthetic
statements, or between necessary and contingent truths, according
to their epistcmological source, their form of validity, and their
informational content about the world. Descartes* positivist creden¬
tials are weakened because he did not observe the modern form of this
distinction and attempted to apply necessary truths in characterizing
the world as it actually exists. But this facet of Descartes' thought
was of crucial epistemological significance to him. More than a
reservation concerning the extent of his adherence to positivism, it
constituted a complete repudiation of the phenomenalist assimilation
of phenomena and essences, as well, of course, as a complete rejection
of empiricism and of the necessity for empirical verification. Descartes,
again, was 'anti-cssentialist' only if the concept of 'essence' is
restricted to its technical use in scholastic philosophy. Insofar as
essences refer generally to the reality that is separate from and
supportive of phenomena, he was clearly an essentialist. Furthermore,
it cannot be maintained that Descartes' failure (if it was a failure)
to apply the analytic-synthetic distinction in his systematic theor¬
izing was due to the unavailability of the distinction prior to another
two centuries of development of positivist thought; the distinction
between factual truth and logical validity was a commonplace one in
the medieval logic in which Descartes was trained. (Even less, inci¬
dentally, can such an excuse be maintained for Leibniz, who was instru-
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mental in extending the distinction and making it fundamental to
modern logic). Rather, the analytic-synthetic distinction is not
one which can profitably be applied to Descarte^ philosophy at all.
His a priori and necessary truths were not founded in logic, that is,
in application of syllogistic, so much as they were based on consider¬
ations of ontology, that is, on the direct inspection and analysis of
the implications and characteristics of being.
Thus, Descartes' "denial of non-phenomenal essences" did
not constitute a denial of non-phenomenal reality or of its availabi¬
lity to scientific investigation, and it is consequently difficult to
credit him as a positivist. A precisely opposite difficulty in the
characterization of positivism can be found in the early twentieth
century movement in the philosophy of science known as conventionalism,
whose adherents often did believe in non-phenomenal essences—and often
scholastic ones at that—but were positivists nonetheless. Convention¬
alism is clearly in the historical mainstream of positivist thought.
It was in part an outgrowth and extension of Mach's positivism, and
had a major influence on the development of logical positivism (Frank,
1949a). However, the leading exponents of conventionalism—Poincare,
Duhem, and LeRoy in France, Dingier in Germany—were neither phenomen-
alists nor nominalists. Poincare and Duhem were both conservative
Catholics, intellectually Thomist but theologically more inclined to
Augustinianism, emphasizing the necessity for grace and otherworldly
faith equally for salvation and for the achievement of any insight
into the Absolute. LeRoy was a popularizer of Bergson's theories of
intuition and direct contemplation of reality. Dingier was a philoso¬
pher in the German voluntaristic tradition of Fichte and Schopenhauer,
according to which our conception of nature (some would say nature
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itself) is an untrammelled creative act of the will. These philoso¬
phers were all transcendentalist in their conception of reality; what
made them positiviets was, as will become clear, their analyses of
the methodology and opistemology of science. Their non-scientific
convictions concerning the nature of reality were defined as precise¬
ly that—non-scientific; they were sharply distinguished from, and
were related only negatively (albeit closely) to their theorizing
about science .
In short, the four central characteristics adduced by Kola-
kowski are insufficient as a general characterization of positivism,
because some positivist thought does not incorporate them and some non-
positivist thought does. It is necessary to consider the relationship
between science and the real world, in the conceptions of the thinkers
mentioned, to clarify what it is that makes Poincare and Duhem positi-
vists but Descartes and Leibniz something else.
The distinction between these two pairs of philosophers
lies in the different status which they accorded to their scientific
theories. Descartes and Leibniz believed that their theories were
true or, at worst, false. That is, for them the validity and worth of
their theories consisted in their accord with reality; since reality
was partly phenomenal and partly non-phenomenal, any valid theory had
likewiso to incorporate phenomenal and non-phenomenal references.
Poincare and Duhem, on the other hand, maintained that their theories—
and all scientific theories—were neither true nor false, but merely
more or less useful. For them, the validity and worth of their theories
consisted solely in their accord with observational predictions deduced
from them. The corpuscles and monads with which Descartes and Leibniz
filled the universe were, although strange and incomprehensible to us,
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assumed to be real. The space, time, mass, and gravitation with
which Poincare and Duhem filled the universe were, although more
familiar and customary to us, assumed to be irreducible hypothetical.
Since these entities, forces, etc., are merely hypothetical, they can
whenever they outlive their usefulness be replaced with other hypo¬
theses, without such replacement necessitating any basic changes in
our comprehension or apprehension of reality. Regardless of the nature
of reality—and Poincare and Duhem were in complete agreement with
Descartes and Leibniz that much of reality is not phenomenal—the
scope of applicability of science is perforce restricted to the pheno¬
menal realm. Science, for the conventionalists, does not give access
to a trans-empirical or trans-phenomenal realm of essences, things in
themselves, grace, or reality—and this property marks a genuine
limitation of science. This trans-phenomenal realm was of great impor¬
tance to the conventionalists, as it was historically for many other
positivists, but it was not the realm of science. Science deals only
with the observable—and for the conventionalists even that was not
absolute and fixed, but was in large part a product of previous
experience, expectations, 'knowledge', etc.—and as a result science
delivers only the useful or workable.
This distinction between conventionalists such as Poincare
and Duhem and rationalists such as Descartes and Leibniz can be extend¬
ed to cover positivists and non-positivists—to whom the term
•realists' will be seen to be applicable—in general. Mach's positi¬
vism was not the handmaiden to theology that Duhem's sometimes seemed
to be. Mach had no interest in metaphysics of any sort, and was con¬
cerned only to establish the purely empirical character of science.
To this end he made searching criticisms of scientific concepts which
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were assumed to have universal applicability, such as space and time
in Newtonian mechanics. Mach maintained that there was no way in
which such universal concepts could have empirical significance,
that they should therefore be considered inadmissible in any empir¬
ically oriented science, and that the unwarranted extension of the
concepts of space and time to universal status was largely respon¬
sible for the (then) current crisis in physical explanation. All
of these scientific concepts were founded in our perceptions, Mach
insisted, and as a result they could not validly be extended beyond
the reach of perceptions. For Mach, the function of scientific
theories—their only possible function—is to provide the most
economical arrangement and classification of our perceptual observa¬
tions^ .
In opposition to Mach we may place Planck—and this oppo¬
sition was a real one at the time. If Mach's positivism was not in
the service of the transcendent, neither was Planck's rejection of it.
Unlike Descartes and Leibniz, Planck made no systematic claims in
favour of a rationalistic source of knowledge or justification of
knowledge claims, or of a reality that had any transcendent character¬
istics of any sort. With those philosophers however, and even more
forcefully, Planck insisted that the goal of science was to uncover
the truth about nature, and he resisted all hedgings concerning the
domain of applicability of the truth that was thus sought. Not only,
he maintained, was science a search after truth, but science was in¬
capable of development, was even inconceivable, in the absence of
this search. In particular, he stressed that any such goal as Mach's
principle of economy of description of observed phenomena was inade¬
quate as a basis on which to account for scientific activity as it
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was actually practiced. In a paper published in 1909 Planck stated:
When the great masters of exact investigation of nature
gave their ideas to science, when Nicholas Copernicus
removed the earth from the center of the universe, when
Johannes Kepler formulated the laws named after him,
when Isaac Newton discovered gravitation.. .—the series
could be long continued—surely, economical points of
view were the very last thing to steel these men in
their struggle against traditional opinions and domina¬
ting authorities. No, it was their unshakeable belief—
whether resting on an artistic, or on a religious basis,
—in the reality of their world picture. In view of
these certainly incontestable facts, one cannot reject
the surmise that, if the Mach principle of economy were
really to be put at the center of the theory of knowledge,
the trains of thought of such leading spirits would be
disturbed, the flight of their imagination crippled, and
consequently the progress of science perhaps fate fully
hindered (quoted in Frank, 19Zf9a, p. 63).
The distinction between Descartes, Leibniz, and Planck on the
one hand, and Poincare, Duhem, and Mach on the other, can best be summed
up as a distinction between positivism and realism, and this opposition
between the two orientations towards science serves to characterize
them. The most general characteristic of positivism, on this view, is
a refusal to ascribe realistic significance to a scientific theory.
More precisely, it is a systematic suspension of judgment, or a denial
of the possibility or meaningfulness of judgment, concerning the abso¬
lute truth or falsity of a scientific theory. Scientific theories are
neither true nor false—truth and falsity are judgments not applicable
to them—but only useful or useless, economical or uneconomical. Hypo¬
thesized entities and forces are neither real (existent) nor unreal
(nonexistent), but only and inescapably provisional. Thus, any judg¬
ments about whether a theory is true or false, or about whether it
represents reality or not, are barred as a matter of principle from
being relevant to the assessment of the theory. The truth or falsity
of a theory is nor available as a criterion for judging it, and the
judgment that a theory is true thus adds nothing to its empirical content.
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Thcro aro almost incontestable logical reasons for this
suspension or abjuration of judgment. Any such judgment goes beyond
any observations which can provide empirical support for the theory,
and to that extent is not even in principle confirmable or discon-
firmable by reference to such observations. If reality consists in
anything other than what we observe, then our observations cannot
of themselves reveal it to us, or even reveal the fact that it so
consists. Conversely, if reality does not consist in anything other
than what we observe (a position we might call metaphysical pheno¬
menalism or, in another form, Berkeleyian idealism), then our observ¬
ations cannot reveal that to us either. As a result, the question
of what reality consists in is a question which empirical data cannot
be used to answer; any answer to the question is empirically meaning¬
less. It follows that the question is not one that has any place in
science.
Thus, the systematic suspension or abjuration of judgment
can also be characterized as a repudiation of all empirically un-
verifiable or 'metaphysical' pronouncements or concepts in science.
It constitutes, therefore, a general form of the verifiability criter¬
ion associated with logical positivism. The verifiability criterion
asserts, in its simplest formulation, that the meaning of a statement
is identical with or is given by the operations and observations that
would constitute its verification. The intended consequence of this
criterion is that, of all possible synthetic statements—statements
purporting to give some factual information about the world—only
those ones which can be empirically verified can be considered to
have any genuine factual meaning. All others—but not, of course,
including analytic statements—aro categorized as meaningless and
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metaphysical . The veriflability criterion has, through its
vigorous promulgation, been sufficiently influential that lack of
empirical verifiability has come to be accepted almost as a defining
characteristic of metaphysical statements. Its influence has not been
sufficient, it is true, to secure general agreement that all such
statements are meaningless. Still, the criterion has been accepted
as sufficient at least to demonstrate that scientific theories can and
should have nothing to do with metaphysics.
The field is thereby left open, however, for metaphysical—
that is, non-empirical, non-scientific—theories to claim access to a
higher kind of truth than that available to scientific theories. The
access of such non-empirical theories to a higher truth cannot be
strictly gainsaid on scientific grounds, so long as their proponents
are careful not to incorporate any empirically meaningful statements
into their theories. This restriction is one which some philosophers
have found themselves able to meet, and the resulting opportunity for
a complementary relationship between positivism and non-empirical or
metaphysical philosophy has been a source of considerable ambiguity
within positivist philosophy, one that at times has occasioned severe
discomfort. Some positivist philosophers, such as Poincare and Duhem,
have promoted positivist analyses as a means for clear demarcation
between science and metaphysics, a demarcation salutary to the progress
of both. Others, ouch as Mach, have disdained any interest in meta¬
physics at all, and wished merely to get on with their science. Still
others, and particularly the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle,
were vigorously opposed to any sort of rapprochement between science
and metaphysics; they took it as their aim to effect the complete ban¬
ishment of mctaphy. ics, or at least the demonstration that metaphysics
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could have none other than poetic or emotional significance.
In all fairness, however, it must be said that this aim
of the logical positivists was a failure from the outset. For on
their own principles, there was no way that the verifiability criter¬
ion—the touchstone for distinguishing between meaningful and meaning¬
less statements—could have any other than stipulative significance.
This property of the verifiability criterion—that in other words it
was itself empirically meaningless—was a formal embarassment to
logical positivism from the beginning, although not one that was
worried about unduly. A statement that could not be empirically
verified could be called meaningless only by restricting the domain
of meaningful statements to those which were empirically verifiable,
and this restriction of course could not itself be justified on
empirical grounds. The verifiability criterion of meaning thus reduces
immediately to, at best, a criterion of demarcation between empirical
science and everything else, particularly between science and meta¬
physics. This purely demarcative function of the verifiability
criterion was sufficiently obvious at the time it was first promul¬
gated that, despite the hostility of logical positivism to metaphysics,
many metaphysicians welcomed the movement with open arms. It seemed
to them that logical positivism would safeguard the status of meta¬
physics as much as that of science. Phillip Frank, one of the earliest
members of the Vienna Circle and a particular opponent of scholastic
philosophy, bleakly instantiates this trend.
The French Catholic philosopher J. Maritain, at the Thom-
istic Congress in Rome in the summer of 1936, character¬
ised as a great service that was essential also for Cath¬
olic philosophy the fact that the aim of the Vienna Circle
an.i of the whole movement of logical empiricism was 'to
disontologise science' (Frank, 1949a, p. 175).
Thu:., from the point of view of the metaphysicians, logical positivism
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provided a demonstration that scientists had no business encroaching
on their territory, which included all questions concerning ultimate
reality. Where empirical data are relevant they cannot, indeed, be
transcended, but for the most important questions they are not always
relevant and must then quite properly be ignored.
Realism, as the general alternative to positivism, has
rarely received any systematic formulation as such, since it includes
any theoretical or methodological scheme that is taken to lead to the
truth about the world. In general, scientific realism is the convic¬
tion that scientific inquiry is capable of revealing the truth about
the world, or about that part of it being studied. It carries also
the accompanying conviction, as expressed in the quotation from Planck,
that this truth cannot be assigned limits corresponding to the limita¬
tions of the experimental procedures employed in its determination.
The truth that is sought by science always has a wider domain of
applicability than that of the experiments utilized in the search;
typically, the truths sought are universal ones. In relation to any
specific scientific theory, it follows from a realist orientation that
it is both meaningful and important to ask whether the theory is true
or false. Coming to any conclusion regarding the truth or falsity of
a scientific theory necessitates going beyond the available empirical
evidence, and going beyond it in a direction in which, as was shown
above, future empirical evidence cannot strictly follow. Thus, the
maintaining of the truth or falsity of a scientific theory within a
realist orientation necessarily involves affirming the theory to an
extent greater than can ever possibly be strictly warrantable on the
5
basis of empirical evidence and logic .
Nevertheless, the truth that, on a realist account of
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science, is revealed by scientific investigations, is not necessar¬
ily thought of as being wholly trans-phenomenal; but neither is it
wholly phenomenal either, in the sense of being identified with
phenomena. More characteristic would seem to be the belief, even
if sometimes implicit, that while appearances can be deceiving,
they can also, with proper solection and control, be revealing*5. The
unanalysed or uninterpreted phenomena of everyday life are insuffi¬
cient to provide the truth about the world, because these phenomena
are the final perceptible result of a long causal chain beginning
with the complicated interacting forces which constitute those compo¬
nents or aspects of physical reality that are operative in one form
or another in our immediate vicinity. These forces are themselves,
however, at least in principle open to discovery, even in their most
general form. They can be distinguished, separated, identified, and
understood—but only through careful investigation, control, and
measurement, or in short, through the sophisticated and careful
practice of science.
The differing attitudes towards scientific theories and the
resulting contrast between positivism and realism, as presented so
far, can serve as the basis for specifying additional and subordinate
characteristics of positivism. These are for the most part implicit
in what has already been said, but can now be stated systematically
and related to those described by Kolakowski.
The first subordinate characteristic of positivism is what
nay bo callod observationalism. This is simply the positive side of
the repudiation of metaphysics, and implies a commitment to publically
observable data, and to a correspondingly public data language, as the
sole vehicle for making meaningful theoretical statements. Observa-
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tionalism can be differentiated from phenomenalism, as Kolakowski
describes it, in two ways. First, observationalism is neutral with
respect to the choice between phenomenalistic and physicalistic
descriptive languages, while phenomenalism at least seems to imply a
commitment to phenomenalistic language. Different positivist formu¬
lations have in fact used both languages. Furthermore, as Frank
(1949a) points out, the choice between them within positivist philo¬
sophy is a matter of convenience rather than one of principle; it
is desirable to reflect this relative indifference in the character¬
ization of positivism. Second, and more important, observationalism
as described here has the character of a rule or convention more
explicitly than does phenomenalism in Kolakowski's treatment. The
difficulty with Kolakowski's description of both phenomenalism and
nominalism is that he makes them seem perilously close to being
metaphysical positions, and hence not really relevant to positivism
at all. It is certainly not Kolakowski's intention to present pheno¬
menalism and nominalism as metaphysical positions, that is, a theses
about the constitution of reality; thus he speaks about the rules of
phenomenalism and nominalism, thereby emphasizing their methodologi¬
cal character. Nevertheless, it was a consideration of the systematic
and non-empirical content of phenomenalism and nominalism that provoked
the difficulties over how to characterize Descartes and Leibniz.
Positivism implies phenomenalism and nominalism, if it does at all,
not as judgments about the real character of the world, and not as
assumptions about the character of the world made for methodological
or heuristic purposes, but only 'in effect'; that is, as a result of
the refusal to go beyond observations or phenomena in search of 'real'
entities. With these two minor reservations, observationalism and
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and Kolakowski's rule of phenomenalism have the same import.
The significance of observationalism is that it directs
attention to the procedures for acquiring knowledge or for validating
knowledge claims at least as much as to the content of those knowledge
claims. This characteristic of observationalism can be extended and
generalized. For positivism in general, it is the methodology of
scientific research—that is, the logical, observational, and experi¬
mental procedures appropriate to a field of inquiry—that constitute
an activity as scientific. The content of scientific theories
cannot exercise this function, nor can their form. Thus, the same
string of words may comprise a metaphysical or a scientific statement,
depending entirely on what operations are used to justify the statement.
This emphasis on the methodology of science is not an all or nothing
matter of courso, rigidly separating positivism and realism. Some
degree of emphasis on scientific method is typical of most scientific
activity. But it is only as part of a positivist conception of science
that the methods of inquiry can come to be of greater importance than
the contents and systematic scope of theories for the assessment of a
field as scientific. On a realist conception of science, the empirical
and logical methods of science are justified instrumentally, by virtue
of being the most powerful tools available for the study of nature.
On a positivist conception, the empirical and logical methods are (if
the phrase is permissible) of the essence of science, and science
itself is justified only on broadly instrumental grounds.
The positivist emphasis on the methodological constitution
of science is displayed to varying degrees in what can be identified
as older poGitivist thought. In the early days of Copernican astronomy,
for instance, the purely mathematical character of the astronomical
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formulations was taken to provide a guarantee that the astronomical
theory itself was purely scientific or 'mathematical' rather than
metaphysical. The permissible function of the heliocentric hypothesis,
like that of the detailed Ptolemaic hypothesis which it superseded,
was to 'save the appearances', to enable calculation and prediction of
the observed motions of the stars and planets without regard to their
hypothetical actual behaviour. So long as the heliocentric hypothesis
was used and interpreted in such a way, it would be assessed purely
on mathematical and empirical grounds; the distinction between mathema¬
tical and metaphysical truth served to ensure that the validity of the
heliocentric hypothesis was of such a sort that it could not conflict
with the physical-cum-metaphysical truth of the loose geocentrism that
had strong theological backing at the time. Any defence of the helio¬
centric hypothesis that claimed it to have physical validity there¬
by transferred the hypothesis outside of what were taken to be the
bounds of science; once outside, it would then be subject to assess¬
ment on explicitly non-scientific grounds.
A stronger and more explicit emphasis on the methodological
constitution of science is typical of modern positivism. To a consider¬
able extent, this emphasis marks a reaction against the dogmatic
realism typical of much physical science during the last century.
Adherence to Newtonian mechanics was so strong in scientific circles
around the middle of the nineteenth century that it was possible to
define scientific explanation in purely substantive terms, as consist¬
ing precisely in the reduction of complex observed phenomena to the
7
principles of Newtonian mechanics . This tendency was both a product
of and an ongoing stimulant to the overextension of Newtonian principles,
the same overextension that came eventually to hinder the progress of
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physics until the principles were recast in an empirically meaningful
and hence limited form—after which, of course, they eventually came
to be seen as approximations to limiting cases of the more general
principles of relativity theory and quantum mechanics. The recasting
of Newtonian principles, and the development of new ones, required
far closer attention than had been given previously to the operational
specification of any concepts that were used; concurrently, the
manipulation of these new and revised concepts required, partly on
account of their (then) counter-intuitiveness, a more rigorous commit¬
ment to their logical implications. It was only by such rigorous
commitment to the logical and operational apparatus of research that
the non-metaphysical (i.e., not overextended, hence empirically
warranted and significant) components of Newtonian mechanics could be
identified and retained, the metaphysical husk discarded, and newer
more generally adequate principles developed. This necessity for a
methodological emphasis in the successful practice of physics at the
time made apparent the general logical appropriateness of such an
emphasis. The detailed construction and development of an unambi¬
guous logical framework for science which resulted from such recogni¬
tion comprises the main original and systematic contribution of
logical positivism to the tradition of positivist thought. For a
tradition which has always valued formalisms, this contribution is a
significant one.
The unity of science as discussed by Kolakowski is a conse¬
quence jointly of observationalism and of the emphasis on methodology,
insofar as these two are characteristic of any positivistic science.
In modern positivism, the unity of science is a unity of logical
methods and of data language. Theoretical unity or unity of basic
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explanatory principles is an open and broadly empirical question.
To maintain otherwise would be to repeat the error of Helmholtz and
du Bois-Reymond (see footnote 7 to this chapter).
The final subordinate or derived characteristic of positi¬
vism—these are all, obviously, closely interrelated—concerns the
goal of science, or what we can expect science to provide us. The
goal of science cannot, on positivist criteria, be the pursuit or
attainment of truth. That goal, then, must be related to more modest
and non-transcendent considerations, such as Mach's principle of
economy of expression, or power to predict new phenomena, or perhaps
practical utility. That is, at the most general level science and
scientific activity can only, as suggested above, be justified
instrumentally. A realist approach to science does not of course
necessarily disdain instrumental considerations, but separates them
from, even if it does not subordinate them to, the pursuit and
acquisition of truth.
These four characteristics—repudiation of metaphysics,
commitment to observationalism, emphasis on methodology and logic, and
a broadly instrumentalist conception of science—are offered as pro¬
viding a general characterization of positivism and as highlighting
the contrast between positivism and realism. The four characteristics
are listed roughly in descending order of importance to positivist
thought. The relationship of these to phenomenalism and the unity of
science, in Kolakowski's treatment of positivism, has been discussed.
Nominalism and the fact-value distinction have not boon treated here.
Nominalism can be subsumed along with phenomenalism under observation¬
alism, insofar as it avoids having metaphysical implications about
the permissible forms of theoretical laws. The fact-value distinction
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is not specific to positivism, and is equally applicable to most
forms of scientific realism. Comte's positivism has not been treated
because, despite his advocacy of a kind of observationalism, there is
enough basic divergence between his position—which, according to
the dichotomy advanced here, is in its central social aspects a
'realist1 one—and that of scientific positivism that assimilation of
the two would be a disservice to both.
It is clear that neither positivism nor realism as character¬
ized here constitutes a theory or a set of doctrines, v/hether about
the content of specific scientific theories or about the nature or
form of reality or about anything whatever. Rather, they are divergent
convictions about the possible scope of scientific theories. Neither,
for that matter, do positivism and realism directly imply different
strictures on how research should be done. Rather, they lead to
different estimates of the status of the methodological considerations
that guide that research—usually, in contemporary science, the same
methodological considerations, whether the scientists making use of
them are themselves realists or positivists. Thus, positivists and
realists, such as Bohr and Einstein, can do very similar and fully
compatible research; and while they may have utterly divergent convic¬
tions about the raeaningfulness of any attempt to attain an approxima¬
tion to the final truth through such research, their differences
assume central importance only in their informal debates and popular
writings.
Often, nonetheless, there may indeed be significant differ-
nces between the two orientations, particularly in the interpretation
of scientific research. Cogent objections can then be advanced against
ea orientation by prcporents of the other.
113.
The objection that positivists can bring against realism
is that the factual or empirical content of a scientific theory is
in no way increased by tacking on to the theory a belief that it is
'true', in any sense apart from or additional to its empirically
ascertained validity. On the contrary, the theory's factual cont¬
ent is in practice more likely thereby to be reduced. The exten¬
sion of the domain of applicability of scientific theories beyond
that point to which their observational warrant properly extends
(which seems to be the consequence of treating them as 'really
true') can lead and has led to gross errors. It was just such err¬
ors, arising from the empirically unwarranted universal extension
of the concepts central to Newtonian mechanics, that led to a crisis
in nineteenth century physics, stifling physical research until the
conceptual excesses were rectified. This argument against realism
and in favour of positivism is sufficiently familiar that it need
not be elaborated; its validity is almost unquestioned.
The objection that realists can bring against positivism
is twofold. First is the claim, illustrated by the quotation from
Planck, that belief in the reality of a conceptual schema is neces¬
sary as a basis on which scientists can undergo the toil and strain
of constructing wide ranging theories, defending them against oppo¬
sition, and in the teeth of such opposition extending them in the
discovery and interpretation of new phenomena. This defence of re¬
alism as, in effect, a heuriGtic principle, thus constitutes in
Planck's formulation of it a claim about the psychology of the cre¬
ative process. Consequently, it could in principle be investigated
:pcrimentally, although the attempt to do so would undoubtedly en-
cour. sr incalculable difficulties. If one attempts to test Planck's
,icir:.c with examples taken from the history of science, it re-
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ceives at best partial confirmation. Some scientists have been po-
sitivists and other, perhaps greater in number, have been realists;
many seem to alternate between the two orientations; both positi-
vists and realists can be found among the greatest scientists in
history. It is not possible, therefore, to maintain the heuristic
justification of realism as a universal principle, admitting of no
exceptions; although it may certainly be true that a realist world-
picture is a psychological necessity at least for many scientists.
The second objection is a related one, but is of a con¬
ceptual rather than a broadly empirical nature; it is a less famil¬
iar point, and thus requires a-bit fuller explanation. Positivism
erects a stipulative ceiling on the capacity of science to explain
the world, and even if scientists respect this ceiling, it is like¬
ly that otherswill not. The ceiling is imposed, of course, by the
stricture against making scientific explanations refer to physical
reality as such, separate and apart from specific controlled obser¬
vations of it. This ceiling on scientific explanation is much the
same as was imposed by medieval scholastic philosophy, both Thomis-
tic and Averroist; it is the same limitation that Osiander insinua-
g
ted into Copernicanism and that the church forced on Galileo.
That it is recognized as the implication of modern positivism is
attested to by the ready acceptance of logical posi-ivism by meta¬
physically sophisticated transcendentalist philosophers Guch as
Jacques Karitain and Ernst Cassirer.
The metaphysician can in effect say to the positivist
scientist: "I will not try to tell you anything about the behav¬
iour of electrons if you will not try to tell me anything about the
nature of reality. Discerning the nature and structure of reality
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is my job; conducting experiments and constructing empirically lim¬
ited theories—without drawing any universal or metaphysical impli¬
cations from them—is yours. I may indeed make reference to your
empirical findings as illustrating a principle about the construc¬
tion of the real world, and in so doing I will explain the signifi¬
cance of your results. None of this will constitute an encroach¬
ment on your domain, however, because I will not attempt to predict
or stipulate in advance the particular empirical results which you
will find; as Duhem (191A-) has already shown, metaphysical princi¬
ples never uniquely imply empirical findings in any case."
The positivist scientist must, whether willingly (as in
the case of Duhera) or unwillingly (as in the case of Frank), accept
this division of labour. The most he can say by way of demurral is
that the metaphysical principles which the philosopher will erect
will be empirically meaningless. However, the metaphysician has ex
hypothesi accepted this proviso at the outset, and is not disturbed
by it since any empiricist criterion of meaningfulness is, as indi¬
cated previously, purely stipulative. The metaphysician merely re¬
stricts himself to a richer kind of meaning and truth that is not
empirical. Furthermore, even this restriction has little force,
for while the metaphysician cannot draw empirical implications from
his philosophical principles, there is nothing to stop him from draw¬
ing pragmatic ones, that is, implications concerning the way we can
best assume the world to be in charting our daily actions. Thus, with
both the most general and the most specific interpretations of scienti¬
fic theories, as well as reality itself, all marked as his province,
the metaphysician is barred only from the experimental laboratory.
The positi- '_ scientist is barred from everywhere else.
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The realist scientist feels that this arrangement and di¬
vision of labour is both overly restrictive and excessively cosy.
He may feel that the behaviour of electrons has something to do
with the nature of reality if anything does (and that he should be
involved in deciding whether it does or not), and that he is there¬
fore bettor qualified to say something about that reality than any¬
one whose sole qualifications are metaphysical ones. Positivism
thus seems to the realist to be abrogating the power and the resp¬
onsibility of science to discover the truth about nature and surr¬
endering that power and responsibility to those who, even if eager,
are unqualified to exercise it.
It must be said that both sets of objections, against po¬
sitivism and realism alike, have considerable force. The positi-
vist objections against realism seem clearly to have greater logi¬
cal significance, while the realist objections against positivism
have, perhaps, greater pragmatic and systemic significance. The
positivists, nevertheless, have somewhat the better time of it in
such a controversy, for only their objections appear incontroverti¬
ble. A logical purist could shrug off the realist objections as
being irrelevant to the constitution of science, while few scien¬
tist' cf any persuasion would care to deny the claims of logic. It
would seem that if one had to make an unequivocal choice between
the two orientations, one would have to choose between maximizing
systematic richness and maximizing logical rigour; between empha¬
sizing intuitive and emphasizing strictly empirical significance;
between the danger of developing overextended and empirically deg¬
enerating conceptualizations and the complementary danger of 'crip¬
pling the flight of the imagination' of many of the 'leading spir¬
its' of science. It would not be a particularly happy choice.
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It is not, however, mandatory that the choice be made in
so uncompromising a manner, and there is little basis for maintain¬
ing that is has been regularly made in such a manner in the history
of science. The key to the resolution of the conflicting claims of
positivism and realism is the recognition that the strengths and
weaknesses of each position are complementary, and have therefore
complementary degrees of relevance during different stages of sci¬
entific inquiry. The weaknesses of realism are particularly dis¬
ruptive of scientific progress at the same time, or under the same
conditions, as the strengths of positivism are most conducive to
such progress, and vice versa. In examining the potentialities for
an interplay and alternation between positivism and realism in the
conduct of scientific inquiry, we will be able to see these
strengths and weaknesses in a somewhat broader perspective.
II. The Reconciliation of Positivism and Realism.
Two Types of Assessment of Scientific Theories.
Scientific theories, and even global scientific systems,
frequently begin and end in periods of intense controversy concern¬
ing the appropriateness or meaningfulness of the concepts fundamen¬
tal to the theory. In between these terminal periods, this kind of
controversy is likely to diminish, and controversy and research both
centre more typically on the application and extension of the theo¬
ry in accounting for the range of events which it was designed or
later extended to explain. At the beginning and the end, that is,
it is customary to ask, in various ways, whether the explanatory
and descriptive concepts used in the theory make sense . In between
(assuming the theory survives the initial stage of questioning) it
is more customary to ask, in various ways, how great a range of ev¬
ents the theory can be made to account for. To put it a third,
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still simpler way, at the beginning and the end it is a very rele¬
vant question to ask, "Why should this (the proposed theoretical
account) count as an explanation?" In the middle, it is more rele¬
vant to ask, "How much can this come to explain?" or "How can this
theory be applied to the explanation of that phenomenon?"
The classic example of this shift of focus, as of so many
other features of scientific inquiry, is Newtonian or classical me¬
chanics. When Newton published the Principia Mathematica in 1686,
there was no question that his account provided an excellent mathe¬
matical fit to the observed events which it sought to account for,
nor that parametric predictions of these events could be rigorously
derived from an impressively small set of postulates. Controversy
did not turn on these features of his theory. Instead, and in ad¬
vance of any systematic attempt to try out Newton's theory in the
solution of other difficult problems in physics, controversy cen¬
tred on the admissibility into science of some of the basic con¬
cepts involved in his theory. His conceptualizations of attractive
and repulsive forces, gravitational attraction, action-at-a-distance
in general, absolute space and time, all received widespread criti¬
cism. Use of these concepts in physical theory was quite widely
regarded as tantamount to a reintroduction of medieval occultisms
into natural science (see Koyre, 1957, for an account of the cont¬
roversy). Newton was able to ride out the storm, partly by agree¬
ing with his opponents that many of these concepts would indeed
qualify as occultisms if they were taken to have literal meaning,
if 'gravity', for instance, was taken to refer to a specific but
unknowable quality; but on the contrary, Newton insisted that no
such hypostatization was any part of his intention, that his prin-
Q
ciples were merely 'mathematical' rather than 'physical* .
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The provisional, and hence unobjectionable, character of
Newtonian physical concepts having thus been established (to the
satisfaction of some critics at least^), the way was clear for
such concepts to be further assessed and evaluated on the basis of
their systematic application, with the need for separate analytic
justification for their use gradually diminishing. Evaluation of
them on the basis of their systematic application, of course,
involved their extension and adaptation to more and more diverse
phenomena. As the Newtonian system was revised and successfully
extended to cover observational and predictive astronomy, electricity,
pneumatics, hydraulics, heat and heat transfer, physical chemistry,
and other previously separate or nonexistent fields of inquiry, the
meaningfulness and validity of the fundamental concepts involved
came to be taken more and more for granted. Questioning of the status
of concepts such as attraction and repulsion came to seem little more
than a narrowly academic exercise inasmuch as the interrelated set
of theories based on such concepts was having such unprecedented
success in extending man's understanding of the physical world.
Eventually, as described previously (and see footnote 7 to this
chapter), the fundamental concepts of attraction and repulsion came to
seem not only acceptable within science, but absolutely essential to
its successful enterprise .
Finally, of course—the story is well known--latter day
Newtonian theories began to encounter more and more serious difficulties.
Anaraalous findings such as unexplained perturbations in the orbit of
Mercury and the failure of the Michelson-Morley experiment to locate
evidence of an ether drift combined with incomprehensible theoretical
predictions such as those concerning black body radiation to produce
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a situation in which 'Newtonian' theory (most of it undreamt of by
Newton) no longer seemed able to provide a trustworthy guide in the
investigation of nature. Having provided the basis for physical
science for two hundred years, and an almost unquestioned basis for
over a hundred, it had finally begun to show its limitations. That
it had any such limitations was a great shock to many scientists and
scientific commentators, and provoked a reassessment of the status of
scientific theories and of the concepts implicated in them, that is
still going on. Attempts to preserve what was still valid or valuable
in Newtonian theory led some physicists particularly to reanalyse some
of the central concepts in the theory and to conclude that in their
customary universal form they were misleading—sufficiently misleading
that reliance on them was in large part responsible for what was coming
to seem a crisis in physical explanation. Reformulation of these
concepts (especially those relating to space and time) in more limited
and empirically warranted forms was instrumental in the development of
the theories—relativity theory and quantum mechanics—that accounted
for many of the anomalies and eventually replaced Newtonian mechanics
altogether.
The reception and later career of Wundt's new structuralist
psychology displayed a similar pattern, although on a much smaller
scale. The scale was smaller both because Wundt's innovations were
not so great as Newton's and because the resulting theory did not have
such wide applications. When Wundt first proposed his system of
structural psychology in 187'f, he faced opposition from the proponents
of Comtean positivism (who, long before Watson, repudiated all
introspection on much the same grounds as the latter), from the
proponents of German phenomenology (who, long before Wertheimer,
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repudiated analytic introspection on much the same grounds as the
latter), and indeed from the vast majority of German philosophers
(who followed Kant or Hering, both of whom denied the possibility of
an experimental use of introspection11). That Wundt was able to
proceed and gather support for his system in spite of these objections
was due to three features of his system and of the way he presented it.
First, as the experimental background to his psychological system he
appealed to the thriving science of experimental physiology rather
than to the already extant introspectionist tradition which was
dominated by phenomenologists and Cartesians (it was the latter to
whom Corate's criticisms were chiefly directed). Second, consonant with
the character of German philosophy at the time, Wundt's overall
classification of the contents of consciousness was respectably a priori
and speculative; the detailed introspective experiments which followed
provided the precise details concerning the structure of consciousness
but were not, initially at any rate, claimed to reveal that basic
structure itself. Third, and relatedly, the elements into which he
decomposed conscious experience were, if not widely adopted in German
philosophy at the time, at least familiar and relatively acceptable due
to their source in the well-established tradition of British empiricism.
The first of these features served in part to remove Wundt's system
from the ambit of its harshest potential critics, while the second and
third served to reduce or mitigate its innovative character. Together,
these three features enabled Wundt to bypass conceptual objections to
his enterprise by staking out a small and previously unclaimed area of
scientific investigation as his own. The specific means whereby the
respectability of his enterprise was established were different from
those employed by (and for) Newton, but the goneral procedure was the
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same: to gain time for the system to be developed and extended by
minimizing its revolutionary or otherwise unacceptable implications.
As Wundt's system became more extended and ramified, both
through his own publications and through those of his students and
colleagues, the need for defensiveness concerning its propriety or
possibility diminished and the detailed structure of the system
became of primary concern. As a result, the area which it encompassed
came to be seen as identical with the reaches of experimental psychology
altogether. Eventually, when other investigators, working in other
contexts, became interested in matters which Wundt's particular
structural approach could not adequately incorporate—imageless thought,
perceptual wholes (Gestalten), animal behaviour, etc .—and of which
structural psychology, because of its predominance, was seen as hinder¬
ing the active investigation, the debate over the applicability and
meaningfulness of Wundt's general approach began again, in renewed and
intensified form. In the ensuing controversy Wundtian structural
psychology withered away almost entirely, and, particularly within the
geographical limitations of American psychology, introspective psychology
in general lost much of its credibility.
In behaviourist psychology, too, the same kind of alternation
is visible, although because of the particular exigencies of behaviourist
research, described in the last chapter, the shifting of focus was not
so strong or so clear in behaviourist psychology as in the other two
examples cited. Conceptual analyses and thinly veiled polemics advoca¬
ting the focusing of attention on strictly observable behaviour began
with Cattell (190if) and Meyer (1911) and continued through Watson (1913a,
1913b), Weiss (1925), Hunter (1928), and many others. On the other
side, attempted refutations or disparagements of the behaviourist
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approach wore made by Lovejoy (1923), Roback (1923), Broad (1925),
and, again, many others. By the late 1920s such external and general
criticisms were becoming less frequent, partly perhaps because of
their total lack of effect. Throughout the 1930s and 19if0s conceptual
analyses and methodological polemics were clustered more within behav¬
iourism, serving principally as ammunition in the rivalry between
various behaviourist schools. Also in this period however, as
described in the last chapter, a great deal of detailed and precise
experimentation was carried out in support of the positions of the
various schools. Such experimentation was relatively free from concern
with the conceptual basis of any particular form of behaviourism, or of
behaviourism in general, and was addressed to specific theoretical
problems, in much the same way as characterized the middle periods of
the careers of the other two scientific systems cited. It is difficult
to state with any precision when the second period of detailed concep¬
tual critiques of behaviourism got underway, but as indicated in
Chapter 1 this period may conveniently be said to date from publication
of the volume Modern Learning Theory (Estes et al., 195^); the second
period has continued since that date with the eventual results described
in Chapter 1, so that by now behaviourism is, though much more than a
memory, much loss still than a hegemony.
This alternation of critical focus from theoretical concepts
to theoretical extension and application and back again is not particu¬
larly surprising, and can be accounted for, in a loose sense at least,
fairly easily. If a new theory requires new ways for looking at or
interrelating observed events, if it asserts the relevance to an
already specified problem area of hitherto ignored or unrecognized
phenomona, if in general it requires a reconceptualization of that part
of the world to which it is addressed, then its sheer novelty will
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ensure that it initially receives attention qua novelty rather than
strictly qua theory. It will be considered as a novelty first, and
to the degree that the fundamental concepts involved in it are strange
ones, to that degree they will require exposure and familiarization as
concepts before they are utilized within the theoretical structure.
In advance of further elaboration of the theory however, it may seem
entirely questionable whether it is worth the effort required to
assimilate the new concepts, v/hether their strangeness is due simply
to their newness or rather to their general inappropriateness for
dealing with familiar problems. The question of the appropriateness
of the concepts central to the theory is not altogether an empirical
question. That is, it is perhaps conceivable that such questions of
appropriateness could in principle be answered by elaborating every
proposed theoretical structure and comparing the outcomes. But in a
world with finite human and scientific resources any such exhaustive
procedure is impossible. Hence, the question of whether or not it is
meaningless or a waste of time to begin working with a proposed new
theory must bo answered before further theoretical elaboration and
detailed testing takes place, to the satisfaction at least of enough
scientists to take up the theory and continue trying to show its
merits. Thus, to the degree that the concepts central to a proposed
new theory are unfamiliar ones, critical analysis of the concepts is
a necessary precursor to their experimental and theoretical elaboration.
If, by whatever means, a theory passes its first conceptual
test, then for those who have accepted it on this basis further
conceptual justification for it will be relatively unnecessary;
relatively unnecessary only, for such justification may continue to
bo necessary in presenting the theory to critics. But for those
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working inside the theory—those, that is, for whom questions of
the meaningfulness or appropriateness of the theoretical concepts
have been resolved, dismissed, or set aside—such justification need
play no part in their application and testing of the theory. Such
application and testing consists in using the theory to interpret
and account for the world, to answer the kinds of questions which it
was designed to answer. Thus, the success of the Newtonian physical
theory did not consist in demonstrating or postulating the existence
of rigid bodios, Euclidean space, rectilinear motion, or principles
of attraction and repulsion; the admissibility of these concepts and
postulates was a bitterly disputed precondition of the theory's
evaluation. Once the existence of these entities and forces had been
provisionally assumed, the success of the theory consisted in showing
how the principles of attraction and repulsion could account for the
rectilinear motion of rigid bodies in Euclidean space. Such achieve¬
ments are the goal of theory, the goal of scientific inquiry as such,
and can be pursued autonomously once the admissibility of the concepts
used in the theory has been established.
The second period of conceptual analysis, toward the end of
the career of a scientific theory, can be accounted for in a similar
manner. To begin with, the end of one theory frequently overlaps with
the beginning of another which replaces it, and if the new theory
requires another reconceptualization it will provoke conceptual analysis
and examination in the way described above. In addition, if a well
supported and useful theory begins to encounter numerous serious
anomalies, to the extent that the theory cannot consistently be upheld,
it might signal an unacceptable loss of economy to reject the theory
outright. There may be nothing of comparable power to replace it with,
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at least until a new theory has been developed to an equivalent
extent. Thus, it becomes desirable to determine the bounds within
which the old theory can continue to function and beyond which it is
invalid. Determination of these bounds within the limits of the old
theory itself involves recasting it so that it does not extend to the
types of situation in which it is inapplicable; it involves, therefore,
a reformulation of the theoretical concepts in such a way as to limit
their scope. Finally, a reanalysis of the foundations of an old theory
might be undertaken as part of an effort to repudiate it, to show that
the eventual failures of the old theory were inherent in it from the
beginning, that, as Watson characterized structuralist psychology, it
"was founded upon the wrong hypotheses." All three of these bases for
analysis of a declining theory overlap and can be considered together.
On the most general level, we can say that when a scientific theory is
doing its job, leading to successful investigations of nature, it is
relatively unnecessary to question its foundations; when it stops or
fails to do its job, or before it is allowed to begin, questioning its
basis is almost essential.
This account of the basis for the shift in focus from the
theory itself to that part of the world which the theory addresses and
back again serves also to suggest the circumstances in which the
examination of some theories will not display the shift. The amount
of justification for the fundamental concepts of a new theory which
will be required depends on the extent to which these concepts are
unfamiliar or incompatible with those hitherto accepted. Thus, a new
theory which doos not require any reconceptualization of a part of
nature can be assessed more or less immediately on the basis of itB
elaboration and empirical support. Alternative theories within a
127.
given theoretical matrix are of this sort. Thus, within the Hullian
framework, assessment of Mowrer's two factor theory (Mowrer, 19if7)
could be carried out on a strictly empirical basis from the beginning;
those psychologists who were concerned with the theory understood what
Mowrer was talking about, and accepted his theoretical terms as
meaningful, without any specific justification or explanation of them.
At the other extreme, a theory might require so great a reconceptual-
ization of its subject matter that almost all scientists concerned
with it reject the theory as outlandish, while preserving, perhaps,
whatever component of it can be fitted in with current conceptions.
Such was the fate of Fechner's psychophysical theory (Fechner, 1851,
1860); the psychophysical methods which he developed were assimilated
into the mainstream of early experimental psychology, while the theory
itself was universally dismissed as unscientific and mystical. Unfor¬
tunately, it is not obviously apparent how one could specify in
advance how much 'outlandishness' a new theory will be allowed to have
before it is rejected out of hand. There is a rough sense in which a
proposed theory will have to be at least somewhat compatible with the
general conceptual framework of contemporary science for it to be
given serious consideration; but determination of whether or not a
given theory is or is not sufficiently compatible can perhaps be done
only after the fact. Newton's and Fechner's theories were objectionable
to their respective contemporaries on much the same basis, to wit, that
the fundamental concepts involved in them were mystical, obscurantist,
empirically meaningless, and in general not up to current scientific
standards.
The Context of Construction and the Context of Reconstruction.
For convenience of reference, I propose to lable the contexts
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in which the two different kinds of questions described above are
asked of a theory as the 'context of construction' and the 'context
of reconstruction' . The context of construction is that in which
theories are elaborated and tested in terms of how well they make
contact with nature, how well they fulfill their predictive and
explanatory tasks. The context of reconstruction is that in which
the terms, concepts, and variables out of which the theory is built
up are subjected to searching critical examination, in order to
establish or disestablish them as appropriate or meaningful.
This terminological convention need not be taken too
seriously, but it is at least convenient in the present discussion.
Furthermore, the terms have been chosen with some care. 'Construction'
signifies a building-up and progressive development of a theory, a
house, or whatever; and 'reconstruction' signifies an at least partial
tearing down and replacement or strengthening of the foundations, as
a preliminary to further building. Scientific work undertaken within
these two contexts is often loosely separated in time, for the
reasons given. The context of construction is primary while a theory
is being extended and elaborated, and the context of reconstruction
is primary while a theory is being initially examined and finally
abandoned. Work done within the two contexts certainly interpenetrates
in time however, and may well be co-extensive with only variations in
relative emphasis throughout the life of a theory.
It can be seen that the proposed distinction between the
context of reconstruction cuts across the well-known distinction, dating
back at least to Herschel (18J0), between the context of discovery and
the context of justification. The present distinction is not so sharp
as that between the contexts of discovery and justification, however,
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because the criteria for judgment of a theory are by no means
completely separated or mutually exclusive within the two proposed
contexts. They are clearly separable, nonetheless, inasmuch as
different questions are asked in the different contexts. If one is
pursuing a particular elaboration of an already well attested theory
it is relevant, but usually only tangentially relevant, to be given
information concerning the logical and empirical status of the concepts
fundamental to the theory. Similarly, if one is examining the elements
of a thoory to see if they have, for instance, unambiguous empirical
referents, then it is relevant, but usually only tangentially relevant,
to be told that the theory accounts for a given phenomenon with such-
and-such a degree of success. The two contexts are related hierarchi¬
cally, in that the context of reconstruction is or should be subordinate
to the context of construction, because it is in the latter context
that the development of science as such takes place. The context of
reconstruction comes into its own most forcefully during the decline
of a scientific theory, when the conceptual analysis of the theory is
undertaken in order to determine why it is that questions asked in the
context of construction are no longer receiving satisfactory answers.
The Differential Relevance of Realism and Positivism
to the Contexts of Construction and Reconstruction.
The distinction between the context of construction and the
context of reconstruction, and an appreciation of the different tasks
appropriate to the two contexts, makes possible a resolution of the
conflicting claims of positivism and realism in the conduct of science.
I- brief, the position advanced here is that a realist orientation
towards scientific theories and what they account for is most conducive
to scientific progress within the context of construction. Conversely,
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a positivist orientation is most conducive to scientific progress
within the context of reconstruction.
A summary justification for this position is implicit
within what has already been said in the description of the two
orientations. In the context of construction, attention is focused
on (what is taken to be) the world; there is greatest conceptual
economy in assuming that the world autonomously possesses those
characteristics which are attributed to it by the theory and which
are progressively elaborated in the course of scientific discovery.
Furthermore, in the context of construction, there is no reason to
assume otherwise about the status of such theoretically attributed
characteristics; to do so would only distract attention from the task
at hand, that of further determining the character and structure of
the world through elaboration, testing, and revision of the theory.
In the context of reconstruction, on the other hand, attention is
focused on the variables and concepts of the theory, primarily as
components of the theory and only secondarily as attributes of the
world. There is greatest conceptual economy in examining these as
they occur, without assuming that they either have or do not have a
universal external reference independent of their specified observa¬
tional content. Furthermore, within the context of reconstruction,
any assumption about the •objective1 (i.e., 'real') reference or lack
thereof of such variables and concepts would, as in the previous
parallel case, distract attention from the task at hand, which in this
case involves explicating their logical implications and observational
content.
To put it another way, relating to the pragmatics of science
rather than to its semantics, a roalist orientation towards a particular
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scientific theory can be expected to encourage tenacity in the
maintaining of that theory in the face of potentially disconfirming
evidence, and to promote commitment to the general validity of the
theory in its future application to specific problems. In the
elaboration of a theory which has already received some development,
such tenacity and commitment will often be rewarded. A positivist
orientation, conversely, can be expected to encourage flexibility and
lack of full commitment in the assessment of and choice between theories,
a flexibility that is sorely needed when theories are being broken down
and examined piece by piece. Such flexibility, however, may reduce to
vacillation, and withholding of commitment to nit-picking, as a science
incorporating one or more major theories proceeds from strength to
strength in the successful investigation of nature. Equally, commit¬
ment to the value and validity of a theory may be arbitrary and
capricious when a new point of view incorporating it is first expressed;
even worse, tenacity may degenerate to dogmatism as the breakdown of a
scientific synthesis indicates to an uncommitted observer that something
is basically, i.e., conceptually, wrong with the theoretical position.
The differential relevance of the two orientations, in short,
establishes the need for an alternation between them, corresponding
to the alternation between the contexts of construction and reconstruc¬
tion. What seems to be most called for, that is, is a progressive
alternation of realism and positivism in the conduct of science, with
realism predominating in the context of construction and positivism
predominating in the context of reconstruction. Furthermore, something
at least resembling such an alternation, as a function of different
problems faced at different times, is indeed apparent in the examples
of the careers of scientific systems—Newton* s and Wundt * s—cited above.
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A more detailed justification for this position concerning
the relationship between realism and positivism will require a
further examination of modern positivism. It will hinge largely on
showing that, regardless of our preferences in the matter, a consist¬
ently positivist approach is almost impossible to maintain in the
context of construction. The justification for realism in the context
of construction will, correspondingly, be pragmatic rather than
ontological. It will proceed, that is, not by attempting to validate
or defend the realist conviction that there is a real world with
determinable characteristics existing independent of our experience
of it, but by showing how the assumption of the existence of such a
world can facilitate scientific advance. The analysis will have to
centre on the fine structure and detailed implementation of a positivist
orientation in science, for the specific features that limit the
applicability of positivism are not such as show up in summary or
programmatic statements of the position. The analysis will therefore
be directed for the most part to the characteristics of modern logical
positivism and related movements, for it is only through these that the
implementation of positivism has become sufficiently sophisticated and
detailed that it can be examined with anything approaching the necessary
precision. This circumstance is also fortunate of course, in that it
was the modern and sophisticated forms of positivism that eventually
came to be implicated in behaviourism, and so it is with these that we
would in any case be concerned.
The description and analysis of positivism has already
progressed far enough, however, that it can begin to be applied to the
development of behaviourism, especially to behaviourism in its initial
versions before it became associated with the formal movement of
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logical positivism. Making some use of the descriptive vocabulary
that has been built up in this chapter, therefore, the next will
describe the background to and the initial emergence of behaviourism;
it v/ill show how right from the beginning, within the context of
reconstruction, the incorporation of positivism in behaviourism was
significantly variant from the usual and appropriate pattern as
described here.
Chapter 4
Behaviourism's Background: The Instigation to Behaviourism
in Studies of Animal Behaviour
Two features of behaviourism were cited as central to the
movemont in Chaptor 2. The first was the repudiation of unobservablo
entities and processes—particularly the mind and consciousness, but
by extension others as well; it was this repudiation that, as we have
seen, more than anything else marked the emergence of behaviourism.
The second was the adherence to explicit decision procedures as the
basis for evaluating scientific statements, hypotheses, and theories,
and as sufficiently establishing thereby the scientific and presumably
progressive character of behaviourist theorizing. In Chapter 3 it was
pointed out that these two features also generally typify different
v/ays of implementing a positivist orientation toward the practice of
science. In behaviourism as—at least in modern times—in the physical
sciences, the repudiation of unobservables was the initial means for
the implementation of positivism, and the adherence to explicit
decision procedures was the later, more sophisticated means. We can
say roughly that the repudiation of unobservables characterized the
positivist orientation of behaviourism from the beginnings of the
movement until the development of 'neobehaviourism' in the late 1920s
and early 1930s, and that the adherence to explicit decision procedures
characterized it thereafter.
Chapter 5 will deal with the use of decision procedures in
neobehaviourism and generally in science, both by briefly documenting
their popularity in psychology and by analysing their structural
potentialities and limitations at some length. The present chapter
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will deal with the circumstances which led to the initial emergence
of behaviourism in the early part of this century; it will thus be
concerned with what was called in Chapter 3 the 'context of reconstruc¬
tion' , and with the inclination toward positivism which can be expected
to arise within that context. It will consider, that is, the circum¬
stances that led to behaviourism's being initially based on or nearly
identical with an objectivist and positivist conception of psychology,
characterized by the repudiation of the mental and all other unobserv-
ables, and distinguished from the rest of psychology primarily by its
methodological stance rather than by its subject matter or its
substantive principles. The discussion will be fairly extensive for
a number of reasons: first, a discussion of the circumstances of
behaviourism's birth is obviously germane to a general examination of
the movement; second, it is important to emphasize the specificity and
even uniqueness of these circumstances; and third, some of the effects
of behaviourism on the later practice of psychology make sense only in
comparison with the dominant trends of the psychological tradition
which stimulated the emergence of behaviourism and which behaviourism
supplanted.
To consider the birth of behaviourism we must look to the
early history of comparative psychology. The circumstances which led
to the establishment of behaviourism, the repudiation of unobservables,
and the institution of positivism—all three labels referring to the
same complex ovent—arose around the turn of the present century,
particularly in American psychological laboratories. They arose in
the context of problems in the study of animal behaviour, Thorndike's
ar.d Watson's initial field of interest. What happened in brief was
that in such studies, the growth of sophisticated methods of
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experimentation and experimental control was proceeding faster than,
or in a different direction from, growth of the functionalist and
evolutionary conceptual framework on which the studies were based.
As a result, the evolutionary analyses applied to the behavioural
observations which were the immediate results of the studies came to
seem outmoded and irrelevant, an unnecessary gloss on the increasingly
precise observations which were being made. The observations and
experimental results themselves came to seem the only valuable aspects
of the research programme, and quite independent of their dubious
theoretical interpretation. In this situation, the suggestion that
attention might better be confined to mere data, with the theoretical
interpretations repudiated on principle, was an obvious, welcome, and
not altogether unreasonable one . The widening gap between data and
theoretical interpretation of data which seemed to justify this
separation of the two was not, however, an inevitable consequence of
research on animal behaviour at the time. To understand as far as
possible how this gap developed, and what alternatives to it existed,
it is necessary to go back a further step and look in some selective
detail at the development of this research on animal behaviour from
which behaviourism sprung.
I. The Conceptual Development of Comparative
Psychology: 1882-1901.
Animal behaviour became of interest to psychology mainly
through the development of comparative psychology. Studies of animal
behaviour had previously been undertaken, if at all, as part of
natural history or in connection with the practical demands of
husbandry and selective breeding. Studies made on these bases, while
occasionally acute, lacked any systematic theoretical basis for the
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selection and interpretation of phenomena to be studied. Comparative
psychology, based on Darwinian evolutionary theory, provided such a
theoretical basis. The goal of comparative psychology, from the time
of its first elucidation by Romanes (1882), was to demonstrate the
qualitative continuity of inferred adaptive capacity and psychic
processes throughout the animal kingdom, and complementarily, to trace
the stages of evolutionary development of such capacities and processes
to their culmination, frequently in man. The capacities and processes
of principal interest were what were considered to be the higher mental
or psychological ones. That is, they were those manifested in the
plasticity, variability, and modiflability of behaviour, and often
termed •cognition', 'reason', etc., in contradistinction to those
specific structural-cum-behavioural ones manifested in the particular
abilities (for flying, burrowing, etc.) of different animals. This
choice of emphasis was in part anthropocentric; the desire was to
explicato the kinship between tho animals and man specifically with
regard to man's highest and most 'distinctly human' faculties, those
to do with rational thought and consciousness. The choice could also
be justified non-anthropocentrically however, since capacities for
varying and adapting behaviour could be considered more fundamental
than specific behavioural capacities, at least in the sense that the
former, by being a step removed from specific behaviours, can be
studied as ouch throughout the animal kingdom and hence can be expected
to show moot clearly what evolutionary progression, if any, occurs.
One can compare turtles and raccoons, say, v/ith respect to their
abilities for exhibiting response perseverance or for grasping three-
term relations, v/ith the hope that tho results may illustrate general
differences in the ways that turtles and raccoons are able to function
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in the world; but there is less point in comparing them with respect
to their abilities for climbing trees. Or so at least it seemed.
The general method initially used to implement the programme
of comparative psychology was a combination of behavioural observation,
analogy, and inference. Observations of selected behaviour which could
not be accounted for on the basis of instinct or reflex action—because
of the behaviour's novelty in the history of the organism and its
adaptive specificity to the requirements of an unfamiliar situation-
served as the basis for inference of generalized adaptive capacities.
These capacities were conceptualized as resulting from the action of
a mind exhibiting characteristics and undergoing experiences analogous
to those typical of a human mind. The method was succinctly described
by Romanes.
For if I contemplate my own mind, I have an immediate
cognizance of a certain flow of thoughts and feelings,
which are the most ultimate things—and, indeed, the only
things—of which I am cognizant. But if I contemplate
Mind in other persons or organisms, I can have no such
immediate cognizance of their thoughts and feelings; I
can only infer the existence of such thoughts and feelings
from the activities of the persons or organisms which
appear to manifest them. Thus it is that by Mind we may
mean either that which is subjective or that which is
objective. Now throughout the present work we shall have
to consider Mind as an object; and therefore it is well
to remember that our only instrument of analysis is the
observation of activities which we infer to be prompted by,
or associated with, mental antecedents or accompaniments
analogous to those of which we are directly conscious in
our own subjective experience. That is to say, starting
from what I know subjectively of the operations of my own
individual mind, and of the activities which in my own
organism these operations seem to prompt, I proceed by
analogy to infer from the observable activities displayed
by other organisms, the fact that certain mental operations
underlie or accompany these activities (Romanes, 1884;
1969 ed., pp. 15-16).
In short, Romanes' procedure was to infer the presence of consciousness
in animals in the same way that he supposedly inferred it in other
humans, by analogy from his own conscious experiences. He then used
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the same procedure to infer the particular states of consciousness
of the animal which he was observing, that is, by considering how he
would feel if he were acting in the same way the animal was acting or
were exposed to the same situation as that to which the animal was
exposed. The description of the animal's states of consciousness was
expected to be the same sort of description as would result from
introspection of the contents and structure of human consciousness,
roughly the same, that is, as resulted from the experiments in
analytical introspection typical of human psychology at the time.
This general approach to the study of animal psychology has
become so discredited that it is difficult to assess it in anything
like its own frame of reference, and difficult even to see why the
attempt should be made. Such an assessment is nevertheless necessary
as a basis for tracing the development of comparative psychology.
Romanes' approach was also used, with modifications, by succeeding
writers in comparative psychology. It has been almost universally,
and facilely, repudiated on the grounds that it is impossible for us
to gain access to the alleged subjective experience of other organisms
(which none of these writers ever denied) and that comparative psycho¬
logy based on Romanes' method of inference nover made any notable
theoretical or substantive advances (v/hich is not strictly true). The
central features of Romanes' inferential method have almost never been
afforded a critical examination outside the previously established
context of a blanket acceptance or rejection of them. What follows,
therefore, is an attempt, first, to indicate what could be judged
inappropriate in Romanes' method and in his conception of the task of
comparative psychology, from the standpoint of one working in the same
general intellectual or scientific context as Romanes; and second, to
1ifO.
delineate the minimal changes in that method and conception necessary
to establish comparative psychology as a viable research activity.
Luch an attempt is not merely an exercise in cultural relativism. The
necessary amount of suspension of our own standards of criticism is
very limited, amounting to no more than a de-emphasis of the same
strictures against the study of mind in itself which, as we have seen
in Chapter 1, have already been called into question. Furthermore, the
minimal changes which will be shown necessary are, to a considerable
extent, the same changes that were in fact tacitly made as comparative
psychology developed.
The central feature of Romanes* approach is, of course, his
use of analogy; that is, it is his reconstruction of the minds of
animals on the basis of analogy with the operations, structures, and
subjective experiences typical of his own mind. This 'argument from
analogy' depends on two major assumptions. The first is that the
operations and the quality of subjective experience typical of human
minds are already known, or at least can be readily determined through
introspection or objective experimentation1. The second is that the
minds of animals are similar (or analogous) to the minds of humans,
both with regards to their subjective experiences and with regard to
their mental functions or operations. To pass judgment on these in a
nutshell, the first assumption is incorrect, the second so far as it
relates to subjective experiences is strictly speaking untestable
but universally agreed (e.g., by Romanes, see below) to be highly
dubious, and the second so far as it rolates to mental operations
should not be introduced as an assumption at all, as it is the same
continuity hypothesis that comparative psychology was designed, and
was competent, to investigate. Let us consider each of these in turn.
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That the first assumption is incorrect is fairly apparent.
V/e do not have sufficiently detailed knowledge of our own mental
operations to use these operations as the basis for constructing and
extending such an analogy. Even if our own mental operations and
private experiences could in principle serve as the basis for
constructing and utilizing the analogy, the construction would have to
wait on the development of a human psychology rich enough to systematize
or account for such experiences. That the operations and conscious
states of the human mind are transparent to casual introspection may
be termed the Cartesian fallacy (even if it was chiefly Descartes'
followers, rather than Descartes himself, who committed it). It was
this fallacy that bore the main brunt of Comte's and, in Britain,
Maudsley's attacks on introspection, and it was as clearly a fallacy
2
in Romanes' time as it is in ours . The detailed knowledge of human
psychology necessary to eliminate dependence on the fallacy might be
acquired as a result of the systematic practice of analytic or pheno-
menological introspection or objective experimentation; recognition of
the fallacy has no implications for the way in which the remedial
knowledge can best be acquired. In any case, such knowledge was not
available to Romanes; nor, indeed, is it available to us. In the
absence of such knowledge, neither term in the analogy—our own minds
or the minds of others—can be built upon with any confidence^.
The main brunt of the criticism, however, must fall on the
analogy itself, relating both to the subjective experiences and to the
mental operations (cognitive functions, etc.) of non-human organisms.
Here there are several points to be made. To begin with, it was
generally recognized that the analogy cannot be given any independent
justification. The analogy constitutes an assumption that certain
142.
observable behaviours are accompanied by certain subjective experiences
or mental operations, such experiences and operations being somewhat
the same as what we humans would have (or perform) in a similar
situation or when behaving similarly. However, since we have no access
to these elements of inner mental life—it is a truism that the subject¬
ive experience or personal consciousness of others is closed to us—we
cannot prove or even provide the slightest trace of evidence for the
validity of the analogy. This much was freely admitted by Romanes and
by all later writers who made use of the analogy, and accepting this
was almost a precondition of the analogy's use. The position of these
writers was that the analogy could be justified by its heuristic use
in interpreting the mentality of animals, and that the analogy,
although totally unprovable, was sanctioned by custom, as it was the
same as was continually used by each of us in attributing consciousness
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to other persons .
Now, regarding this supposed sanction by custom: the analogy
assumes a large part of what comparative psychology was purportedly
attempting to investigate, that is, the continuity of mental processes
throughout the course of evolution. If one is concerned about the
presence of consciousness and cognitive faculties in animals, and
desirous of refuting the Cartesian view that animals are unconscious
automata, then one must initially treat it as an open question whether
animals are conscious or not. It is certainly conceivable—it was
widely enough conceived—that they might not be. Since the thesis that
animals are conscious was regarded as central to the evolutionary view,
it was hardly appropriate to introduce the thesis as an assumption.
Contrary to what Romanes claimed, the assumption of consciouness in
animals is not comparable to the assumption of consciousness in other
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persons, even if this latter cam also be regarded as an inference
(cf. footnote U to this chapter). If our choices are restricted
either to attributing consciousness or to denying it, the alternative
to the latter assumption is solipsism; the alternative to the former
is nothing of the sort. The two assumptions are thus not practically
equivalent. They aro theoretically equivalent only in that each is
utterly incapable of evidential justification; if this property were
regarded as sufficient vindication for assuming consciousness in
animals, it would also vindicate assuming consciousness in plants,
stones, and the cosmos as a whole.
Furthermore, even if we assume that animals are conscious,
in the sense of having private subjective experiences, the analogy
does not in fact provide a useful guide to investigating the nature
and content of their consciousness. That is, the heuristic justifica¬
tion of the analogy also breaks down. The analogy requires not only
that animals bo conscious, but also that their consciousness be similar
to ours. By use of the analogy we can attribute to animals only the
same feelings as we would have in a given situation, or the same mental
operations as we would perform. We are therefore unable to deal
either with the diversity of evolved forms or with the process of
evolutionary development itself.
To consider the matter of diversity: if we are to use the
analogy, we are obliged to assume that every creature that can respond
to a form of energy to which wo also are sensitive has the same
experience, upon being affected by that energy, as we do (subject to
a qualification to be discussed below); as Romanes specifically
stated, it is only on the basis of this assumption that we can talk
about the mental lives of other creatures at all. Given, however,
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nature's notorious prodigality in bringing about a wide diversity
of evolved adaptive mechanisms for performing similar tasks, sensory
rocoptors for responding to given energy forms, etc., it would seem
improbable that theso would be coupled with a singular parsimony with
respect to subjective experience. This is an a priori argument,
admittedly, but then it is an a priori position that it is being
brought against. The point is, once it is admitted as a reasonable
possibility that some animals might have a different kind of private
experience than we do when confronted with a given stimulus situation,
then the presumed universal applicability of the analogy breaks down.
But although we may grant that the analogy will sometimes fail, we do
not know what the circumstances or situations are under which it will
fail; hence wo do not know when the analogy can successfully be applied
and when it cannot.
We might attempt to resolve this specific difficulty by
stipulating that morphological similarity will govern the application
of the analogy, so that structurally different receptors for the
perception of a given energy source, for instance, will be deemed to
give rise to different forms of subjective experience. This stipula¬
tion, it should be noted, can itself be introduced only as an assump¬
tion which is in principle unjustifiable. Furthermore, it does not
help very much. For one thing, it precludes any hope of making
comparative psychology generally applicable throughout the animal king¬
dom; it prevents us, that is, from giving any consideration to any
animals that are structurally dissimilar to man on the dimensions being
investigated (and since all animals are structurally dissimilar to man
on all dimensions to some degree, we would have to stipulate an
arbitrary cutoff point beyond which we would agree not to employ the
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analogy). For another, we would face the complementary difficulty to
the one first mentioned, in that we would have to assume complete
disuniformity of subjective experience whenever the opportunity arose.
But just as the diversity of evolved forms might make us wary of
postulating complete uniformity of subjective experience, so might the
frequency of instances of convergent evolution make us wary of
postulating complete disuniformity.
All of this applies to the subjective experiences enjoyed by
diverse creatures when confronted with the same types of stimulus
situation as those which we also can experience. There are, further¬
more, at least some cases in which we can be quite sure that if an
animal has conscious experiences at all, then those experiences are
often totally dissimilar to any of ours. Some animals are sensitive
to forms of energy or sources of information to which we are not—bees
to the direction of polarization of light, for instance, or eels to
very faint electrical currents in water—and their subjective experiences
in response to these forms of stimulation are therefore in no way, so
far as we can imagine, relatable to ours. In this latter case, we can
at least say how far the analogy fails us, that is, utterly. In the
former cases the analogy may fail us utterly, or in some respects, or
not at all; but we are quite unable to find any indication as to whether,
or when, or how much.
To turn to the question of development: restriction to our
own experiences as a standard also, although relatedly, makes us unable
to deal with the process of evolutionary development through use of the
analogy. It was assumed by most writers who employed the analogy that
its adequacy would decrease as a function of the phylogenetic distance
separating man from any other given species. The shape of the 'function'
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is, of course, not determinable, so that we cannot say how much less
valid the analogy will be when applied to a cat than a monkey, a
pigeon than a cat, etc. But even apart from the question of the
shape of the function, this acknowledged limitation on the use of the
analogy renders it of practically no comparative use. If someone
steps on my toe I will experience a certain sensation of pain. If now
I step on tho toe or other exposed extremity of a dog, a chicken, a
frog, a fish, a crab, a flatworm, and a paramecium (the particular
series is not incontrovertible), all I can say about the sensations
which these creatures have is that I am progressively less certain as
we go through the list that what each experiences is what I experienced.
I may stretch the point slightly and infer that what each of these
animals feels is progressively less like what I felt, but what it is
that they did feel, with mounting dissimilarity to what I felt, is
completely indeterminable. Thus, the analogy cannot be used in comparing
what animals at different evolutionary distances from man will feel in
a given situation, nor, mutatis mutandis, in comparing what they think
(or otherwise do in their minds). On the other hand, if the assumption
were not made that the adequacy of the analogy deteriorates with
phylogenetic distance, then we would have to assume that each of these
creatures felt just what I felt, with no variation due to evolutionary
divergence—an assumption which few writers would be prepared to make,
and which would flatly contradict the fundamental evolutionary principle
of development. But the alternatives in the comparative use of the
analogy are restricted to either denying evolutionary differences or
being mystified by them; in either case, the analogy cannot encompass
such differences as do occur. Even less, if possible, can the analogy
be used to compare the experiences of animals at approximately
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equivalent evolutionary distances from man, because the assumed
deterioration of the analogy applies only to the distance of non-
human species from man, not from each other; this point relates back
to the problem of evolutionary diversity, discussed previously. Do a
cat and a dog feel the same thing in a given stimulus situation? Do
an arthropod and a mollusc? We do not know of course, and presumably
will never find out. The analogy, which is supposed to be the tool we
use in investigating the consciousness of animals, cannot let us infer,
rightly, wrongly, or indeterminately, whether the experiences of these
pairs of animals are the same or different.
In summary, the analogy may well have some degree of validity
in some situations; we have simply to grant this point if we are to
discuss the analogy, because it cannot be established in any other way.
In those cases where the analogy has some validity, we will make more
accurate or valid interpretations of the animal's private mental life
if we employ the analogy than if we do not; the surface appeal of the
analogy is based on this consideration. However, the same kind of
(slightly loose) reasoning that suggests that the analogy has some
point suggests at least as strongly that the analogy will not always
hold; that it will hold for some species and for some components of
mental life in a given species better than for others; and that in
different species where it has the same overall applicability—that is,
presumably, in different species at about the same phylogenetic remove
from man—it may hold differentially for different components of mental
life depending on the particular species involved. Furthermore—and
this is the crux of the matter—all this variability in the worth of
the analogy is hidden from us and cannot be brought into the open. We
can assume that the analogy deteriorates as a gross and indeterminate
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function of phylogenetic distance and morphological dissimilarity,
but this assumption, which can only be introduced as such, does not in
itself provide any insights into the subjectivity of animals as
revealed by use of the analogy. In any given application of the analogy
we cannot be sure that it holds at all (although we suspect that some¬
times—we do not for sure know when—it does not), how well it holds
(although we suspect that it holds for some species—we do not for
sure know which ones—better than for others), for what components
of mental life it holds best (although we suspect that in a given
species it holds better for some components—we do not for sure know
which ones—better than for others). In short, the degree of validity
of the analogy is not only variable but indeterminably variable. Since
it is variable, we must know the sources and dimensions of variability
in order to make any informed use of the analogy; but since the
variability is indeterminable, we are unable to do so. If, in any
situation, we employ the analogy, then whether our inferences based
on it are valid, and if so to what extent, and in what respects, are
all matters which we can never know.
At least some of these problems in the use of the analogy
were recognized by Romanes and by succeeding writers who made use of
it. They did not explore its limitations in detail, but agreed that
its validity was both questionable and unanswerable, and in particular
that it deteriorated as a function of phylogenetic distance. Inferences
to the mental lives of ants and bees, it was agreed, could not be so
well founded as inferences to the mental lives of apes and dogs.
Nevertheless, it was maintained, while we may acknowledge the dubious¬
ness of all such inferences, and especially of the former set, we must
still continue to use them, even if with great caution, simply because
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they comprise the only interpretive method available to us.
That is to say, if we observe an ant or a bee apparently
exhibiting sympathy or rage, we must either conclude
that some psychological state resembling sympathy or
rage is present, or else refuse to think about the sub¬
ject at all; from the observable facts there is no other
inference open. Therefore, having full regard to the
progressive weakening of the analogy from human to brute
psychology as we recede through the animal kingdom down¬
wards from man, still, as it is the only analogy avail¬
able, I shall follow it throughout the animal series
(Romanes, 1882; 1895 ed., p. 9).
While restricting our attention still to an examination of the kinds
of methods which were available for Romanes to employ, we now turn to
the question as to whether there was in fact any "other inference open",
and how the question came to be handled by the comparative psychologists
who succeeded Romanes.
If there was to be any "other inference open" than one
requiring the attribution of sympathy or rage to bees, it would
evidently have to be one that was less dependent on the subjectivity
of the experimenter or observer. That is, the grounds for the inference
of mind in other organisms could not include in any central role the
experimenter's subjective experience or his reflection on his mental
states because, for the tv/o sets of reasons given above, such subjective
experiences and reflection do not provide sufficient information for
the construction and critical application of the analogy, whether the
analogy be directed toward apes or fishes^.
These considerations bring us to the second part of the
assumption regarding the analogy (cf. p. HO), that is, relating to the
similarity of mental operations or cognitive functions in man and beast.
All that was said regarding tho inapplicability or indeterminable
applicability of the analogy applies equally, of course, to everything
that supposedly goes on inside an animal's mind. In the case of mental
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operations, however, the analogy is not only more or less useless, it
is also, as we shall see, irrelevant. Questions about an animal's
mental operations, or more properly about its capacities for such
operations, are questions about what the animal can do; and such
questions can be answered on the basis of objective experimentation.
In fact, Romanes himself attempted to answer them objectively. Although
for the most part Romanes held true to his subjective method of inter¬
preting the animal mind by explicit analogy from what he knew of the
contents of his own mind, he was also very concerned to introduce
objective (that is, publically applicable) criteria by which the
inference from behaviour to mind could initially be justified. As a
result, the basis for a reduction (if not outright elimination) of
subjectivity was present in his own writings, and was confounded with
his subjective methods.
The criterion chosen by Romanes, and retained with only
slight modification by later writers, was essentially the ability to
learn, or to modify behaviour selectively in response to the demands
of a novel situation. The selectivity of the adaptive response was
taken to differentiate learned responses from reflex ones which, while
adaptive, are fixed and invariable.
It is, then, adaptive action by a living organism in cases
where the inherited machinery of the nervous system does
not furnish data for our prevision of what the adaptive
action must necessarily be~it is only here that we recog¬
nise the objective evidence of mind...Does the organism
learn to make new adjustments, or to modify old ones, in
accordance with the results of its own individual experience?
If it does so, the fact cannot be due merely to reflex action
in the sense above described, for it is impossible that
heredity can have provided in advance for innovations upon,
or alterations of, its machinery during the lifetime of a
particular individual (ibid., pp. h-5).
In practice, Roranos further refined this criterion so as to make it
as unambiguously applicable as possible in considering specific instances
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ol' behaviour. He did not consider it definitive however, but merely
broadly descriptive, and was concerned that in certain cases it might
lead to an excess either of parsimony or of generosity in the attribution
and description of mind.
There was a tension in Romanes' analysis resulting from the
fact that two more or less separate lines of reasoning—objective
inferences based on observations of behaviour and subjective inferences
based on application of the analogy—were directed toward the same goal,
the description of the animal mind. Generally, although not with
perfect consistency, Romanes tacitly resolved the tension in the same
way as did succeeding writers, by using the objective inferences to
detail the operations and capacities of the animal mind and subjective
inferences to describe the animal's subjective experiences. In practice
therefore, and for what will be seen to be very good reasons, the
analogy from human to animal mind played much less part in the recon¬
struction of what the animal could do than in the attempts at describing
what it felt.
The differences and the relationship (or lack of relationship)
between thece two forms of inference should bo made clear. If a parti¬
cular capacity—for recognizing size relationships, say, or for abstract¬
ing the spatial positions of objects from a single perspectival view of
them^—is necessary for the performance of a certain action, and if the
animal proves able to perform the action, then the capacity can be
inferred. The procedure is not all that simple of course; it is not
always an easy matter to judge whether the capacity being sought is
recuired for the acquisition or performance of a given test action, or
is only consistent with it, and the methodological development of
comparative psychology after Romanes consisted largely in refining the
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bases on which it could be concluded that the capacity was in each
7
case actually required .
It is obvious that such objective inferences do not provide
direct contact with the inner mental life of an animal any more than
subjective inferences do. They do, however, make it possible to judge
that either a given set of mental operations, or a functionally equi¬
valent set, has taken place. The degree of precision in the specifi¬
cation of what mental operations, if any, may be said to have taken
place 1g dependent only on the degree of precision with which an
experimental task is established (cf. the account of Thorndike's
analysis, below).
Thus, the operations and functional capacities of mind can be,
if not defined in terms of their behavioural consequents, at least
measured and assessed in such terms. The same could not be said of
subjective experience, at least so long as experience was considered,
in the empiricist tradition, as something separate from action, and
especially so long as the experiences being inferred were required to
have the same degree of specificity as those typically considered in
introspective psychology. Experience as such has no 'functional equi¬
valents1 . Neither has anything else considered as such, of course,
but mental operations and abilities could be considered primarily in
terms of their functional significance, while subjective experience,
because of its specifically existential significance, could not.
Determination of the specific quality of experience was precisely what
was of interest. Thus, subjective experience could only be considered
in its own right, in the way in which it actually occurred—that is to
say, failing any better method, by application of the analogy. The
objective criterion could, if used carefully, be used to justify the
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inference that an organism being tested possessed certain capacities
for action, or that it could comprehend relationships (and manifest
its comprehension in action), or even that it was conscious, so long
as consciousness v/as considered as a capacity or mechanism for the
differential sensitization and direction of attention, rather than as
the 'quales' which presumably comprised its content; but the objective
criterion could not, as we have seen, justify any inference relating
to the subjective experience of the organism as something distinguished
from its capacities or propensities for action. The objective criterion
could guide the choice of what particular subjective experiences were
to be inferred, but that inference itself could be justified only by
prior acceptance of the analogy.
In short, subjective experiences are one thing and capacities
or dispositions for adaptive behaviour are another, and the bases on
which each can be inferred are separate. The inference of cognitive or
other capacities can be made on the basis of behavioural evidence, that
is, on the basis of behaviour which cannot be accounted for without
postulating the capacity. The inference of subjective experiences
analogous to those of humans requires, in addition to behavioural
observations, the prior and inescapably a priori assumption that such
subjective experiences occur and are, in fact, analogous to ours.
Inferences concerning an animal's subjective experiences are thus not
only separate from but, what is more important, irrelevant to,
inferences concerning its mental operations, i.e., its capacities for
solving problems, grouping like and unlike objects along prescribed
dimensions, or whatever; for the latter are sufficiently manifest in
observable behaviour and the former are not. It follows that the
qualitative psychic or mental continuity throughout the animal
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kingdom can be demonstrated (if indeed it is present), and the stages
in evolutionary development traced, without reference to subjective
experience; the task requires reference only to capacities, 'faculties',
mental operations, etc., which, while not themselves observable, can
be inferred and subjected to critical examination strictly on the
basis of their observable effects. What would be left out of such an
account is any description of the subjective experiences themselves,
and however great that loss might be it was inevitable under the
circumstances, for given tho inadequacy of the analogy, and the
unavailability of any alternative, such subjective experiences were
in any case being introduced into the interpretive account only by
what amounted to a fiat.
Thus, the way to overcome Romanes' problem of there being "no
other inference open" than one requiring the attribution of sympathy or
rage to bees is to recognize, first, that there are indeed other
inferences open, inferences relating to what the bee is capable of
doing (including, from the construction given, what it is capable of
'thinking*, if anything); and second, that the inference of sympathy
or rage is on Romanes' own analysis unjustifiable. Applying this
insight requires close specification of the objective criterion which
is to justify the inference of course; more important, it requires
specification also, in a form independent of the experimenter's sub¬
jective experience, of the mental characteristics which are to be
inferred. That these characteristics might still be based initially
on ones abstracted from subjective experience is of comparatively
little moment; the important requirement is that they be specified
independently of such experience so that they can in turn be examined
O
and assessed independently \
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The proper or available subject matter for comparative
psychology is thus, initially at least, mind in its external mani¬
festations, rather than mind in its internal constitution and relations.
This may seora to bo halfway on the road to behaviourism already, but
it is not really. In the first place, this formulation of the domain
of comparative psychology does not eliminate, or even significantly
attenuate, the reference to mind; it merely explicates the reference.
In the second place, and as we shall see, behaviourism was the product
of antithesis rather than one of steady development.
Within comparative psychology itself, the lesson about
subjectivity and its limits was gradually and steadily assimilated.
That it was not accepted all at once was due to the conviction already
mentioned, shared by most comparative psychologists, that the descrip¬
tion of the probable subjective experience of non-human organisms
comprised a major part of the explanatory goal at which they were
aiming. The descriptions sought were not required to conform to the
analytic conventions of any particular theory or school of introspective
psychology, but were still expected to be of the same general sort as
were characteristic of introspective psychology at the time. Neverthe¬
less, the equivocality of subjective inferences served to reduce their
independent role in the actual business of reconstructing the animal
mind and loft them to be added at the end; in this way, the subjective
inferences were prevented from interfering with the sifting of evidence.
Somewhat paradoxically, it vias largely because the subjective descrip¬
tions of the contents of the animal mind were the goal or end-point of
research that they could become, at least, harmless in the course of
that research; that is, since they came last, there were relatively
few additional conclusions dependent on them.
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The practical dirainuition of the role of subjective inference
in comparative psychology is exemplified in the work of Lloyd Morgan.
Morgan's Introduction to Comparative Psychology (189^) contained much
the same mixture of subjective and objective methods as did Romanes'
Animal Intelligence (1882), but for Morgan the relative importance of
the two methods was the reverse of what it was for Romanes. Morgan (l89*f,
pp. 56-52) made a profound bow to the necessity and desirability of sub¬
jective inference as a complement to objective inference, but then (ibid.,
PP- 53-59) made several methodological assumptions which jointly served
to minimize the independent role of subjective inferences. First he
assumed, as did Romanes, that the analogy from human to animal mind deter¬
iorates with increase in the amount of phylogenetic separation between the
animal and man. Second, he assumed that the deterioration is not a smooth
function of any other objectively ascertainable evolutionary process.
Third, and most important, he assumed that the analogy would extend to
different capacities or faculties differentially, so that the deteriora¬
tion of the analogy was not necessarily even monotonic . That is, he
assumed that mental evolution is not a unitary process; one species may
possess one faculty to a greater extent and another faculty to a lesser
extent than another species, and thus some animal species may possess
certain psychic faculties to a greater extent than does man (as is obviously
the case with specific perceptual-motor abilities). None of these assump¬
tions was claimed necessarily to be correct; rather, they were introduced
expressly in order to limit severely any systematic but unchecked use of
subjective inference. One was required to assume that the analogy does
not hold in a given way in a given case unless objective inferences provide
an independent account of the animal's mind such that the questioned
application of the analogy could most readily seem to follow. In short,
objective inferences were to lead in the characterization of the animal
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mind, subjective inferences to follow. Thus, while Morgan was not
prepared to abandon the dualism of subjective and objective inferences,
he was sufficiently sensitive to the demands of his research that in
practice he effectively curtailed the claims which could be made on the
basis of the former. His method, as he put it, "is the least anthropo¬
morphic, and therefore the most difficult (ibid., p. 58)."
Morgan posited these methodological assumptions in the context of
developing his famous canon of parsimony. Their effect is summarized in
the canon: "In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the
exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the
outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological
scale (ibid., p. 5^)." The canon and the reasoning which leads to it thus
have the dual effect of encouraging parsimony in general and of subordina-
9
ting subjective inference to objective reconstruction . The canon also
signals the beginning, at least, of an attempt to externalize the mental
characteristics which are to be inferred, that is, to formulate them as
faculties or capacities without reference to subjective experience of their
operation. It is a bare beginning, but the reference to a "psychological
scale" on which the abilities of man and beast alike are to be placed takes
them one step away from their founding in subjective experience and reflec¬
tion. It is not a step which Morgan took with confidence, however, or at
least not one which he followed up, so that while he carefully based each
of his inferences to psychic faculties or capacities on detailed and system¬
atic observations of animal behaviour, he just as carefully translated each
inference into descriptions of the contents of the animal's conscious
experience.
In 1896, Morgan gave a course of lectures at Harvard, where
Thorndike was a graduate student, and it has been suggested that he
influenced Thorndike to take up the problem of experimental research on
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animal behaviour (Warden, JenkinB, & Warner, 1935, I, p. 27). The main
publication that resulted from Thorndike's researches, his "Animal
intelligence" (1898), has been justly acclaimed as a classic for a number
of its innovations, including the introduction of a rigorous experimental
procedure, concentration on typical rather than on extraordinary perform¬
ance, etc. On the issue which we have been emphasizing here, that of the
relationship between subjective and objective inferences in the description
of the animal mind, Thorndike was not entirely consistent. In parts of his
experimental analysis, however, he took the practice of reconstruction of
the animal mind on the basis of objective criteria much farther than it
had been taken before. He asked the question, for instance, what has been
going on in an animal's mind while it has been learning to escape from a
puzzle-box and acquire food?
The commonly accepted view of the mental fact then present
is that the sight of the inside of the box reminds the
animal of his previous pleasant experience after escape
and of the movements which he made which were immediately
followed by and so associated with that escape. It has
been taken for granted that if the animal remembered the
pleasant experience and remembered the movement, he
would make the movement. It has been assumed that the
association was an association of ideas; that when one
of the ideaB was of a movement the animal was capable of
making the movement (Thorndike, 1898; 1911 ed., p. 99;
italics in the original).
In other words, the animal is held capable of abstracting from its exper¬
ience in the puzzle-box a representation of those experiences, a represent¬
ation which it is able to use to guide its subsequent actions. Thorndike,
by contrast, claimed that the animal is capable of no such abstraction, or
at least that no such abstraction guides its behaviour; the basis for his
claim was that the animal was unable to initiate the behavioural sequence
leading to escape and food by means of a new response.
If a cat is given training trials in a puzzle-box, so that
it is made to enter the front door of the box and left to learn the
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response which will open the door and give it access to food, it
will over a series of trials acquire the escape response more and
more perfectly. If the cat is then set outside the box on a test
trial, with the door open, it will initiate the trial by entering
the box of its own accord. If, however, a cat is dropped into the
box from the top, and learns the escape response to the same criterion,
on a test trial it will not enter the box through the front door of
its own accord. Thorndike concluded on this basis that the action of
walking into the box is indispensable to learning the sequence: enter
the box—escape from the box—oat. Ideas cannot be considered to
function in any way independent of such specific behaviour, at least
in cats, because the cats which were dropped into the puzzle-box from
the top
had exactly the same opportunity of connecting the idea
of being in the box with the subsequent pleasure. Either
a cat cannot connect ideas, representations, at all, or
she has not the power of progressing from the thought of
being in to the act of going in (ibid., p. 102).
Thus, whatever cognitions may bo said to function in the cat's behav¬
iour are inseparable from the particular responses which the cat has
acquired in a given situation.
We may note in passing that the evidence in favour of
Thorndike's claim is not conclusive. In particular, it depends upon
the assumption, which Thorndike explicitly made (ibid., p. 29), that
the associations involved in learning to enter and escape from the
puzzle-box are representative or typical of the kinds of associations
which the animal is required to make in its day to day life. With
this qualification, which is an important ono, the most significant
feature of Thorndike's analysis is that he was able to characterize
in unprecedented detail the mental operations of cats by analysing
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the divergent actions which different classes of mental operations
would be capable of initiating. He thus carried the process of
objective inference of mental operations and capacities to a new
level of precision. The *either-or' form of Thorndike's inference
as quoted exemplifies the kind of reconstruction of mental operations
that is possible. Either one set of mental operations, or a
functionally equivalent set, has taken place; either the cat cannot
abstract the reinforcement contingencies from its exposure to the
experimental situation, or it cannot utilize this abstraction in the
determination of its subsequent behaviour.
On the other hand, Thorndike was quite determined that
experimental investigations of the skills, capacities, and general
behaviour of animals should not only "give the much-needed information
how they do it. but also inform us what they feel while they act (ibid.,
p. 26; italics in the original)." Thus, after analysing the mental
operations and capacities of cats in the way just described, he went
on to consider the quality of the cat's consciousness in the course of
the action.
It is most like what we feel when consciousness contains
little thought about anything, when we feel the sense-
impressions in their first intention, so to speak, when
we feel our own body, and the impulses we give to it.
Sometimes one gets this animal consciousness while in
swimming, for example. One feels the water, the sky,
the birds above, but with no thoughts about them or
memories of how they looked at other times, or aesthetic
judgments about their boauty; one feels no ideas about
what movements he will make, but feels himself make them,
feels his body throughout. Solf-consciousness dies away.
Social consciousness dies away. The meanings, and values,
and connections of things die away. One feels sense-
impressions, has impulses, feels the movements he makes;
that is all (ibid., p. 123).
Thus, for Thorndiko, as for Morgan, detailed analysis of an animal's
mental operations were followed by descriptions of the animal's
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subjective experience, such descriptions being based on a dubiously
effective empathy or equally dubious analogy between human and non-
human experience. At the risk of labouring the point, the difference
between the two sets of inferences is, again, not one of •inner* and
•outer'; the operations of mind are at least as •inner' and unobservable
as are the impressions received by that mind. The difference is rather
that the former inferences make contact with observable behaviour
through specification of the actions which the mental operations (or
equivalent ones) lead to, while the latter do not. The latter have
observable causes, but the former have observable effects. The differ¬
ences may bo highlighted by the consideration that the former set of
inferences can be made as confidently if the subjects are ants or
Martians as they can if the subjects are cats or dogs—subject to the
qualification mentioned above, which applies to all four species
equally—while the latter quite clearly cannot. For the latter
inferences, we must already have some knowledge or conviction concern¬
ing the quality of the experiences of the subject organism, a conviction
which for Thorndike as for Morgan and Romanes amounted to a predisposi¬
tion to accept the analogy from human minds to others; but for tho
former inferences, no such prior knowledge or predisposition is necessary.
Nevertheless, Thorndike carried still further than Morgan the
practice of effectively isolating the subjective inferences from the
objective ones. Morgan placed limitations on the use of subjective
inferences which in effect subordinated them to, and prevented them
from interfering with, objective inferences. Thorndike in addition
treated the two kinds of inference as separate and only minimally
related problems, by virtue of his conclusion that subjective exper¬
iences were not effectively implicated in the determination of action.
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Finally, and to complete the series, we may mention the
work of Leonard Hobhouse. Hobhouse's Mind in Evolution (1901) carried
the conceptual and methodological, development of comparative psychology
as traced here to its highest level to that time. Hobhouse formulated
his own version of the canon of parsimony, one that was closer to
Occam's original razor: "In comparative psychology the legal maxim
must hold, that the thing which doos not at some point or other appear
in action must be treated as non-existent (Hobhouoe, 1901, p. 5^)."
Following on this formulation, he made the clearest distinction to
that date between the 'mind' and the 'consciousness' of animals, and
with some regrets took the final step in eliminating the experimenter's
subjectivity as an analytical tool—and hence, in effect, in eliminating
references to the subjective experience or conscious contents of the
animals being tested—from comparative psychology.
I am not here concerned so much with the kind of conscious¬
ness that animals may enjoy, as with the bearings of their
experiences on their actions and achievements. In describ¬
ing the behaviour of an animal, to use terms derived from
the human consciousness is often the only way of avoiding
intolerable prolixity. Properly guarded and corrected by
attention to points of difference as well as resemblance,
such usage can lead to so little error that, even if we
were ultimately to decide that all animals were automata,
no change but that of names would be needed in our account.
By "feeling" in an animal, then, we shall mean a state
essentially similar in causation and function to that which
we know as feeling in ourselves. Whether it is similar in
other respects, is a question which we do not decide by
merely using the term. And so with similar terms (ibid.,
p. 90).
In addition to such conceptual refinements, Hobhouse made numerous
methodological and substantive advances in the experimental study of
animal behaviour. He effectively criticized and corrected the
artificiality of Thorndike's puzzle-box studies and conducted his own
experiments in situations much closer to the animal's day to day life
situations. He prefigured in great detail Kdhler's studies of
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insightful behaviour in apes, made highly sophisticated studies of
what was later to be called •perceptual learning' in cats, dogs, and
monkeys, and incorporated his findings into an evolutionary theoreti¬
cal structure that was in equal parts parsimonious and comprehensive.
His work cannot, however, be afforded more detailed treatment in
considering the development of comparative psychology because, rightly
or wrongly, it was almost totally neglected and had practically no
lasting influence1^. It is at least possible that comparative psychology
might have fared better if it had.
In summary, comparative psychology in the first two decades
of its existence made numerous advances in investigative methodology
and in the scope and precision of its findings. Perhaps even more
important, it worked also at achieving a gradually refined, even if
usually only implicit, conception of its subject matter, as consisting
in the adaptive character and capacities of mind as revealed through
its effects in promoting or potentiating the efficient behavioural
adjustments of organisms to their environments. Through all of this,
its goal remained, with remarkable constancy, that of reconstructing
the pattern of evolutionary development of mind or of capacities for
increasingly complex adaptive behaviour. In Romanes' terms, the goal
was "that of tracing, in as scientific a manner as possible, the
probable history of Mental Evolution, and therefore, of course, of
enquiring into the causes which have determined it (Romanes, 1884;
1969 ed., pp. 11-12)." For Morgan, it was "to ascertain the limits of
animal psychology (Morgan, 1894, p. 53)," "to discuss the relation of
the psychology of man to that of the higher animals (ibid., p. ix),"
and "to indicate the relation of mental evolution to evolution in
general (ibid., p. 358)." For Thorndikc, "The main purpose of the study
of the animal mind is to learn tho development of montal life down
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through the phylum, to trace in particular the origin of human
faculty (Thorndike, 1898; 1911 ed., p. 22)." Finally, for Hobhouse,
the purpoao was "to trace the main stages of orthogenic evolution,
which we have provisionally identified with the evolution of Mind
(Hobhouse, 1901, p. 9)." (Orthogenic evolution is evolution toward
a higher type.) These four writers comprise a convenient group for
illustrating the development of the science, but similar formulations
differing only with regard to the role assigned to subjective inferences
and hence conscious experience could be taken from the writings of
Jennings, Loeb, Lubbock, and others. The tracing of the conceptual
development of the science will take on added significance in the
context of the two following sections, where it will be seen to
indicate a direction that comparative psychology, after becoming embroiled
in further conceptual and methodological difficulties, could possibly
have taken but did not; and will also serve as a source of contrast by
which to highlight these difficulties.
II. Comparative Psychology and Functionalism.
In the attempts at the reconstruction of the animal mind as
detailed so far there is a possible pitfall. From behaviour we can
infer the operations and general functionings of mind. From the analogy
between human and animal minds we can infer—or it was taken that we
could infer—the subjective experiences or conscious contents that
accompanied or were the inner aspects of such operations. What could
seem more natural, therefore, than to explain the observed behaviour
as a function of these conscious contents, or in other words, to show
how the subjective experience of the animal functioned in determining
its behaviour? Such a procedure would be in line with our common sense
expectations concerning the relationship of thought and experience to
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action, and given that the analogy was to be used at all, there would
seem to bo little reason not to use it in this way.
The reason for not using it in this way of course is that the
analogy is, as we have seen, incapable of systematic justification or
critical modification. Its use is not warranted at all, and the only
saving grace attached to its use was that it was coming to be used less
and less centrally as comparative psychology developed. Refraining
from use of the analogy would not constitute a repudiation of the
subjective experience of other organisms, but merely the recognition
that use of the analogy could not in any case encompass such subjective
experience. That is, the particular subjective experiences of an
animal being tested could not really be inferred on the basis of the
analogy, but merely posited, since the analogy amounts to a statement
that subjective experiences of a certain sort—similar to those of man-
occur. In this respect, use of the analogy can only echo already-held
beliefs, derived from whatever source, about the subjectivity of animals.
Attempts based on use of the analogy to show how an animal's subjective
experience determines its behaviour would therefore involve the use of
an incorrigibly artificial construct in a central role, would amount to
explaining the known by, not merely the unknown, but the unknowable.
None of this, however, was fully appreciated at the time. The
only writer, among those mentioned, who did not rely on the analogy was
Hobhouse, and he did not repudiate it so much as abandon it; in any case,
his lead was not followed subsequently. None of the other three writers
discussed above entirely avoided the pitfall of explaining behaviour with
reference to subjective experience, but for different reasons they did not
become altogether ensnared in it. For Romanes and Morgan, as already
indicated, the description of possible or probable subjective experience
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was an end point in the reconstruction of the animal mind; as a result,
such descriptions did not have a major systematic function in any
further chain of reasoning. Morgan, in addition, placed such stringent
limitations on the use of subjective inference that it was effectively,
even if not theoretically, subordinated to objective inference.
Thorndike treated the two kinds of inference as separate and only
minimally related tasks, being convinced that in point of fact subjective
experiences did not function separate from behaviour in guiding subse¬
quent behaviour. For these writers, subjective inferences were more or
less isolated from the rest of the task of reconstruction. Being isolated,
such inferences were, if of little use (from our standpoint), at least
relatively harmless. By contrast, in most of the behaviour research
associated with the American functionalist movement in psychology, there
were no such factors operating to minimize or mitigate the role of
subjective inferences and the consequences of their use.
Functionalism.
The genesis and development of functionalism in American
psychology has been amply described by Boring (1950a) and related by him
to such self-consciously American turn-of-the-century preoccupations as
individualism, practicality, democracy, and the loss of the open western
frontier (see also Boring, 1950b). Functionalism was in large part based
on or inspired by evolutionary theory of course, just as was comparative
psychology in Britain, but with a difference. Functionalism, to begin
with, was a general movement in or orientation toward psychology (it was
never a system), of which comparative psychology was one small part. The
general character of the difference between British and American post-
Darwinian psychology is sometimes summarized by saying that in British
psychology the dominant focus of interest was in explicating how we all—
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men and animals—arrived at our present positions, with the emphasis
both in comparative and in differential psychology on these positions
as already established; while in American functionalist psychology
the focus of interest was more on explicating and harnessing the
principles of development and change, with the emphasis on the ongoing
process of change itself. This interpretation of the difference in the
two psychological traditions, as reflecting general differences in
national mood or preoccupation, is, as an interpretation, admittedly
facile. Furthermore, it requires serious qualification, inasmuch as
the most virulent forms of 'social Darwinism'—which might perhaps
better be called 'social Spencerism'—arose also in the United States,
as justification for the current distribution of wealth and power
(Corwin, 1950). Still, whatever the limitations of the general account,
it is quite true at the level of simple description that a liberal,
progressivist, and optimistic version of evolutionary dynamics and
their implications underlay and provided the thematic background for
much of functionalist psychology.
It followed, therefore, that the central concern in function¬
alist psychology was with the processes of adaptation, growth, and
development—in the individual, the species, the phylum, and the animal
kingdom as a whole, in roughly that order of descending emphasis. The
way in which this concern was initially expressed marks another source
of the difference between American and British psychology. At first,
psychology in the United States, especially the naturalistic and
experimentally inclined psychology associated with the universities,
was derived in large part from German influences, and particularly the
introspective experimental psychology of Wundt. This 'new psychology',
as it was called, was of course a psychology of the fundamental contents
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of consciousness. The way in which the American interest in develop¬
mental processes and individual differences, in conjunction with the
interest in the implications of evolutionary theory, gradually trans¬
formed this somewhat abstract conception of psychology into the more
concrete functionalist one is described in detail by Woodworth (1931) .
The transformation Itself was remarkably simple and straightforward;
indeed, what is largely of interest in it is that it was gradual, non-
revolutionary, cumulative, and quite fully recognized at the time.
That it was gradual and non-revolutionary is indicated clearly enough
by the piecemeal way in which it occurred and by the relative lack of
opposition which it encountered; its main opponent was Titchener, who
did not repudiate it so much as merely suggest that it was occurring
too soon. That it was quite fully recognized and even intentional on
the part of its chief agents is indicated by the early statement of
James (1881+) and the later one of Titchener (1898), both contrasting
psychologies of structure with psychologies of function, or as Titchener
put it, the "is" with the "is for".
Functionalist psychology was thus neither a continuation nor
a reaction, but an adaptation of the Wundtian, introspectionist,
structural psychology to the particular demands of the American situation.
British psychology, by contrast, was from the beginning less inclined
toward analytic introspection and experimentation than were either the
German or the American sort. While British psychology was introspection¬
ist, it was not systematically so, and did not have such an overriding
concern at any time with the specific, analytically determined contents
of consciousness. In consequence, the hold of analytic introspection,
and hence of consciousness—the specific kind of consciousness which
could be discovered through analytic introspection—as the basic subject
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matter of psychology, was much stronger in Germany and the United
States than in Britain11; it was strong enough in the United States
that in the course of the quite non-revolutionary passage from Wundtian
to functionalist psychology both introspection as a collection of
methods and the associated consciousness as the subject matter of
psychology were willingly retained.
The consciousness that was retained was, nevertheless, regarded
in a somewhat different way than Wundt (or Titchener) regarded it. The
emphasis in functionalist psychology was, quite reasonably, on the uses
of consciousness, what it was good for, how it facilitated the adapta¬
tions of organisms to their environments. James (1890) wrote at length
on the presumable efficacy of consciousness as a regulator of the
complex, finely tuned, and inherently unstable neural mechanisms of the
12
highly evolved human brain . Angell explicitly based his psychological
writings on the principle that "consciousness is an organic function
whose intrinsic occupation consists in furthering the adaptive responses
of the organism to its life conditions (Angell, 1904, p. 79)." Function-
alism, he stated in brief, is the "psychology of the fundamental
utilities of consciousness (Angell, 1907, p. 70)."
Neither James nor Angell, nor, for some time, almost anybody
else, made either a methodological or a theoretical distinction between
consciousness as a form of differential and directed sensitivity to
different aspects of the environment, and consciousness as a state of
basic personal awareness consisting of specific private experiences.
Nor, for their purposes, was there any particular reason to do so,
although the distinction is, as we have seen (p. 152), an essential
one if we are to talk about the consciousness of animals. The signifi¬
cance of the two aspects of consciousness and at least some aspects of
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the distinction between them were certainly acknowledged, as when
Angell spoke of attention as "the very heart of consciousness, its most
important centre of vitality (1901+, p. 6k)," and, on the other hand, as
when both writers took part in the acrimonious debates concerning
whether, and how, consciousness as a state of basic awareness could
have evolved from some previous state which contained no traces of it.
But while the distinction was made, what was distinguished was regarded
as no more than different points of view in the consideration of
consciousness—as indeed, in one sense, it was. That is, the distinction
that was made was the perspectival distinction, fundamental to function-
alism, between what consciousness is and what it does, between its form
and its functions, its contents and its operations, its "is" and its
"is for". It was therefore, in light of the gradual way in which the
functionalist orientation developed, a distinction that could support
a difference in emphasis, but not a difference in basic theoretical and
methodological stance. While it was the latter aspects of consciousness,
that is, its functions or operations, that were of principal interest to
the functionalists, the consciousness that was thereby studied in terms
of its utility was clearly understood to be the same consciousness that
could otherwise be studied in terms of its form, internal properties,
or content. That is, the functionalists were concerned with the adaptive
significance of that same consciousness of which Wundt and Titchener were
13
investigating the structure . The distinction between the form or
contents of consciousness on the one hand and its functions on the other
in no way corresponded to a distinction between a consciousness that
could be studied and a consciousness that (at least in animals) could
not, between consciousness as publically inferrable and consciousness as
inescapably private. It would in fact have been virtually impossible
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for the two distinctions to correspond; it is of principal importance
for them to do so only in animal psychology, which was not initially
at the centre of the functionalists* concern, and even within animal
psychology use of the analogy was widely regarded as a means whereby
the second distinction (between investigable and non-investigable
consciousness in animals) could be circumvented. Indeed, it would
have seemed bizarre to any psychologists of the day to suggest that the
two distinctions should correspond; consciousness, after all, is what
it is, whatever it is, and while it can be studied in different ways,
it is surely the same consciousness that is being studied.
Functionalist Comparative Psychology.
Thus, functionalism was concerned with the adaptive signifi¬
cance or utility of that consciousness which exists as a state of
awareness independent of its functions, with the adaptive significance,
that is, of those conscious contents that include what was designated
previously as 'subjective experience' or 'experience as such'. Given
the increased liberalism in contemporary psychology concerning studies
of consciousness, it is possible to look with more sympathy on this
type of investigation than might have been possible, say, twenty years
ago. Indeed, so far as the enterprise was applied to human beings, who
are often capable of fairly accurate introspection, it may be worthy
of considerable respect. But for comparative psychology, where there
was no opportunity for independent reporting of conscious contents and
of behaviour, the consequences of functionalism's stand were immediate
and disastrous. The general programme and orientation of functionalism
mass it inevitable that comparative psychology would fall into the pit¬
fall described at the beginning of this section, that of using inferred
subjective experiences as a systematic basis for accounting for an
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animal's behaviour, and would fall into it, furthermore, in a
particularly debilitating manner. Let us see why this should be so.
The subject matter of functionalist psychology, human and
animal alike, was consciousness as such, considered in terms of its
functions and adaptive significance. That is, it was the adaptive
significance of the specific and particular subjective experiences
or mental operations which an experimencal subject was having or
performing while in the experimental situation; and in the case of
animal subjects, of course, these various conscious contents had to
be inferred rather than reported. Such particular conscious contents-
subjective experiences and mental operations—clearly had functions,
and it was these that were of interest, but because of their particu¬
larity could not have functional equivalents. That is, they could not
be approached or investigated through a consideration of their functions
or effects but had to be considered directly, in the way in which they
actually occurred. As detailed in the previous section, it is only
when functionally equivalent sets of inferences can be drawn that it is
possible to make any sort of testable reconstruction of an animal's
mental life; and in functionalist comparative psychology this condition
was lacking. Consciousness or subjective experience or mental operations
as such—anything as such—have, again, no functional equivalent. There
is no functional equivalent for the existence or the purely existential
characteristics of anything, even when, as in the present case, the
reason for directing attontion to that thing is to ascertain and analyso
what functions it in fact has. Since it was the function of conscious¬
ness as such, or of the specific contents of consciousness, that
interested the functionalists, it was therefore of central importance
to the programme of functionalist comparative psychology to describe
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the particular content of an animal's consciousness, just as they and
the structuralists alike described the particular content of human
consciousness, so that the specific functioning of this consciousness
in determining the animal's behaviour could be demonstrated.
Boring (1950a) neatly summed up the three-stage method which
was typical of functionalist comparative psychology from the late 1890s
until about 1915, in a bald statement of the relationship between
observation, subjective inference, and reconstruction of the animal
mind based on such inference:
The rule of functional animal psychology of that date was
that, when you have finished your observations of behavior,
you use the results to infer the nature of the animal's
consciousness and then show how those processes function in
the animal's behavior (Boring, 1950a, p. 556).
V/here this rule departed from the method of Romanes and his successors
was simply in the addition of the systematic requirement that the
inferred conscious "processes" must be shown, and shown with specific
detail, to "function in the animal's behavior". The functionalists,
however, possessed no new and better ways of gaining access to these
conscious processes or subjective experiences of non-human organisms,
and so had to rely more than ever on the assumed adequacy of the
analogy from human to animal minds.
In thus employing the analogy between human and animal
minds as the tool for the interpretation of the latter, the functional¬
ists, as we shall see, constructed a comparative psychology that was
significantly different in emphasis from the contemporaneous British
movement in the field (to which we have effectively assimilated
Thorndike1if). Both movements, of course, made much use of the analogy.
What differentiated functionalist comparative psychology was first, its
emphasis on the functional utility or significance of specific conscious
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contents (as just discussed), and second, its character of being
more closely derivative of introspective psychology. These two
features jointly prevented functionalist comparative psychology from
making those compromises with the exigencies of research which
established the British programme of work in the field as viable
despite its incorporation of the analogy in a central role. Instead,
and in conjunction with the generally accepted constraints on psycho¬
logical theorizing, these two features led the movement, quite against
the wishes of many of its ablest exponents, toward an almost trivially
sensationalistic, 'passive organism' model of the mental life of
animals. In the process, the field of comparative psychology could
hardly help taking on the shallow mentalism and estrangement of data
from theory against v/hich behaviourism was advanced as an explicit
reaction.
It might be suggested that the development in functionalist
comparative psychology of a sensationalistic, passive organism model
of mental life could follow in part from the continuing influence of
the British empiricist tradition, in which the passive organism model
had been gradually developed and fully adumbrated from Locke through
the Mills. Certainly the continuing influence of the British empiri¬
cist and associationist model was invoked many years later by Hull
(1%3) as providing the thematic background for the psychology of his
own day. But while the influence of this tradition may indeed have
been implicated in the course of development of functionalism, it could
hardly provide a sufficient account; the British comparative psycholo¬
gists discussed previously were, presumably, equally subject to the
influences of British empiricism, and yet they managed at least in part
to go beyond a passive organism model in considering what animals were
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capable of doing.
The influence of introspective experimental psychology—
which was itself of course largely a German formalization of the tenets
of British empiricism—was no doubt directly implicated to some degree
in the acceptance of a sensationalistic model within functionalism.
V/undt's and Titchener's psychological systems were themselves, by the
late 1890s, becoming increasingly oensationalistic (especially
Titchener's), and had always been elementaristic. The status of
functionalist psychology as being partly derivative of introspective
psychology afforded a high initial credibility to descriptions of the
consciousness of animals based on the same terminology and structural
organization typical of the more straightforward experiments in human
introspection. The difference between American and British comparative
psychology was, it is quite true, not fundamental in this respect,
since in both cases the descriptions of animal consciousness were based
on the model of human introspection. In Britain, however, the descrip¬
tions were relatively imprecise, often based on the somewhat vague
classifications of Locke or Hume (cf. footnote 3 to this chapter); in
the United States, by contrast, they were considerably more precise
(or more precise sounding) and more explicitly sensationalistic, as
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befitted their more immediate origin in experimental introspection
The principal influence of introspective psychology, however,
was an indirect one, manifest through its original influence on the
constitution of functionalism, whereby functionalism was to be concerned
with the utility of the particularized individual consciousness. In
brief, the incorporation of a sensationalistic, passive organism model
in comparative psychology, while no doubt facilitated by the other
influences mentioned, followed principally from the methodological
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difficulties in taking the functions of consciousness qua state of
awareness as the object of investigation. To clarify these difficulties,
let us again consider the tension that would be present in any account
that attempted to incorporate both objective and subjective inferences.
This tension did not severely affect functionalist comparative psycho¬
logy} because the two forms of inference were not generally combined.
Nevertheless, the way in which the tension was avoided for functionalism
makes an illuminating contrast with the way in which it was resolved by
earlier writers.
The tension, of course, is that between the two available
bases for inferring the existence and operations of mind or of mind¬
like activity, that is, between objective inferences based on observa¬
tions of behaviour and subjective inferences based on the analogy from
human to animal minds. Again, from the observations of behaviour in
conjunction with a carefully specified criterion we can infer the kinds
of integrative or adaptive capacities which an animal manifests in its
behaviour, and from the application of the analogy to such observations
we can supposedly infer the actual mental operations and experiences
which are present to the animal's consciousness. If these two sets of
inferences yield different conclusions, there is a problem in reconcil¬
ing them; if they do not, it becomes questionable whether both are
necessary. The tension was resolved or at least mitigated for the
writers previously discussed by their considering the two forms of
inference as relating to more or less separate questions; for Morgan,
additionally, by his making subjective inferences effectively subordinate
to objective ones; for Thorndike, additionally, by his conclusion that
subjective experiences play little or no part in the determination of
behaviour. For the writers associated with functionalist comparative
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psychology, however, the tension could not be resolved or avoided
in quite this way. Subjective inferences could hardly be subordinated
to objective inferences inasmuch as it was the relationship of private
or subjective experience—the natural goal of subjective inferences—to
ongoing behaviour that was the focus of interest. At the same time,
objective inferences could not be wholly subordinated to subjective
inferences because of the realization and general acceptance that all
inferences had in some way to be uniquely determined by observations
of behaviour if they were to amount to anything more than rank speculation.
Nevertheless, objective inferences were, in a way, subordin¬
ated to subjective inferences, or in another way assimilated to them.
Some such subordination or assimilation was presumably inevitable. The
most effective product of objective inferences was mental capacities or
faculties for adaptation, conceived independently of any conscious
experience; and such capacities could be of little relevance or interest
in the context of a primary and irreducible concern with the functional
utility of specific conscious experience. What was required, therefore,
was some way to combine the particularized content of subjective
inferences with the public observational basis of objective inferences,
some way, in other words, to place subjective inferences—inferences to
subjective experiences, predicated on the analogy from human to animal
minds—under the strict control of objective criteria.
There was, furthermore, no apparent difficulty in restricting
the latitude of subjective inferences in just this way. Such
restrictions were, after all, continually being increased as part of
the methodological development of comparative psychology. The function¬
alist comparative psychologists wore heir to all the constraints on the
drawing of subjective inferences which Morgan had introduced and summar¬
ized in his canon, as well as to the methodological strictures in favour
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of rigorous experimental procedures advanced by Thorndike. Morgans
canon of parsimony required that sal subjective inferences (and
objective ones as well) be the minimal ones available. The methodolo¬
gical. strictures associated with the development of experimental
methods required that the factors relevant to the performance of a
task required of an animal be all, as far as possible, explicitly
specified and hence controlled in the establishment of the experimental
situation. The subjective inferences, that is, were to relate as
uniquely and precisely as possible to the animal's experience of and
reactions to the specifiable parameters of the stimulus situation.
In the context in which they were originally introduced,
these restrictions did not have quite the same intent or effect as they
came to have in functionalist comparative psychology. Morgan and
Thorndike employed both subjective and objective inferences, and the
function of the restrictions on the drawing of inferences was in large
part that of regulating the relationships between the two kinds. The
restrictions served to emphasize objective inferences based on observable
behaviour, to minimize the latitude of subjective inferences, and
consequently to subordinate subjective inferences to objective ones.
Subjective inferences were subordinated, that is, both by being required
to conform to the initial interpretations based on objective inferences
and, inasmuch as they were the end point in the inferential chain, by
having little or no specific functional significance assigned to them.
As a result, the burden of explanation for the most part fell on the
objective inferences.
In functionalist comparative psychology, by contrast, the
restrictions could servo only to reduce the latitude of subjective
inferences. They could not regulate the relationship between subjective
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and objective inferences sinco, due to the emphasis on specific
conscious experience as the subject matter of psychological investiga¬
tions, objective inferences were hardly implicated at all. It is of
the greatest importance to emphasize, furthermore, that subjective
inferences could only be restricted by these means; they could not be
refined, in the sense of malting increasingly precise or accurate contact
with the animal's subjectivity, because of the insuperable difficulties
described previously in gaining access to such subjectivity and in
checking the worth of the inferences to it. In the British work in
the field, it is impossible to judge whether or not subjective inferences
were becoming refined or more accurate, but it is certain that, in
addition to being restricted by the methodological constraints, they were
being guided and directed by the account of the animal mind already
established on the basis of objective inferences. They were closely
determined by the behavioural observations, that is, in two ways; they
were restricted by the methodological constraints, and directed by the
objective inferences. In functionalist comparative psychology, since
there were practically no objective inferences, the subjective ones
were merely restricted by the methodological constraints.
Since such methodological constraints on their use comprised
the only check on the drawing of subjective inferences in American
research, the increasingly sophisticated employment of these constraints
became implicated more and more centrally in the development of com¬
parative psychology, as a means—the only means—for making the
inferential accounts precise and unambiguous. But again, while such
constraints could make the inferences progressively more 'objective',
in the sense of being based on publically observable events and
publically applicable criteria (i.e., so that different observers could
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make the same inference), they did not make them any more accurate.
Objectivity and accuracy, in this instance, were quite separate and
unrelated considerations, even if they were, naturally, not recognized
as such. Objectivity was a consideration relating to the information
from which the inferences proceeded; accuracy was one relating to the
consciousness to which they proceeded; and all the procedures designed
to maximize the former could do nothing to increase the latter.
Thus, the interpretation of experiments carried out within
the programme of functionalist comparative psychology came to display
a curious pattern. On the one hand the methodological strictures
served to minimize the choice and extent of subjective inferences, and
did so more and more as the methodological sophistication of animal
behaviour studies continued to increase. As a result, the inferred
conscious contents gradually became correspondingly restricted and
impoverished as to their constituents. On the other hand, because of
the priorities of functionalist psychology these impoverished inferred
conscious contents were accorded enormous functional significance. To
put it another way, the strictures on the drawing of subjective infer¬
ences—the canon of parsimony, the increase in experimental control-
refined these inferences in the only way in which they could be refined
and rendered uniquely determined by the experimental situation; they
refined the inferences, that is, by rendering them little more than a
reflection, or a translation into the sensationalistic language of
introspective psychology that was held appropriate for the description
of subjective experience, of the animal's behaviour and of the parameters
of the experimental situation as they were judged to impinge on the
animal's sensory apparatus. Looking backward from our present perspec¬
tive, we can see that tho reason for such an impoverishment of
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subjective inferences as a function of increase in experimental
control—the same experimental control that was supposed to render
them precise and unspeculative—was simply the incorrigible artificiality
and unwarrantability of such inferences. As the latitude for speculation
decreased, so did the latitude for subjective inferences; but the
subjective inferences could only be restricted rather than sharpened.
As a result, the more they were restricted, the closer they came to
being merely trivial. But such almost trivially inferred states were
supposed to comprise conscious contents, which were supposed to have
functional utility; they were what was held to guide behaviour, and
explicating how they did so was taken to be the most significant part
of any comparative psychological experiment. In short, at the same
time that subjective inferences were becoming so restricted and hemmed
in that their artificiality and triviality could hardly fail to become
evident, their importance in revealing the determinants of behaviour
vms being magnified as never before.
As a result, a sensationalistic, passive organism model of
mental functioning could hardly be avoided. The alternative to a
passive organism model of mental activity is one in which the organism
performs internal operations of a sort which do not simply mirror
its surroundings and its internal biological conditions. Such an
•active organism1 model is certainly compatible with an evolutionary
emphasis on the development and functioning of adaptive processes, and
was indeod the theoretical goal of much of functionalist psychology.
However, the elaboration of such an active organism model would require
some sort of specification or description of the internal activity. The
only effective way to make contact with such activity is through
objective inferences from the organism's behavioural capacity, because
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only such inferences relate to internal capacities and operations
that can be specified in terms of their functional significance.
Functionalist psychology had little place for such descriptions of
capacities or functionally equivalent sets of internal operations
however, because of its particular concern with individual consciousness.
It was thus limited for the most part to subjective inferences. Subject¬
ive inferences, in turn, might conceivably have been used for the
description of the particular mental operations that an animal was
performing. Such inferences could not have been very effective, it is
true, since subjective inferences, necessarily based on the use of the
analogy, never are. But they might at least have stimulated the develop¬
ment of objective methods—methods, that is, based on the use of
objective inference—for the description and analysis of such mental
operations, if the operations themselves had been agreed to be of
principal interest. This suggestion is purely conjectural, admittedly,
but it is strengthened by the fact that the replacement of subjective
methods with objective ones for making the kinds of descriptions
generally desired, that is, those in which the actions of the experi¬
mental animal are regarded as reflections of its surroundings and its
internal physical states, was much the course that psychology followed
in giving birth to behaviourism.
But this is getting ahead of the story. Within the programme
of functionalist comparative psychology, subjective inferences—
inferences to the private mental lives of individual organisms—could
not legitimately be directed to the description of mental operations,
regardless of how heuristically valuable such inferences might have been.
In th: absence of any account based on objective inferences (which could
serve to subordinate the subjective ones), subjective inferences could
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be prevented from lapsing into uncontrolled speculation only, as we
have seen, by being kept rigorously related to the specifiable para¬
meters of the experimental situation. Mental operations of the sort
which would characterize an active organism model could not, almost by
definition, be so restricted; such operations were hence outside the
range of control which could be exercised over subjective inferences,
and such inferences were, accordingly, restricted to the minimal
sensationalistic ones.
The passive organism model of mental life which became
typical in functionalist comparative psychology was thus in large part
a methodological artifact, resulting from the constraints imposed on
subjective inferences in an attempt to make them objective, rather than
simply a product of the continuing influence of the empiricist tradition
or of any other longstanding philosophical trend. It is not less
important in the subsequent history of psychology on that account, but
its derivative status highlights the more immediate significance of the
methodological constraints, and begins to indicate how the model could
be retained, as a result of similar methodological considerations, in
behaviourism. Furthermore, the attempt by the functionalists to make
objective descriptions of subjective states could not, it is apparent,
be ultimately successful; it resulted only in the organism's growing
ever more passive. The 'organism' thus studied in terms of its subject¬
ive experiences became more and more a mere reflection or sensationalis¬
tic translation of the stimuli which it received and of the responses
which it emitted. Between stimulus and response there figured little
more than a mental representation of the stimulus and a mental represent-
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ation of (or instinctive impulse to) the response
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A Representative Experiment.
It is potentially misleading to describe the emergence and
trivialization of the passive organism model entirely as a gradual
process of development, for the artificial quality of the theoretical
accounts advanced within functionalist comparative psychology was more
or less characteristic of the field from the start, and increased only
slightly throughout the short life of the movement. It resulted, as
has been indicated, not from the progressive elaboration of a set of
workable although flawed principles, but from the thematic influences
that were present in almost fully developed form from the beginning.
The interplay of observations of behaviour and inferences to subjective
experience in the interpretation of the animal mind is brought out
forcefully in as early a study as Small's investigations of learning in
rats (Small, 1899, 1901). Small's study included the experiments in
which he introduced the maze as a tool in the study of animal learning.
In the experiment to be quoted here (in which the discussion is unusually
concise), a rat was trained to gain access to a portable goal box
containing food by tearing off a paper seal which obstructed the door to
the box. On the test trial, the door to the box was further secured so
that it required a firm push to open it after the seal had been removed.
At the beginning of the quotation Small discussed the quality and contents
of the rat's consciousness before it encountered the new obstruction.
The train already formed may be figured somewhat as follows:
feeling of hunger, sight of box, smell of food (these two
probably simultaneous), curiosity, location of food in box
by smell (and sight), tearing off paper, getting food,
pleasurable state. In some instances, as has been noted
in considering the preceding groups, the first term of
this hypothetical series drops out, and the mere sight of
the box is sufficient to start off the train. (It is quite
possible that the instinctive acquisitiveness furnishes the
organic basis for the series in such cases. It is highly
unlikely that any excitation of a purely sensational
character would furnish the motive force.) The connection
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of these links becomes so Intimate that when the rat is
normally hungry the appropriate movements are gone
through with immediately upon seeing the box introduced
into the cage. Now, when this associative process is
broken up at the biting-off-paper point, as in this
experiment, what happens in the rat's mind? The mani¬
fest purpose of the animal is to get inside the box,
and this desire to get inside is coupled with the idea
of getting in through the door. The modified form of
the association train may now be: hunger, a mixed image,
motor and visual, of entering the box through the door,
getting the food, pleasure. That is, one of the terms
of the chain is variable—the association is not deter¬
minate. When this term is expunged, another one, perhaps
a suppressed one, rises to take its place. Of course it
is not necessary to postulate such a process as the
following in the rat's mind: "Biting off paper fails of
its usual result, therefore I'll try another method." The
only necessary elements are: the persistence of the feel¬
ing of hunger, the location of the food inside the box,
either as a present smell-sensation or as a memory of getting
the food inside the box, or both, and the memory of getting
in at that place. This last accounts for the constant
return to, and the poking of, the door, but, as she is not
hurt by it, her boldness increases; and this being further
stimulated by the smell of food, finally impels her to force
open the door.
The pausing of the rat when the door unexpectedly failed
to open might seem to imply reflection; but this is not so
in any strict usage of the term reflection. Surprise and
disappointment would be quite sufficient to restrain
activity for the time; and these affections would preclude
the possibility of reflection unless reflection is used
merely in a descriptive sense to designate the transition
from this passive state to an active state under the re-
surging impulse of hunger. That the rat feels "why" or
"what" is certain, that she thinks "why" or "what" is
both doubtful and unnecessary...
It is also clear, I think, that what properly may be
called ideas, find slight place in the associative process.
Crass images—visual, olfactory, motor—organic conditions,
and instinctive activities are assuredly the main elements.
That these elements may bleach out and attenuate into ideas
is not impossible. Analogy with human experience would
indeed point to that conclusion (Small, l899f pp. 153-155).
Small's interpretations of his experimental observations
were typical of many that were made during this period, by Kinnaman
(1902), Kline (1899), Watson (1903, 1907), and others. The general
rule is that stimuli lead to sensations, which lead to associations,
which in conjunction with instincts lead to behaviour. There were
of course theoretical debates going on, but they tended to centre on
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the relative importance of sensations versus instincts in the mental
life of animals, or on the differential role of stimulus-produced
sensations versus organic ones in directing behaviour (Watson*s 1907
paper, which he presented as a more precise test and confirmation of
Small's hypotheses, was addressed to this latter question). The
inferred train of associations was typically similar to that brought
out in Small's discussion, containing sensational, impulsive, and
motoric (response) elements indifferently; it was almost classic
associationism, or a sort that, one can presume, would have been quite
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acceptable to the Mills or Hartley, and certainly to Wundt . The
point to be emphasized is that in practically all such work the mental
aspect of the animal's activity was conceived almost entirely in terms
of what it has, rather than in terms of what it does. In Small's paper
there were almost no inferences to capacities or mental operations, of
the sort which characterized Thorndike's report a year earlier. Both
writers agreed in concluding that 'ideas' play little part in the
determination of the animal's behaviour. But for Thorndike this con¬
clusion was reached by considering what responses could be potentiated
by the presence and functioning of ideas, responses which his experi¬
mental animals did not perform; for Small the conclusion was dependent
only on the possibility of postulating a sufficient number of 'impulses'
—drives or instincts—that could interact with the animal's experience
to stimulate whatever behaviour was observed to occur. The chain of
inferencos in Small's discussion started with the rat's observable
behaviour and the characteristics of the experimental situation;
progressed to the rat's sensations and feelings, which latter were
either those arising from postulated instincts (e.g., curiosity) or
-se resulting from experimental manipulation (e.g., of deprivation
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schedules); and from these sensations and feelings in conjunction
with behavioural instincts moved back to behaviour again. The infer¬
ential chain, in brief, proceeded from stimuli (including movement-
produced stimuli), to the organism, to responses; but the •organism'
component of the inferential chain was almost entirely passive,
consisting of sensations, instincts, feelings, and impulsions. The
inferred mentation, that is, was a passive process; what the rat did
was a function solely of what it subjectively experienced and of the,
not explicitly specified, laws of association. In every instance where
the possibility arose that the rat was initiating a train of mental
operations (reflection, analysis of relationship between action of
tearing off seal and expected consequence), Small concluded solely on
the basis of parsimony that it was not doing so. His conclusion was
spuriously facilitated by his representing the possible mental operations
as propositional in each case; but what is more important is that he
gave no indication of what behaviour the rat could perform that he would
take as indicative of self-initiated internal operations. That is to
say, lacking any behavioural criterion by which he could judge whether
or not ideas or any other form of autonomously mental operations took
place, Small was constrained by the canon of parsimony to conclude or
assume that they did not. As a result, the evidence of the rat's be¬
haviour could not be implicated in the general direction of the inter¬
pretation of its mind or consciousness. This general direction of
interpretation was established in advance, as indicated, by the
methodological constraints on the making of subjective inferences.
The irrelevance of behavioural observations to the general
line of interpretation of the animal mind on the one hand, and the
polarity of trivial inferred conscious contents versus the great
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functional significance they were supposed to have on the other,
together were responsible for the estrangement of data from the
theoretical interpretations which were supposed to make sense of them.
Thorndike (1901) vigorously criticized Small's experiments partly on
the grounds of the equivocality and unwarrantability of any conclusions
which could be drawn from them concerning the constitution of the
animal mind; but Thorndike's own ideas about how to proceed in inter¬
preting the animal mind were not sufficiently clear that they could
have very much effect—even assuming, as is dubious, that they could
have had much effect otherwise.
It did not take long, nevertheless, for the unsatisfactoriness
of this kind of theoretical interpretation to give rise to a widespread
reaction. Small's experiments constituted the first detailed working
out of the functionalist programme in comparative psychology. In the
eight years between 1899, when Small's initial report was published, and
1907, when Watson stopped making use of subjective inferences in his own
experimental work, there was only a slight elaboration or exacerbation
of the trends which Small's own discussions displayed. In the five
years between 1907 and 1912, when Watson repudiated subjective inferences
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altogether, there was only a slight bit more . The behaviourist revo¬
lution that Watson inaugurated was a direct and largely explicit reaction
against the kind of psychological interpretation exemplified by the
quotation from Small. The reaction, furthermore, was in light of the
imbalances of functionalist comparative psychology a justifiable one,
although the direction which the reaction took in being promulgated
beyond the bounds of comparative psychology was, perhaps inevitably,
such that these imbalances were never rectified.
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III. The Birth of Behaviourism.
Contrast between American and British Comparative Psychology.
In brief, the function of functionalist comparative psycho¬
logy was twofold. On the one hand, it served to assimilate all con¬
siderations of mentality and of psychological organization in animals
to the private consciousness of individual animals. That is, everything
about the animal which is not itself behaviour, but which is presumed
to determine or have some effect upon behaviour—in other words, every¬
thing related to the animal's mind—has an autonomous status such that
it cannot receive any investigation predicated merely upon a study of
its presumed effects upon behaviour but requires, in addition, an
interpretive key (use of the analogy) that has in itself no evidential
justification and no direct relationship to behaviour. The dualism
effectively incorporated within the comparative side of functionalism
was therefore not just one of mind and behaviour. It was one of a mind
which could not receive any characterization merely on the basis of its
effects, and conversely, of behaviour which was not sufficient to
provide any information about the factors which potentiated it. Mind
and behaviour were both inescapably an slch . What mediated between
them in the construction of theories was something that belonged to
neither, that is, the analogy.
On the other hand, when the analogy was applied to the inter¬
pretation of mind, the requirement that the interpretive inferences be
minimal rendered the mind thus revealed of such a sort that its separate
and special status hardly seemed to have any point. The private
consciousness to which all mentality was assimilated, and which was
therefore so important in guiding behaviour, turned out to contain
little more than a copy of observable external factors. Mind was
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an sich but, apart from tho fact that it was totally other than and
separate from—that is, had a different ontological status than—the
organism's immediate environment, seemed curiously similar to it. Behav¬
iour could not reveal the factors which potentiated it, but these factors,
again apart from their different ontological status, were almost identi¬
cal to the external environmental and experimental factors which were in
fact the ones systematically manipulated in order to vary behaviour.
This situation may be contrasted with the one that prevailed
in British comparative psychology, which also effectively incorporated
a dualism of mind and behaviour. There, as much by accident as anything
else, mind was not so thoroughly separated from behaviour, and so could
be characterized in part on the basis of that behaviour. That is, it
was at least partly an accident that this was so, since initially it was
the mind of the introspectionists—the mind comprised of conscious
contents—that the British psychologists were trying to discover in their
animal subjects, just as it was for the Americans. For the British, as
a result, those considerations of mentality and psychological organiza¬
tion which did become assimilated to private consciousness fared no
better than in America. They likewise required interpretation by means
of the analogy, and were, consequently, incorrigibly artificial; but
they were not required to comprise the totality of what was being
investigated as mind. Because of this, the inability of the British
comparative psychologists to discover the mind of the introspectionists—
an inability which was quite as unrecognized for them as it was for
most of the American researchers—did not lead them into a dead end.
Instead, it led them step by step to a mind that they could discover,
the mind that manifests itself sufficiently in the organism's adaptations
to complex and ever changing environmental conditions.
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What gave the British comparative psychologists this
relative freedom of maneuver, so that they did not have to assimilate
all mentality to private consciousness, was the negative factor of
their not being primarily concerned with the relationship between
conscious contents and behaviour. Consciousness, for them, was of
interest for its own sake even more than for its relation to ongoing
behaviour. The demands of objectivity in reconstructing the mind on
the basis of observations of behaviour therefore led them, not to
trivialize their subjective inferences (which would have contradicted
their aims), but to supplement them with objective ones which could
provide an apparently sounder footing—it was certainly sounder in the
sense of being more detailed, definite, and unambiguous, even if not
in the sense of being more conducive to accuracy—from which the
subjective inferences could then proceed. Such a method could not fully
explicate the relations between consciousness and behaviour, since the
variability in the inferred conscious contents and the variability in
observed behaviour did not always correspond; but for the British com¬
parative psychologists, if not for the functionalists, that was an
acceptable limitation. What such a method could do was to make the
description of consciousness both detailed and apparently definite
(which was initially its main purpose), and also, almost incidentally—
although less and less so as the science developed—to allow sophisti¬
cated and exact determination from an external viewpoint of the
capacities and mental operations involved in em animal's behavioural
adaptations. The mind-behaviour dualism implicit in British comparative
psychology was therefore in part—the part that made the development of
science possible—a dualism of capacities or faculties vs. their
behavioural manifestations, capacities fbr behaviour vs. the behaviour
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which manifests them .
For the functionalist comparative psychologists, by contrast,
there could be no compromise with their goal of showing how conscious
contents guided the behaviour of animals, for explicating that relation¬
ship was central to their conception of the task of psychology. Like
the British psychologists, the functionalists could subordinate non¬
essential aspects of their task to the essential ones, but for them
the nonessential aspects were the converse of what they were for the
British; that is, they were those concerning the intrinsic constitution
of consciousness. This intrinsic constitution could be trivialized so
long as the relationship between consciousness and behaviour, which
relationship was for the functionalists the essential thing, was left
intact. The functionalists were thus constrained to attack the problem
of that relationship head on, by using the analogy without any additional
tool which could support and hence vindicate it. In consequence, they
could not begin to develop any fundamentally different ways to account
for behavioural adaptations until they were prepared to replace the
introspectionist conception of mind with one that was more appropriate
to their purposes—which they could not do for a number of reasons,
the main one being that for some time the introspectionist conception
was the only widely available one that did not carry an unacceptably
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heavy gloss of Hegelian idealism or theology or both —or, of course,
until they were willing to drop the reference to mind altogether.
It is one of the small ironies of history that the functiona¬
lists were unable to deal with the adaptive capacities of mind, precisely
because they were trying so hard to do just that; while the British
comparative psychologists were able to make considerable progress in the
task, precisely because it was not initially their major concern. The
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irony is resolved, if not lessened, by the realization that the two
groups of comparative psychologists shared a conception of the mind
that is totally inappropriate as a basis for investigating the adaptive
capacities of animals; but the British psychologists, because they were
not so tied to using it for that purpose, could at least begin to
transcend it^1.
The Behaviourist Reaction.
When a dualism proves unacceptable, when the way it divides
nature comes to be regarded as counter-intuitive or counter-productive
of further intellectual and scientific progress, the wisest course might
then be to re-examine the resulting division, to see if what has been
treated as two might better be regarded as one, or if the lines of
division should be differently drawn. However, this course is hardly
ever followed, or if it is followed by some individuals it is with
little effect. The more typical reaction to an unacceptable dualism
would seem to be to emphasize one of its poles to the exclusion of the
other. Thus, to Descartes' dualism of mind and body, a dualism that had
a primary metaphysical and a subordinate epistemological aspect, the
metaphysical reaction was La Mettrie's mechanistic materialism and the
epistemological reaction was Condillac's sensationalism. Neither was
able fully to replace Cartesian dualism because each proved unable to
incorporate many central aspects of human experience to which the
Cartesian model, in however unsatisfactory a manner, gave due weight.
Something similar happened with the founding of behaviourism.
The dualism of mind or consciousness vs. behaviour that was the un¬
witting product of functionalist comparative psychology was clearly
untenable . The mind which resulted was autonomous and unavailable to
independent empirical investigation, was somehow possessed of enormous
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functional significance while being comprised of trivial contents.
The behaviourist reaction was to drop the reference to mind or
consciousness and to try to assimilate all psychological considerations
to the behaviour which, in functionalism, was the complement of
consciousness.
The foundation of behaviourism as a self-consciously new
start for psychology was discussed briefly in Chapter 2. Let us now
examine it in more detail specifically as a reaction to introspective
psychology and to functionalist comparative psychology, as expressed
in Watson's (1913a) announcement of the movement's birth.
Given the conceptual difficulties associated with function¬
alist comparative psychology, one could well sympathize with Watson's
complaint:
On this view, after having determined our animal's ability
to learn, the simplicity or complexity of its methods of
learning, the effect of past habit upon present response,
the range of stimuli to which it ordinarily responds, the
widened range to which it can respond under experimental
conditions,—in more general terms, its various problems
and its various ways of solving them,—we should still
feel that the task is unfinished and that the results are
worthless, until we can interpret them by analogy in the
light of consciousness. Although we have solved our
problem we feel uneasy and unrestful because of our defini¬
tion of psychology: we feel forced to say something about
the possible mental processes of our animal (ibid., p. 160).
Watson's recommendation with regard to this unsatisfactory situation was,
at first sight, an eminently reasonable one. He suggested that since the
relation of consciousness to behaviour is essentially stipulative,
experimentally indeterminable, and irrelevant to all those problems
that can be investigated experimentally, it is fruitless to continue
trying to solve all those problems—pseudo-problems we might almost say—
which pertain to the relationship.
Such problems as these can no longer satisfy behavior men.
It would be better to give up the province altogether and
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admit frankly that the study of the behavior of animals
has no justification, than to admit that our search is
of such a 'will o' the wisp' character. One can assume
either the presence or the absence of consciouness any¬
where in the phylogenetic scale without affecting the
problems of behavior by one jot or one tittle; and with¬
out influencing in any way the mode of experimental
attack upon them (ibid., p. 161).
Such considerations as these served to support his contention that we
should drop or at least minimize all concern with consciousness in
comparative psychology, and study only that which is experimentally
investigable, that is, behaviour per se.
It seems reasonably clear that some kind of compromise
must be effected: either psychology must change its
viewpoint so as to take in the facts of behavior, whether
or not they have bearings on the problems of 'conscious¬
ness'; or else behavior must stand alone as a wholly
separate and independent science (ibid., p. 159).
How promising such a programme would be would have to depend
on the characteristics of the 'behavior' which was henceforth to be
emphasized, and on what, if anything, was eventually to replace the
introspective conception of consciousness. The two considerations are
closely related, as the introspective conception of consciousness and
the functionalist conception of behaviour (which Watson was starting
from) were complementary. As it turned out, however, nothing was to
replace the introspective conception of consciousness, and the comple¬
mentary conception of behaviour was to be left on its own. This became
clear as Watson continued his polemic. In the first instance, his
analysis mainly supported a demand for the autonomy of comparative psycho¬
logy. In this restricted field, the focus of attention solely on
observable behaviour could be justified by the unmanageability and
fruitlessness of the more heavily theoretical conceptions which were
available ;o comparative psychology. Watson went further, however, and
his analysis became a bid for assimilation of the rest of psychology
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when he carried the argument out of comparative psychology as such and
into general psychology. After insisting on the independent value of
behavioural observations in comparative psychology, Watson proceeded
to detail the conceptual and methodological problems which he considered
were an inevitable accompaniment of any kind of psychology, not just
comparative psychology, which was dependent in any way on introspection.
Introspection was an inadequate method and 'consciousness' as such
provided the foundation of an inadequate conceptual framework, not only
for comparative psychology, but for scientific psychology in general.
Consciousness, therefore, had to be scrapped, without replacement,
throughout the discipline.
I do not wish unduly to criticize psychology. It has failed
signally, I believe, during the fifty-odd years of its
existence as an experimental discipline to make its place in
the world as an undisputed natural science .. .The time seems
to have come when psychology must discard all reference to
consciousness; when it need no longer delude itself into
thinking that it is making mental states the object of ob¬
servation .. .1 firmly believe that two hundred years from now,
unless the introspective method is discarded, psychology will
still be divided on the question as to whether auditory sensa¬
tions have the quality of 'extension,' whether intensity is an
attribute which can be applied to color, whether there is a
difference in 'texture' between Image and sensation and upon
many hundreds of others of like character (ibid., pp. 163-I6lf).
The existing division of labour between consciousness and behaviour, and
hence between introspective and behavioural methods in psychology, was
not, it seemed, to be reworked or re-analysed; rather it was to be repu¬
diated. Watson, in other words, was standing out as the champion of that
behaviour which he had been investigating all his professional life—the
behaviour studied in functionalist comparative psychology—over against
the consciousness in terms of which that behaviour had until then been
explained—the consciousness likewise studied in functionalist comparative
psychology, as well as in introspective psychology. The two poles of the
functionalist dualism, consciousness and behaviour, were so far separated
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that they could not be related to one another except on a priori
grounds. Since the former, consciousness, could have no observational
status as a theoretical construct and no independently determinable role
in the production of behaviour, the natural response to Watson seemed to
be simply that of lopping it off, sundering the dualism and malting an
enormous gain in conceptual economy thereby. This was Watson's response
in emphasizing one pole of the consciousness-behaviour duality to the
exclusion of the other, and furthermore, by excluding that other,
declaring that all genuine phenomena and problems which previously had
pertained to it could be better expressed in the language of behaviour:
Psychology as behavior will, after all, have to neglect but
few of the really essential problems with which psychology
as an introspective science now concerns itself. In all
probability even this residue of problems may be phrased
in such a way that refined methods in behavior (which
certainly must come) will lead to their solution (ibid.,
p. 177).
Thus, the behaviourist reaction to the incommensurability of
consciousness and behaviour, to the unbridgeable gap between theory and
data, to the esoteric distinction between the (hardly distinguishable)
internal causes of and the external stimuli to behaviour—the reaction
to all of this was to deny the meaning, existence, or conceptual
necessity (there was some vacillation) of consciousness, theory, and
internal causes; to repudiate, in short, that which could not be
resolved. It was all declared unnecessary, throughout all of psychology,
with the firm expectation that everything of genuine psychological
interest, everything that was in any way related to observable behaviour
(including, therefore, not consciousness, but talk about consciousness)
could be fully accounted for without it.
This clarion call to behaviourism was certainly revolutionary
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enough in its abrupt denial of all concern with consciouness, and it
was appreciated as revolutionary from the beginning, since an attack
upon consciousness as the subject matter of psychology seemed to strike
at the heart of the scientific enterprise. And strike it did, although
as an attempt at a direct resolution-through-repudiation of a dualism,
it involved no re-examination of the terms of that dualism and only
little of the relationship between them, and therefore carried over
into the new age a major part of the conceptual framework which that
dualism embodied.
In contrasting behaviour as it was then conceived, with
consciousness as it was then conceived, and affirming that only the
former should have scientific status, Watson was, again, attempting
to resolve the consciousness-behaviour dualism of functionalism by
denying it and expressing everything of psychological interest in terms
of behaviour alone. What initially limits such a programme is that
'behaviour' is not a pristine concept. In the consciousness-behaviour
dualism, behaviour as well as consciousness derives its properties from
the dualistic relation—just as, in Cartesian dualism, body was
assigned its properties by contrast with mind as much as (or even more
than) mind was assigned its properties by contrast with body. Behaviour,
like body, is thus not given as uninterpreted data, but as the embodi¬
ment in a fairly simple way of the conceptual framework to which it has
been assimilated. If there is something wrong with the conception of
consciousness which was associated with functionalism, there is likewise
something wrong with the complementary conception of behaviour, and
any programme of research based upon that conception of behaviour could
therefore be expected to embody, in a suitably disguised form, the same
limitations.
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What is wrong with the conception of behaviour which grew
out of functionalism is that it is an impoverished concept. Everything
that gives meaning to behaviour, everything that establishes behaviour
as adaptation to the environment, as subserving the economy of the
organism, as performing broadly biological functions—all of these
features of behaviour are by no means denied in the functionalist
conception, but are separated utterly from the observable aspects of
the behaviour of animals, and are assimilated loosely and unclearly to
a private consciousness that cannot be characterized merely in terms
of the adaptive functions themselves. What is left as observable
behaviour is the movements of a physical body in space; such behaviour,
again, is insufficient to reveal the factors which potentiate or evoke
it. The meaningfulness of behaviour, in short, neither resides in
behaviour nor can be characterized solely on the basis of the observable
features or results of that behaviour. Without the somewhat ineffable
consciousness that, so to speak, 'informs' behaviour, the behaviour of
organisms differs little from the behaviour of stones.
This is not to say that a psychology based on the repudiation
of consciousness as the guide for behaviour would be wholly unable to
deal with the factors responsible for behaviour, or would be unable to
distinguish organisms from stones. Consciousness as the basis for
behaviour was, as we have seen, a somewhat trivial construct, serving
as little more than the means whereby external stimulation could be
transformed into internal agency. The way in which this internalization
actually resulted in adaptive agency—that is, the way in which the
private consciousness of the animal was directed toward the process of
adaptation—was never made clear; and indeed, it could not be made
clear so long as the methodological constraints on subjective inferences
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22restricted those inferences to the minimal sensationalistic ones
With the repudiation of consciousness, therefore, what were left as
the determinants of behaviour were the same experimental and other
environmental conditions which had already effectively served as
determinants through the mediation of consciousness. These external
conditions could now be variod explicitly so as to show their effects
on behaviour--on behaviour as physical movements—and could thus be
shown to account for behaviour by themselves without the necessity of
invoking any intermediary, non-empirical, explanatory concepts. At the
beginning behaviourism was thus, at the very worst, no worse off for
explanatory concepts than was functionalist comparative psychology.
But if all this is not to say that a behaviourist psychology
would be wholly unable to account for behaviour, it is still to say
that the behaviour which it was capable of accounting for remained the
behaviour characteristic of functionalist comparative psychology. The
focus of control has shifted, from the environment-via-consciousness
to the environment per se, but the behaviour that is thus controlled
remains isolated from its biological adaptive significance. The meaning
or functional significance of behaviour still does not reside in
behaviour, nor does it serve (through the conception of adaptive
capacities) as one of the determinants of behaviour; it appears rather
as the result of behaviour, as an abstraction from the observed series
of environmental-behavioural correlations or stimulus-response connect¬
ions. Environment has thus replaced consciousness as the vehicle of
meaning, but has not improved upon it; the functional significance
which is the meaning of behaviour still forms no part either of the
constitution or of the immediate determinants of behaviour. The most
essential characteristics of the organism's functioning in the world—
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previously its consciousness, now its behaviour—remain a reflection
of environmental conditions. Watson put it quite clearly; the
"principal contention" of behaviourism, he said, is that "there are no
centrally initiated processes. The environment in the widest sense
forces the formation of habits (Watson, 1914; 1967 ed., pp. 18-19)."
Thus, it follows that the goal of a behaviourist psychology—the only
reasonable goal under the circumstances—is that "given the response
the stimuli can be predicted; given the stimuli the response can be
predicted (Watson, 1913a, p. 167)."
It can be seen, therefore, that the behaviourism propounded
by Watson was an improvement over functionalist comparative psychology
in the one important respect that it made the factors which the latter
had in fact emphasized in the determination of behaviour—experimental
and other environmental factors—into the explicit determinants of
behaviour. These determinants were thus essentially unchanged as to
their content but were reformulated so as to make them explicitly
manipulable and observable. Behaviour was, consequently, of such a
sort that it could now reveal the factors involved in its production,
which it could not do in functionalist comparative psychology unless
abetted by application of the analogy. But behaviourism was not an
improvement over functionalist comparative psychology, or any sort of
significant change from it, in its conception of the composition of
behaviour. Behaviour remained composed of isolated, separable responses,
each occasioned separately by specific causal factors and the entire
series integrated likewise by external causal factors. Control, whether
naturally by the environment or systematically by the experimenter,
remained central to the conception of behaviour—not extrinsically, as
related merely to the goals of research, but intrinsically, as following
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from the composition of behaviour as being essentially reactive, as
being evoked in each particular by environmental pressures. Again, it
is because of this composition of behaviour as reactive that Watson
could formulate the goal of behaviourism—given the stimulus, to predict
the response, etc.; for given that behaviour is reactive in this sense
(as previously, consciousness had been), achieving that predictive goal
23would amount to making a complete explanation of behaviour . Behaviour¬
ism therefore retained the investigative priorities that had unwittingly
developed in functionalist comparative psychology, those of showing
precisely how the organism's functioning (behaviour, consciousness) was
a reflection of the specific parameters of the experimental situation.
Behaviourism replaced the old sensationalism with a new environmentalism,
and conscious processes with responses as the unit of analysis, and
thereby structured the priorities in such a way that they could be
implemented more directly and precisely than before—a significant
change, unquestionably, even if it did not involve any fundamentally new
problems or solutions. It is in this sense, which is not exactly the
one he intended, that Watson was quite correct in his claim that "behav¬
iorism is the only consistent and logical functionalism (ibid., p. 166)."
As such, behaviourism established itself, initially at least,
as no more conceptually suited to dealing with problems of generalized
adaptive capacities in animals than functionalist comparative psychology
had been. Just as the latter had been directed by its research priorities
toward explicating the specific subjective experiences implicated in the
performance of a given behavioural adaptation, so was the former, inherit-
in; those priorities, directed toward explicating the specific stimulus
conditions which called forth a given response. Just as the particular¬
ized nature of these subjective experiences made it difficult for the
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functionalists to arrive at an effective general characterization of
the mental processes required for bringing about behavioural adaptations,
so did the particularized nature of these stimulus conditions make it
difficult for the behaviourists to arrive at an effective general
characterization of the relationship between environmental circumstances
and the patterns of adaptive responses made to them. Just as functiona¬
list comparative psychology tended toward sensationalism largely as a
result of the rigorous experimental control needed for drawing subjective
inferences, so did behaviourism tend toward elementarism largely as a
result of the rigorous experimental control needed for the demonstration
of stimulus-response connections. In both cases, the artificiality of
the fundamental units of analysis (specific subjective experiences,
specific responses) tended to restrict the theoretical and experimental
analyses to isolated laboratory situations.
The restrictive tendency was resisted of course. It was not
the intention of Watson or any of the other early behaviourists to
restrict the scope of their explanatory models in any such a way, any
more than it had been the intention of the functionalist comparative
psychologists to do so. On the contrary, both groups were very concerned
to avoid the narrow, abstract, laboratory-based academism which they both
considered an undesirable characteristic of introspective human psychology.
Both therefore made vigorous attempts to apply their principles to the
understanding of concrete practical situations, and did so with varying
amounts of at least partial success. Despite these efforts, the tendency
toward minute analysis of specific events, toward making the units of
analysis smaller and more restricted (rather than larger and more inclu¬
sive) as a function of increased experimental control and theoretical
sophistication, was part of the methodological foundation of both
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movements; and it was therefore a tendency, central to both movements,
that required constant resistance in order for either to make any
continuing progress toward their explanatory goals. The tendency toward
minuteness of analysis at the expense of breadth of coverage, it should
be emphasized, affected both functionalist comparative psychology and
behaviourism equally; it stemmed as has been shown from the emphasis on
rigorous experimental control, characteristic of both movements, rather
than merely, in behaviourism, from an emphasis on observable behaviour.
Thus, from the viewpoint of behaviourism's relationship to the
psychological tradition from which it emerged, as well as from that of
its specific proposals for the future conduct of psychology (cf. Chapter
2), the revolution that founded behaviourism was a methodological
revolution. Behaviourism consisted largely in an objective reconstruction
of the programme of functionalist comparative psychology—or, as we can
now say, an objectivist reconstruction, since what was central to it was
the replacement of subjective with objective formulations as a matter of
principle, based on the judgment that only the latter should be admissible
in science. The repudiation of consciousness, the adoption of a stimulus-
response model, the tendencies toward environmentalism and minute analysis
—all of these characterized the foundation of behaviourism, and all
stemmed from the simple elimination of subjective inference and the con¬
sequent objectivist reconstruction of the programme and conceptual frame¬
work of functionalist comparative psychology.
Alternatives to the Behaviourist Reaction.
We may pause for a moment to inquire whether the reaction
against functionalist comparative psychology could have taken any other
form than the behaviourist one. On the surface, it would appear obvious
that the metnodological orientation of the contemporaneous British work
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in the field might have provided an alternative—especially as it is
somewhat fictional to call this orientation 'British' in any case, one
of its chief exponents being Thorndike. Watson, or someone else, might
indeed have repudiated 'consciousness' as comprising any part of the
subject matter of comparative psychology, and declared (then implemented
the declaration) that the subject matter should instead be the capacities
or processes of adaptation themselves. Such a reformulation might well
have made something similar to the workable parts of the 'British'
programme central to comparative psychology, while leaving out the
artificial descriptions of conscious experience also implicated in that
programme. Furthermore, such a reformulation could have been perfectly
in line with the functionalist emphasis on growth and adaptation—far
more in line with it than the actual programme of functionalist compara¬
tive psychology ever was. Why, then, could no such reformulation as this
have been made the basis for change?
It is impossible to do more than speculate as to why such a
programme might not have developed, but a few suggestions offer them¬
selves. First, the British orientation was never explicitly formulated
(except somewhat elliptically by Hobhouse) as a way in which behavioural
evidence could serve, without recourse to the analogy, as the basis for
the characterization of mind; such a formulation of that programme
depends upon a reconstruction of it as was offered here. The British
workers made as thorough and determined use of the analogy as did the
Americans, only, it must have seemed, more loosely and imprecisely, and
with even fewer doubts about its validity. What was viable in their
programme was thus never available as an explicit alternative to the
functionalist procedure. Furthermore, even if it had been so available
it might well have been unacceptable; formulated explicitly, the British
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programme was very similar to a faculty psychology, and faculty psycho¬
logy was in even worse repute in America (where it had been appropriated
by the parsons) than in Britain (where it was merely suspected of being
unscientific—cf. footnotes 19 and 20 to this chapter). Watson's
concluding hope in his announcement of behaviourism was that a behaviour¬
al psychology would soon be "as far divorced from an introspective
psychology as the psychology of the present time is from faculty psycho¬
logy (ibid., p. 176)."
Basically, however, it may be that such a reformulated programme
would have been at once too much of a change and too little. It would
have been too much of a conceptual reorientation to take effect entirely
within the introspectively derived framework of functionalism, and too
little to serve as the basis for a strong reaction against it; too much
in that it would seemingly have required the abandonment of the whole
concept of analytic introspection for insufficient reasons, and too little
in that it would have kept the unobservable inner mental causes of
behaviour intact. It would have required a subtle and sophisticated re-
analysis and reformulation of the functionalist dualism; and as suggested
previously, such a reanalysis of a dualism is both difficult and rare.
This speculation is reinforced by the fact that some such
reformulation was indeed attempted, and for the whole of functionalism,
by Dewey (1896; cf. footnotes 13 and 16 to this chapter). Dewey's intent
was to stress the coordinated reaction of the individual to events
constituted as such by way of their impingement on the individual's life
situation. Stimulus, response, consciousness, were not, Dewey maintained,
isolated events or states, but components equally of an integrated
adaptation; separation of them by analytical introspection or by any
other means was artificial and destructive of the integration. However,
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Dewey18 analysis, while often cited, was never incorporated within
the conceptual basis of functionalism, and Dewey himself did not long
remain involved with psychology as it was practiced by the psychologists.
Thus it may be that Watson, and with Watson those who followed
his lead, were at once too much trapped within the already constituted
functionalist conceptual framework, and too impatient with the experi¬
mental products of that framework, to consider making basic modifications
of it. The implicit aspects of that framework—elementarism, experimental
rigour—had become too fundamental to their conception of behaviour to be
seriously modified; and the explicit aspects—conscious processes,
internal causes of behaviour—had become too unacceptable to be retained.
If this reconstruction is valid, then it would have been, not quite
impossible, but certainly very difficult, for the behaviourist reaction,
at least within comparative psychology, to take any form basically
different from the one it did, involving a repudiation of the explicit
problematic elements and a retention of the implicit methodological ones.
The Incorporation of Positivism.
The account as presented eo far has, however, an element missing,
one which helped to give the newly constituted behaviourism its initial
momentum and to integrate some of its diverse trends. It has been left
until the end so that the behaviourist reaction could first be presented,
as far as possible, solely in terms of problems internal to the practice
of psychology. This remaining element is simply the source of the
'principle' by which subjective formulations could be generally replaced
with objective ones, both in comparative psychology and throughout
psychology. It is here that the incorporation of positivism within
behaviourism appears and becomes relevant, for with this incorporation,
all of the features of behaviourism as just cited were free to become
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subtly modified.
The incorporation of positivism within behaviourism must
itself be regarded in two aspects, as an internal development within
comparative psychology and as an external influence brought in for
the purpose of extending the range of that development throughout
psychology. The repudiation of consciousness as a concept or construct
within comparative psychology was perhaps reinforced by the already
growing positivist and anti-metaphysical cast of the scientific culture
as a whole, resulting from the breakdown of the Newtonian synthesis, but
it was nonetheless a specific response to a specific conceptual dilemma
primarily affecting one area of psychology. The repudiation of unobserv-
ables—the unobservables that were causing trouble—in comparative
psychology was in this respect a purely internal development. It was
unquestionably a positivistic move, but was one of the sort that was
described in Chapter 3 as a natural and appropriate response to unresol-
vable conceptual dilemmas which come to vitiate scientific research in a
given field. Whether, had the reaction stopped there, the positivist
recasting of comparative psychology would have eventuated in a new set
of theoretical principles and presuppositions which would gradually have
been allowed tacitly to assume realistic significance, as was described
as the typical course in many other sciences, is impossible to say with
any certainty; but there is no specific indication in the course of
psychological research to that time which would cause one to assume
otherwise. However, the reaction did not of course stop with comparative
psychology but was extended throughout psychology. As a result, the
purely internal pressures which justified it within the more limited
field were no longer sufficient as a justification.
What was required to constitute the behaviourist reaction as
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establishing a positivist orientation throughout psychology was the
extension of the repudiation of unobservables throughout the discipline
—the repudiation of consciousness elsewhere than in comparative psycho¬
logy and the subsequent repudiation of other unobservables throughout
psychology. This extension of the reaction was contained in large part
in Watson's original polemic, although it by no means ended there. The
conceptual basis for the extension was inherent in the emphasis on
rigorous experimental control of environmental conditions as the only
means for isolating the determinants of behaviour. That is, there was
an implicit environmentalism incorporated within the foundations of
behaviourism, one that was entirely analogous to the sensationalism
from which it derived, and a tendency toward environmentalism is
entirely compatible with an insistence that the determinants of behaviour
all be observable. However, the extended version of the rejection of
unobservables could not, again, be justified, as the limited form of the
24
rejection of consciousness in comparative psychology could be justified ,
by appeal simply to the impossibility of getting on with research while
restricted to the old introspective formulations. The general form of
the rejection required rather an appeal to the physical sciences as
providing an external standard of objectivity against which introspective
psychology as a whole could be tried, found wanting, and rejected. In
Watson's words:
Psychology, as it is generally thought of, has something
esoteric in its methods. If you fail to reproduce my
findings, it is not due to some fault in your apparatus
or in the control of your stimulus, but it is due to the
fact that your introspection is untrained. The attack
is made upon the observer and not upon the experimental
setting. In physics and chemistry the attack is made
upon the experimental conditions. The apparatus was not
sensitive enough, impure chemicals were used, etc . In
these sciences a better technique will give reproducible
results. Psychology is otherwise. If you can't observe
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3-9 states of clearness in attention, your introspection
is poor. If, on the other hand, a feeling seems reason¬
ably clear to you, your introspection is again faulty.
You are seeing too much. Feelings are never clear
(Watson, 1913a, p. 163).
It was on the basis of nothing more than this application of a hypo¬
thetical or ideal external standard of objectivity that Watson was able
to carry his argument against consciousness out of its limited ambit in
comparative psychology and into psychology as a whole, and to maintain
thereby that the unresolved and contentious problems of introspective
psychology (e.g., the imageless thought controversy; cf. Chapter 2)
would never be resolved, were incapable of resolution. Unless one was
"wedded to the system as we now have it," Watson maintained, one could
never be expected to believe that "there will ever be greater uniformity
than there is now in the answers we have to such questions"—quite
regardless of the fact that "it is admitted that every growing science
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is full of unanswered questions (ibid., p. lb/f)."
Thus, to the initial home-grown rejection of consciousness as
a theoretical construct in comparative psychology was added its rejection
throughout psychology on the basis of appeal to the alleged practices of
the physical sciences. It was on this that behaviourism's claim to
encompass the whole of psychology was founded, and with this claim, the
resulting application of an objectivist, positivist orientation through¬
out the entire discipline—or at least, as much of it as could be won
over. The longstanding tendency in psychology for appeal to the physical
sciences, that is, was made the basis for the incorporation (as opposed
to an internally stimulated emergence) of positivism, by being used as
a s indard for the rejection of all unobservables, specifically all
mentalistic ones. The adoption of such an external standard of objecti¬
vity by which all mental entities could be repudiated was, as we have
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seen, consistent with the conceptual framework which behaviourism
acquired in its reaction to and outgrowth from functionalist compara¬
tive psychology, whereby the emphasis on the environmental control of
behaviour established a predisposition toward searching for causes
that could be seen, rather than merely hypothesized. That is, it was
the establishment of this conceptual and methodological framework that
motivated or stimulated the application of the external standard through¬
out psychology. Since, again, some sort of appeal to the physical
sciences had long been customary in psychology, the addition of the
external standard of objectivity was therefore not, at the time, a very
large stop. On the contrary, it is of some interest as indicating the
autonomous direction of development of psychology that it was an almost
unnoticeably small step. It was a step that had profound consequences
nevertheless, because it served to base the restriction of attention
to observable entities and processes on a rationale sufficiently
general that it could have far wider applicability than any argument
derived from particular problems in psychology.
The main effect of the systematic appeal to the external
standard of objectivity was to further establish the methodological cast
of behaviourism, a cast which it acquired in the first instance through
the form of its reaction to functionalism. That is, such a rationale
for the repudiation of unobservables, by being more general than any
derived from specifically psychological concerns, was also more diffuse
in its applicability. The considerations internal to psychology which
led Watson to the repudiation of consciousness—the problems of doing
research on animal behaviour within a functionalist framework—were
related, at least, to what had become a substantive issue, to wit
environmentalism. Environmentalism, as basic to the foundation of
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behaviourism, established a predisposition toward searching for
external and observable causes for behaviour, but these causes were
necessarily of a particular sort. Use of the external standard of
objectivity, instead of unadorned environmentalist presuppositions, as
the basis for the rejection of internal 'mental' causes, made it
possible instead for the causes sought to be of any sort whatsoever, so
long as they were observable or at least empirically specifiable. Thus,
v/hile Watson never came to abandon or seriously limit his commitment to
environmentalism--on the contrary, he increased it more and more--he
established the methodological base on which others could dispose of it
at will.
The full-scale establishment or entrenchment of positivism in
behaviourism, through the rejection of other unobservables throughout
the discipline, took some time. Unobservables were weeded out of psycho¬
logy one by one, and by the time they were all or almost all excised it
was becoming apparent that behaviourism had to seek a more sophisticated
basis than it had possessed previously if it was to continue to develop.
The general repudiation was, nevertheless, implicit from the beginning,
in the emphasis on the environmental or other control of specific
responses, as just discussed. Furthermore, Watson took great pains to
eliminate mentalistic terms of every sort from his psychological
vocabulary as soon as he propounded the behaviourist programme; his
paper on "Image and affection in behavior" (Watson, 1913*0 was directed
toward this end.
•Instincts* and other concepts indicative of behavioural
dispositions were tolerated for a somewhat longer time. They did not
become seriously marked for elimination until the mid 1920s, largely as
a specific responso to thoir excessive use by McDougall and other
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'instinct theorists', who seemed to be using them in the service of
the nominalist fallacy. The toleration for instincts in behaviourist
psychological theories might have been due in part to the difficulties
involved in making a strictly behavioural translation of inherited
behavioural dispositions. Even so, as early as 1914 Watson proposed
one tentative answer to the problem, in his book on comparative
psychology, a book in which he still, in other contexts, made occasional
use of the instinct concept:
In thus arguing against a fundamental difference between
the behavior of man and brute it must not be supposed
that we are trying to support the continuity theory of
the Darwinians...It has often been said that where there
is similarity in structure, as an observed fact we find
similarity in function.. .Logically we must apply the
principle consistently. If we find man doing something
which the animal does not do, it is due to one of two
things: (a) the animal does not possess the structure,
or (b) he does not possess it in a highly enough develop¬
ed form (Watson, 1914; 1967 ed., p. 321).
Differences in behaviour, in other words, should be accounted for in
principle by differences in structure and in environmental conditions,
rather than by the presupposition of independently existing and
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functioning behavioural predispositions . Again, however, use of
this analysis for disposing of instincts would require a continuing
theoretical commitment to environmentalism. The course that was more
generally adopted v/as to allow the dispositional properties expressed
by the term 'instinct' to survive in a modified form as 'drives'; drives,
like instincts, are autonomous behavioural dispositions, but they are
different from instincts in that they can be manipulated by the experi¬
menter, thereby satisfying at least the requirements of empirical
speciflability and requiring litte—eventually requiring almost nothing
27
at all—in the way of theoretical commitment
Thus, in taking an external standard of objectivity and
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subsequently applying it in blanket fashion throughout psychology,
behaviourism assured itself of a generally methodological character;
the more pronounced this methodological character became, the less it
needed to be tied to any particular theoretical principles or orienta¬
tions. In establishing its methodological cast on the basis of external
standards behaviourism also, not unimportantly, helped to assure its
own success, since it was the only movement within psychology that was
able or inclined both to meet and to promote these external standards
of objectivity; and these standards, for their part, became more and more
influential throughout the scientific culture with the increasing tendency
toward positivism in the physical sciences and the philosophy of science.
In other words, if the environmentalist and methodologically rigorous
conceptual framework which behaviourism acquired in its reaction to
functionalist comparative psychology provided the thematic background
for extending the positivist reaction throughout psychology, the
burgeoning influence and popularity of positivist formulations generally
in science was in large part responsible for the subsequent success which
the extended reaction was to have. Positivism in psychology, in short,
was at first the almost incidental (although not unnecessary) addition
to an autonomous methodological development in one part of the field;
it was initially introduced by way of appeal to an external standard
that could provide support for the universalization of that development,
and was subsequently maintained and extended as the realization of
the dominant and most progressive methodological currents of contemporary
scientific thought.
Chapter 5
Implications and Effects of the Incorporation of Positivism
into Behaviourist Psychology
I. The Institutionalization and Refinement of Psychology's
Positivism in the Transition from Classical Behaviourism
to Neobehaviourism.
It is less than clear whether American psychology as a whole
can legitimately be said to have been engaged in the context of
reconstruction prior to the founding of behaviourism in 1913. It is
clear that comparative psychology was so engaged, and furthermore that
throughout American psychology there was, beginning around 1900, a
gradual increase in the use of objective methods of investigation and
a concomitant decrease in the reliance on introspective ones for at
least some classes of problems, and particularly for some of those
related to human psychology (as mentioned in Chapter 2). This develop¬
ment was, however, broad, diffuse, and evolutionary, much as the
earlier shift to functionalism had been, rather than abrupt, revolution¬
ary, or stimulated by any general intractability of current research
problems. Conceptual and methodological flexibility was the rule. If,
nevertheless, we regard this trend as reconstructive, then we can
conveniently fix on the year 1904 as the approximate date of its self-
conscious emergence. Affixing such a specific date is of course some¬
what arbitrary, but it was in 1904 that J. McK. Cattell made what seems
to have been the first systematic statement1 of the independence, or at
least partial independence, of objective experimentation from intro¬
spective methods and formulations in psychology.
I am not convinced that psychology should be limited to
the study of consciousness as such, in so far as this
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can bo set off from the physical world...It seems to me
that most of the research work that has been done by me
or in my laboratory is nearly as independent of intro¬
spection as work in physics or in zoology...It is cert¬
ainly difficult to penetrate by analogy into the
consciousness of the lower animals, of savages and
children, but the study of their behavior has already
yielded much and promises much more (Cattell, 1904,
pp. 179, 180, 184).
If the context of reconstruction may be said to have been
started with Cattell's paper then, gaining momentum, it continued
through the diffuse and uncoordinated but progressively less apologetic
analyses of the role of behaviour in psychology, as exemplified by the
statements of McDougall (1908), Pillsbury (1911), Thorndike (1911), and
others, culminating in Watson's (1913a) polemic. Thereafter there was no
doubt of the reconstructive character of the trend, for even if the tendency
toward objective methods of investigation had not involved a dramatic re¬
casting of the scope and nature of psychology before Watson's polemic
appeared, it certainly did thereafter, as a result of Watson's successful
exportation of the problems of comparative psychology, and of the local
response to those problems, to the discipline as a whole. From that point,
therefore, the context of reconstruction embodied a somewhat more sharply
defined direction of progress, resulting from its new focus in the specific
conceptual problems of comparative psychology, the response to which, ex¬
tended throughout the discipline, established the general way in which the
reconstruction was going to be made. The reconstruction thus continued
through Watson's attempts at translation of mentalistic terms into behav¬
ioural ones (Watson, 1913^, 1914); through the adoption of methods of
investigation deemed appropriate to the new conception of psychology
(Watson, 1916); through vigorous attempts at experimental demonstration
of the general worth and broad applicability of the new approach (Watson
& Raynor, 1920); through extension of the behaviouristic strictures to
includo instinct and heredity (Kuo, 1924); and finally, once the initial
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battle for objectivity had been won to the extent that Watson could say
in 1924 "Most of the younger psychologists realise that some such formu¬
lation as behaviorism is the only road leading to science (Watson, 1919;
1924 ed., p. vii)," through the beginning of the settling-down period with
concentration on detailed psychological research. It is in this period,
starting in the late 1920s, that the context of reconstruction could be
expected to give way gradually to the context of construction.
As soon as behaviourism began to settle down in this way,
however, it began to become apparent that it did not yet possess all
the requisites for the progressive development of the science, that in
particular it lacked satisfactory means for the expansion of experimentally
adduced results into broader explanatory principles. The conceptual and
methodological development of behaviourism during this period has been
analysed in some considerable detail by Koch (1959, 1962a, 1964), and
the present account will, accordingly, make considerable use of quotations
from his statements. Koch summarizes the early development of behaviourism
as follows:
Classical behaviorism had been an attempt to escape the
stagnation of the subjectivist psychologies then prevail¬
ing by providing psychology with a decision procedure,
which, it was hoped, would make forward movement inevitable.
But though the position soon attained hegemony.. .it
degenerated with comparable celerity into polemicism and
inflated program-malting.. .By the late twenties, there was
much "objective" experimentation but few bodies of clearly
stated predictive principles comparable to the crowning
achievement of physics: its theories. Instead, experiment¬
ation seemed aimless, "theoretical" hypotheses but loosely
related to data, and debate idle (Koch, 1964, P» 9).
In short, behaviourism was sorely in need of some kind of
unifying principles that could give it enough direction that its
achievements in establishing the objectivity of psychology could be
safeguarded and made the basis for somewhat more steady and progressive
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theoretical development. The priorities of the emerging context of
construction were, characteristically, those of establishing and
extending theoretical or otherwise explanatory accounts. Such goals
were, of course, always considered the fundamental priorities of the
scientific endeavour, in behaviourism as elsewhere, but they had been
relatively subordinated during the period of reconstruction, while the
foundations of science agreed to be necessary for their implementation
were being recast. That job presumably accomplished, the priorities
of the context of construction gradually acquired a more central
position and stimulated increasing concern with what had to be done in
order for behaviourism to acquire increasingly comprehensive theories.
Koch continues:
Neobehaviorism may be seen as a second attempt to provide
psychology with a decision procedure—this time an effect¬
ive one that would conserve the orienting attitudes of
[early or classical] behaviorism but recast them in such a
way as to give them teeth...The search for a "decision
procedure" thus became a search for a formulary of the
techniques for "constructing" rigorous theory .. .Early
behaviorism had primarily involved attempts to guarantee
the objectivity of the descriptive (first-order) concepts
used for empirical data. While not giving up this object¬
ive (and indeed trying to place its pursuit on a more
secure footing), neobehaviorism sought to realize and
implement objectivism at the level of theory (ibid.,
pp. 9-10).
One might ask at this point, why was it necessary that the
development and elaboration of theories within behaviourism be dependent
upon obtaining from somewhere a 'formulary of the techniques for
constructing rigorous theory'? Why, that is, could the task not be
approached in the way described in Chapter 3 as typical and appropriate
in the context of construction, through the autonomous elaboration of
theories the terms and concepts of which had already been subjected to
searching critical examination and subsequent approval in the context of
reconstruction? In part, the reason is simply that it was not the terms
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and concepts of any proposed theories, old or new, that were so
examined in behaviourism's reconstruction of psychology, but the terms
and concepts of psychology as a whole. Behaviourism was not founded on
theoretical or otherwise substantive principles but, again, on method¬
ological ones; not on knowledge claims, but on claims about how to
develop and assess knowledge claims. Part of the answer, therefore, is
that at the time when theoretical development became of central concern
within behaviourism, there was a paucity of conceptually acceptable
theories to develop.
The lack of initially acceptable theories is only one part of
the answer however, or one side of the coin. The other concerns what
behaviourism had at its centre in place of theories or substantive
insights. What it had was its methodological orientation, that is, its
insistence on an anti-mentalistic kind of objectivity, rendered universal
throughout psychology by the incorporation of an external standard of
objectivity and of a resulting low-level positivism relating to psycho¬
logy's permissible data-base (as detailed in Chapter if). This primarily
methodological orientation toward science was in large part responsible
for the paucity of theories available at the beginning of neobehaviourism,
because the insistence on the objective and hence observational character
of all reported statements militated against going very far beyond them
in the development of higher level, necessarily somewhat abstract,
theories (cf. the third quotation from Watson on p. 67). Furthermore,
the faith in the power of an objective methodology had not been at all
shaken by the modest results of behaviourism's first fifteen years. The
natural response to the dawning recognition that higher level theories
were after all necessary in science was therefore the employment of
further objective methods in the development of theories, methods which
220.
could supplement and extend the range of those already in general use
at the experimental level. Just as objective methods were to be the
guarantee of successful experimentation, so were objective methods to
be the guarantee of successful theorizing.
The important systematic significance of this continuing
emphasis on methodology, from the standpoint of this monograph, is that
it indicates how it was that, within behaviourism, a positivist orienta¬
tion came to remain central to the scientific enterprise in the context
of construction. The factor that made it possible for it to do so was
simply that positivism was from the beginning taken over as the foundation
of the movement, rather than occurring solely as an internal development
with local significance specific and appropriate to the problem context
in which it arose. Later in this chapter we will examine the general
sorts of circumstances in which a positivist orientation can be expected
to arise as an internal development within a scientific field, provide
the dominant approach to scientific inquiry within that field for a time,
and then fade away. One example of such circumstances has already been
given in detail, in the last chapter: positivism arose autonomously
within comparative psychology, as a consequence of the insoluble
methodological and conceptual dilemma in which that field found itself;
but instead of having merely local significance was constituted as
central to behaviourism—to behaviourism as encompassing all of psychology
—by being immediately exported from comparative psychology to the rest
of the discipline.
With positivism thus central to the behaviourist approach to
psychology, the emphasis on methodology and on the observational status
(or later, observational anchorage) of the concepts used in any proposed
explanatory accounts did not diminish as a result of concentration on
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theory In neobehaviourism. Instead, the emphasis was if anything
increased, while being made more subtle and sophisticated; given the
central position of the positivist orientation as basic to behaviourism's
claim to encompass all of psychology, it is difficult to see how the
movement could have continued to develop in any other way. Thus, looked
at in one way, the emphasis in neobehaviourism on developing a •formulary
of techniques' for theory construction was the natural development and
elaboration, within the context of construction, of the positivism that
was already established as central to the movement. Looked at in another
way, this emphasis, in the absence of any substantive principles, was a
compromise between the accepted necessity for theory (if the predictive
and explanatory goals were to be met at all) and the demand for object¬
ivity; use of such a formulary constituted the only permissible way in
which theories could be developed and elaborated in neobehaviourism, that
is, by being kept entirely consistent with and subordinated to the
requirements of the extant positivist methodological orientation. But
whether the emphasis on techniques of rigorous theory construction in
neobehaviourism is considered the natural course of development of the
movement's positivism, or a compromise that had to be effected if
theories were to be developed at all—the distinction may be mainly a
verbal one—it remains clear in either case that the continued adherence
to positivism within the context of construction occurred as a result of
the central role which that orientation had acquired, from the begin¬
ning, in the constitution of behaviourism.
For these reasons, therefore, the search for objective
methods of theory construction was the first major task for neobehav¬
iourism. In fact, the search was not at all a difficult one. It met
with apparent success almost at once in the formulations of theoretical
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structure being advanced within logical positivism and independent,
similar movements. Koch continues:
In pursuit of these ends, psychology did not go directly
to physics but turned instead for its directives to
middlemen. These were, for the most part, philosophers
of science (especially logical positivists) and a number
of physical science methodologists who had been codify¬
ing a synoptic view of the nature of science and who, by
the early thirties, were actively exporting that view
from their specialties to the scholarly community at
largo. The view was based on a "rational reconstruction"
of a few selected formulations in theoretical physics and
put forward a detailed model of the scientific enterprise
which came to be known as the "hypothetico-deductive
method" (ibid., p. 10).
It was not entirely coincidental that such rigorous formulations of the
nature and structure of scientific theories were being advanced by
philosophers of science just at the time when behaviourism needed them.
Logical positivism was itself part of the generally positivistic reaction
to the scientific ferment stimulated by the collapse of Newtonian theory,
just as (to a lesser extent, and at a greater remove) behaviourism was.
Furthermore, there was at least some slight direct influence of the early
versions of behaviourism on the early versions of logical positivism.
Bergmann (1954) cites classical behaviourism, along with relativity
theory, Poincare's conventionalism, and the Principia Mathematica. as
among the chief sources of inspiration for the members of the early
Vienna Circle in the middle and late 1920s, as indicating jointly the
relevance, appropriateness, and probable acceptability of formal empiricist
analyses of theoretical structures. Thus, in a small way, behaviourism,
through its initially positivist cast, contributed to the development of
logical positivism—a contribution that was soon to be more than recipro¬
cated by the logical positivists.
Koch briefly indicates some of the elements of the 'new view'
of science which resulted from the labours of the logical positivists and
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scientific methodologists.
This "new" view held forth an ideal of rigorous theory
and seemed to define a route toward its achievement. In
barest outline, it asserts theory to be a hypothetico-
deductive system. Laws or hypotheses believed fundamental
are asserted as postulates, and the consequences of these
(theorems) are deduced by strict logical and mathematical
rules. The theorems are then to be tested by experiment.
Positive results increase the probability of the hypo¬
theses; negative results call them into question. Scienti¬
fic theories differ from logical and mathematical systems
only in that their basic terms are given empirical refer¬
ence (made to describe the world) by operational defini¬
tions (Bridgman) which state the observational conditions
under which the terms may be applied. A science aims
toward explicit and, if possible, quantitative hypothetico-
deductive organizations of events in its domain (Koch,
1962a, p. 401).
And in summary:
In broad aspect, neobehaviourism may be seen as a marriage
between the orienting attitudes of classical behaviourism
and one or another interpretation of the "new" model of
science. The general orienting attitudes are to be imple¬
mented by translation into theory, or theory-like formula¬
tions, in accord with the requirements of the model. As
a result, the earlier attitudes are reasserted but in
altered form. Thus, for instance, re objectivism, the
metaphysical overtones of classical behaviourism are, at
least by frequent asseveration, sloughed off and attempts
are made in a variety of directions to find rationales for
a consistently methodological objectivism (Koch, 1964,
p. 12; italics in the original).
The relationship of the orienting attitudes of classical
behaviourism to the 'new view' of science which neobehaviourism came,
in the minds of many, to exemplify, should be elaborated. If the shift
to the 'new view' of the role and structure of theory was potentiated
by the initially positivist constitution of behaviourism, as indicated
above, then it is desirable to specify what became of that initially
positivist constitution. In other words, the question arises as to how
much continuity there was in behaviourism's positivism throughout the
movement's development, and how that continuity was expressed.
In fact, the amount of continuity was considerable. In the
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transition from classical behaviourism to neobehaviourism what was
retained from classical behaviourism was the feature that was central
to the initial positivist orientation of the movement, that is, the
in-principle repudiation of unobservables as such, expressed as an
insistence on an uncompromisingly public and objective observation base.
Koch summarizes the neobehaviourist continuation of this insistence as
consisting in a pair of requirements relating to the permissible
constitution of independent and dependent variables in psychology, and
especially for the permissible constitution of 'stimulus' and 'response'.
While not attempting to identify the systematic basis for this insistence,
Koch indicates also the extent to which it was both prior to and more
fundamental than any particular meaning criteria or meta-theoretical
principles associated with the 'new view' .
Though interpretations of technical meaning criteria
imported from the philosophy of science were free and
various, certain core beliefs concerning the legitimate
observation base for psychological statements were common
to all of them. It is significant that these commitments
were historically prior to the importation of such criter¬
ia, and after importation, they remained untouched by the
frequent and radical changes in meaning theory which con¬
tinued in normal course of professional epistemological
scholarship.
Such rock-bottom commitments concerning the observation
base may be suggested via the following reconstructions:
1. All lawlike statements of psychology containing
dependent variables not expressible in, or reducible to,
publically verifiable and thus "objectively" observable
behavior indices are to be excluded as illegitimate...
The prototypical case of an admissible dependent variable
is, of course, the notion of response or, more specifically,
a "measurable" index of response, in some one of the varied,
if often unspecified, meanings of "response."
2. Similarly, it is demanded that legitimate independent
variables of psychology designate references which cam pass
the test of independent, simultaneous observability and are
definable in either the observation language of physical
science or the concepts of physics. The prototypical case
of an admissible independent variable is, of course, the
notion of the stimulus, again in some one of many rather
unseparated meanings (ibid., pp. 13-14; italics in the origi¬
nal) .
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Nevertheless, despite the considerable continuity manifest,
there was a subtle—but far reaching—change in the character of
behaviourism's positivism, resulting from the transition to neobehav-
iourism and hence from the alliance with logical positivism. As we
saw in the last chapter, positivism was initially introduced into
behaviourism—or rather, behaviourism was initially constituted as
positivistic—through appeal to the standards of objectivity and
observability allegedly characteristic of the physical sciences. Such
standards were taken to provide justification for the exclusion of
anything mental from consideration in psychology, because mentality and
consciousness could not be observed. However, there was a slight and
at first almost unnoticeable difference between what was required for
behaviourism to encompass all of psychology, and what it obtained by
its appeal to an external standard of objectivity. What it required
was a basis for repudiating mind and consciousness. What it got was a
basis for repudiating unobservables as such.
The difference between what behaviourism needed and what it
got was not particularly significant throughout the period of classical
behaviourism, lasting until the late 1920s—after which time, the needs
of behaviourism were no longer the same in any case. As long as the
insistence was on the "objectivity of the descriptive (first-order)
concepts used for empirical data", so that everything that was going to
be talked about in psychology had to be the kind of thing that could be
pointed to, the repudiation of consciousness and the general repudiation
of unobservables went hand in hand, the former being merely a special
case of the latter.
However, the transition to neobehaviourism and the rendering
explicit of behaviourism's positivism were marked by two trends which
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had the effect of notably liberalizing the anti-mentalistic stand.
First, things that could not be pointed to were agreed to be worth
talking about sometimes after all, so long as the talk was sufficiently
careful. Second, the general positivist orientation including the
repudiation of unobservables, which had initially been introduced in
support of behaviourism's anti-mentalism and which had therefore been
effectively subordinate to it, became dominant within behaviourism,
independent of its polemical background, and elaborately articulated
by a wide variety of theorists from a diversity of theoretical back¬
grounds. The repudiation of mind and consciousness thus could no
longer be considered given, and sufficiently justified by the summary
judgment that ouch things were unobservable. It would have to be based
instead on a demonstration that any given conceptualization of mind or
consciousness, or of concepts traditionally taken as indicative of them,
could not satisfy the empiricist meaning criteria which were now to be
the sole arbiters of a concept's admissibility in science.
Now, such a demonstration would be very difficult to provide,
in fact impossibly so; there could be any number of possible conceptual¬
izations of mind and consciousness, and a specific demonstration could
not be sure of establishing the inadmissibility of all of them. Further¬
more, by the time the positivist orientation of behaviourism had become
explicit, so that such formal moaning criteria were becoming to be
accepted for use, there was little obvious point in continuing to wage
the fight against subjectivism in most of its aspects. Introspective
psychology was rapidly disappearing from the American scene and the
dominance of some form of behaviourism seemed assured. It was thus no
longer clear that the continued demonstration of the inadmissibility of
the mental would be worth the effort and frustration which it would
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undoubtedly Involve. Furthermore etHi, if some proposed conceptuali¬
zation of mind or consciousness were, against all odds, to satisfy the
empiricist meaning criteria, could it, in good faith, be rejected as
inadmissible nevertheless? Clearly it could not, not at least if the
empiricist criteria were to be taken seriously as providing the explicit
standards of objectivity—as they had to be, if they were to be used as
the basis for theory construction. The possibility thus existed that
some refined version of the criteria which had been imported into
psychology specifically in order to exclude the mental, might eventually
come to ratify mentalistic concepts. But after all, how much harm would
really come from such an eventuality? The goal of behaviourism was to
make psychology an objective science; if mind and consciousness could
somehow be rendered objective, then surely mind and consciousness in
that form had to be fit subjects for science. They would certainly bear
little relation to the indefensibly subjective mind and consciousness
which were studied in psychology before the advent of behaviourism.
This reassessment of the possible status of mind and conscious¬
ness, or in general of what was to be excluded from psychology and how,
had definite advantages. It seemed to acquit behaviourism of the charge
that it was paradoxical and utterly opposed to common sense in that it
tried to argue for the nonexistence of something with which everybody
was directly acquainted through personal experience. It put the burden
of proof on the 'other side', so that behaviourists no longer had to
concern themselves with finding ways to keep mentalistic concepts out
of psychology; instead, the 'mentalists* were constrained to find proper
ways to bring them in.
Tho in-principle rehabilitation of consciousness—that is, the
declaration that it was no longer absent from psychology in principle
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but only in fact—was sounded forcefully by Hull in a frequently
quoted passage from his presidential address to the American Psycholo¬
gical Association. The "miniature theoretical system" referred to is
a very early version of what was to become the Principles of Behavior.
What, then, shall we say about consciousness? Is its
existence denied? By no means. But to recognize the
existence of a phenomenon is not the same thing as insist¬
ing on its basic, i.e., logical priority. Instead of
furnishing a means for the solution of problems, conscious¬
ness appears to be itself a problem needing solution. In
the miniature theoretical system, no mention of conscious¬
ness or experience was made for the simple reason that no
theorem has been found as yet whose deduction would be
facilitated in any way by including such a postulate
(Hull, 1937, P. 30).
And then, concerning the in-principle admissibility of consciousness
to the body of science, Hull went on:
There is, however, no reason at all for not using
consciousness or experience as a postulate in a scientific
theoretical system if it clearly satisfies the deductive
criteria already laid down. If such a system should be
worked out in a clear and unambiguous manner the incorp¬
oration of consciousness into the body of behavior theory
should be automatic and immediate. The task of those who
would have consciousness a central factor in adaptive
behavior and in moral action is accordingly quite clear.
They should apply themselves to the long and grinding
labor of the logical derivation of a truly scientific
system (ibid., pp. 30-31).
This statement of Hull's may be taken to mark the final emancipation
of behaviourism from its explicitly anti-mentalistic background. The
first and the greatest principle of behaviourism, its rejection of the
mental, was henceforth to be subordinated to the explicit procedures
designed to ensure objectivity in general. It is, of course, quite
true that such procedures seemed sufficient to ensure the exclusion in
fact of mentalistic concepts for some time. Referring to the "several
centuries" of effort on the part of psychological and philosophical
theorists to establish the "priority of consciouness or experience",
Hull concluded:
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Considering the practically complete failure of all this
effort to yield even a small scientific system of adaptive
or moral behavior in which consciousness finds a position
of logical priority as a postulate, one may, perhaps, be
pardoned for entertaining a certain amount of pessimism
regarding such an eventuality (ibid., p. 31).
The general characteristics of neobehaviourism's brand of
positivism having been established, let us return to further considera¬
tion of the elements of the 'new view' of science through which the
positivism was implemented. Hull was, of course, one of the outstanding
raethodologists and chief advocates of hypothetico-deductive theorizing
in psychology. But if the hypothetico-deductive model of theorizing, as
he expressed it, was in some ways at the heart of the 'new view', it was
nonetheless not all or even most of what there was to it. The 'formulary
of techniques* for theory construction included an extensive apparatus
of logical tools for the refining and testing of concepts and theories;
although these could be used in conjunction with, and hence be supportive
of, the hypothetico-deductive model, they could also be used in virtual
independence of it. As a result, they gained widespread use even amongst
those theorists—in fact the vast majority of neobehaviourists—whose
commitment to the hypothetico-deductive model in all its grandeur was,
because of tho cumbersomeness of that model, somewhat less than complete.
These logical and methodological tools included operational analysis (or
definition), empiricist meaning criteria, related empiricist validation
criteria for the assessment of the validity of hypotheses and other
statements (whether formally deduced from a theory or not), and others.
All of these techniques, or decision procedures, could be and were
taken as sufficient (i.e., even without invoking the hypothetico-deductive
model) to indicate not only how to evaluate statements and theories in
science, but also how to put one's ideas into a form suitable for such
evaluation.
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Perhaps the most important single methodological tool
utilized by the neobehaviourists, and also the one that was closest
to being home-grown, was the intervening variable. Intervening
variables were formally introduced by Tolman in a paper published in
1936, but in fact he had already made extensive use of them in his 1932
book, Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men. The use of intervening
variables was taken to establish a way in which purely objective
reference could be made to unobeervable inner states and processes, by
defining such states and processes as consisting in the regularity of
the connection between independent stimulus variables and dependent
response variables. The specification of the independent and dependent
variables, repeated observation of which establishes the presence of the
inner state (or rather, indicates the conditions governing the use of
the terms which otherwise would be taken to refer to such an inner state),
thus constitutes a kind of operational definition of such states and
processes. Tolman, in fact, called hi3 approach 'operational behaviorism'
before he Introduced the term 'intervening variable'. Intervening
variables differ from Bridgman's operational definitions, in that while
Bridgman's involve a statement of the operations used to measure the
quantity of something, intervening variables involve a statement of the
observations used to define its presence. Tolman's usage was sufficiently
influential that it came to provide the model for operational definitions
generally in psychology (e.g., as described by Stevens, 1939); the
systematic difference between his usage and Bridgman'e was not pointed
out for some time (by Israel & Goldstein, 19^). Intervening variables
camo to comprise the dominant vehicle for the introduction of theoretical
constructs, and were extensively used by Guthrie and Hull and their
students, as well as by Tolman and his. Even Skinner, who disapproved
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of theoretical constructs on principle, made some use of them in his
first (1938) book.
The implementation of the various logical techniques consider¬
ed necessary and appropriate for theory construction into the ongoing
course of neobehaviourist theorizing, in such a way as to preserve the
original commitment to data-base objectivism while simultaneously
de-emphasizing the dogmatic anti-mentalism originally associated with
it, was gradual and somewhat piecemeal, but apparently inexorable. It
was characterized equally by abstract analyses of the methodological
and logical tools involved in theory construction (e.g., Bergmann &
Spence, 19^1; Stevens, 1939); by elucidatory analyses of psychological
concepts and theories on operationist and other, compatible, principles
(e.g. McGeoch, 1935; Stevens, 1935a, 1935b; and at some remove,
MacCorquodale & Meehl, 19^8); and most significantly, by the increasing
day to day use of operational definitions, axlomatized theoretical
structures, high level theoretical variables with only indirect
observational reference (intervening variables), etc., in the experiments
and theories of the time (e.g., most notably Hull, 19^3; Hull et al.,
19^0; Tolman, 1932—but these were only the exemplars of what was
significant precisely because it was a general trend). Koch states:
The neobehaviorist period was ushered in by Hull's advocacy
of hypothetico-deductive method [1930] •• .Though Bridgman's
work had been cited by H. M. Johnson as early as 1930, it
was not until the mid-thirties that a spate of articles on
"operational definition" directed the attention of psycho¬
logists to empirical definition and produced the widespread
impression that objectivism could be finally implemented
only by careful "operational" practice. It was not until
the late thirties that the preceding contexts of discussion
were supplemented by analyses which explicitly took the
logical-positivist model of science as regulative. Though
initially recommendations of axiomatic method and discussions
about operational strategy had tended to occur in somewhat
separated contexts, both of these topics found an integra¬
tive framework in the formulations of logical positivism.
Discussions and applications of positivistic meaning
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criteria began to appear in the literature side by side
with operationist analyses (Koch, 1964, pp. 10-11).
This, then, was the general character and composition of
behaviourism's positivism in the neobehaviourist era, or what Koch
calls the 'age of theory', an age, that is, which the emphasis on
theoretical development justifies assigning to the context of
construction. That positivism was autonomous, formal, and explicit;
it was free of the more obviously dogmatic anti-mentalism characteristic
of classical behaviourism, and was directed by means of the various
logical techniques associated with it wholly toward the progressive
and objective development of psychological theory. It seemed, further¬
more, to be well on the way toward accomplishing these aims. That is,
the assimilation of the positivist principles or techniques for
elaborating and evaluating theories, their gradual diffusion throughout
the scientific culture within psychology, and their eventual synthesis
into a more or less established, if not completely unified, conception
of science, were widely regarded as satisfying neobehaviourism"s need
for a logical and methodological apparatus that would ensure its
cumulative and progressive scientific character. Koch speaks of the
"hypothetico-deductive prescription" as the regulative or normative
aspect of these principles or techniques, that is, as the prescription
that the more or less established conception of science which they embody
constitutes the way in which scientific investigation can most effectively
—and in practice therefore should—be conducted; and he characterizes
the "age of theory" specifically as the optimistic period (c. 1935-1950)
during which this prescription was, in somewhat different ways by
different theorists, most widely and cheerfully accepted. He describes
the general effects of the adherence to this prescription on the
2
practice and 'self-image' of neobehaviourism as follows:
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The acceptance of the hypothetico-deductive prescription
had important consequences for the prevailing conception
of the aims of psychology, the conception of where
psychology stood in relation to its aims, and thus the
indicated route for further progress. It was, for
instance, assumed by many that a backlog of significant
empirical knowledge existed adequate to the "construction"
of broad-scope, if not comprehensive, theories conforming
to the requirements of the hypothetico-deductive model.
It was believed that psychology was at a stage such that
theoretical differences would inevitably and almost
automatically be resolved by the "differential test" of
"derivations" from rival "postulate sets." Perhaps of
most serious import for the character of actual practice
was a cluster of beliefs to the effect that adoption of
the forms of the hypothetico-deductive method (or the
imagery of its forms) guaranteed that the scientific
enterprise would be "self-corrective." Such beliefs led,
for instance, to the strange expectation that the initial
plausibility of a "postulate" is of little moment in that
proper adherence to the forms of the hypothetico-deductive
method would almost certainly refine its adequacy or lead
to its early demise (Koch, 1959, III, p. 777).
The chief purpose of the remainder of the present chapter is
to assess and comment upon the in-principle adequacy of the kinds of
techniques incorporated within neobehaviourism for the attainment of
the ends for which they were introduced, that is, for the establishment
of the progressive and self-corrective character of the scientific
enterprise as described (with a touch of sarcasm^) in this last
quotation from Koch. Or rather, the purpose is—as promised in the
conclusion to Chapter 2—to demonstrate the inadequacy of such techniques
for attaining these ends, by means of a review of the systematic
limitations that have become apparent throughout the last twenty to
thirty years on the applicability of these techniques, and, that initial
purpose accomplished, to draw some of the implications of their inadequacy.
It is the •in-principle' rather than the •in-fact' adequacy
of these techniques that is of concern, for two reasons. The first is
that there is no question about their in-fact adequacy. The decline of
behaviourism, its failure to accomplish its systematic scientific goals,
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and the continuing fragmentation of neobehaviourist theory throughout
the highly optimistic age of theory and beyond, all provide a clear
enough demonstration that the implementation and consistent use of
these techniques did not suffice to establish the progressive, cumulative,
and self-corrective character of the scientific enterprise.
Koch has marshalled imnressive testimony as to this specific
point, concerning the in-fact inadequacy of these techniques, from the
later reflective writings of many neobehaviourist theorists themselves.
Such testimony serves as evidence, not of the inadequacy as Buch of the
techniques, but of the extent to which their inadequacy came eventually
to be appreciated by those who had been responsible for their dissemina¬
tion throughout psychology. The last quotation above is taken from
Koch's epilogue and report of trends as revealed in the first 'study',
comprising the first three volumes, of his Psychology: A Study of a
Science (Koch, 1959, 1962b). This first study brought together 36
eminent theorists associated with a wide of variety of systematic
formulations in sensory, perceptual, physiological, and social psychology,
and in learning, general behaviour, personality, and psychoanalytic
theory; learning theory, for instance, was represented by Estes, Guthrie,
Logan (for Hull and Spence), Miller, Skinner, Tolman, and others. These
theorists made detailed statements of the development and current status
of their systematizations, and analysed the role and contribution of the
hypothetico-deductive prescription and its various independent exempli¬
fications (operational definitions, intervening variables, empiricist
meaning criteria, etc.) in the development and completion of these
systematizations. Immediately after detailing the hoped-for consequences
of adherence to the prescription, as quoted above, Koch observed,
summarizing the various theorists' positions:
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• • .we nay report that the trends of the study are in
definite contrast to the earlier Age of Theory position...
Few authors in this study would "scrap" the hypothetico-
deductive model as the stipulation of a methodological
ideal, ultimate approximation of which would be highly
attractive. Most, however, would challenge the feasibility
of the hypothetico-deductive prescription.. .as an immediate
program for all domains of systematic effort, or indeed
for any systematic enterprise contemplating reasonably
broad empirical reference (Koch, 1959, HI, p. 778;
italics in the original).
The second reason for concentrating on in-principle rather
than on in-fact adequacy is a more fundamental one, and has been
implicated in the discussion at several points throughout this monograph.
The claim being advanced here is stronger than the one just reviewed, to
the effect that the implementation of a positivist orientation, through
adherence to the hypothetico-deductive prescription and the various
decision procedures associated with it, did not suffice as a basis for
behaviourism to reach its scientific goals. Rather, the present claim
is that the implementation of positivism as the basis for elaborating
theories was sufficient to prevent behaviourism from thus being success¬
ful, largely by ensuring the continuing fragmentation of neobehaviourist
theorising as detailed in Chapter 2. The claim is thus that a positivist
orientation is generally inappropriate as a basis for theoretical
systematization in a science. It is therefore necessary to demonstrate
that the implementation of positivism could not, even in some ideal case,
have eventuated in a body of systematized scientific knowledge
significantly more comprehensive and integrated than that which in fact
resulted from neobehaviourism.
These considerations make it necessary that the analysis focus
mainly on the decision procedures and related techniques as originally
formulated and extended by 'philosophers of science and physical science
methodologists', rather than simply as incorporated into neobehaviourism.
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The way in which they were incorporated into neobehaviourism is in
most respects quite consistent with the spirit of their development,
even if their application did not keep pace with all the modifications
eventually made to them. Nevertheless, one could maintain that part of
the reason for their failure in neobehaviourism was that they were not
incorporated and applied with the necessary skill, sophistication, and
subtlety. Koch, in fact, takes such a position; while he is highly
dubious about whether the positivist-neobehaviourist programme could
have been successful under any circumstances, he feels strongly that it
was vitiated in particular by the lack of competence in the way it was
actually implemented. Concerning the variety of sources from which
neobehaviourism derived the 'new view', Koch states:
It should be observed that psychology's selections from
this cluster of formulations were spotty, adventitiously
determined, and not supported by especially expert scholar¬
ship in the relevant sources.. .What in fact seems to have
been the case is that psychology was enthralled by the
apparent authority of these ideas, not their content (Koch,
1964, pp. 10-11).
Koch feels that if the neobehaviourists "had done their outside reading
in slightly different order", so that they had discovered Carnap or
Schlick before Bridgman, "the clang of the psychological literature re
definition would today be different (ibid., p. 24)."
I may briefly state my own position, in contrast to Koch's,
on this question of the skill or sophistication with which the neo¬
behaviourists implemented their positivist programme. It is that while
the particular components of the programme were indeed introduced in a
way that was 'spotty', and while the programme itself never attained
full formal coherence, this unevenness was a reflection of the unevenness
and lack of full coherence of the positivist principles that were being
incorporated, rather than of the level of skill and sophistication with
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which the neobehaviourists incorporated them. While the neobehaviourists
did not keep up with all the developments in logical positivist thought,
and did not wait upon its ultimate stabilization before implementing
their programme, they can hardly be faulted for this: logical positivist
(and related) formulations kept shifting in a kaleidoscopic manner from
the time of their inception, and did not begin to stabilize until, after
growing further and further away from considerations of actual scientific
practice, they started to disintegrate in the middle 1950s. If the
neobehaviourists were going to attempt to implement a formally positivist
conception of theoretical science at all, there was no reason, either
at the time or in hindsight, for them to delay after first becoming
apprised of the possibilities of doing so in the early 1930s. Inevitably,
in rushing ahead at that time, they followed a programme that was not so
sophisticated in many of its particulars, nor so complete in its formal¬
ization, as a later one might have been. But there is a respectable
body of opinion, which will be sampled later in this chapter, to the
effect that full formalization is by no means necessary as a preliminary
to the effective use of the positivist techniques. Furthermore, if, as
I maintain, the positivist feature of the neobehaviourist programme were
a sufficient cause for the systematic failure of that programme, then
any divergence of that programme from a consistent and sophisticated
positivism cannot be accounted a necessary component of its failure. On
the contrary, such divergence would at worst have no effect on the
programme's systematic failure, and at best might mitigate it.
My position on this question cannot, it is true, be justified
in all respects. Given that the implementation of a formal or systematic
positivist orientation within neobehaviourism was in large part 'spotty'
and 'adventitiously determined', it is Impossible to say precisely what
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the results would have been had the orientation been implemented in a
more consistent manner; at least, it is impossible to say whether the
failure might then have come about in a somewhat different way. What
can be said, however, and what I propose to show, is that given a sincere
and whole-hearted commitment to explicit decision procedures such as
widely obtained in neobehaviourism, the failure was inevitable; that is,
that there is no way in which such consistent implementation of a
positivist orientation could have resulted in a successful and cumulative
systematization of behaviourist psychology.
Again, therefore, the analysis will have to focus on positivist
techniques for the assessment and evaluation of theoretical statements
in their most general form, in order to show their basic limitations as
vehicles for scientific inquiry. To the fairly small extent that the
results of the analysis require further interpretation specifically as
relating to neobehaviourism or behaviourism generally, the application
will be made following the general analysis. We are therefore taking
up the discussion of positivism as a basic for scientific inquiry from the
point where we left it at the end of Chapter 3. The discussion was inter¬
rupted at that point specifically so that it might be given more substance,
by being related to the particular circumstances of behaviourism. We have
followed the circuitous and unusual concatenation of influences which
eventuated in behaviourism's being founded on a positivist orientation
toward the practice and problems of psychology; have characterized the
initial form of that positivism; have briefly traced the development of
behaviourism to the stage where its positivism became explicit and more
or less emancipated from its dogmatically anti-mentalistic background; and
have made mention of the significance of neobehaviourism as a unique case
study in scientific methodology, a status bestowed upon it by its
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unparalleled commitment to a formal positivist programme in the
development of theories (cf. footnote 3 to this chapter).
As in Chapter 3, the alternative or antithetical approach
v/ith which positivism will be contrasted and compared is that of
scientific realism. The aim will be to establish the greater
appropriateness of a realist orientation to science in the context of
construction—the context in which neobehaviourism operated—and,
conversely, the greater appropriateness of a positivist orientation to
science in the context of reconstruction. Some initial evidence for or
arguments in favour of this position were presented in Chapter 3, but
the present account will attempt to establish the conclusion somewhat
more firmly.
At first sight, however, this contrast of positivism with
realism might seem paradoxical when related specifically to behaviourism.
Behaviourism never involved an explicit repudiation of realism, either
as a common sense conviction about the potential and ultimate truth of
scientific theories, or as a philosophical doctrine. On the contrary,
the most influential philosophical defender of the movement in its early
stages was E. B. Holt, a member of the important philosophical school
known as the 'New Realism'. Nevertheless, although behaviourism was
not founded specifically on an antithesis to realism—and although this
fact will be seen to be an important one later on—that antithesis is
the appropriate one to emphasize in discussing the movement as an
implementation of positivism. 'Realism' must be understood as it was
characterized in Chapter 3. There, it was shown that a realist orienta¬
tion to science involves not only an intuitive conviction about the
scope of scientific theories but also, following from this and even
more Important, the ascription to an accepted theory of greater
240.
validity (i.e., potentially ultimate validity) than can ever be
warranted on strictly logical and empirical grounds. Neither Holt
nor any behaviourist psychologists ever took a realist position in
this sense; Holt's realism was something similar to what is known as
epiotemological naive or direct realism. Scientific realism as
characterized in Chapter 3 involves what on positivist grounds would
be equivalent to assigning metaphysical status to empirical scientific
theories. The repudiation of such a position is implicit in any
approach to science which involves adherence to general methodological
criteria of objectivity, such as behaviourism was from the beginning;
it is explicit both in modern positivist philosophical thought and in
l±
neobehaviourism .
A perhaps not unrelated point is that any conclusion that may
be reached as to the invalidity of behaviourism as resulting from its
Dositivist orientation will have no direct implications for the value
or appropriateness in psychology of what is often taken to be behaviour¬
ism's antithesis, that is, some form of mentalism or subjectivism.
Although it was in relation to the dogmatic anti-mentalism of early
behaviourism that the movement initially became constituted as
posicivistic, that dogmatic anti-mentalism was itself soon outgrown,
having fulfilled its historical purpose, as behaviourism's positivism
became more explicit and sophisticated. The residual anti-mentalism of
neobehaviourism was given only tentative, matter-of-fact justification
by the explicit poeitivist principles which the movement came to
incorporate; and as the quotations from Hull indicated, it was held
possible in principle for even this residual anti-mentalism to be
abandoned under the appropriate circumstances. On the other hand, if
a demonstration of the systematic untenability of positivism in the
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theoretical development of science could provide no specific
justification for the acceptance of concepts indicative of mind or
consciousness, it certainly could provide none for their rejection; and
furthermore, it would demonstrate the invalidity of the grounds on which
they continued to be rejected 'in-fact* in neobehaviourism. Such a
demonstration would be sufficient to indicate, that is, that the
putative inability of the majority of concepts indicative or descriptive
of mind and consciousness to satisfy formal empiricist meaning criteria
cannot comprise sufficient grounds for excluding them from a central
place in psychological inquiry.
This example of the kinds of conclusions which could be reached
concerning mentalistic concepts typifies the kinds of conclusions which
can be reached in general. That is, it will be possible for the negative
conclusions, concerning how theoretical systematization in the context
of construction can not best be accomplished, to be fairly explicit and
definite. By contrast, it will not be possible for the positive
conclusions, concerning how theoretical systeraatization can best be
accomplished in the context of construction, to be explicit and definite
to any comparable degree. But this limitation will itself emerge as a
not insignificant conclusion concerning the role which any methodological
principles or analyses, devoid of specific substantive import, can hope
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to play in the conduct and regulation of scientific inquiry .
II. Realism and Positivism in the Conduct of Scientific Inquiry.
One way of characterizing what is most fundamental to a
positivist orientation toward science, to recapitulate what was said in
Chapter 3, is to designate it a repudiation of metaphysics or, more
specifically, a repudiation of any inferred entities or processes which
are unobservable in principle. As we have seen, behaviourism was in
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large part initially based on such a repudiation. But while this
simple repudiation might be adequate as a basis for ensuring the
unequivocal status of statements restricted to the description of
observed data, it does not readily apply to the concepts implicated
in theories—which are of primary concern, at least in the context of
construction—because theoretical concepts as such (e.g., mass, force,
reinforcement) rarely designate observables in any simple or direct way.
This lack of immediate observability of theoretical concepts was part
of the problem faced by behaviourism at the beginning of the context of
construction, and it was partly in order to gain ways whereby theoretical
concepts could be guaranteed untainted by metaphysics, and hence be
suitable for use, that the movement sought advice from the logical
positivists.
With regard to theoretical concepts, therefore: to implement
a positivist orientation within the context of construction, it would be
necessary first of all to develop adequate means to ensure that all the
concepts and variables implicated in any proposed theory were free of
ontological or metaphysical presuppositions; to ensure, that is, that
such concepts are not permitted to refer to any entities or forces
which are unobservable in principle. This requirement can be expressed
in different ways. In the language of ancient or classical positivism,
if a theory is designed solely in order to 'save the appearances', to
provide an economical description of phenomena with only 'mathematical
truth', it is necessary that independent existence not be ascribed to
the mathematical explanatory fictions brought in to account for the
appearances. That is, such fictions (e.g., epicycles in Ptolemaic
astronomy) cannot be considered to refer to anything except, in a
complex way, the phenomena (observed planetary and stellar motions)
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which they are used to classify. It can be determined that the
explanatory fictions are indeed beginning to function as real or
independently existing entities or forces in a theory if, in the
elaboration of the theory, they take on or are found to have properties
other than merely those which have already been ascribed to them for
the explicit purpose of saving or, in a non-causal sense, 'accounting
for' the appearances. Thus, it is necessary to have a built-in limita¬
tion on the range of operation or extension of the explanatory fictions
used in the theory^. In the more exact language of modern positivist
thought (dating approximately from Mach), this requirement can be
reformulated to state that the variables and concepts implicated in a
proposed theory must, if they do not have immediate observational
reference, have ascribed to them only those properties and functions
which can be empirically specified by reference to the class of observable
events to which the theory is intended to apply. To put it more simply,
the constituents of a theory may be permitted to function in the theory
only to tne extent that they can be shown to have unambiguous empirical
content. One of the main contributions of Mach (1883) to the reconstruc¬
tion of physics, it will be recalled, was to attempt a reformulation of
the concepts of space and time in Newtonian theory in such a way as to
eliminate their reference to unobservables.
The problem sometimes arises, however, as to how one can be
sure that all the concepts implicated in a theory have empirical content
and none other. The Newtonian concepts of absolute space and time, after
all, clearly had empirical content. The eventual problems in their
application arose because they had non-empirical content as well, and
the empirical and the non-empirical components of their theoretical
content were not separated. Or rather, the two kinds of content were
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not separable at all within the theory, hut resulted from the
development of tho concopto in ouch a way that their referonce
extended to empirical and non-empirical, observable and unobservable,
entities and processes equally. The conceptual excesses of Newtonian
theory which potentiated this indiscriminate reference were, it is true,
eventually identified and dealt with; but they came to light only after
reliance on them had come to hinder severely the progress of physics,
and dealing with them required the overturning of the results of much
of the development of physical science during the preceding two
centuries. How could the occurrence of such conceptual excesses be
prevented from the beginning, before they had such drastic effects?
This was the problem facing modern positivist thought.
The answer to the problem seemed clearly to lie in the develop¬
ment of formal meaning criteria, criteria which could be used to evaluate
the empirical content or empirical meaningfulness of any proposed
conceptualization before it was incorporated into an ongoing theory. It
was important that the criteria be formal ones, since informal or
intuitive criteria of meaningfulness were obviously unreliable. It could
be presumed that Newton had not intended to handicap the ongoing course
of science in developing his conceptualizations, and that neither had
Helmholtz or du Bois-Reymond when they asserted (see footnote 7 to
Chapter 3) that Newtonian concopto were essential to and constitutive
of scientific explanation. Since concepts receive their meaning through
use (the Newtonian concepts of space and time were empirically warrantable
in some of their applications, unwarrantable in others), the meaning
criteria v/hich were first necessary were ones which applied to the
e.aluation of concepts in their simplest applications, that is, to the
evaluation of statements. The development of such formal empiricist
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meaning criteria for the evaluation of statements, and later of
theories, comprised the single most important set of tasks undertaken
within the loose alliance of interests that constituted logical
positivism.
Some contrast can be seen from the beginning, therefore,
between the factors that led modern positivists to develop formal
meaning criteria, and those which led behaviourists to incorporate
such criteria into their scientific practice. The positivist philosophers
and logicians developed such formal criteria in order to ensure that no
metaphysical references could be insinuated into scientific theories.
The behaviourists, for their part, had effected their own elimination
of metaphysics from psychology already, and thus were not so centrally
concerned with its excision. Their problem rather was one of how to
develop high level theories, given their already established low level
positivist commitment to an objective observation base. Thus, they
adopted the formal positivist measures, not so much to keep their
theories free of metaphysics, as to enable them to develop their
theories at all.
Realism and Positivism in the Context of Construction: 1.
Problems in the Development of Meaning Criteria.
The development of the formal meaning criteria judged
necessary was originally thought by many logicians to be a relatively
simple task. It proved far more difficult than had been expected,
however, to develop or construct meaning criteria that would set the
boundaries between sense and nonsense, between empirical and non-
empirical (or metaphysical) statements, in the right place; to develop
them, that is, so that they would allow all statements which were
•obviously' meaningful and disallow all statements which were
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'obviously* nonsensical. Such difficulties extended throughout the
entire range of the criteria which were first proposed.
To begin with, as described in Chapter 3, it seemed that
the verifiability criterion—the first meaning criterion proposed in
any detail—condemned itself as empirically meaningless, and hence
could have only stipulative significance. In doing so, the verifia¬
bility criterion made the same reflexive judgment that Hume's criterion
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for meaningfulness had made almost two centuries earlier . More
important than this however, the verifiability criterion also condemned
as meaningless all general or universal scientific laws, since there is
no way that universal statements (e.g., "all swans are white", "for
every action there is an equal and opposite reaction") can be verified,
short of exhaustive enumeration of all possible instances, a procedure
which is usually impossible in principle. This particular limitation
on the application of the verifiability criterion is a consequence of
the practical fallibility and logical invalidity of induction. It might
in principle be avoided, therefore, by making use of a criterion of
falsiflability, rather than one of verifiability, as the determinant of
meaning. Universal statements cannot be verified, but in principle
they can be falsified and refuted by a single negative instance; their
g
empirical meaningfulness or their status as scientific statements can
thus, on falsificationist principles, be established by specifying the
conditions or events which would constitute their falsification or
refutation.
Falsificationist logic has problems of its own however. The
exact falsificationist counterpart to the unverifiability of universal
statements is the unfalsifiability of existential statements. Existen¬
tial statements (e.g., "some swans are black") are not falsifiable,
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oxcept (as in the corresponding case) through exhaustive enumeration
of all possible particulars. To deal with this difficulty, Popper,
the chief modern exponent of falsificationism, grasps the bull by the
horns and argues persuasively that existential statements, as such,
are indeed non-scientific and metaphysical (Popper, 1959). His argument
concerning existential statements per se has considerable merit (he
assimilates them to statements such as "Somewhere there is a philosopher's
stone, a holy grail, a golden isle"); but it does not readily apply to
statements containing both universal and existential quantifiers (e.g.,
"For every pure solid at a given external pressure there is a temperature
above which it becomes either gaseous or liquid."—the example is
adapted from Maxwell, 1966). Such statements are typically allowable
in science, but because of their existential component they are clearly
not falsifiable—while conversely, because of their universal component
they are clearly not verifiable. It is impossible to examine every pure
solid, while if any solid selected for testing resists a change of state,
it is always possible that it needs merely to be heated a little more.
There are, in addition, further problems for empiricist meaning
or demarcation criteria that bedevil verificationist and falsificationist
approaches equally. A trivial example will suffice to show the kinds of
difficulties which can arise.
In order to sanction the use of at least some universal state¬
ments, logical positivist analyses from about the time of Ayer's
Language. Truth and Logic (1956) began typically to emphasize 'confirm-
ability' rather than •verifiability' as the appropriate criterion of
empirical meaningfulness. A statement is confirmable if an observation
statement can be deduced from it or from a set of statements of which
it forms an essential part. More precisely, a statement M is confirmable
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if and only if It can bo directly (oboervationally) verified or if
in conjunction with some other otatement P it implies an observation*,
ally verifiable statement 0 not implied by P alone. This confirmability
criterion makes allowance for universal statements and for other state¬
ments which do not in themselves have immediate observational referents
or consequences; but it is intended to require that any such statements
have clearly specifiable observational content nonetheless. As it
stands however, this criterion renders any statement confirmable, in
the following way. Let M be any statement at all, 0 any (true)
observation statement, and P the statement "M implies 0". Then, from
the conjunction of M and P, but not from P alone, we can deduce 0. 0
is found to be true by observation, hence M is confirmed. The same
trivial example can be used to show that any statement M forms part of
a falsifiable set of statements. Let M and P be the same as in the
preceding example, and 0 any falsifiable statement (it need not be true,
nor be observationally falsifiable). Again, the conjunction of M and P
implies 0. Thus, specification of the events which would constitute
falsification of 0 serves also to specify the events which would
constitute falsification of at least one of M and P, and hence of their
conjunction. It has been shown by Church (1%9) that, with somewhat
more complicated logical manipulation, any statement M can still be
confirmed even if stringent limitations are placed on P so that it must
be either analytic, observationally verifiable, or independently
confirmable.
Of course these examples are, as mentioned, trivial ones.
However, their triviality cannot be taken as an indication that they
are irrelevant or unimportant. If it is desired to construct formal
criteria of moaningfulness because informal or intuitive ones are
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unreliable, then it is pointless to have to resort to informal
criteria for deciding when the formal ones are to be applied. Hence,
trivial 'mistakes' made through the application of a proposed criterion
are relevant precisely because they are trivial. Trivial mistakes are,
at least, easily recognized. They demonstrate that the proposed
criterion is capable of leading to mistakes. There is, however, no
formal criterion of triviality, and no guarantee that naturally occurring
mistakes which arise through application of the proposed criterion will
be either trivial or in any other way easily detectable. Hence, trivial
mistakes serve effectively to invalidate a proposed criterion.
The attempts to develop empiricist meaning criteria continued
to encounter difficulties such as these, as well as considerably more
recondite ones, to the extent that some logical empiricists (who by and
large no longer call themselves logical positivists) came to abandon
the attempt to construct formal meaning criteria of any sort (e.g.,
Hempel, 1950, 1951). Others, recognizing the apparently insurmountable
difficulties in unequivocally analysing the meaning of statements,
continued to press for the development of formal criteria but came to
concentrate on analysis of the meaning or empirical content of theories
rather than of statements (e.g., Carnap, 1956, Feigl, 1956). Statements
and concepts alike are now widely agreed to receive their meaning as
part of the theories in which they are embedded, from what Feigl (1956)
calls their "locus in the nomological not". This kind of account no
doubt does greater justice to the complexities of the use of concepts
in science than did the older logical positivist analyses of statements.
However, these more recent attempts at revamping or replacing the old
meaning criteria have encountered difficulties of their own. Feigl's
(1956), for instance, has not progressed beyond a sketch of the
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characteristics which a completed account will eventually have to have.
Carnap»s (1956), while more complete, allows meaningless contrivances
similar to those discussed just above in the case of statements
sanctioned by the confirmability criterion. Maxwell (1966) provides
as examples of statements admissible to theories on Carnap's criterion,
"The cosmic mind dislikes cheese" and (an old exemplar of meaningless
statements) "Last night everything doubled in length". He shows also
how the meaningless term •masiquity' can be introduced into any theory
through application of Carnap's criterion.
In general, the chief difficulty with any formal analysis of
meaning that must be applied to an entire theory is its extreme
complexity. A theory which is to receive any such analysis must have,
or be reformulated to have, the specific and precise logical structure
demanded by the analytic criterion to be applied. The same holds true
for the analysis of statements of course; for the simple criteria to
be applied, the statements must be of a logical form that could permit
verification or falsification, depending on the criterion. Such
logical requirements for statements are relatively simple, however,
and many statements in science possess them in any case, before any
analysis is deemed necessary; the statements "Some cosmic minds dislike
cheese" and "All cosmic minds dislike cheese", for instance, have the
requisite logical form for application of the criteria of verifiability
and falsiflability, respectively. By contrast, the logical form which
a theory must have for a criterion such as Carnap's (1956) to be applied
to concepts and statements in it is neither so simple, nor so easily
obtained, nor so characteristic of already extant theories. As a
consequence, it is rather difficult to apply such criteria, and in fact
neither Carnap's criterion nor any comparable one has yet been found
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capable of general application to extant theories. The upshot of
such complexity, therefore, is that there is no longer any cut and
dried technique which can be applied to determine whether a given
statement or concept, or already existing theory in which these are
embedded, can bo judged meaningful or meaningless, empirical (in whole
or part) or metaphysical (in whole or part). No such complex analysis
has come any closer than the simple ones to providing a useable
criterion, and indeed it is an unresolved question as to whether such
a technique could exist even in principle . That is, it is not certain
that it is possible even in principle to give a formal and complete
account of the meaning or empirical status of theories or of the
terms of them—apart from the apparently insurmountable difficulties
of doing so in practice—by means of such global analyses (see, for
instance, Maxwell, 1966, for an argument against the possibility of
doing so). Unless a proposed meaning analysis is both formal and
complete in just this sense, no criterion can follow from it for identi¬
fying and expunging the non-empirical components of or additions to a
theory that, as a whole, has some empirical content (i.e., entails some
confirmable or falsifiable predictions). Making such identification
possible for such therapeutic use was, of course, the purpose for which
meaning criteria were developed in the first place.
In summary, the development of meaning or demarcation criteria
which could be used as tests for statements or theories to prevent the
occurrence of conceptual excesses such as those which eventually
vitiated Newtonian theory has been effectively frustrated. The early
attempts to construct formal criteria for the assessment of statements
proved incoherent, and no refinement of them was able to eliminate
their incoherence. The few later attempts to construct formal criteria
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for the assessment of concepts or statements as embedded in theories
encounter the same difficulty, and in addition, the complexity of such
criteria and the special requirements imposed by them would render
them of dubious generality even if their specific inadequacies were to
be overcome. None of the proposed criteria has proved of very much
practical value in the task of assessing the meaningfulness of statements
or theories .
Realism and Positivism in the Context of Construction: 2.
Problems in the Application of Testing Criteria.
The preceding section showed that it is extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to develop theoretical concepts which can be
guaranteed to be 'clean', i.e., to have empirical content and nothing
else, simply bocause the criteria for assessing the empirical status
of any such concepts have, at least until the present, proven faulty
and intractable to improvement. Such problems in the development of
meaning criteria do not affect a realist approach to science in the
context of construction, for in a realist approach metaphysical baggage
(or what positivists might consider such) is not prohibited, and in
the context of construction considerations of purity can legitimately
be subordinated to considerations of theoretical fruitfulness. Such
problems do, however, clearly make it difficult for a rigorously
positivist approach even to begin functioning in the context of
construction.
Scientific concepts and theories must not only be formulated
and judged admissible however^ whether they are clean or not; they must
also be used. Theories must make contact with nature in the context of
onstruction; they must be tested, developed, accepted or rejected as
providing genuine information about the world, however that world is
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conceived. Explicit criteria for testing or assessing statements
and theories in terms of their validity are much the same as, or can
he derived from, those used to assess them in terms of their meaning-
fulness. The verifiability criterion, for instance, makes the meaning
of a statement dependent on a statement of the operations involved in
its verification. Testing a statement thereby acknowledged as
meaningful simply involved carrying out the specified operations. There
are no logical problems involved in doing so that do not equally affect
the statement of the operations. Some of the same problems do arise,
however, in suitably altered form, so that in the testing and development
of theories, no less than in their formulation, formal criteria—chiefly
criteria of refutation or falsification in this case, since no-one
today would claim that theories can be conclusively verified—are
inadequate to the task.
Most of the considerations which warrant this conclusion
are well known, and can be discussed relatively briefly here. First,
almost every theory encounters anomalies, experimental results and
other observed phenomena which are incompatible v/ith the theory. If a
scientific theory is regarded (or recast) as a formal hypothetico-
deductive system, there will almost certainly be predictions entailed
by it which, on any strict application of falsificationist logic (which
is not repudiated by any logicians, even if it is supplemented by some),
will refute the theory or some part of it. Every scientific theory,
as Weimer and Palermo (1973) strikingly describe it, "lives in an
ocean of anomalies"; each one is "born refuted". Hull's (19^+3)
behaviour theory, for instance, was 'born refuted' by the results of
latent learning experiments (Tolman & Honzik, 1930), and was further
refuted in infancy by Crespi's (19^) demonstration of elation and
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depression effects on response strength. Newtonian mechanics was
born refuted by the failure of the moon to follow the orbit (apparently)
ascribed to it by Newton's equations, Copernican astronomy by the
absence of any detectable stellar parallax, etc. Instances of such
anomalies affect most theories, perhaps all. Their ubiquity may be
referred to the incompleteness of our knowledge, to the fact that our
best theoretical efforts to date are at best approximations to the
truth, or simply to the law of sheer cussedness; such explanations may
be consoling, but are not otherwise helpful. For the most part,
anomalies must simply be lived with in science.
Reaction to such anomalies in the course of science can take
many forms, depending on the specific circumstances of their occurrence
and on the inclinations of the affected scientist. Given a theory, and
a finding which is anomalous with respect to the theory, should the
finding be considered peripheral or central? That is, can the anomaly
be Bafely passed by as indicative only of a unique or uncharacteristic
class of events of only tangential relevance to the theory, or does it
call for intensive investigation as the key, for good or ill, to the
theory's claims to validity? If the latter case obtains, should the
theory with regards to which the finding is anomalous be considered
wrong or merely incomplete? That is, does the theory need to be replaced
or merely extended? Such questions are of the essence in dealing with
anomalous findings. They call for judgments which cannot be made
through application of any strict criteria of confirmation or refutation,
because such judgments go beyond the available evidence to assess the
relevance of the given anomaly in the context of knowledge which has
not yet been acquired. They involve an estimation of the consequences
of treating the anomaly in one way or another, an estimation which
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therefore has the character of a prediction of future knowledge.
Thus, anomalies, like other unsolved problems in science,
may provoke intense theoretical and experimental efforts at assimilation,
or force ad hoc revisions of theory, or be shelved pending the further
development of science, or simply be ignored. Only rarely do they
serve to refute any well-attested and ongoing theory with regards to
which they are anomalous. Given the ubiquity of anomalous results in
scientific investigations, this chariness concerning acceptance of
them as refutations is entirely appropriate. Many or most anomalies
prove assimilable within further extensions of current theory or
through more precise application of theory (the anomalies for Newtonian
and Copernican theory cited above were eventually resolved in this
latter way; see Kuhn, 1957). Hasty acceptance of anomalies as
constituting refutations would thus lead to the rejection of theories
or of parts of theories which in some cases would later prove perfectly
competent to account for the anomaly, or which in other cases might in
the same interim period lead to other new achievements which would render
them worth retaining despite the continuing presence of the anomaly.
Such a chary attitude towards anomalies is perfectly consistent with
a realist orientation to science (if nature is assumed 'really' to be
the way the theory says it is, then an experimental result which
blatantly contradicts the theory will naturally be looked on with some
suspicion), but is clearly not consistent with any rigorous commitment
to formal testing procedures.
Second, if in some respects ouch formal testing procedures
are too harsh on a theory, in other respects they are too easy. Any
anomaly can be accommodated within a theory by making an ad hoc addition
to the theory or by referring the anomaly to some other theory which
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must be assumed valid for the theory under examination to be tested.
As Feigl (1956, p. 12) regretfully puts it (regretfully, because he
is concerned to justify formal criteria as far as possible), "from a
purely formal point of view it must be admitted that adjustments in
any part of the theoretical network may result in a better empirical
9
'fit' Thus, Newtonian theory could have been 'saved' from the
anomalous evidence of the moon's orbit by postulating that the moon
was of non-uniform density, so that its centre of gravity did not
correspond with its physical centre-point. The parameters of the
moon's density distribution could have been chosen freely so as to
induce just that correction in its predicted orbit that would yield
conformance with the observed one. Indeed, Newtonian theory towards
the end of its career was saved in just such a way from the results of
the Michelson-Morley experiment. The Fitzgerald equations predicted
the contraction of a body in the direction of travel to an extent which
would precisely counterbalance what would otherwise be the measured
effect of the ether drift; the failure to find evidence of an ether
drift thus no longer formally told against the theory. This formal
rehabilitation of Newtonian theory did not, of course, prevent the
Fitzgerald equations from being used by Einstein for quite a different
purpose, in the establishment of special relativity theory.
In short, a strict insistence oh compatability of theory and
observation (of the predictions entailed by the theory) would require
that ovory anomalous result be dealt with when it occurred, but would
allow the dealing-with to be ad hoc and trivial. Indeed, such an
insistence would force the dealing-with to be ad hoc, since it would
rule out any delay, any further gathering of evidence, insight, or
interpretation, prior to considering the anomaly if the theory was to
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be maintained.
Third, and closely related to the availability of ad hoc
defensive procedures in a theory, is the fact that an unequivocal
comparison of a theory with all potential alternative theories is never
possible. This impossibility is not simply due to the infinity of
possible alternatives. Rather, there is always more than one possible
theory that will entail a given set of experimental results, account
for a given set of events. Alternatives to a given theory, possessing
this property of empirical equivalence, may be trivial, as contrived
examples usually are. For instance, as an alternative to theory T we
could propose theory T + M, where M is a meaningless statement or set
of statements sanctioned as empirically significant by any of the
inadequate meaning criteria described in the previous section. On the
other hand, each alternative may be a highly developed and fruitful
theory in its own right. For instance, the relevant parts of the most
refined version of Newtonian mechanics were in this sense empirically
equivalent to special relativity theory, or could have been rendered so
with slight further modifications, at the time special relativity theory
was first proposed. As another example, the Copernican and Tychonic
astronomical theories were empirically equivalent with respect to
predictions concerning events within the solar system—in this case
for the rather special reason that they were also geometrically
equivalent. (They were not, however, thus equivalent in the context
of the universe as a whole, since Copernican theory predicted stellar
parallax and Tychonic theory did not; the evidence available at the
time supported Tycho.)
Choosing between such empirically equivalent theories cannot,
by definition, be done on the basis of the evidence in favour of each.
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Empirically equivalent theories can, nevertheless, often be forced
to become non-equivalent, by elaborating both to the point where they
yield differential predictions. Such a procedure can be effective,
however, only with the imposition of stringent limits on the amount of
post hoc accommodation that will bo permitted to the theories. Such
limits, furthermore, cannot themselves be formally specified in any way
that will prevent either trivial or possibly significant exceptions,
any more easily than meaning criteria can be specified, and for much
the same reasons. The imposition of such limits on post hoc accommoda¬
tion in the absence of formal preset criteria for doing so therefore
amounts to placing limits on what will be accepted as attributable to
the world. The practice of doing so is thus consistent with the
position that what is taken to be the autonomous constitution of the
world should exercise a directive influence on the content of scientific
theories—in short, with a position of scientific realism—but is not
consistent with a position which lacks (and could be taken to abjure)
any systematic justification or rationale for deviating from the
requirements of unequivocal empirical and logical grounds for the
assessment of theories. The same position of scientific realism provides
grounds for rejecting a proferred alternative theory which is equivalent
only trivially to a given theory, since alternatives of this sort
involve the same kind of post hoc accommodation just considered, without
benefit even of a prior deciding experiment.
On the other hand, choosing between non-trivially equivalent
theorios, both of which arc significant and well-developed, in the
absence of what is accepted beforehand as deciding evidence, is not
rendered any systematically easier by adopting a realist approach than
by adopting a positivist approach. Nor is there any reason why it
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should be easier; the systematic function of realism in the context
of construction (as contrasted with its psychological function as
emphasized by Planck) is not to provide a basis for making judgments in
the absence of evidence, but to provide a basis for making judgments on
the basis of evidence which is not logically compelling. When the
choice must be made, therefore, between Copernican and Tychonic
astronomy, between Newtonian mechanics and special relativity, scientists
who make the choice on realist grounds may well disagree in their
choices. As will be seen, the circumstances in which such choices are
made often serve to mitigate the arbitrariness and "all or nothing1
character of the choice.
It should be mentioned that some of the same considerations
which have been brought forward here in support of a realist position—
the impossibility of making completely unequivocal tests or crucial
experiments to decide between alternative theories—led Poincare (1905)
and Duhem (191/+) to adopt a precisely opposite position. They maintained
that since scientific theories cannot be unequivocally tested or compared,
therefore we cannot assume that they make definite contact with the real
world. The truth that is allegedly sought by scientific theories, after
all, is presumably univocal, even if the theories themselves are not.
Therefore, they maintained, the multiplicity of possible scientific
theories dictates that such theories cannot be considered •true' in
anything related to an absolute sense, but should rather be considered
as conventions, to be adopted on the basis of their convenience and
discarded when they no longer prove convenient.
Such, in brief, is the position associated with the particular
form of positivism known as conventionalism (cf. the discussion on pp.
97ff.). It is certainly a consistent position, although it can bo
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argued that the progressive character of science renders it only
trivially so (e.g. Griinbaum, 1966). It does, furthermore, offer one
means for resolving the difficulties generated by reliance on formal
testing procedures; and it will be seen later that, on the account
presented here, it was an appropriate moans to employ at the time the
position was advanced. There is no reason to accept it as either
generally appropriate or logically compelling however. The convention¬
alist position amounts merely to the demonstration that commitment to
formal testing procedures, with the practically limitless ad hoc
adjustments to theory which such procedures allow, is incompatible with
commitment to a realist account of science. Specifically, the
conventionalist position combines commitment to formal testing procedures
with a keen appreciation of the fallibility of such procedures, and uses
the conjunction to justify withholding commitment from the theories
which are sanctioned by such procedures. The conventionalist position
effectively repudiates realism, therefore, only if the formal testing
procedures are given independent prior affirmation, but conventionalism
does not itself provide any grounds for making any such affirmation.
Thus, conventionalism does not tell against the realist orientation
advocated here, which is in part an alternative means for dealing with
the same problems as those to which conventionalism is addressed
(resolving them by de-emphasizing the testing criteria rather than by
de-emphasizing the theory), but which is also vindicated initially by
the incoherence of formal criteria even in advance of their application
to the testing of extant theories. Furthermore, the choice between
alternative extant theories is not in any case simplified by designating
the theories as conventions^. Such a designation is Indeed independent
of the problems which gave rise to the conventionalist position, problems
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associated with choosing between theories—except im the special case
where an out of date but familiar theory is maintained on the basis of
its everlasting truth. Such cases belong, as a rule, to the context
of reconstruction, and will be considered there.
Realism and Positivism in the Context of Construction; 3.
Problems Arising from the Resort to Methodological rather than
Logical Criteria.
The practical task of assessing statements or theories in
terms of their empirical content or meaningfulness, and that of determin¬
ing their validity, are thus equally unresolved so far by the application
of strictly or consistently logical analyses. A positivist orientation
towards the conduct of science thus cannot, on the available evidence, be
coherently implemented as a formal programme. That is, no attempts at
implementing it as a formal programme have been successful. There is
nothing in what has been said, however, to suggest that positivism cannot
be consistently or coherently maintained as an attitude toward the
conduct of science, even in the absence of adequate formalizations. Just
how much the attitude, in the absence of adequate formalizations, will
be able to accomplish, is certainly an open question; but it is not
unreasonable to expect that it might have some use. In line with such
considerations, some logicians and philosophers of science have insisted
that the value of meaning or demarcation criteria is not altogether
negated by the logical weaknesses displayed by such criteria. They
maintain that the purpose of constructing such criteria—that of ensuring
the unequivocally empirical character of science—can effectively be
served by applying the best available criteria to the best of our
ability. At the very least, it is maintained, such a procedure, while
not proof against errors, is better than none at all. Maintaining such
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an orientation towards the construction and use of meaning and
demarcation criteria characterizes the position as a methodological.
rather than a logical one. That is, such a position is concerned with
the construction of techniques for achieving a given end, that of
ensuring the empirical character of science; the techniques are,
accordingly, to be judged primarily on the basis of how well they can
or could achieve that end, not on the basis of their logical properties
per se. Maxwell, who does not himself subscribe to this position,
summarizes it as follows (the letters 'M' and 'P' refer back to the
discussion of the confirmability criterion on pp. 2A-7-2/+8; they replace
equivalent symbols in Maxwell's text):
"It is true that the criterion will not do as it stands;
but what is intended is quite clear. Let us modify it
to read something like, 'Some observation sentence must
be derivable from M and P, and P must function nontrivially
and in an uncontrived manner in the derivation.' It is
true," this position continues, "that we may not be able
to give formal criteria for triviality and for uncontrived-
ness—-criteria which will meet all of the logician's trick
cases. Nevertheless, we know what is meant and will be
able to recognize triviality, etc. (in this sense) when we
see instances of it" (Maxwell, 1966, pp. 320-321).
This methodological position amounts at times to that of
treating the available meaning and demarcation criteria as if they were
valid, and adapting them to meet special cases where they might lead to
error. However, it is not clear at the outset, at least, how formal
criteria can be fully rehabilitated by any such retreat from the
requirements of formal coherence. If one liberalizes the rules for the
application of formal criteria, does one end up with informal criteria,
with unreliable formal criteria, or with nothing at all? That is, the
problems with any pragmatic use of such formal criteria concern the
identification of the special cases where the criteria are inapplicable,
and the decision about what to do with them once they have been
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identified. The "logician's trick cases" can be recognized easily
enough, if for no other reason than that they are put forward by
logicians. But as pointed out before, the value of such trick cases is
that they show that a proposed criterion can lead to unacceptable
conclusions—and they show it in such a way that the conclusions can
easily be identified as unacceptable. No such ease of identification
is provided if application of a proposed criterion leads to contentious
or problematic conclusions in the analysis or construction of complex
theories. There, it is precisely in the difficult situations where
sense might be mixed with nonsense and the result prove opaque to common
sense inspection that the application of the criterion is most relevant;
and it is precisely in those situations that the logical fallibility of
the criterion will render its applicability most in doubt. Hence, if
a proposed criterion is not valid in all situations, as none of them
are, it will have to be supplemented by something else—common sense,
commitment to the realistic significance of an explanatory schema, etc.—
in just those cases where the criterion alone could, if it were generally
adequate, prove most useful. In short, a fallible criterion can be
expected to abdicate its responsibility just when it 1b most needed,
when confronted with the most difficult tasks; it will do so not because
it is more likely to lead to absurd conclusions when applied to difficult
tasks, but because the informal checks to which it must constantly be
subject are themselves most in doubt when the tasks are difficult.
Let us apply these considerations to the two most influential
methodological positions put forward to date, falsificationism and
operationism. Both were initially developed before the search for formal
criteria reached its peak, and both remain influential at present, in
the face of the reduced influence of formal criteria.
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Falslficatlonism. Falsificationism as a methodological
position is associated almost entirely with Popper and his more
faithful students. Popper is not and never has been a positivist, in
the sense in which that term has been used here. On the contrary, he
has always regarded the goal of science as the attainment of absolute
truth. He regards this goal as unattainable in principle however, and
has devoted most of his philosophical career to the development of
logical and empirical decision criteria for the unambiguous assessment
of statements and theories11. These criteria are different from, but
entirely comparable with, the meaning criteria developed by logical
positivists. Popper's appreciation of the fallibility of human
knowledge, however, has led him to stress the provisional character
and fallibility of any such criteria as tools in the search for knowledge.
Against the hopes, at least, of some logical positivists, he declares
that the application of any demarcation or testing criteria can never
lead to any certainty regarding either the truth or the falsity of any
statements: "If you insist on strict proof (or strict disproof) in the
empirical sciences, you will never benefit from experience, and never
12
learn from it how wrong you are (Popper, 1959, P» 50). " Since his
falsiflcationist criteria of demarcation and (derivatively) theory-
testing are parts of a general methodological position, he is able freely
to supplement them when in unadorned form they are insufficient to
establish or guarantee the empirical character of science. For instance,
in countering the charge that any theory could be made to resist
falsification on his criteria, simply by making ad and post hoc adjust¬
ments to it as necessary, Popper states: "the empirical method shall
be characterized as a method that excludes precisely those ways of
evading falsification which, as my imaginary critic rightly insists,
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are logically possible (ibid., p. 42)."
How far do such supplementations render falsificationism
workable? Three major problems for logical (as contrasted with
methodological) falsificationism have been mentioned so far. They are
the admission of meaningless statements of the same sort as are
sanctioned by the confirmability criterion (p. 248), the 'immunization'
of theories against refutation by an injection of ad hoc-ness (p. 255),
and the unfalsifiability of existential statements (p. 246). Concerning
the first of these, Popper has little to say, trusting presumably (like
the fictional methodologist portrayed by Maxwell) that such instances
can be recognized when they occur; the dangers inherent in this trust
have already been mentioned. Concerning the second, Popper's answer
is necessarily complicated by the fact that an addition to theory is
not usually identifiable as simply ad hoc or not; there are degrees of
ad hoc-ness. corresponding to degrees of empirical content and degrees
of increase therein. While the Fitzgerald contraction equations and the
associated Lorontzian theory are not completely ad hoc (ibid., p. 83;
cf. above, p. 256) they generate fewer testable consequences than does
special relativity theory, which, Popper claims, is therefore to be
preferred on the basis of its greater empirical content. Such an answer
is certainly acceptable in principle, but it only pushes the problem
back a step: How does one now go about comparing the revised theory
(Newtonian mechanics + Lorentz-Fitzgerald equations) with the new one
(special relativity) on the basis of their differential empirical
content? Empirical content can be defined as a function of the number
of testable predictions entailed by a theory, and, again in principle,
two theories might be compared on this basis. A technique for making
such comparisons is difficult to develop, however, since sets of
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theoretically entailed predictions tend to be, if not empty, infinite
in number. Popper sketches the outlines of such a technique, but his
account is no more than schematic and broadly descriptive; it is more
an analysis of the problem than at attempt at a solution. Neither
Popper nor anyone else has yet been able to develop such a technique
to the point where it could be applied in any concrete instance. In
the absence of such a technique, the placing of restrictions on ad hoc-
ness can only be based on the content of the ad hoc additions and their
parent theory, considered separately from their number. Such a practice,
therefore, cannot be given a general justification, methodological any
more than logical, which is separate in any way from the substantive
issues related to the particular case. It constitutes, that is, the
placing of limitations on what will be accepted as attributable to
nature (as indicated above, p. 258,) over and above those which can be
justified with reference to the (methodological or logical) decision
criteria. Such a practice, when based—as it must be, if it is not to
be random—on broadly theoretical considerations, including, perhaps,
intuitive ones, typifies a position of scientific realism.
The third problem is that existential statements, whether also
containing a universal quantifier or not, are not falsifiable, and hence
on strict application of a falsificationist criterion are non-empirical
or metaphysical. Many such statements, especially of the latter (mixed)
sort, are nonetheless typically allowed in science and appear in
scientific theories.. Popper maintains his falsificationist criterion
strictly only with respect to isolated existential statements. For those
that are included in theories he is more lenient, requiring only that
they be incorporated in the theory in such a way as to minimize their
purely existential import.
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...an isolated existential statement is never falsifiable;
but if taken in a context with other statements, an exist¬
ential statement may in some cases add to the empirical
content of the whole context; it may enrich the theory to
which it belongs, and may add to its degree of falsifia-
bility or testability,. In this case, the theoretical
system including the existential statement in question is
to be described as scientific rather than metaphysical
(ibid., p. 70; italics in the original).
Again, Popper's answer is entirely acceptable in principle, but his
statement must nevertheless be read with some skepticism. No matter
how pragmatic we wish to be about the testing of theories, the question
of whether a theory entails falsifiable predictions or not is a logical
one. From the conjunction of an existential and a universal statement,
no universal statements are entailed except those entailed by the
original universal statement alone. New existential statements may be
entailed by such a conjunction, but existential statements are not
allowable as theoretical predictions, because as such they are not
falsifiable. Hence the incorporation of an existential statement in a
theory does not increase the falsifiability of the theory; it does not
increase the theory's empirical content in the strict sense of generating
additional testable (falsifiable) predictions. On the contrary, if the
empirical content of a theory is measured as a function of the ratio of
theoretical postulates to derivable predictions (using an as yet
undeveloped calculus of infinite sets, as mentioned above), the inclusion
of any existential statement will always decrease the empirical content
of the theory by increasing the ratio. Since all existential statements
are on a par in this respect, Popper's emphasis on "some cases" is,
strictly speaking, otiose (as well as in fact unsupported by him); the
truth consequences of a theory incorporating existential statements are
the same whether the existential statements are transcendentally meta¬
physical or (in some sense) empirically meaningful. On grounds of
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falsifiability alone, if any existential statements are allowable in
a theory, then all are. The falsiflability criterion cannot distinguish
between them.
And yet, Popper is undoubtedly correct when he claims that
some existential statements, but only some, enrich a theory or add to
its empirical content. The example he gives is that of the discovery
of the element Hafnium, and the inclusion in chemical theory of
existential statements asserting its existence, after some of its
properties had been predicted by Bohr on the basis of strictly univeral
entailments from theory. The discovery and identification of Hafnium
as exhibiting these properties enriched chemical theory, extended its
range, may have been instrumental in the discovery of further elements,
etc. But the empirical content or meaningfulness of existential state¬
ments such as that asserting the existence of Hafnium is not such as
can be defined or measured by use of the falsifiability criterion, as
has just been shown. The empirical content of such statements must be
of a sort that can be assessed, if at all, only on the basis of criteria
other than that of falsifiability. Existential statements must be
judged empirical or non-empirical, meaningful or meaningless, apart from
their incorporation in any theory which receives its evaluation of
empirical status strictly on the basis of its falsifiability. Such
judgments of meaningfulness or lack thereof can certainly be made on
theoretical grounds, but not according to Popper's rules, not, that is,
by the use of his version of 'empirical method'.
In short, the use of falsification as a methodological rather
than a logical tool does not eliminate the difficulties concerning
existential statements. Strict (logical) falsificationism bars them
all; methodological fiat, if it admits any, admits them all and cannot
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—again, on methodological grounds—distinguish or discriminate
between them; their evaluation and the choice between them can be made
only on substantive grounds independent of the falsificationist
methodology. Such grounds, if they are to have any systematic rigour,
can only be theoretical grounds, but it follows that they must be
occupied in the absence of, or to an extent greater than that warranted
by, strict adherence to the canons of logical or methodological
justification. The occupation of such grounds, to such an extent,
constitutes, again, a position of scientific realism.
In both of the cases considered, the adoption of falsification-
ism as a methodological rather than a logical position provides a
licence, for repudiating ad hoc-ness and for admitting some existential
statements, respectively. But it is only one who has bound himself to
explicit rules of procedure who needs a licence to deviate from them,
and the licence does not carry with it any new rules of procedure for
doing so. In the absence of such rules of procedure, making use of the
licence entails making a choice that can later be vindicated pragmatically
(if it was the 'right' one) but that at the time can be made only on
grounds appropriate to a position of scientific realism.
Operationism. An independent technique for empirically
establishing the meaning of concepts was developed by Bridgman (1927),
under the name of 'operational analysis', usually shortened (to
Bridgman's distaste) to 'operationism'. The fundamental tenet of
operational analysis is that the meaning of a term or concept is
determined by (Bridgman never quite said 'the same as') the operations
performed in applying the concept. As Bridgman put it in a later
summary of his position:
The fundamental idea back of an operational analysis is...
that we do not know the meaning of a concept unless we can
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specify the operations which were used by us or our
neighbour in applying the concept in any concrete
situation (Bridgman, 1951; quoted in Lindsay, 1956,
p. 68).
Like the logical positivist analyses described previously, operational
analysis was developed as part of a reaction to the overturning of
Newtonian mechanics in the modern scientific revolution, in a spirit
of "How could we have been so wrong?1 Bridgman's avowed aim in setting
forth the principles of operational analysis was to "render unnecessary
the services of the unborn Einsteins (Bridgman, 1927, p. 2Jf)" in
dramatically recasting our conception of the universe. His principles
have been applied, however, more to rendering unnecessary the services
of the unborn Watsons, having been much more influential and widely
adopted in behaviourist psychology than in physics. Unlike most logical
positivist analyses, and like Popper's, operational analysis was never
intended as a formal criterion of meaningfulness but rather as a
technique, backed by an attitude, for keeping theoretical constructs in
close touch with observations. Nevertheless, attempts to generalize it
as a set of explicit principles encounter comparable difficulties to
those affecting empiricist meaning criteria, as well as some new ones
stemming from its practical character. These will be considered in
turn.
We can operationally define the 'length* of an object as the
reading taken from a yardstick placed against the object, and we can
specify the operations involved in measuring length as precisely as we
wish. Similarly, we can define the 'brittleness' of an object as the
force of a hammer blow necessary to shatter it; or we can stipulate a
brittle-not brittle dichotomy by arbitrarily assigning a cut-off point
on the continuum of force (of hammer blows). None of this is problematic.
Often, however, we need to attribute a property to something without
271 .
actually performing the designated operations for defining that
property. It would be inconvenient to have to measure the length of
a body every time wo wish to refer to its length. It would bo
impractical to establish the brittlenees of a body by hitting it with
a hammer until it shattered, if wo had need of a whole brittle body.
It is therefore necessary to phrase the operational definition as a
conditional statement. The meaning of "This flask is brittle" is
operationally given by the conditional "If I hit this flask with a
hammer at the designated force, the flask will shatter." The meaning
of "This desk is three feet wide" is given, similarly, by "If I place
a yardstick against the side of this desk, the yardstick will yield a
measurement of three feet." The use of such conditional statements
establishes the designated properties as dispositional ones; the body
would display such a property i£ if were subjected to the specified
operation. All operational definitions are of dispositional properties
in this technical sense. The validity of a conditional statement that
is untested in a given case—hence, the validity of an operational
definition, as contrasted with the operations themselves—is dependent
on generalization from a test case; the desk was measured yesterday, a
sample of flasks from the carton each shattered when hit with the
hammer. From this reconstruction of operational definitions, there are
two problems which arise, the first from the form of conditional state¬
ments, the second from the process of generalization.
The first problem is that the conditional "If X is hit with
a hammer, X will shatter" is satisfied by any X that is not hit with a
hammer; this problem is a consequence of the logic of conditional
statements (which are falsified only if the antecedent is true and the
consequent is false). Thus, in the example given, everything that is
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not hit with a hammer is operationally defined as brittle, and (by
extension) every desk that is not measured is three feet wide. These
consequences are obviously unacceptable, but they follow inevitably
from the use of conditional statements, and it is hard to see how such
statements can be avoided. Hempel (1956) suggests that the problems
resulting from the use of conditional statements generally can be
overcome only by relating the dispositional property to universal
(theoretical) laws which account for it. As applied to operational
analysis, such a procedure would involve deducing the dispositional
property from a theoretical account, and hence would subsume operational
definitions under the general class of observation statements entailed
by a theory. Making operational definitions thus dependent on theory,
however, negates the purpose for which they were developed, that of
defining a concept or property independent of its function in a theory
so as to place limits on its extension within the theory.
This first problem results from what might seem the vagaries
of logic, and hence might be dismissed as irrelevant to a practical
technique. The second problem, however, leads to much the same
conclusions concerning the relation of operational definitions to
theories, and does so on eminently practical grounds. Generalization
from a test case—which, as we have seen, is necessary if operational
definitions are to be used—involves an inductive risk; that is, it
requires the judgment that a given case is similar to the test case with
regard to the property considered. One must assume that the desk did
not change its width overnight, or that the quality control at the glass-
blowing works is sufficient to guarantee that each flask in the carton
is equally likely to break. The fact that these assumptions can be
made only within certain limits is not a concern in these cases. We
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can safely make the necessary assumptions in the cases cites, because
we are familiar with the way in which desks and flasks generally
behave . That is, we know what variables can for our present purposes
be considered irrelevant, can be left out of consideration, in
attributing the same property to two different objects or to one
object at two different times. More precisely, we can and must judge
that the operationally defined value of a designated variable is
invariant with respect to changes in the value of certain other
variables, in order for our operational definitions to have even the
slightest degree of generality. We assume, for instance, that desk-
width (as operationally defined) is invariant with respect to time, or
that flask-brittleness (as operationally defined) is invariant with
respect to denumeration.
Thus, from the necessity of inductive risk we are led to the
necessity of assuming invariance of certain variables with respect to
others1"^. These assumed invariances establish the limits within which
operational definitions can be considered valid. They are typically
not specified in reports of experimental procedure because they are,
in fact, infinite in number, comprising all of the unique circumstances
under which the operational definition was made. The only variables
with respect to which invariance is not assumed are those specified in
the operational definition itself. Thus, the operational definition of
•intelligence' as 'the score achieved on an intelligence test' assumes
invariance with respect, among other things, to choice of test. The
operational definition of 'intelligence' as 'the average score achieved
on the verbal and performance subscales of the Stanford-Binet
Intelligence Test, 195*+ revised edition, administered by a trained
tester and in conformance with the test instructions printed in the
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test handbook' assumes invariance with respect, among other things,
to sex, age, and social status of the tester.
Thus, operational definitions are always definitions with
respect to certain variables and without respect to all others, which
are presumed irrelevant. The operationally defined concept, that is,
is presumed variable with respect to the implicated variables and
invariant with respect to the rest. The assumption of invariance can
be justified on, at best, two bases. First is informal familiarity
with the objects and properties involved; there is no reason to expect
that desk-width varies with time because it has never happened before
and besides, desks don't do that sort of thing. Second is a theoretical
account that specifies the behaviour appropriate to the objects and
properties involved; the definition of a solid in conjunction with the
heat expansion coefficients of steel and wood, for instance, may enable
us to predict, or may be taken to guarantee, that the desk will not
change its width overnight. The assumption of invariance (or irrelevance)
is not rigid of course; it can be tested with respect to any variables
chosen for consideration and available for measurement. The choice of
variables to test in this way m^y be made on almost any basis whatever-
common sense, hunches, random selection, theoretical expectations—but
is not implied in any way by the procedures of operational definition
itself, and can never be exhaustive.
Let us apply these considerations to the operational analysis
of the concepts of Newtonian theory. In that context, Bridgman's claim
was that careful operational definition of concepts such as mass,
distance, simultaneity, etc., could have prevented physicists from
assuming instantaneous action at a distance and similar counterfactuals
generated by Newtonian theory^. However, while it is perfectly true
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that operational analysis of these concepts, with respect to the
variables and limits later emphasized by relativity theory, could
have had such a limiting effect on physicists' expectations, the point
is that there was no reason—and no way—for the analysis to be carried
out in that way at that time. What we would have to recognize as
operational analyses of a very sophisticated sort were carried out on
all these dubious concepts—mass, force, distance, simultaneity, etc.—
quite regularly in Newtonian physics. But just as, to make generaliza¬
tion from specific observed instances possible, we assume that width
is invariant with respect to time, so did Newtonian physicists assume
that length and mass were invariant with respect to velocity, time
determinations with respect to distance, etc.—they had no reason to
assume otherwise, and they had a theory that assured them that their
assumptions were tenable. Nor were any reasons available to them to
question their assumptions, on the basis of any measurements which they
could make. Carrying out operational analyses with respect to the
limits emphasized by relativity theory would not, after all, have
exposed any glaring counterfactuals in Newtonian theory; nor would it
today. Such an analysis would not have disclosed the dependence of mass
on velocity or of time determinations on distance. The discovery of
these relationships required—among many other things, including a
directed search—measuring instruments more precise than any available
before the last third of the nineteenth century. Thus, a relativity-
inspired operational analysis conducted before that time could have
revealed only that, within the limits of measurement, the assumed
invariances held. Refusal to generalize beyond the limits of measure¬
ment could only have restricted the application of theoretical concepts
in a way that both then and now would seem gratuitous. Any analysis,
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for Instance, that could have forestalled the assumption of the
existence of signals or forces with velocities greater than that of
light (which, for Newtonian theory, was a purely arbitrary limit)
could equally have been applied to exclude consideration of any
material bodies with velocities greater than, say, half that of light.
In each case, that is, the sole basis for refusing to assume that such
velocities occurred would have been that none such had ever been
observed. We now have good reasons for accepting the first limit and
not the second, but no such reasons were available to physicists until
near the end of the nineteenth century. In the absence of a theoretical
basis for distinguishing between the two limits-—signals at light
velocity and bodies at half light velocity—they could not have been
ascribed any differential significance. Finally, it should be mentioned
that any such restriction of theoretical concepts on the basis of the
limits emphasized by relativity theory might well have been, not merely
gratuitous in Newtonian theory, but utterly disruptive of it. The
objectionable aspects of the concepts of mass, distance, simultaneity,
etc., were not ancillary to Newtonian theory but fundamental to it.
Griinbaum (1956) has argued, therefore, that any analysis which could
have precluded the assumptions of absolute simultaneity and instantaneous
action at a distance would have prevented the formulation of the theory
from the beginning.
In short, operational analysis can delimit the application of
a concept only along those dimensions where its propriety is already
suspect1^. Use of the technique to delimit concepts in any other way
would necessarily rest on a choice of variables or dimensions random
with respect to the theory in which the concepts appear; such use would
be, in the context of the development of the theory, gratuitous at best^
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and fatal to the progress of science at worst. In between, it may be
merely trivializing. The choice of variables to control for—that is,
the selection of suspect dimensions—cannot be made on the basis of the
principles of operational analysis itself; such variables are not
specifiable, even as regards their general type, independent of the
theory and the problems with which they are connected. If the choice of
such variables is to be systematic, it must rest on broadly theoretical
considerations, but in the absence of a finished theory that entails
the relevance of specified variables—that is, in the construction and
development of a theory—the theory-based choice must proceed on grounds
other than, or weaker than, entailment. Again, the assumption that
nature autonomously possesses the characteristics, or some of them,
attributed to it by the theory, that is, the attribution to the theory
of greater validity than is strictly warrantable, can provide such
grounds; and again, the holding of such an assumption constitutes a
position of scientific realism. Thus, operational analysis, like
methodological falsificationism, requires for its systematic utilization
in the context of a developing theory a position of or equivalent to
scientific realism.
Realism and Positivism in the Context of Construction; 4.
Conclusion.
This concludes the critique of positivism, and its contrast
with realism, in the context of construction. We may summarize the
discussion to this point by saying that theory-evaluations and other
scientific decisions, when based on explicit criteria either of a
strictly logical or of a methodological type, are often equivocal at
beet and incoherent at worst. That is, the criteria do not in fact
apply unambiguously to all the situations which require decisions of
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a sort to which the criteria are supposed to be relevant, decisions
concerning the empirical meaningfulness and validity of concepts and
statements. In such cases, the proposed criteria for evaluation stand
in need of replacement or supplementation with an evidentially unwarranted
and strictly unwarrantable commitment to the unqualified truth or
falsity of a scientific theory, in order to provide a systematic basis
for the making of such decisions. We now turn to the other side of the
story, the comparison of positivism and realism in the context of
reconstruction. The exposition in this case will be based mainly on
what has already been said, and so can be considerably shorter than in
the previous discussion.
Positivism and Realism in the Context of Reconstruction.
To return to a point which was made before, the systematic
or pragmatic justification for realism in the context of construction
is that it provides a basis for making decisions or arriving at conclusions
on the strength of evidence which is not logically compelling. Therein
lies the strength of realism, and also its weakness: it enables
decisions to be made, thereby preventing intellectual paralysis, but by
the same token may encourage them to be made wrongly. Drawing conclusions
on the baBis of non-compelling or, strictly speaking, insufficient
evidence necessitates a relaxation or abridgment of critical standards.
Such standards are in part replaced by reliance on the power of a theory,
or of the fundamental insights which the theory exemplifies, to serve as
a guide in the continuing investigation of nature. The reliance on the
theory's power is, if not altogether uncritical, at least relatively so;
it must be strong enough to warrant ignoring or minimizing the claims
of the flood of anomalies that besets any theory, as well as those of
the innumerable alternative theories that are always logically possible.
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A theory that is maintained in such a way is not, of course,
necessarily monolithic; the realist commitment is not to the theory
in all its details but to what are taken to be its fundamental insights.
Thus, the theory can be revised, modified, extended, and improved on
the basis of applying these insights to the solution of further problems.
The fact of commitment, however, places certain stringent limitations
on the direction and extent of possible theoretical development. In
particular, it makes it very difficult for the theory, or for the
scientists who maintain it, to incorporate or adopt any interpretation
of observed events which contradicts the fundamental insights of the
accepted theory, any interpretation, in other words, which is incompatible
with (what the theory claims to be, hence what is accepted as) the real
world. If the investigation of nature by means of an accepted theory
leads to a situation in which such 'unreal' interpretations are called
for or, more accurately, in which the order and arrangement that nature
displays in conformance with the accepted theory begin to break down
and can be restored only by the adoption of such 'unreal' interpretations,
then the realist approach to science runs into very serious trouble.
Such a situation can arise when experimental findings, or
conceptual analyses thereof, that are incompatible with the fundamental
Insights of the accepted theory come to the fore. They may come to the
fore, and thus be separated from the perennial flood of unresolved
theoretical and experimental anomalies, in a variety of ways. They may
arise as counterfactuals to theoretical predictions which are of crucial
importance to the accepted theory by virtue of relating closely to the
theory's most fundamental InsightB or precepts; the recognition of such
counterfactuals as particularly important thus proceeds, in this case,
from the very fact of the realist interpretation of the theory. They
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may arise as a result of external, non-scientific criteria of relevance,
such as the demands for better navigational aids, calendars, or
intelligence tests; such demands can confer upon some unresolved
theoretical problems a more intense focus than they might have received
on autonomously scientific grounds. They may arise from the success of
a competing theory, with a different set of fundamental insights or
precepts, in predicting and accounting for an overlapping set of events,
especially if the success of the competing theory thereby attests to
the power of the different set of fundamental insights which it
exemplifies.
Although such anomalous findings and interpretations may arise
from many sources, and be ascribed importance for as many reasons, it
is the commitment to realism that renders them of telling importance to
the particular accepted theory. Once it has been agreed that they must
be dealt with in the course of science, that is, that they can be
neither denied or ignored, the failure in fact to deal with them within
the accepted theory—if, indeed, it continues to be a failure, if the
new intensity of focus upon them does not lead to their resolution-
places a realist interpretation of that theory in a double-bind situation.
The commitment to the truth of the scientific system with regards to
which they are anomalous serves simultaneously to accord them major
systematic status and to preclude the employment of any easy stratagems
(such as ad hoc modifications to the theory) for dealing with them.
Thus, howsoever such problems arise, they constitute a
challenge to the accepted theory of a sort that cannot be ignored but
that also, within the constraints of a realist interpretation of the
theory, cannot be met. Such unresolvable problems that, for whatever
reason, cannot be bypassed or ignored, have a devastating effect upon
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the tenets of scientific realism. In the presence of very many of
them, the realist conviction that science as exemplified by the
accepted theory can disclose the truth about the real world may begin
to crumble; alternately, the conviction may be upheld but begin to be
divorced from its formally inadequate (and now also systematically
inadequate) empirical foundations. Either reaction involves a
re-examination of the relationship of the theory qua theory to its
empirical base, in order to understand how the two came to diverge.
That is, either reaction (and they are not that much different) requires
a consideration of the theory and its component parts primarily as
abstract constructions rather than as representations of the world.
Either, therefore, establishes the context of reconstruction as central
to the continuance of the scientific enterprise.
In short, as indicated in the initial description of the two
contexts in Chapter 3, the context of reconstruction emerges as
primary when scientific focus must be significantly shifted from that
part of the world which the theory addresses, to the theory itself.
There are three tasks for scientific inquiry in the context of recon¬
struction. First is the determination of why it is that the accepted
(or, for some, formerly accepted) theory is no longer proving adequate
to the demands made of it. This task involves identifying the factors
within the accepted theory which have come systematically to (as it now
seems) vitiate it. Such factors may include the assumptions involved
in the theory's formulation or application, the choice of variables
and entities in terms of which the theoretical explanation is given,
etc.; some or all of these may be identified as empirically unwarranted,
overextended, or simply meaningless. Second is the correction or
elimination of these vitiating factors, either by recasting them in an
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empirically more warranted form or by replacing them with altogether
new ones; in the former case the appearance, at least, of the old (i.e.,
accepted or formerly accepted) theory may be preserved. Third is the
finding of solutions to the intractable problems that precipitated the
reassessment in the first place. The successful completion of these
three tasks imposes demands, both of a technical and of an attitudinal
character, which can be met much more easily within a positivist
orientation to science than within a realist one.
The main consideration that makes a realist approach unsuitable
when applied to these tasks is the comparative inflexibility of a
realist approach in dealing with substantive issues. A realist
orientation facilitates an intensification of focus on what is known
or taken to be important; it is thus well suited to highly directed
activities such as adding new findings onto old frameworks, expanding
a theory built on an established base, or rejecting one of a pair of
incompatible theories. This intensification of focus exacts a price,
however, in that it implies a comparative blindness outside the area of
focus; the restricted and comparatively linear mode of assessment
characteristic of a realist approach renders it incapable of supporting
a critical analysis of all components of an accepted theory equally,
since some fundamental components will be accorded status which is
almost unquestionable, or at least less questionable than others as a
function of how fundamental they are. If some of these fundamental
components of a theory are precisely the ones identified as responsible
for many of the difficulties encountered by the theory, a realist
interpretation of the theory may actually hinder its critical analysis.
It is under such circumstances, a6 suggested earlier, that tenacity in
the defence of a theory may degenerate to dogmatism: the attitude does
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not change, but its degree of appropriateness does.
A realist approach, even if not tied to the old theory,
may also hinder the development of solutions to the crucial problems
which brought the old theory into comparative disrepute . The realism-
derived requirement of systematic coherence, that is, of the compatibility
of different solutions to different problems, may impose constraints
on the solutions of specific problems which serve only to make the
problems even more difficult. In addition, some of the basic tenets
of the old theory may have become enshrined as common sense, either
throughout the culture or, in more limited form, for those scientists
who have been working with the old theory. Even in the absence of a
specific systematic commitment to the old theory, such common sense
constraints on what can be accepted as attributable to nature may promote
prejudgment of the validity of counter-intuitive solutions to outstanding
problems.
A positivlst orientation, on the other hand, involves no
commitment to the truth or ontological significance of a theory, but
only to its empirical foundations. Such an orientation thereby facilitates
the performance of the tasks appropriate to the context of reconstruction,
both in general and in specific ways.
The general facilitative effect of a positivist orientation
in this context is a simple consequence of its abjuration of commitment,
of its refusal to agree that a theory must be either true or false; that
is, It reduces the stakes in the evaluation and selection of theories.
Positivist analyses of the status of scientific theories merely as
classifications of observed data, or as freely chosen conventions, or as
3trictly empirical knowledge-claims in which ontological references are
contaminations, all serve to reduce the tenacity with which an old
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theory is maintained by virtue of devaluing the status of all theories;
or at least, they do so for those who accept the analyses. Such
analyses may prove attractive, furthermore, for those who cannot cast
off the old theory but who acknowledge the cogency of the empirically
based objections to it. By divorcing the absolute truth of a theory
from its evidential support, positivist analyses enable a discredited
but familiar and well-loved theory to be elevated covertly to the
status of a metaphysic; it can be maintained as true, and any new ones
considered merely as aids to calculation. In this way, the insistence
on the truth of a well-known but increasingly untenable theory can be
rendered harmless in the course of science, and even what was previously
seen as a limitation on the applicability of positivist analyses can
serve a useful function. Finally, such positivist analyses can serve
also to reduce the diffidence associated with proposing a new theory,
minimizing such considerations as that a new theory is either grossly
counter-intuitive or contradictory of already existing theories. It
was this last feature of positivism, its encouragement through conven¬
tionalist analyses of free flights of creative imagination, that was
most emphasized by Poincar6 (1905) •
With regard to the specific tasks necessary in the context
of reconstruction: in the identification and analysis of disruptive
factors that have vitiated an accepted theory, a positivist orientation
contributes, first, an intellectual climate in which the task can be
freely undertaken (as just described), and second, the beginning, at
least, of a set of analytical techniques appropriate to the task. These
techniques stem from the basic positivist principle of requiring the
terms and statements of a theory to be free of ontological presuppositions,
or to have unambiguous empirical content, and thus include all the
285.
techniques developed for implementing this principle. That is, they
include all the recent meaning and demarcation criteria—in their
application as methodological techniques—that have been critically
examined in relation to the context of construction. They were not
appropriate or sufficient in that context, even when considered from
a methodological rather than a rigorously logical standpoint, princi¬
pally because the development and elaboration of theories required the
making of decisions concerning the admission and interpretation of
observed data to which these criteria were not relevant. That is, the
implementation of a positivist orientation through the use of these
techniques did not provide answers to many of the most important
questions that arose in their supposed field of application, relating
to the meaningfulness, empirical content, and validity of selected
terms, concepts, and statements. In the present context however, that
of reconstruction, and particularly with regard to the present task of
identifying and analysing the disruptive elements of a theory, the
relevant questions concern precisely the unambiguous empirical content
of selected concepts and statements in the theory. The kind of meaning-
fulness and validity that is to be ascertained and designated as
trouble-free is precisely that restricted but unequivocally empirical
kind that can be reliably ascertained through use of the techniques.
Any surplus meaning attributed to the concepts and statements in the
theory is legitimately suspect, in the present case. True, as we have
seen it is typically necessary in developing a theory to extend
theoretical concepts beyond the range of their unambiguous empirical
warrant, and thus to invest them with surplus meaning; but certain
instances in which they are so overextended are the ones that lead to
trouble for the theory, and these require identification and analysis.
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The extent and direction to which any chosen concepts are thus
overextended can be determined by application of the positivist
methodological techniques. It was, for instance, through analysis of
the possible observational implications of the current theoretical
conceptions of space and time that Mach was led to conclude that the
concepts of absolute space and time were meaningless. Such an analysis
of theoretical concepts can be carried out at any time of course, and
the positivist methodological techniques are always the appropriate ones
for doing so; however, since, again, theoretical concepts are in this
sense quite typically overextended, the use of the techniques is called
for only in the comparatively rare situations in which such overextension
can be identified as responsible for a breakdown in the theory.
The correction or elimination of the disruptive factors in a
theory follows on their identification and analysis. In some cases the
concepts or assumptions selected for examination may be concluded to be
incorrigible or meaningless, and in need of complete replacement.
However, if the selected concepts have any ascertainable empirical
content, they can be recast so as not to transcend it, by having their
application restricted to that which follows from their definition by
17
means of the analytical techniques, e.g., from their operation definitions
or from the statement of their confirming or falsifying instances. Such
restriction on the applicability of concepts renders them of less power
in any proposed new theory of course, but in a sense prepares them for
the investment of surplus meaning of a new sort in future theories by
stripping them of the particular, no longer acceptable, surplus meaning
which they carried in the old theory. The recasting of the offending
components of the old theory, when added to the general positivist
absence of commitment, facilitates the extraction from that theory of
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those parts of it or those applications of it which can still be
considered workable. Such extraction is necessary; the old theory may
still serve as a useful guide in some scientific investigations, and
may have many practical applications as well. It could not be maintained
as true on a realist interpretation, because the exceptions to it are too
great, but to reject it altogether as false would, in the absence of an
alternative theory of comparable power and scope, signal an unacceptable
loss of economy. On a positivist interpretation the theory can be
maintained in whatever form can be empirically justified; in such a
form the theory may have lost much of its elegance and systematic unity,
but at least its utility is preserved while it is prevented from acting
as a straitjacket on the development of alternative, possibly incompatible
theories and models.
Such alternative theories and models may be directed primarily
at resolving the outstanding theoretical and experimental problems that
touched off the reappraisal of the old theory. The solution of such
problems comprises the major substantive achievements made in the
context of reconstruction. In the attack on such problems, a positivist
approach encourages a conceptual flexibility that permits the tentative
pursuit of diverse and even incompatible routes towards their solution;
again, this is the feature of positivism emphasized by Poincar6. In
the attack on such problems, a positivist orientation, or rather the
absence of the complementary realist orientation, serves also to diminish
the force of any systematic requirements, such as those of generality and
simplicity, in the evaluation of a proposed solution. Such systematic
considerations are often legitimately relevant to the evaluation of
problem-solutions, but not when applied to the kind of intractable
problems considered here, which were implicated in the breakdown of a
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previous systematization. Such problems are likely to be hard enough
to solve by any means, without imposing requirements on their solutions
concerning their applicability to other problems throughout the field
of inquiry. Finally, a positivist orientation contributes an emphasis
on conceptual precision and rigorous determination of data that draws
attention to the fine structure of the observed experimental phenomena,
and may thereby be of considerable instrumental utility in focusing
attention on previously neglected or unconsidered aspects of the problems.
In short, in the solution of outstanding problems a positivist orientation
promotes a narrowing and intensification of focus on the phenomena
related to the problems and does so without a corresponding systematic
commitment. The combination of intensity of focus and conceptual
flexibility would, indeed, provide an ideal orientation for the practice
of science, if science were not also concerned with the construction of
theories possessing maximum scope and generality.
In speaking of the appropriateness of positivism to the
context of reconstruction it may be valuable to distinguish, not only
between its application to different tasks, but also and more generally
between its critical and its mediating function. The critical function
of positivism is exemplified by the analysis of overextended or otherwise
unsound theoretical concepts, and by the recasting of such concepts,
where possible, in such a way as to afford them more solid empirical
anchorage; this function of positivism has already been discussed in
sufficient detail. The mediating function of positivism is exemplified
by its analysis of the status of theories as conventions, classifications
of data, etc. By reducing the stakes involved in the assessment and
comparison of theories, a positivist orientation to science mediates
between successive dominant theories or sets of theories in a branch of
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science, easing the transition from one to the next. It is able to
do so by being available for use simultaneously as a conservative and
as a radical influence—'conservative1 and 'radical' meaning nothing
more here than the favouring of 'old and entrenched' vs. 'new and
unfamiliar* ideas and theories. The influence of positivism is a
conservative one, in that it permits the retention of old theories, or
old views about the nature of reality, in the face of new and--from a
realist standpoint—disconfirmatory evidence. At the same time its
influence is a radical one, in that it facilitates the development of
new ideas and theories with a minimum of opposition predicated on their
'outlandishness' or counter-intuitiveness, and stemming from the inertia
attained by the ideas associated with the old system. In modern physics,
the conservative influence of positivism may be exemplified by the
'saving' of Newtonian theory by the Lorentz-Fitzgerald equations when
they were first proposed; the radical influence may be exemplified by
Einstein's use of the equations in the construction of special relativity
theory. Thus, different scientists, depending on their preferences, can
look upon either the old or the new theories as either absolutely (and
hence non-empirically) true, or as mere aids to calculation, or indeed
as both, so long as the two forms of validity are not confused; separating
the two kinds of assessment of scientific theories enables the old and
the new theories to co-exist as long as proves necessary.
Co-existence is only necessary, however, so long as the old
theory retains its vigorous proponents, and until one or more of the new
theories has been developed to the point of being able to replace the
old theory, either by accounting for most of its successes (as well as
some of its failures) or by successfully devaluing them in favour of a
new set of achievements. Specifically, it is in the achievement of
290.
solutions to or resolutions of the outstanding problems that led to
the decline and reappraisal of the old theory, and in the extension
and systematization of such solutions, that the context of reconstruc¬
tion gradually merges into and is eventually replaced by the context of
construction. Once the critical problems have been solved, or shown to
be pseudo-problems and replaced with others that are more amenable to
solution, it becomes desirable in the course of science to maximize the
range of applicability of their solutions so as to make them the basis
for a theoretical account of as much of the field of inquiry as is
possible . One can give psychological accounts for this tendency towards
theoretical development and resulting systematization. One might appeal
to an inherent striving, rooted in the psychology of the creative process,
for scientists to see the greatest possible simplicity and elegance in
nature; Planck's defence of realism was founded in part on such an appeal.
Alternatively, one might appeal to a less sublime striving, rooted in the
sociology of the scientific community, for scientists to increase their
professional status by maximizing the range of a theory with which they
have become associated. Such psychologistic accounts undoubtedly have
their place, particularly in characterizing the scientific conduct of
individual scientists, and it is fortunate that the two suggested
rationales for theoretical expansion are compatible. The shift from
reconstruction to construction can be accounted for on less personalistic
grounds, however. Maximizing the range of a restricted theory, and
unifying several such which have been developed autonomously to account
for different specific problematic findings, makes it possible unambig¬
uously to predict and account for new findings, and to incorporate more
of the range of phenomena hitherto explicable by the old theory alone.
And on any account of the nature and function of science—whether science
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is supposed to be seeking truth or classifying data—it is considered
desirable to maximize the range of phenomena for which an account can
be given and to eliminate any potential contradictions in explanation.
Such systematic considerations may be less powerful in a positivist
than in a realist approach to science, and may be more fully subordinated
to stringently empirical considerations, but are by no means repudiated.
Approaching this goal of systematization constitutes the function of
science in the context of construction, and in its pursuit the new
theory or theories may be expected gradually to modify or abandon
altogether their positivist cast in response to the exigencies associated
with their development. The replacement of positivism with realism may
be a slow process at best, tied to the entry into the scientific field
of younger scientists who are not restricted in their options, as some
of their elders may be, either to a positivist renunciation of the search
for truth or to an outdated common sense commitment to the truth of the
18
old theory . With time, nevertheless, if a new systematization is to
achieve maximum scope and power, it is essential, as has been shown,
that it come to be accepted as having genuine reference to real things.
By way of summary, it may be reiterated that the characteristics
of realism and of positivism are the same, whether they are manifested
in the context of construction or in that of reconstruction. The primary
characteristic of realism is the commitment to the truth of a scientific
system or theory (or possibly to the falsity of a competing one) to an
extent greater than is strictly warrantable on the basis of empirical
evidence and the rules of whatever logic has been adopted; realism thus
encourages systematization at the expense of rigorous logical and
empirical analysis. The primary characteristic of positivism is the
refusal to entertain any such commitment, and the insistence on
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evaluating theories and statements strictly on the basis of explicit
logical and empirical criteria; positivism thus encourages rigorous
logical and empirical analysis at the expense—largely for technical
reasons—of systematization. In the shift from the context of
construction to the context of reconstruction and back, what changes,
because of the changed circumstances, is the relative appropriateness
of these two contrasting orientations to science. In the context of
construction realism is most appropriate, since what is required is
the systematic development and elaboration of theories. In the
context of reconstruction, positivism is most appropriate, since what
is required is the critical examination, analysis, and occasional
dismemberment of theories.
The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification.
A corollary of the analysis of the relationship between
realism and positivism as developed here is that the hoary distinction
between the context of discovery and the context of justification is
fully tenable only within what has been called here the context of
reconstruction. The purpose of the distinction between discovery and
justification is to separate the factors properly relevant to the
development of a theory from those properly relevant to its assessment.
The context of discovery is now typically considered to be relatively
free of rules of procedure; or at least, such rules are considered only
as heuristics, with no normative significance. (Herschel, who gave the
distinction its first clear modern formulation—although he did not
name it—was not so cavalier about the function of rules in the context
of discovery, but the rules which he formulated were strict inductivist
ones of a sort no longer considered tenable.) The context of justifica¬
tion, on the other hand, is characterized by the application of clear-cut
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rules and criteria of assessment of a proposed theory.
In the context of construction, however, it is necessary to
go beyond the application of any such clear-cut rules because, as we
have seen, such rules are not always applicable. Such rules constitute
decision procedures that are applicable to some decisions relating to
the evaluation of theories, but not to all. Others require recourse
to guesses, intuitions, hunches, etc.--and the 'etc.' specifically
refers to decision-making procedures which are systematic but not
formalizable, procedures based on commitment to the truth of a theory
to an extent greater than is strictly warranted by the available
evidence—in order for the decisions to be made at all.
Such limitations on the applicability of decision procedures
do not invariably weaken the distinction between discovery and
justification. Certainly, considerations relating to the construction
or development of a theory can be separated from those relating to
its assessment in extreme cases such as that of Kekul6, whose dreams
of snakes swallowing their tails suggested to him the structure of
benzene rings (Koestler, 1964). In such cases, however, the develop¬
ment of the theory is also divorced from previous theoretical conceptions;
and it is specifically in the relationship of new theories to old ones
on which they are based, or of which they form extensions, that the
distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification breaks
down.
When the extreme case of a Kekule is not involved, and a
proposed new theoretical interpretation forms an extension of and
addition to an already functioning and accepted theory—as is typical
in the context of construction—then the criteria for the assessment of
the proposed extension are partly derived from the prior content of the
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already functioning theory. The criteria are in part derived, that is,
from what the theory is taken to have established as the range of
acceptable interpretations of (i.e., possible characteristics of)
nature. The already functioning theory can serve as the basis for
assessment of its extension in two ways. First, the compatibility of
the extension with its parent theory may form one of the explicit
criteria for judging it. Second, and more important, in the attempts
at independent empirical testing of the proposed extension, the inter¬
pretation and judged relevance of the observed data will be, again,
partly based on what the parent theory is understood to claim is true
of the world. Interpretation of the data will be thus partly determined
by the content of the parent theory, not because of any kind of
scientific closed-mindedness but because, as we have seen, such inter¬
pretation cannot be based on anything else and still be both systematic
and unequivocal. For the interpretation of empirical data to be
systematic, it must be theory-based; for it to be unequivocal, it must
be extralogical (cf. the discussion of methodological falsificationism
and operationism, above).
The breakdown of the independent status of the criteria of
assessment is sufficient to jeopardize the distinction between the
contexts of discovery and justification, because maintaining the
distinction depends on the possibility of independent specification of
the procedures used in justification. But furthermore, this same lack
of independence demonstrates the interpenetration of the two contexts,
since it is the same factors—the systematic contents of the parent
theory—that are implicated both in the development and in the assess¬
ment of the extension of that parent theory.
This interpenetration of the contexts of discovery and
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justification, and consequent blurring (at least) of the distinction
between them, is due at root to the problems involved in the empirical
specification of meaning, that is, in the development of criteria of
meaning, demarcation, and, derivatively, testing. It is because such
criteria are not fully applicable to the evaluation of theories that
theories must instead be evaluated partly on the basis of internally
derived contentual and systematic considerations, and it is because
theories must be evaluated in this way that the context of justifica¬
tion cannot be either specifically characterized or even unambiguously
separated from the context of discovery.
To put it another way, the distinction between allowable and
un-allowable, necessary and gratuitous concepts and statements in
science (in the development and elaboration of theories, hence in the
context of construction) does not exactly correspond to the distinction
between meaningful and meaningless, scientific and metaphysical concepts
and statements as characterized by the application of explicit meaning
and demarcation criteria. If these two distinctions were to correspond,
then the superordinate distinction between the contexts of discovery
and justification would be both appropriate and necessary. In particular
it would be necessary; because for the testing criteria to be applied
and the results of such testing accorded any confidence, it is essential
that the assessment of the theory (through the statements which it
entails) be based on application of the criteria and nothing else.
In the context of reconstruction just such a situation
obtains, in which the meaningfulnes6 and validity that is to be allowed
to the concepts and statements chosen for examination is precisely that
which can be warranted by the use of the meaning and demarcation criteria
considered as methodological techniques. In that context, as a result,
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the distinction between discovery and justification is essential.
For instance, the considerations—whether theoretical, skeptical, or
whatever—that led Mach critically to re-examine the concepts of space
and time in Newtonian theory are of no relevance to the examination
itself or to its subsequent application, both of which are based
entirely on the adoption and use of explicit criteria of observational
significance. It follows also that the choice of theoretical concepts
to examine in such a way is likewise irrelevant to the significance of
the outcome of the examination. As in the context of construction (as
detailed in the discussion of operational analysis) the choice of
concepts to be analysed and the dimensions along which the analysis is
to proceed do not follow from the principles of the analysis but must
instead be based on external considerations; but in this context, the
external considerations are in no way implicated in the substance or
effect of the analysis itself.
In short, the distinction between the context of discovery
and the context of justification presupposes the tenability and assumes
the value of a consistent and rigorous positivist orientation to science;
and such an orientation is both tenable and valuable only in the context
of reconstruction.
A Note on Origins.
The account sketched here of the relationship of realism and
positivism in the conduct of science has close affinities with a number
of other positions advanced by philosophers and historians of science
at various times. These affinities, some of which are fairly obvious,
have not been mentioned so far in order to keep the exposition as
simple as possible, but they require acknowledgment at least. The
•fundamental insights* exemplified by a theory and resistant to
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modification are similar to the 'metaphysical core' of a research
programme as described by Lakatos (1970). The 'systematic considera¬
tions' relevant to the assessment of a theory in the context of
construction are much the same as those that Margenau (1950) has called
'metaphysical requirements' . The necessity for commitment to the
realistic significance of a theory has been discussed in great and
perspicacious detail by Polanyi (1958), and there are similarities both
in content and in the choice of descriptive terms between his account
and the one given here . The conception of science as embodying in part
a cyclic character, alternating between periods of progressive theore¬
tical and experimental elaboration of an accepted system and periods of
comparative theoretical anarchy leading to replacement or abandonment
of the once accepted system, is most closely associated today with
Kuhn (1962), and in many respects the present account is most closely
19
related to his . Each of these formulations has, inevitably, exercised
a major formative influence on the account given here; in turn, the
present account is intended as far as possible to complement, rather
20
than compete with, each of these
The immediate thematic background to the present account,
however, is none of these, but rather the historical and philosophical
analyses specifically of the relationship between realism and positivism
as made by Meyerson (1930) and Koyre (e.g.,1956). Meyerson and Koyr6
both characterized realism and positivism in much the same way that
those orientations have been described here, and analysed the relations
between them with detailed references to the history of science. The
present account follows in large part directly on their analyses, but-
whatever its other deficiencies relative to theirs—attempts to go
beyond them in two ways.
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First, Meyerson and KoyrS both saw positivism as a kind of
enemy to creative scientific thought--in much the same way that Planck
did—and took it as one of their major responsibilities to combat it.
For Meyerson, positivism was a kind of occasional aberration; his
lengthy analysis of the history of science attempted to show that
despite the claims of a few individuals such as Mach, a positivist
orientation has never been characteristic of true science. Koyre
moved beyond Meyerson to the extent of considering positivism a
recurrent and cyclical phenomenon in the history of science; but he
characterized it entirely as a "phase of renouncement", a failure of
nerve that periodically besets scientists in the face of new and
unfamiliar concepts. From KoyrS's position it is a small but vital
step to the position taken here, that the cyclical alternation of
positivism and realism is necessary to the continuing development of
science, as a result of the differential strengths and weaknesses of
each.
Second, Meyerson's and Koyre's accounts were both excessively
psychologistic, in that each attempted to ground the tendency towards
scientific realism solely in the psychology of the creative process.
Meyerson declared that his analysis was really an attempt to discover
the fundamental laws of thought by analysing their properties as
revealed in their most exalted products, completed scientific theories.
Koyre was again less extreme, but after categorizing positivism as a
"phase of renouncement" declared that the re-emergence of realism could
be accounted for sufficiently by the fact "that by nature there is in
man the desire not only to know but to understand (Koyre, 1956, p. 203)."
The analysis sketched here and in Chapter 3, by contrast, while not
entirely abjuring psychologism, eschews it as far as possible and tries
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to account for the necessity, at least, of a realist commitment in
the context of construction by detailing the inadequacy of the explicit
decision procedures available in its absence.
III. Behaviourism and its Positivism.
Finally, we can return to a specific concern with behaviourism.
At the end of Chapter 2 an explanation was promised as to why neobehav-
iourists were wrong in their shared conviction that "commitment to the
procedures of science" and possession of "a set of decision procedures,
appropriate to all sciences indifferently" would be sufficient to
guarantee the viability and successfully progressive character of their
scientific enterprise. The explanation has been some time in coming,
for it required an analysis of the historical foundations of behaviourism
as well as a schematic overview of the relationship between the methodo¬
logical and the substantive features of science in general. The
explanation has thus been building since the end of Chapter 2, but the
specific analytical material on which it depends has been concentrated
in the preceding pages of the present chapter.
How Adherence to Explicit Decision Procedures Results in
Theoretical Fragmentation.
Contrary to the neobehaviourists* expectations, adherence to
the logical principles of scientific methodology can guarantee neither
the progressive theoretical development of a scientific field as a
whole, nor theoretical convergence of competing positions within that
field. Rather, such adherence, when widely accepted as constituting
what is essential to the scientific enterprise, can prevent progressive
theoretical development and theoretical convergence. Adherence to the
methodological principles had this effect on neobehaviourism in two
complementary ways, expressed through the relative superordination
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of methodological principles and through the relative subordination
of substantive ones.
The potentially fragmenting and hence 'non-progressive'
effects of the superordination of methodological principles have been
treated at length in a general way in the preceding section. It is
entirely consonant with adherence to the methodological principles to
make an indefinite and even unlimited number of specific alterations
to a preferred theory in order to maintain that theory in the face of
anomalous empirical findings. Indeed, Hull (1937) considered this
unlimited alterability of methodologically rigorous theories—
specifically his own—to be constitutive of their genuinely scientific
charactor. Ho maintained that this feature guaranteed that ouch
theories would progressively approach the limit of complete validity,
inasmuch as negative results would be as important as positive ones in
their construction and elaboration. But contrary to Hull's belief, and
as we have seen, such unlimited alterability merely renders theories
incapable of refutation. Furthermore, the history of neobehaviourism
supports this conclusion better than it does Hull's faith. Throughout
the neobehaviourist period the theories of, say, Guthrie, Hull, and
Tolman—as well as the derivative ones of, say, Estes, Miller, and
Krechevsky—were subject to constant experimentally based criticism,
each being criticized by the proponents of the others. Such criticisms
had their effect: they stimulated accommodation in each theory in order
to meet the objections, and such continual accommodation was widely
regarded as demonstrating the corrigible, hence progressive, character
of each. But while the competing theories were thus refined to the
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point where, in their areas of overlap , it became difficult to tell
them apart in terms of their empirical content—difficult, that is, to
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draw differential predictions from them—this "empirical convergence"
was accompanied by no comparable theoretical convergence or rapprochement.
At the level of theory, the Guthrians, Hullians, Tolmanians, etc.,
remained as far apart as ever. Their shared methodological, commitment
helped to keep them theoretically disunified, by apparently rendering
all their disparate positions empirically defensible, rather than to
bring them any closer to theoretical unification.
The effects of the subordination of substantive principles,
insofar as they can be separated from the effects of the superordination
of the methodological ones, were more subtle. The brunt of much of the
preceding section was that some kind of logically and methodologically
indefensible realist commitment (or ontological reference, or substantive
insight) is not merely desirable or appropriate as a basis for pursuing
theoretical development, but is absolutely indispensable to it. Such
commitment provides the only possible systematic basis on which many
of the crucial theoretically relevant decisions—on how to interpret
data, on v/hat variables to implicate and hence control for in making
operational definitions, etc.—-can be made. It follows therefore, that
the neobehaviourist theorists must in fact have incorporated some such
indefensible references or unjustifiable substantive principles into
their positions, since otherwise they could not have effected any
theoretical development even of their own theories. And indeed, such
indefensible references can be found throughout neobehaviourist theories,
if one looks hard enough for them. And there is the rub: such references
are explicitly denied—are methodologically banned—in neobehaviourist
theories; being denied, they make their appearance only covertly; being
covert, they are idiosyncratic to the particular theory in which they
appear (or, one might say, in which they are hidden); being both
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idiosyncratic and covert, they are out of the 'public domain',
unavailable to other theorists either to adopt or to criticize .
What was covert about the substantive principles in
neobehaviourist theories was not their presence but their methodological
indefensibility, that is, their character of having content which was
not in fact specifiable in terms of, or justifiable by, the methodolo¬
gical rules which purportedly governed the introduction and application
of theoretical terms; and furthermore, their character of being usable
within the various theories precisely by virtue of their unjustiflability.
Almost the entire set of theoretical terms, postulates, and variables
of neobehaviourist theories had covert substantive implications in this
way . Their incorporation is responsible for much of what unique
content remained in the diverse neobehaviourist theories, after theore¬
tical accommodation had gone as far as it could go; it was largely the
disguised independent content implicated in the use of such theoretical
terms that was manipulated and elaborated in the different theories. As
Scriven observes:
I remember the glee with which I discovered that nobody
actually produces operational definitions, even when
they say they do. Hull's work is replete with examples
of allegedly operational definitions. Within three
lines of many of these he will insert an ontological
addendum but still insist that the defined term has no
meaning except as an intervening variable (Scriven,
196/f, p. 180).
The two most extensive and best documented classes of
theoretical terms with such covert and unjustifiable substantive
implications comprise also the two most widely used classes of theoreti¬
cal terms in neobehaviourist theories: intervening variables in the
theories of Guthrie, Hull, Skinner, Tolman, and their students, and
hypothetical constructs in the theories of Hull and his students. Both
of these classes of variables are supposed to be completely definable,
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in different ways, within a theory, and their use is supposed to be
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restricted to what follows from their explicit definition . In fact,
they are practically never thus definable, and their use in a theory
depends essentially upon the ambiguity of reference which they display,
upon informal extrapolation from their formal definitions, and upon the
implicit ascription to them of autonomous status to a sufficient degree
that their theoretically relevant properties can later be discovered
in the subsequent elaboration of the theory. This much can be said
with full confidence, even without making a detailed application of the
analysis contained in the preceding section to the composition of hypo¬
thetical constructs (as postulates in a hypothetico-deductive theory)
and of intervening variables (as a class of operational definitions).
Rather, all of this has been demonstrated in numbing detail, through
consideration of these constructs independent of any general analysis
such as has been offered here, by Koch (1954, assessing Hull), by
MacCorquodale and Meehl (1954, assessing Tolman), and to a somewhat
lesser extent by Mueller and Shoenfeld (1954, assessing Guthrie) in
their contributions to Modern Learning Theory.
Furthermore, the indefensible status of these constructs was
more or less attested to, again in different ways, by the final reflective
statements of these theorists themselves. In his posthumous final book,
A Behavior System. Hull (1952) retracted all the claims to generality of
his 1943 attempt at a systematization of the laws of behaviour (cf. the
internal quotation on p. 21), and while continuing to hope that a
comprehensive and rigorous theory of behaviour might someday prove
possible, judged that even his latest attempt "will serve mainly to call
attention to the problem (Hull, 1952, p. 354; quoted in Koch, 1954,
p. 168)." Tolman, more forthrightly, came eventually to repudiate the
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hope of ever making a complete definition of any intervening variables
and declared that, if they were not to be abandoned altogether, then
at best all they could be considered was "an aid to thinking (Tolman,
1959, p. IkQ)Tolman's statement is not only a remarkable conclusion
from the man who introduced intervening variables into psychology and
made them the basis of his 'operational behaviorism'; it also comprises
a very close parallel to the almost simultaneous final judgment of
Bridgman, mentioned in Chapter 1, on the value of operational analysis
in general. Guthrie, most forthright of all, repudiated the very
possibility of ever making a methodologically secure anchorage of
theoretical terms as the basis for their subsequent use, as follows:
The fact that it had taken Russell and Whitehead some
kOO pages to establish the conclusion that one plus one
equals two, and that every intervening step could be
challenged and would require more proof, and that the
steps of these added proofs would require still more,
has made me impatient with the notion that there can be
any completely rigorous deduction, or ultimate validity
in an argument. This scepticism colors my notions of
the nature of scientific facts and scientific theory
(Guthrie, 1959, p. 161).
It may be noted however that this insight did not prevent Guthrie, who
was a logician before he became a psychologist, from attempting to
use the intervening variable approach as a means of solidly anchoring
the terms of his own theory. His statement thus represents a gradual
realization, acquired over a period of forty years, that the limitations
of pure logic as exemplified in the Principia Mathematics apply also to
the application of logical principles in the construction of psychologi¬
cal theories. (Skinner, who also made some use of intervening variables
and later repudiated them, is, as in many other respects, a special case,
and will be considered separately in Chapter 6.)
Thus, the purpose of bringing the logical indefensibility of
these theoretical terms into the discussion is not to demonstrate it in
305.
detail, that task having already been accomplished to almost
everyone's satisfaction, but to relate it to the general analysis
offered here and to show its implications for the constitution of
neobehaviourist theories. The way in which this subordinate and hence
covert status of the substantive principles thus embedded and function¬
ing within intervening variables and hypothetical constructs helped
maintain theoretical fragmentation throughout the discipline was, as
indicated, through keeping the principles from the public domain, or
rather, through rendering them subtly and ambiguously different from
the explicitly stated principles which were in the public domain. Each
theorist tended to construe his own theoretical principles in terms of
what he meant by them, what function he intended them to serve, while
maintaining and no doubt sincerely believing that their operational or
postulational specification provided a firm warrant for the use which
he was making of them; conversely, he tended to construe the theoretical
principles advanced by a competing theorist in as firm and rigid a
manner as he found possible, investing such competing principles with
a bare minimum of excess or unjustified meaning. Each theorist or
school of theorists, therefore, tended to expect that the results of
•crucial experiments' adduced by them would prove quite inexplicable by
a (rigorously construed set of) competing principles. But conversely,
they continually found that the results of 'crucial experiments'
advanced by their competitors could readily be accounted for on the basis
of their own principles; or at least that such findings were compatible
with their principles and could be accounted for by them after the
inclusion into their theory of a few supplementary principles perfectly
consistent with the spirit of those already present. Experimentally
based arguments brought against theories by the proponents of competing
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theories thus tended to pass one another by without making much
contact. Each group of theorists tended to see the mutual impenetra¬
bility of each other's theories as evidence of the basic worth of
their own approach and of the deviousness of that of their opponents.
This pattern of off-centre criticisms and rebuttals was especially
characteristic of the relationship between the most directly competing
groups of theorists—who were also those having the firmest commitment
to the construction of elaborate and methodologically rigorous theories—
those centred around Hull and around Tolman. The long and drawn out
controversy between these two groups on the subject of transposition
behaviour, for instance, was conducted very largely in terms of
•crucial experiments' that were supposed to settle the issue for once
and for all—but of course never did.
Hence, even the minimal 'realist commitment'—if such it can
be called, since it constantly shifted and as a result did little to
limit ad hoc modifiability—of neobehaviourist theorists to the
principles of their own theories helped to maintain the theoretical
fragmentation of the discipline, simply because it was never made clear
just what the commitment was to. The strictly unwarrantable substantive
principles which they adopted were inadvertently kept secret, were
disguised (for themselves, it should be emphasized, as well as for their
opponents) as purely explicit and hence methodologically justifiable
constructions, and consequently were unavailable for systematic comparison
with alternative principles. The way out of this dilemma of uncompara-
bility, it should be clear by now, does not lie in enforcing ever more
rigid rules on the composition of theoretical constructs; it was the
inapplicability and ambiguity of such rules that gave rise to the
dilemma in the first place. Rather, it lies in the determined effort
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to specify what it is of substantive import that is being claimed by
a theory, whether through rigid entailment or not; if the content of
a theory cannot all be rigidly derived from postulates, it can at least
be made public, as far as possible at any given time, by its proponents.
Summary of the Character of Behaviourism's Positivism.
The legitimate and valuable role that a positivist orientation
can play in the conduct of scientific inquiry has been sketched out,
both in the present chapter and in Chapter 3. In behaviourism, however,
positivism did not perform this role, but performed one that was almost
diametrically opposed, resulting in the continuing fragmentation of the
discipline. Now that the characterization and analysis of positivism
have been completed, it may be well briefly to review the factors
involved in the systematic differences between positivism in behaviourism
and scientific positivism in general. These factors were all operative
in the relatively primitive data-base positivism of classical behaviourism,
and continued to be operative without significant modification apart
from their further development and elaboration, in neobehaviourism.
As indicated in Chapter if, we can distinguish two versions of
positivism present in the founding of behaviourism. The first is
exemplified by Watson's statement that
It seems reasonably clear that some kind of compromise
must be effected: either psychology must change its
viewpoint so as to take in facts of behavior, whether
or not they have bearings upon the problems of 'conscious¬
ness'; or else behavior must stand alone as a wholly
separate and independent science (Watson, 1913a, p. 159).
The second is exemplified by his statement, only a few pages further
on, that
The time seems to have come when psychology must discard
all reference to consciousness; when it need no longer
delude itself into thinking that it is making mental
states the object of observation (ibid., p. 163).
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The first statement constitutes a declaration that in the area in
which Watson was working, that of studies of animal behaviour, the
dominant conceptual framework had become so cumbersome and unworkable
that it needed to be sloughed off, in order to allow undirected and
hence unimpeded concentration on experimental studies. This first
version of positivism was thus a purely internal development—internal
to comparative psychology that is—and was, on the analysis presented
here, a perfectly appropriate response to the unresolvable conceptual
dilemma in the field. The second version, however, as represented by
Watson's second statement, was very different. It constituted a kind
of intellectual imperialism, an unrequested extension of the indigenous
positivism of comparative psychology to the discipline as a whole. The
circumstances which led to this step, and those which led to its gradual
acceptance throughout psychology, were both unique. Both were detailed
in Chapter if but may briefly be reviewed here from a slightly different
perspective.
The circumstances which led to the extension of positivism
throughout the discipline were related to that same conceptual frame¬
work of functionalist comparative psychology against which Watson was,
from a different direction, rebelling. That is, the sensationalism of
functionalist comparative psychology became, with the local excision of
consciousness, environmentalism. Environmentalism, in turn, is a
general position; it cannot be applied to animals and not to man, unless
man is credited with an immaterial mind or soul, completely different
in kind from whatever it is that animates animals. Thus, if environmen¬
talism is established by the rejection of consciousness as an object
of study, it is inevitable that the position be extended to include man.
The alternative would be an uncompromising dualism established for man
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alone, a dualism which would therefore seem to have inevitable
23
theological implications . Neither the substantive nor the research-
based methodological arguments in favour of Watson's position of
environmentalism and the repudiation of consciousness could carry
enough weight to gain general acceptance in the field of human psychology
of the time however, despite what would seem from the standpoint of
comparative psychology to be their universal applicability. Thus the
more general methodological argument derived from the alleged practice
of physics, concerning the general requirements of objectivity, was
of prime relevance in establishing Watson's position. This argument
was one which could legitimately be applied universally, without
requiring experimental validation at each step (such is the apparent
advantage of methodological arguments); it was a generally positivist
argument in that it applied to all unobservables equally. Thus, the
unique circumstance leading to the move to extend the positivist
reaction throughout psychology was that of the unique relevance of a
general methodological argument to the establishment of a position that
had both methodological and substantive components.
The circumstances which led to the gradual and general
acceptance of the extension of positivism throughout the discipline—
and which eventuated in the complete separation of environmentalism
(and later even the wholehearted rejection of consciousness) from the
methodological position—were likewise unique. They comprised the
growing positivist orientation of the whole scientific culture, a
positivist reaction that was of unprecedented extent in the history of
science. This reaction was occasioned by the overturning of Newtonian
mechanics, with the immediate effects described in this chapter and in
Chapter 3, and was maintained by the intuitively incomprehensible
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findings of quantum mechanics and, to an only slightly lesser degree,
relativity theory. While formally positivist philosophy—except for
the writings of Mach, which were widely misunderstood to be idealistic—
did not have a wide currency in the United States during behaviourism's
24
early years , that is, until some time after Bridgman introduced
operationism in 1927, there was a widespread appreciation of what seemed
to be the limits of scientific explanation, as consisting in closely
determined empirical generalizations of observed data with relatively
25
little systematic import . These circumstances accounted in large
part both for the growing popularity of a positivist approach to
psychology and for its steadily accelerating divorce from any specific
systematic issues.
The fact that behaviourism's positivism was thus an importation
from outside psychology, and that it was likewise maintained largely on
the basis of external factors—that is, that it was neither introduced
nor retained purely as a response to internal problems—had significant
implications for both its critical and its mediating functions, as
these functions were described previously in this chapter.
The critical function of positivism was not, after the
beginning, directed toward specific concepts and variables that had been
identified as troublesome. Even at the beginning, when concepts indica¬
tive of mind and consciousness were being criticized, the critical
function was directed toward such mentalistic concepts primarily as
they occurred in human psychology, rather than as they occurred, most
problematically, in comparative psychology. Thereafter, the critical
function was exercised as a kind of a weapon, directed at any concepts
that appeared to be gaining a central role in non-behaviourist psycholo¬
gical theories (e.g., the concept of instinct), and eventually came,
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with the development of neobehaviourism, to be applied in blanket
fashion to all theoretical concepts. The critical function of
positivism was thus divorced from its specific context of application
to genuinely problematic concepts. In being required to be universal,
the application was inevitably haphazard and unsuccessful. But although
such application was unsuccessful in finally ridding psychology of all
theoretical terms with empirically unspecifiable references, it forced
the unwarrantable substantive principles which it failed to dislodge
completely to become covert and separated from their central position
in the development of psychological theory, as we saw above.
If the critical function of positivism was thus misdirected
and overextended, the mediating function was, by contrast, almost
entirely absent, both from classical behaviourism and from neobehaviourism.
It is significant in this respect that hardly any behaviourists ever made
a definite repudiation of realism, in either its common sense or its
philosophical varieties, even though they adopted many of their
methodological formalisms from a movement—logical positivism—which
was expressly based in large part on this repudiation. While a pro forma
rejection of realism specifically as a metaphysical position was some¬
times made (e.g., by MacCorquodale & Meehl, 19^8), the general assumption
seems to have been that use of rigorously objective methods at all levels
of investigation would suffice to guarantee that behaviourist theories
would gradually become as true as any scientific theories could possibly
be—without much detailed concern over just how true that was (such a
concern being, itself, metaphysical, or at least philosophical). Thus,
behaviourism hardly ever adopted or, more to the point, developed and
acted upon, any conventionalist analyses of the status of theories as
freely chosen 'conventions'—analyses which exemplify the mediating
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function of positivism—and novor acquired tho freedom which ouch
analyses can confer, freedom to engage in unrestrained flights of
creative imagination. Instead, the scientific enterprise was
constrained to be self-consciously pedestrian from the outset. Every
theoretical development had to be such that it could be perfectly valid,
and thus was expected to proceed in accordance with the rules of
rigorous theory construction. As a result, rather than providing a
useful place for unfettered imagination—which could then be brought
down to earth by closely controlled experimentation—the development
of theory was to be at all times what Hull (1937, p. 31) described
as a "long and grinding labor". It was partly due to the limitations
thus imposed on the character of science that behaviourist theories,
while highly receptive to outside ideas that could be rendered
objective, were not particularly marked by the emergence of radically
new ideas of their own. Similarly, the insistence on •objectivity1,
as having a firmer and more distinctly regulative character than many
philosophical positivists could themselves grant it, militated against
an emphasis on creativity or its product—creative ideas—as being most
fundamental to the development of theories; and at the same time, this
insistence promoted the entirely erroneous dependence on the notion of
•crucial experiments', as we saw above, a dependence that might well
have been obviated had behaviourism's positivism been tinged with more
conventionalist insights.
Chapter 6
Conclusion: Toward a General Evaluation of Behaviourism
We now come to the question of what implications the fairly
specific analysis presented in this monograph, concerning the origins
and systematic foundations of behaviourism, has for a general evaluation
of the movement in what will eventually come to be seen as its
historical context; what implications, that is, does it have for an
assessment of both the positive and the negative contributions of
behaviourism to the prospective development of post-behaviourist
psychology? The analysis does of course have some such implications
for a general evaluation of behaviourism, but drawing the implications
will require ranging through the career of behaviourism somewhat more
widely, and hence less deeply, than in previous chapters. Furthermore,
it will have to be recognized that while there are some important
respects in which the analysis can serve as the basis for such a general
evaluation, there are other, no doubt equally important, respects in
which it cannot. Let us make these explicit.
The analysis given here has concentrated on explicating the
systematic foundations of behaviourism. Fairly definite conclusions
have already been made concerning those foundations, and they can
readily be extended to apply to theoretical systematizations which more
or less explicitly depend on those foundations. The conclusions cannot
be applied, howevor, to the evaluation of specific pieces of behaviourist
research, for these gain their chief significance only in their system¬
atic context. The negative judgment which has been made on much of that
context certainly reflects on the research conducted within it, but does
not apply directly to any of the individual pieces of research themselves,
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insofar as they can be considered separate from their context.
Neither can any of the conclusions already arrived at be applied,
except very conjecturally, to those contemporary positions in psycho¬
logy which are often designated as *behaviourist• but which share few,
if any, of the systematic characteristics of either classical behaviour¬
ism or neobehaviourism. Finally, in the attempt which will be made to
describe the chief positive contribution which behaviourism has made to
the ongoing development of psychology, it will become necessary to go
somewhat beyond the analysis presented so far and to consider briefly
some aspects of behaviourist research which were independent of, and
almost unaffected by, any systematic considerations.
I. Systems and Systematic Methodology in Behaviourism.
The fundamental systematic contribution of behaviourism lies
in its practical demonstration of the untenability of the methodological
principles on which it was founded. This may seem to be a harsh and
negative judgment, but it should be emphasized that the contribution
was a major one. As has been stressed many times throughout this
monograph, behaviourism represents the only—or at least by far the
most detailed, uncompromising, and sophisticated—serious attempt ever
made to construct a science on methodological principles alone. Construct¬
ing a science in such a way has long been a dream of philosophers and
methodologically oriented scientists, but has never before been under¬
taken in dotail. That the attempt failed utterly at two levels—that
the attempt to keep ontological references at bay by means of formal
techniques was unsuccessful, and that even the attempt sufficed to
prevent the scientific enterprise from progressing—has or should have
profound consequences for our appreciation of the complementary roles
of method and substance in science.
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Philosophers have often maintained that the philosophical
and broadly methodological or logical presuppositions embodied in a
scientific investigation should be made explicit, since otherwise they
will influence the investigation in ways that escape detection and
possible control. Such a claim may sometimes be invalid; when philoso¬
phical and logical presuppositions are made explicit they may exercise
far greater control than when they are implicit, and if such presupposi¬
tions cannot be successfully organized into, and implemented as, a
coherent formal system they may, in their explicit form, prove
sufficient to hamstring scientific inquiry—as we have seen. On the
other hand, it may be concluded from the examination given here that
the substantive features of scientific inquiry—what it is about, and
what it adduces as causal or otherwise explanatory factors—should be
made as explicit and open as possible, regardless of the formal status
of such features. This conclusion would be entirely unexceptionable
and even uninteresting, were it not that many of the substantive
features of neobehaviourist research were indeed covert and, being
covert, were prevented from playing a central role in the process of
inquiry.
In general., we can say that, of course, a shared commitment
to both substantive and methodological principles is requisite to the
cumulative development of science. But while substantive and methodolo¬
gical principles are each necessary, the former are of greater importance,
both because they are what scientific inquiry is addressed to developing,
and because they alone can provide the crucial implicit indications of
when and how the inevitable deviations from the methodological principles
should occur. Even in the context of reconstruction, when positivist
methodological analyses are unquestionably called for, they need to be
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directed by independently formulated judgments of what particular
substantive principles are responsible for the science's difficulties,
since otherwise the analyses will be random and haphazardly disruptive.
The directive function of methodological considerations needs, therefore,
to be subordinated to the particular substantive issues of individual
cases in science. It is for this reason that it was intimated in
Chapter 5 that there are basic limitations on the positive conclusions
that could be drawn from the analysis presented there, that is, basic
limitations on the regulative capabilities of any general logical or
methodological analyses and of the principles which follow from them.
There is no methodological substitute for good ideas, and no guaranteed
methodology for acquiring them; and while methodological tools are
unquestionably necessary for comparing, interrelating, and developing
these ideas, the continuing progress of science is possible only if the
tools, rather than the material to be worked, are ascribed the supportive
function. The systematic contribution of behaviourism, therefore,
consists principally in demonstrating the general applicability of
these points, or rather, in demonstrating the invalidity of their
contraries.
Following on the above, and in relation to the ostensible
substance of the neobehaviourist attempts to systematize psychology, I
think it can fairly be judged that the ambitious systematizations of
Hull, Tolman, Guthrie, and their students have, apart from what was
just discuosod, little or no enduring significance. To the extent that
they constituted the road leading to certain formulations in contemporary
psychology (e.g., Miller's psychobiology, Bolles' cognitive motivational
theory), and to the extent that these contemporary formulations prove
of enduring merit, then the grand systems will have played a worthwhile
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propaedeutic role; but such a possible and as yet undetermined
historical significance provides only the most tenuous vindication
for the enormous amount of effort expended on the systematizations.
The basic explanatory principles advanced in these systems likewise
do little to vindicate them. These principles—reinforcement, drive
reduction, cognitive maps, expectancy, contiguity, etc.—were for the
most part not original, but consisted in objective reformulations of
explanatory principles acquired from physiologists, philosophers,
other psychologists, and common sense. It cannot even be said that
the failure of the grand systems had the effect of demonstrating the
invalidity of such explanatory principles in the explanation of
complex human behaviour, since the methodological characteristics of
the systems were sufficient on their own to vitiate them—although the
extreme use made of these principles in the grand systems may well help
to make such principles less popular in subsequent psychological
theories.
II. Contemporary Varieties of 'Behaviourist* Theory.
It will have been observed that all of the comments made
about behaviourist theories, relating to the attempt to develop an
explanation for their failure, have been directed to theories that
have already been seen on other grounds to be inadequate—except for a
few occasions relating to proposed theories which have been direct
continuations of the methodologically based systematizations of an
earlier era (e.g., the comments on Smith, 1969, and Skinner, 1971, in
Chapter 1). This diffidence does not merely reflect scholarly humility.
Rather, it expresses one of the themes that has been implicit throughout
this monograph, that the progressive development of scientific theories
can occur through the implementation of a wide variety of specific
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methodological orientations, so long only as these are not taken
sufficiently seriously as to be accorded more weight than the sub¬
stantive principles which scientific inquiry adduces. This considera¬
tion severely limits any attempt at a general assessment of most
contemporary varieties of behaviourism. Most contemporary varieties
that is, do not rely on the systematic methodological foundations of
neobehaviourism, nor on the narrowly anti-mentalistic positivism of
classical behaviourism. Rather, they are constituted as behaviouristic
only minimally, by the decision—based on grounds of personal preference
and historical familiarity—to avoid as far as possible the use of
introspective and impressionistic methods of investigation. It is only
in terms of their historical context that such minimally related
positions can be described specifically as •behaviourist'; in many cases
there is nothing more about them that can specifically be related to
any of the systematic features of behaviourism than there was in the
position of J. McK. Cattell, quoted at the beginning of Chapter 5« Any
detailed evaluation of the models and systematic theories associated
with such minimal contemporary varieties of behaviourism must be based,
therefore, on consideration of the specific content of the theories and
of the experiments which provide evidence in their support. To the
extent that the content of contemporary 'behaviourist* theories has not
been subordinated to methodological considerations, and complementarily,
to the extent that the methodological character of such theories has not
been adduced as justification for them more or less independent of their
content, they cannot fairly be evaluated on the basis of such methodolo¬
gical considerations.
And yet, that much said, one can scarcely avoid acquiring some
impressions—and it must be emphasized that they are only impressions—
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about the way that even the slight methodological constraints of
much contemporary behaviourism have subtly influenced it. Consider
the approach taken by such sophisticated contemporary behaviourists as
Hebb, for whom 'CNS' has meant conceptual nervous system for 25 years,
and who has developed elaborate models of the ways in which cognition,
self-consciousness, and even moral sentiments may be represented in
such an idealized structure; or Eysenck, who has developed wido-ranging
theories of personality dynamics based on the operation and interplay
of a small number of inborn personality traits; or Broadbent, whose
research activity is directed almost entirely to discovering the basic
structures of cognitive functioning; or Berlyne, who has made pioneering
studies of humour and of the aesthetics of artistic experience. The
work of these psychologists constitutes much of the very best of
contemporary psychology. All of these psychologists account themselves
behaviourists, or 'methodological behaviourists', and in the sense given,
that of avoiding subjective and introspective methods and using observa¬
tions of behaviour as ouch as their sole source of data, they undoubtedly
are. And yet i3 is difficult to escape what is, again, an impression,
that 'bohaviour' functions for these theorists chiefly as a metaphor
in terms of which human activity as a whole can be elliptically
described, and that they employ it because they find observations
expressed solely in terms of this metaphor to be personally congenial—
and that they find them congenial because, again, of the historical
familiarity of the metaphor and because of the lingering belief that,
deopite everything, observations of behaviour, oven though it is often
highly complex verbal behaviour, are, as long as they are nonetheless
purely bohavioural, possessed of some unique scientific validity. It
is hard to account for why it is that theorists concerned with concept
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formation, personality dynamics, and aesthetics, eschew any direct
involvement with the personal—subjective—experience of their human
subjects—who, unlike animals, can tell them about it—except on this
basis of the unjustifiable assumption that behaviour data are the only
reliable and scientifically valid ones, and conversely, that intro¬
spective and impressionistic data are incorrigibly untrustworthy. To
the indeterminate extent that these psychologists and other contemporary
behaviourists continue to rely solely on behaviour data on the basis
of such considerations as these, their methodological behaviourism
represents no more than the lingering traces of the behaviourist anti-
mentalist prejudice. This is not, however, to condemn these psycholo¬
gists in any way; we all need a perspective, a point of view, from which
to consider human activity, and their perspective, resting on the
behavioural metaphor, has become sufficiently broad that it shuts no
more from their field of view than many another perspective might do.
But it is to insist that if the suggestion made here as to the basis
for their behaviourism is at all valid, then the reliance of these
psychologists on the behavioural metaphor cannot be accounted more than
a purely personal preference, without any particular scientific justifi¬
cation—a preference that may be explained, but not scientifically
justified, by psychology's history. Thus, while the influence of these
psychologists is unquestionably great, it may be too much to expect—
and hardly something to hope for—that their personal choice of
investigative methodology will exercise a continuing directive
influence on those who follow in their theoretical footsteps.
III. Unsystematic Positive Contributions of Behaviourism.
Apart from any strictly theoretical considerations, the
practical applications of behaviourist psychology in the field of
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behaviour modification may be cited as among its chief contributions
to psychology in general. Various techniques of behaviour modification
have had great and unquestioned application in therapeutic, educational,
and other contexts; they are sufficiently widespread and well known as
to render a review unnecessary. However, without questioning either
the significance of behaviour modification techniques or the close
association that they have had with behaviourist psychology—but, on
the contrary, to explicate that association—one could legitimately
question the extent to which the introduction and application of
behaviour modification techniques constitutes an outgrowth of behaviour¬
ism. Behaviour modification, in its principal early form of behaviour
therapy, started to become influential with its practical development
by psychiatrists disillusioned with psychoanalytic techniques, primarily
Salter (1949) and Wolpe (1952), and was initially based on a muscular
relaxation technique developed by the physiologist Jacobson (1939).
Behaviourist psychologists quickly enough became interested in the
possibilities of behaviour therapy and refined the therapeutic techniques,
but were not responsible for introducing it as a method of treatment.
Prominent behaviour therapists such as Wolpe and Eyeenck have
typically maintained that behaviour therapy constitutes an application
of Hullian and Pavlovian theory. However, since the critical review
of the ostensible theoretical basis of behaviour therapy by Breger and
McGaugh (1965), and the resulting controversy, it has become very
dubious as to whether behaviour therapy owes its formulation to
behaviourist theory any more than it owed its initial dissemination to
behaviourist practice. Indeed, the debate on the theoretical under¬
pinnings of behaviour therapy has faded recently, since it became
generally recognized that the techniques are far more viable than any
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of the theory on which they are purportedly based. London (1972)
celebrates this developing autonomy of the techniques as signalling
•The end of ideology in behavior modification', and points out that
dependence on outdated behaviourist theories is something that behaviour
therapists may be better off without.
Finally, if both the theoretical basis and the practical
introduction of behaviour therapy cannot be unhesitatingly ascribed
to behaviourist psychology, then neither can its first demonstration.
The demonstration by Watson and Rayner (1920) of conditioned and
deconditioned fear responses in 'Little Albert' is often cited as the
first exemplary case of behaviour therapy (e.g., by Wolpe, 1969).
However, Freedberg (1973) has shown that a well developed tradition of
behaviour therapy existed in the United States from about 1890 onwards,
with Morton Prince and Boris Sidis as its chief innovators. The
techniques used came, by 1909, to be held to derive broadly from
Pavlovian theory, although the theoretical derivation was no more
straightforward then than it is now. The techniques were comparable
both in procedure and in efficacy with some of the early modern ones,
although they were not accompanied by the modern de-emphasis of conscious
processes in their implementation—a de-emphasis that, as Breger and
McGaugh (1965) have shown, is in any case strictly pro forma.
None of this is to deny, however, the immense significance
of the contribution of behaviourist psychologists in developing,
extending, applying, further disseminating, and validating the various
techniques used in different forms of behaviour therapy, as well as in
other, derivative, types of behaviour modification. Indeed, the
features of behaviourism which enabled it to serve as the basis for
developing and extending these techniques constitute, I suggest, the
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principal contribution that behaviourism has made and can continue
to make to the future of psychology. These features which enabled
behaviourism to perform this role are not, however, amongst the ones
which are typically most highly emphasized in accounts of behaviourist
psychology. They are features which emerged from the animal laborator¬
ies, from work which was initially the most remote from any areas of
human concern, and they constituted some of the specific aspects of
that work which were the most remote also from the system-building
considerations which were the primary focus of interest of most
neobehaviourists. They can best be described in a slightly roundabout
way, through a brief discussion of the psychology of Skinner, in which,
out of all the highly developed versions of neobehaviourism, they
figure most prominently.
IV. The Principle Unsystematic Contribution of Behaviourism as
Exemplified by Certain Features of Skinner's Psychology.
Skinner has never professed adherence to any of the trappings
of the hypothetico-deductive method, and until very recently abjured
systematic theorizing of any sort. He clearly figures as a neobehav-
iourist nevertheless, because of his uncompromisingly methodological
orientation to psychology. As mentioned in Chapter 2, he was possibly
the earliest exponent of operational definitions in psychology, although
he did not publish on the subject until some time later1 . Even more
than any of the other neobehaviourists, Skinner insisted that the proper
employment of rigorous methodology, both at the experimental and at the
systematic level, wae necessary and sufficient to the construction of a
scientific psychology. He merely found no advantage in going beyond
simple empirical generalizations in his reporting of results. His one
bow to the fashions of neobehaviourism, the intervening variable concept
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of 'reflex reserve' in his 1938 book, was later described by him as
...an abortive, though operational, concept which was
retracted a year or so after publication...It lived up
to my opinion of theories in general by proving utterly
worthless in suggesting further experiments (Skinner,
1959, p. 369).
Consonant with his rejection of formal theories, the covert
substantive principles in Skinner's system do not occur chiefly as
specific postulates or theoretical concepts with disguised ontological
references. Instead, they function at a higher level, as basic meta-
systematic orienting assumptions. These assumptions are fairly
prominent in Skinner's system, and indeed, account for all of its
general systematic character.
The meta-systematic orienting assumptions in Skinner's
psychology amount to the assumptions of environmental and speciational
generality. They are assumptions which were to some degree characteristic
of all neobehaviourist theorizing, and as a result the discussion of them
here can serve as a supplement to the general discussion of covert
substantive principles in neobehaviourist theories as presented on
pp. 300ff., but they were present in none other so forcefully as in
Skinner's system. The assumption of environmental generality, to put
it excessively crudely, asserts that the Skinner box is representative
of all environments. The assumption of speciational generality, equally
crudely, asserts that the pigeon is representative of all species of
organisms. The two assumptions together provide a warrant for extra¬
polating from the behaviour of pigeons in Skinner boxes to the behaviour
of all animals in all environments, and specifically to the behaviour
of humans in complex social situations.
This caricature of Skinner's assumptions serves to convey
their import, but, that accomplished, they should in all fairness be
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stated less crudely. In Skinner's particular version of them (which,
it should be made clear, is a reconstruction from Skinner's practice,
not a representation of any of his systematic statements), they are
actually second order, rather than first order, assumptions, serving
to indicate the procedures required for extending the range of a
descriptive schema. The assumption of environmental generality is
more properly that the modifications in descriptive terminology which
are necessary in order to extend a description of behaviour displayed
in a Skinner box to cover that displayed in another, dissimilar,
experimental environment, such as a runway or a slide, in which the
stimulus features to which the animal responds are different, suffice
to ensure the adequacy of the description (or rather, the descriptive
schema of which the description is an instantiation) when applied to
behaviour displayed in any environment. The assumption of speciational
generality asserts that the modifications in descriptive terminology
which are necessary in order to extend a description of behaviour
displayed by one species to cover that displayed by another, unrelated,
species, suffice to ensure the adequacy of the description (or descriptive
schema) when applied to any species. The upshot of the two assumptions
is thus that a descriptive schema which proves adequate to characterize
the behaviour of rats and pigeons in two different kinds of Skinner
boxes is adequate to characterize the behaviour of all organisms in
all environments.
As indicated, these orienting assumptions are the basis for
the systematic status—or systematic pretensions—of Skinner's psychology.
Once identified, they can clearly be seen to be invalid. With regard
to the assumption of speciational generality, it is plain that there
are major differences in the pattern and structure of behaviour
326.
displayed by different species even in highly controlled and comparable
experimental environments. These differences are sufficiently great
that they render descriptive rubrics applied to the interchange between
organism and environment irrespective of species—such as 'reinforcement',
applied, again, purely as a descriptive term—only trivially applicable.
That is, the behaviour of organisms in controlled operant environments
varies so greatly as a function of species differences—for instance it
is relatively easy to condition a rat to make a standard operant
response (a bar press) for shock avoidance, but almost impossible to
condition a pigeon to make a standard operant response (a key peck) for
the same reinforcer—that the description of such behaviour by means of
general rubrics such as 'reinforcement' and 'response shaping' forces
the ignoring of much of the observable and systematic variability of
the behaviour. Cogent criticism of various forms of the assumption of
speciational generality was advanced by Beach (1950, 1955)> but in a
context that made the applicability of his criticisms to purely descrip¬
tive formulations only tenuous; furthermore, his criticisms did not
focus on the behaviour of different species in similar, controlled
environments. By contrast, Seligman (1970) has surveyed a wide range
of experimental results that make the criticism incontrovertibly
applicable to the description of behaviour emitted in Skinner boxes.
The assumption of environmental generality is, if anything,
even more clearly fallacious. That is, it may be possible to restrict
the experimental environment sufficiently that some limited, but
specific and useful, descriptive generalizations can apply to a broad
range of species within such environments. With the relaxation of rigid
restrictions on the composition of the environment, however, the
variability of behaviour even within a single species becomes so great
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that the only descriptive generalizations that can be made applicable
throughout the range of environmental conditions are those so broad
and diffuse as to be practically meaningless.
For instance, Breland and Breland (1961, 1966) have presented a
wide variety of examples of well established conditioned behaviour chains
which became severely disrupted when the experimental animals were removed
from the original conditioning apparatus and placed in a complex situation
more closely resembling the animals' natural environment. In the more
complex situations the animals consistently interrupted their conditioned
response chains with behaviour segments which the Brelands considered
•instinctive', which were never reinforced by them, which prevented the
animals from receiving reinforcement, and which were very highly resistant
to extinction. In many cases, furthermore, the animals proved very recal¬
citrant to 'reconditioning' in the more complex situation, but impossible
to condition initially at all except within the control apparatus. The
Brelands concluded that the language of operant levels, reinforcement
contingencies, etc., was utterly inadequate to the description of behaviour
in complex situations as observed by them; that is, application of this
descriptive terminology simply did not permit them to describe what was
going on.
Furthermore, the invalidity of the assumption of environmental
generality can be demonstrated, again, even within the confines of a
Skinner box, by systematically varying the parameters of the experimental
situation. Even within a controlled operant environment, the behaviour
of a given organism under a given reinforcement contingency with a given
(operationally defined) motivational state will vary systematically as a
function of the specific response chosen for examination, the specific
discriminative stimuli serving as cues for the emitting of the response,
and the specific reinforcer contingent upon that response. To give a
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simple example, it is fairly easy to condition a pigeon to key peck
with food as a reinforcer, but very difficult to condition it to do so
with shock avoidance as a reinforcer. To cite a more elaborate example,
the relationship between choice of discriminative stimuli and choice of
response in dogs, with reinforcer held constant, has been elegantly
demonstrated. The experimental situation is basically one in which dogs
are trained to make a stimulus discrimination; the discrimination serves
as a cue to indicate which of two responses the dog will be reinforced
for performing. The experiment is a 2 x 2 factorial one, with two sets
of discriminative stimuli (location of tone as coming from upper or
lower speaker vs. pitch of tone as higher or lower) and two responses
differentiations cued by the discriminative stimuli (choosing the
2
correct alley of a T maze vs. running or not running down a runway );
a different group of dogs is assigned to each of the four combinations
of stimulus discriminations and paired response choices. What is found
is that dogs will learn to discriminate differences in tonal pitch much
more readily than differences in tonal source when the discrimination
cues a go-stay response choice. Conversely, they will learn to discrim¬
inate differences in tonal source much more readily than differences in
tonal pitch when the discrimination cues a left-right response choice''
(Lawicka, 196/t; cited in Seligman, 1970). Again, the descriptive
terminology of reinforcement contingencies, operant levels, response
shaping, etc., is entirely inadequate for describing the behavioural
variability observed in such experiments. Such terminology is thus
insufficient for providing descriptive generalizations about behaviour
manifested in different environments, even when the environments are
if
varied only in extremely specific and highly controlled ways .
Evidence such as this exposes the systematic pretensions of
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Skinner's writings, whereby he extends his descriptive account of the
behaviour observed in his own animal studies to cover complex human
behaviour (e.g., Skinner, 19^8, 1953, 1957, 1971) as thoroughly
unjustifiable"^. The meta-systematic assumptions on which Skinner's
systematic extrapolations are based have been treated at some slight
length, so as to contrast them vividly with the other type of his
covert principles, broadly methodological ones in this case, relating
to the perceptual specifiability of stimulus and response. Again, these
features are, like the assumptions just considered, characteristic of
other neobehaviourist approaches to psychology than Skinner's, but not
to such an extent. To troat these covert methodological principles,
it will be nocoesary briefly to reconstruct the way in which Skinner's
approach to psychology can be considered to serve as the basis for
naturalistic and purely descriptive formulations.
Despite the impression one sometimes receives, Skinner is not—
or at least was not (his latest, 1971, book is ambiguous, even on close
reading)—an environmentalist, in the sense of assuming that environmental
pressures cause all behaviour. His position in this regard is not simply
a positivist disavowal of 'causes'^, but accounts also for his total
disinterest in physiology. Whether or not behaviour is caused by the
environment, it takes place in an environment. Any recognizable piece
of behaviour can be observed in its environmental setting. The behaviour
may occur randomly with respect to all discernible features of the
environment—as, for instance, some tics may occur. More typically, a
piece of behaviour may occur more frequently under some environmental
conditions than under others. The environmental conditions include
anything that can be described in the environment, so that the absence
of females in mating season, for instance, comprises part of the
330.
environmental conditions under which certain birds are more likely
to exhibit vacuum courtship activity. Description of the environmental
conditions under which a piece of behaviour is most likely to occur
comprises the most important part of a description of that behaviour
in relation to the environment. Whether the environment forces,
compels, elicits, potentiates, or provides an opportunity or a cue for,
that behaviour, is irrelevant to the description of the behaviour as
occurring in the environment.
When a piece of behaviour occurs, it usually has what we
describe as an effect upon the environment. That is, some of the
environmental conditions change either concomitant with or subseqeut to
the behaviour. Opening a door is an example of the first sort; the
change in the environment is inseparable from the behaviour. Typing
is an example of the second sort; the behaviour of hitting a key is
generally followed by the action of a type die hitting the paper. In
almost all cases of the second sort (as well as in some of the first,
such as turning on a light), the change in environmental conditions is
perceptibly separate from the behaviour of which it is considered an
effect. For the change in environmental conditions in such cases to
be identifiable as an effect of the behaviour (since the environment is
constantly changing), it is therefore necessary that it be observed to
be subsequent to the behaviour (or concomitant with it) on more than one
7
occasion .
Certain changes in environmental conditions—that is, certain
newly observable environmental conditions—which we thus describe as
effects of behaviour, may be among tho discernible conditions under
which the behaviour can be identified as most likely to occur. That
is, the conditions under which the behaviour is most likely to occur
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may include some conditions only insofar as they can be identified
as effects of a previous occurrence of the same behaviour (in a sense
of 'same' which is yet to be explained). Such conditions, if present
other than as effects, are not ones under which the behaviour is most
likely to occur. Description of these conditions as effects of a
previous occurrence of the same piece of behaviour thus comprises an
important part of the description of that behaviour in relation to
the environment in which it occurs. Many pieces of behaviour may in
this way be described as being most likely to occur under conditions
which are effects of a previous occurrence of that behaviour. It is
possible to attempt to discover, through careful observation, whether
the effects of behaviour always constitute some of the conditions
under which the behaviour is subsequently most likely (or, mutatis
mutandis, least likely) to occur. To the extent that such relationships—
between the effects of behaviour and the subsequent occurrence of that
behaviour—can be discerned, they can be elaborated into systematic
statements of the relationship between behaviour, behavioural effects,
and environment, without in any case either addressing or begging the
question of the causes of that behaviour.
Now, all of this is a very roundabout way of saying that the
consequences of behaviour may reinforce that behaviour and that the
composition of the behavioural repertoire may to some indeterminate
extent be described as a function of previous reinforcement contingencies.
The roundabout way of expression serves, however, to indicate the
descriptive character of (at least much of) Skinner's psychology.
Tracing and manipulating the observable regularities is the sole focus
of concern. It is important to establish this point, because it is only
insofar as Skinner's psychology—and by extension other varieties of
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behaviourism and neobehaviourism—can be regarded as purely descriptive,
or as having purely descriptive components in the sense of this
reconstruction, that the following comments can apply.
We have seen that the descriptive schema which Skinner
developed in line with the foregoing reconstruction cannot in fact be
applied with full generality, even before we consider human behaviour.
But that is not the point. The point is that for the description to
be applied at all, it is necessary to be able to Identify the referents
of the terms of it, the 'pieces of behaviour' and tho 'environmental
conditions'. This identification cannot be done—or at least it has
not been done—in any consistent and formal way. Rather it involves
a training of perception, the acquisition of the ability to see stimuli
and responses, and the subtle effects of one on the other, in the flux
of environmental conditions and organismic movements.
This training of perception is a subtle process, requiring
considerable exposure and practice in the observation of experimental
situations. It has been the subject of almost no systematic investiga¬
tions (at least within psychology), but constitutes the 'apprenticeship'
aspect of the training of experimental psychologists. That is, the
final product of a simple conditioning experiment, such as a bar press
by a rat, is usually identifiable by physical criteria such as the
depression of the bar to a criterion depth. But the shaping of the bar
pressing response requires close and trained observation of the behaviour
of the rat in the Skinner box, to serve as the basis for recognizing
and reinforcing the rat's successive approximations to the desired
response. Even closer and more sophisticated observation is necessary
in ordor to chape tho complex trick behaviours of demonstration animals,
such as the playing of ping-pong by chickens—or the guiding of missiles
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by pigeons (Skinner, I960).
The work of Skinner and his students has been characterized,
out of all the varieties of neobehaviourism, by the most highly
developed, sophisticated, and detailed forms of such trained and
resultingly skilled perception, because of the emphasis of these
psychologists on precise descriptive formulations and on control of the
fine grain of the behaviour of individual animals, and conversely,
g
because of their distaste for abstract theoretical structures . To a
9
somewhat lesser extent , however, this acquisition of perceptual skills
has been characteristic of the training of experimental psychologists,
especially animal psychologists, of every stripe. The acquired ability
to see stimuli and responses, independent of the physical specification
of either—the skill involved in being able to recognize what groups of
motions of an experimental animal have the necessary integrity or
•grouped-togethorness* to serve as the unit of description and control-
has been the almost entirely unacknowledged foundation on which all
behaviourist practice has been built. The unique contribution of
Skinner and his students has been to elaborate and ramify this foundation
to a greater extent than any other psychologists have done—and it is a
major contribution, because the foundation of perceptual skills remains
intact when all of the systematic edifices built upon it, including
Skinner's own, have crumbled.
This emphasis on the acquisition of perceptual skills helps
to rosolvo one of the many longstanding anomalies in the theory and
practice of behaviourist psychology, that concerning the identification
of stimuli and responses. The complaint has often been brought that
although behaviourists have insisted on a purely objective observation
base, they have never been able to define it, and their usage of the
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terms 'stimulus' and 'response'— fundamental to that observation base-
has been ambiguous and inconsistent. Much of the problem has, indeed,
stemmed from the various attempts to make explicit definitions of what
was to count as stimulus and response, with the problems being especially
great in the case of the latter. Koch makes some references to these
problems in the quotations drawn in the first section of Chapter 5. In
practice, however, there was little or no problem in the use of these
terms. Stimuli and responses are what one has learned to see as
stimuli and responses. They are not initially, but they become, directly
observable.
Training in ways of seeing—acquiring skills in the recognition
of the functional significance and structural integrity that constitute
physical movements as responses—learning to recognize the meaning of
behaviour, as established by these features of it, as amongst the givens
in what one is observing: these processes constitute training in what
can only be called phenomenological analysis. The analysis is phenomen-
ological in that it involves a subordination of one's preconceptions to
the situation that is being observed, in order to discover the perceptual
givens in the situation. The practice—as opposed to the theory—of
behaviourism is thus in this sense based on phenomenological analysis,
and has been, furthermore, from the beginning.
It may, of course, seem outlandish to suggest that behaviourism
is based on phenomenological analysis. The apparent outlandishness,
however, is due to little more than the fact that the two are not
customarily considered to be related, and more specifically, that
phenomenology is often considered to have close affinities with
subjectivism and—most curiously—introspection. Nothing can be done
about the unfamiliarity of the mentioning of phenomenology and behaviourism
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in the same breath, but the oft-assumed relationship of phenomenology
with subjectivism and introspection can easily be disposed of.
Phenomenology is a way of looking; it does not specify the
direction of looking. Introspection can be, but need not be (and
usually is not) phenomenological, just as 'extraspection' or looking
at the world can be, but need not be (and usually is not) phenomenolo¬
gical. Phenomenology involves merely the setting aside of our abstract
and intellectual interpretive schemas in order to discover what is
given in perception and how it is organized, apart from our knowledge
of it. The 'givens' can be either those that are given as internal or
those that are given as external to the self.
Neither does phenomenology necessarily involve any blurring
of the boundaries between the self and the world. To be sure, the
expressive power of a painting, say, may be such that we 'read into it'
qualities of warmth, spirituality, foreboding, or whatever; and in a
phenomenological description of the painting these qualities will
typically be referred to the painting even though we know that they
are 'really* constituted by our reaction to the painting. But this is
not a blurring of the boundary between self and world; on the contrary,
the dasein of the object, or its quality of being-over-there separate
from the self, turns out to be one of the most general givens in any
phenomenological account of objects. The fact that a phenomenological
account may ascribe properties to objects that they do not 'really' have,
as in the example given, may seem to make such accounts of scant utility
in providing a basis for dealing with such objects. But again on the
contrary, it is precisely this feature of phenomenological accounts
that makes them relevant; the status of stimuli and responses as being
given in perception is what makes it possible to deal with them, despite
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the impracticality or even impossibility of making an unambiguous,
purely physical specification of them.
Still, it may be objected that the process of learning to
see stimuli and responses is in no way a phenomenological process at
all, is if anything the very opposite of a phenomenological process,
since it is artificial—as evidenced by the fact that it requires
directed training—and hence amounts to imposing a conceptual schema
on the objects of inspection. There are two replies to this objection.
The first is that it is not at all certain how widely such imposition
occurs; among the Skinnerians in particular, close observation has
typically preceded any description. The second is that it doesn't
make any difference. Once the conceptual schema stops operating at the
conceptual level—once it is incorporated into perception—then its
implementation becomes among the givens in perception; and the study of
the givens in perception, regardless of their alleged source, is a
phenomenological study. Consideration of how these givens become givens,
or any attempt to restrict them, removes the enterprise from the
phenoraenologlcal field. It is thus erroneous to claim that phenomenology
deals with the givens of perception only insofar as these are Independent
of learning. The consequence of such a position is that the organization
of perception must be referred to something outside of perception—Ktthler1s
neural fields, Husserl's quasi-Platonic pure ideas—in order to distinguish
the 'truly givens' from the mere 'apparently givens'; and such a procedure,
again, is not phenomenology. By contrast, looking at the physical move¬
ments that constitute the activity of a rat or a pigeon, and coming to
see in those movements meanings—intimations of or approximations to
the ultimate response that one wishes to shape—this, however strange
it may seem, is phenomenology.
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In this sense, therefore, despite the unfamiliarity and
counter-intuitiveness of the claim, it is not unfair to judge that
the practice of behaviourist psychology has, to varying degrees, long
been based on unrecognized and covert phenomenological analyses10. The
use of a covert phenomenological approach in the determination of the
units of subject matter of experimental psychological investigations
constitutes, I suggest, an outstanding example of a methodological-cum-
philosophical strategy that is both implicit and successful, and that
for some time was capable of being successful largely by virtue of
being implicit. Descriptive analyses of behaviour of a covertly
phenomenological sort have gradually grown sufficiently detailed and
acute, particularly but not solely in some of the formulations of
Skinner and his students, as to justify being described as a 'phenomen¬
ology of behaviour' . It is this gradual and covert development of a
phenomenology of behaviour, I suggest, that constitutes the most
important positive contribution of all the varieties of behaviourist
experimental psychology to the future development of the discipline. In
particular, to conclude with mention of the topic that introduced this
discussion, it is the perceptual skills which many behaviourists have
acquired in the course of their phenomenological training—skills in
the identification of and subtle discriminations between responses as
embodied in an ongoing stream of behaviour—that have equipped them to
be at the forefront in developing and extending the techniques and the
range of application of behaviour therapy and other forms of behaviour
modification.
But while the inadvertent contribution of behaviourism and
neobehaviourism to the development of psychology may thus have been
great, and especially notable in the various fields of psychological
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technology, that contribution is nevertheless, as a phenomenological
contribution must almost always be, a propaedeutic one, not science
but some of the groundwork on which science is built; and in psychology
the science which could be built on that groundwork still lies an
indeterminate distance away, in one of psychology's many possible futures.
What behaviourism as the most important single influence in the
continuing development of modern psychology can be said to have left us,
besides the important negative lessons discussed earlier, is some
portion of the tools appropriate for building a science—but not the
science itself, and very little even in the way of durable preliminary
structures which can be taken into the science.
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Footnotes
Footnotes to Chapter 1.
1 . It should be made clear that psychoanalytic theory fares no
better than behaviourist theories at Peters' hands, and that this
conclusion applies to both equally.
2. Cybernetics and information theory were developed independently
of general systems theory, but are fully compatible with it and can
be seen as particular applications of general systems principles.
These two theories have, however, been applied extensively in the
context of neobehaviourist theories, and in support of such theories.
Von Bertalanffy (1971) considers that their application in such
contexts is ill-advised, and that it reflects an artificial and
arbitrary partitioning of the systems approach. Koch (1964, p. 32)
makes a similar judgment, and deplores what he considers the
unreasoned support given by information theorists to behaviourist
theories.
3. These two considerations, that he is writing as a disillusioned
behaviourist, and that he has no systematic alternative to offer, may
account in part for the pessimistic title which he gives to a recent
article: 'Psychology cannot be a coherent science' (Koch, 1969).
4. I am not competent to judge unequivocally whether Bergmann's
position in this book should be considered incompatible with behaviour¬
ism or merely irrelevant to it. However, his emphasis on intensionalism
(that is, on mental acts consisting in the referral of meaning to
external objects) seem to make the relationship one of incompatibilitty,
at least with most forms of behaviourism.
5. This •physicalist' thesiB was of course at the heart of the logical
positivist support of behaviourism.
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6. Palermo's views on the succession of scientific systems in
psychology will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
7. Taylor (1964) provides further examples.
Hebb in the first chapter of his The Organization of
Behaviour [1949] speaks interchangeably of •animism'
(the view that animate behaviour must be explained
in terms of 'purpose') and 'interactionism' (the
view that behaviour is the result of the interaction
of observable physical and unobservable 'inner' or
mental processes) and of course 'mysticism' (which
doesn't seem to have a very clear Bense in Hebb'8
usage but which means something counter-empirical,
unscientific and generally nasty). Similarly,
Spence [1944] speaks of animistic theories as those
in which the relation of the (unobservable) constructs
to the empirical (observable) variables is left
entirely unspecified (Taylor, 1964, p. 8).
8. Behaviourism in its heyday never succeeded in its aim of
altogether ridding psychology of mentalism in this general sense of
course; psychoanalysis and gestalt psychology were two successful
movements that were at times particularly objectionable. However,
both of these movements earned a certain amount of (sometimes
grudging) respect from behaviourists: psychoanalysis for its
rigorous determinism and its tension-reduction models of human
functioning (both acceptable to many behaviourists), and gestalt
psychology for its physicalism and its carefully controlled laboratory
studies. The new mentalism often has none of these saving graces.
9. Even in psycholinguistics, there are some signs that Chomsky's
technical contributions are proving less generally applicable than
was once hoped. The formalisms of his transformational grammar are
proving increasingly difficult to relate to actual language use (e.g.
d'Arcais & Levelt, 1970).
10. Book publishing in itself, as distinct from reports of current
scholarly research, also reflects a change of mood. For instance,
the phenomenological writings of Franz From have recently been
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translated and published in English, twenty years after their first
publication in Danish (From, 1971). At the other end of the mentalist
spectrum, Titchener's Systematic Psychology; Prolegomena has recently
been re-issued (Titchener, 1972).
11. Peters' description of Hull's interests is, admittedly, an
overstatement. While Hull published little, if anything, on these
complex matters, he was intensely interested in them and regularly
discussed them in seminars that acquired for their participants a
status similar to that of Pavlov's 'Wednesdays'. The cooperative
volume Frustration and Aggression (Dollard et al., 1939) was composed
largely under his inspiration.
12. There has been an interesting controversy over this model. The
main opposition to Huttenlocher's model has been from Clark's model
of syllogistic reasoning as dependent on semantic representations and
purely linguistic operations. The significant feature of the contro¬
versy, in the present context, is that Clark's operations are as
unabashedly mentalistic as are Huttenlocher's images, while both
researchers are able to conduct their dispute by appeal to quite
incontrovertible experimental data (for references and an overview see
Huttenlocher & Higgins, 1971, 1972; Clark, 1969, 1972).
Footnotes to Chapter 2.
1 . Kuhn writes:
...I was struck by the number and extent of the overt
disagreements between social scientists about the
nature of legitimate scientific problems and methods.
Both history and acquaintance made me doubt that
practitioners of the natural sciences possess firmer
or more permanent answers to ouch questions than
their colleagues in social scienco. Yet, somehow, the
practice of astronomy, physics, chemistry, or biology
normally fails to evoke the controversies over funda¬
mentals that today often seem endemic among, say,
psychologists or sociologists. Attempting to discover
the source of that difference led me to recognize the
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role in scientific research of what I have since called
•paradigms'...Once that piece of my puzzle fell into
place, a draft of this essay emerged rapidly (Kuhn,
1962, p. x).
2. Krantz (1965) attempted to elaborate on a suggestion of Kuhn's
that a shift in the pattern of references in technical journal
articles might index the imminence of a scientific revolution, but did
not seriously examine or defend the appropriateness of considering
psychology as a paradigm-based science. Katahn and Koplin (1968),
likewise assuming the appropriateness of analysing psychology in terms
of paradigms, tried to explain the controversy aroused by Breger's and
McGaugh's (1965) analysis of behaviour therapy by showing how Breger
and McGaugh were working from a different paradigm from that of their
opponents. Numerous other respectful and sometimes wistful references
to Kuhn's analysis have appeared in the literature, without any attempt
at strict application of his thesis to psychology (e.g., Rychlak, 1972,
quoted above; several mentions in Dixon & Horton, 1968). As indicated
in the text, Palermo's papers were the first to attempt to show in
detail the relevance of Kuhn's analysis to psychology; Palermo's thesis
and analysis were independently paralleled, however, with somewhat
different examples, by Segal and Lachman (1972).
3. Masterman (1970) has identified twenty-one distinguishable uses of
the term 'paradigm' in Kuhn's treatise. She groups these into three
distinct classes, but does not emphasize their continuity as increasing¬
ly distant abstractions from the exemplary achievement itself.
4. Warren is, however, somewhat vindicated on this point. The wide
diversity of alternative approaches to psychology does make it difficult
to see how behaviourism could count as a successor to Wundtian
structuralism in an already mature, paradigmatic science. The first
paradigm in a newly matured science may initially stand out as a
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beacon in the midst of chaos, but one would expect that by the time
the next paradigm came along the scientific discipline would have
achieved some order.
5. As Duhem (191^) has shown, this is an invariable limitation of
metaphysical principles, and recognition of the limitation helps to
clarify the suggestive role that metaphysics can play in science .
Duhem's point is generally accepted among those philosophers of
science who concern themselves with metaphysics at all (cf. Watkins,
1956).
6. In a footnote, Briskman acknowledges that "the difference between
paradigms and research programmes is not unambiguously clear (Briskman,
1972, p. 9^)," but suggests two possible distinctions between them.
The first is that research programmes need not be exclusive: there can
be several competing research programmes in a science, whereas on
Kuhn's original view there is almost invariably only one paradigm. The
second is that paradigms have a central core of substantive content,
functioning as exemplary solutions to model problems; research programmes
on the other hand—and this point certainly applies to behaviourism-
can be sufficiently characterized by general acceptance of a methodology.
The first point may be useful in some contexts, but does not help to
distinguish behaviourism as one research programme from behaviourism as
one paradigm. The second point, so far as it concerns the lack of
central defining content in behaviourism, is, I think, a good one.
Behaviourism did not have a central core of scientific content. But
behaviourism was very unusual in this regard, and its lack of any
central content itself requires a special explanation. Behaviourism's
non-contentual, almost exclusively methodological character cannot
support a general demarcation of paradigms and research programmes
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unless Briskman wishes to maintain, as he almost certainly does not,
that scientific research programmes are typically devoid of central
or defining content. Behaviourism's primarily methodological character
thus not only requires a special explanation, it also serves as
evidence against assimilating behaviourism to any general model of
scientific progress (see pp. 68-81).
7. Briskman's 'research programmes' are not claimed to be entirely of
his own invention; rather, as indicated in the text, they are taken
with some modifications from the account given by Lakatos (1968, 1970).
It may be thought, therefore, that justification for applying the
concept of research programmes to science in general should properly
be sought in Lakatos' writings. Such a procedure would be of little
help in trying to characterize research programmes as general alterna¬
tives to paradigms, however. Lakatos' analysis was, it is true,
originally intended to be a Popperian alternative to Kuhn. But in
refining his position Lakatos seems to have moved so close to Kuhn on
fundamental issues that it is very difficult to separate them on the
basis of their differential predictions for or interpretations of
scientific advance (see the cogent review by Bloor, 1971). The vague¬
ness of Briskman's model specifically as an alternative interpretation
of psychology is thus, if anything, increased by appeal to Lakatos.
If there really is practically no difference between Kuhn's and Lakatos'
position, then much the same historical evidence will be relevant to the
question of whether either one or the other of them applies to
behaviourism.
8. This article was written before either Warren's or Briskman's, and
was accepted for publication before Palermo's extended statement of his
analysis appeared (Palermo, 1971). However, because of differential
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publication lags in different journals, it was published last. As a
result, it considered only Palermo's brief summary statement of his
position (Palermo, 1970).
9. It is not overly surprising, even without anticipating the
argument, that it could have such features (e.g., accepted methodology,
concentration of interest on a set of related problems) if it did not
have a paradigm. Kuhn, after all, did not discover these features of
scientific activity. Rather, these are some of the typical features
of scientific activity that his account is intended partly to explain.
It is of course true that Kuhn was for some time one of the few
philosophers of science who stressed the significance of these features.
10. Autonomous, that is, again with respect to the criteria which it
itself comes to make acceptable. It is obviously not autonomous with
respect to all criteria, but the criteria by which it is assessed are
far less restricted than those for the assessment of research based on
it. For instance, it was not uncommon around the middle of the last
century to proclaim that scientific explanation consisted in the
reduction of observed phenomena to the principles of Newtonian mechanics
(cf. the quotations from du Bois-Reymond and Helmholtz, footnote 7 to
Chapter 3). This general criterion for assessment of physical research
was of course not the one applied to Newton's own research. Those
criteria included generality, mathematical elegance, and the applicabil¬
ity of Newton's theories to then current problems. Such general
criteria are not totally devalued during a period of normal science,
but are subordinated to the more specific paradigm-based ones, which
have more unambiguous application. ('Application to current problems',
of course, becomes itself one of the paradigm-based criteria.) Severe
and longstanding incompatibility between the two kinds of criteria may
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be an important feature of a situation in scientific research in
which a crisis and revolution are imminent.
11. Palermo is by no means alone, however, in characterizing paradigms
so minimally that almost anything could serve as one. Feyerabend
(1970), for instance, says that as he sees it, organized crime, and
particularly safecracking, could qualify as a paradigm-based science.
Kuhn himself (1970a, 1970b) would now agree that the criteria for
attribution of a paradigm could be far looser than those which he
maintained in his 1962 treatise, and which I am maintaining here. In
loosening these criteria, however, Kuhn also quite explicitly minimizes
the functional significance of paradigms as providing the basis for
research in a scientific field, where this latter concept is itself
defined in terms of content, problems, etc. In Kuhn's revised thesis,
which he has as yet presented only sketchily, paradigms function only
in the context of scientific communities, defined in terms of patterns
of mutual awareness and personal communication among their members.
Paradigms in this revised form, however, could not begin to support
the weight of explanation which Palermo loads on them here. It should
go without saying that both Palermo and I are concerned in the present
context only with the functional significance of Kuhn's 1962 paradigms.
Palermo is also, however, the co-author of a further paper (Weimer
& Palermo, in press) which attempts to characterize behaviourism in
terms of Kuhn's 1970 paradigms. The attempt may be somewhat premature,
since Kuhn has not yet developed his new ideas beyond the level of a
rough sketch. In general, however, if Kuhn's new analysis is indeed
applicable to behaviourism, or to any other scientific field, it will
necessarily be in an altogether different way than his original
analysis was intended (by Palermo) to be. Kuhn's present interests
347.
centre on the micro-structure of science, on analysis of working-group
structure as revealed by who talks (or writes) to whom. Kuhn describes
the minimum size of such groups as less than twenty-five persons. He
makes no estimate of the maximum size, but it cannot be very large—
large enough, say, to comprise 10% of the living psychologists or
microbiologists—because of the rapidly increasing complexity in
personal communication as a function of increase in group size. The
working-groups or communities thus identified and studied may of course
serve as opinion leaders to the rest of the practitioners in the
discipline, and whatever differentiates such groups from other
practitioners (communication patterns, ideas, general modus operandi—
i.e., their own particular 'paradigm1, as Kuhn now uses the term) may
sometimes have great thematic significance. But then again, and at
other times, it may not. Study of the patterns of small and medium-sized
group communication is altogether separate from a study of the influence
of the group or of the importance of what is communicated within the
group.
Thus, while Welmer and Palermo may be quite in accord with Kuhn's
present position when they write of paradigms in behaviourism—
especially since they differentiate Tolmanian, Hullian, etc., paradigms
and apply them to the conduct of the workers grouped around each major
figure (cf. p. 76, above)—their analysis does not throw much light on
the career of behaviourism as a general movement within psychology, as
Palermo's original analysis attempted to do. The paradigms they describe
have little or nothing to do with directing and justifying scientific
inquiry or with ensuring scientific cohesiveness beyond the membership
of a Belf-selected clique—such functions being what the original
paradigms were expressly formulated as performing. If every group
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doing anything has its paradigm, then paradigms have nothing intrinsi¬
cally to do with reducing the proliferation of groups, and the question
of the directedness and cohesiveness of scientific disciplines, or of
major segments of them, requires an answer that has nothing to do with
paradigms. But in fact, while analysis of intra-group communication
patterns may be a valuable and worthwhile study in itself, Kuhn's 1970
paradigms have next to no connection with his 1962 paradigms, and each
conception has practically no relevance to the problems elucidated by
means of the other. It is simply misleading to describe both conceptions
by the same name.
12. The brief exposition given here of the constitution of a paradigm
is of course closely based on Kuhn's (1962) treatise, but contains a
bit more than reportage. Masterman, in her sympathetic critique of
Kuhn, writes:
...'why', he asks himself (p. 11) is the paradigm, or
scientific achievement, 'as a locus of professional
commitment, prior to the various concepts, laws,
theories, and points of view that may be abstracted
from it?' Unfortunately (and typically), having
posed this highly germane question, Kuhn gives
himself no answer, and the reader is left to work out
the answer for himself, if he can (Masterman, 1970,
p. 66).
In fact, Kuhn does not leave the question quite so up in the air as
Masterman claims (cf. Kuhn, 1962, Chapter 5! 'The priority of
paradigms'), but he does leave much of the answer implicit and hence
available as a source of confusion. The account given here is an
attempt, but undoubtedly not the only possible one, to make it more
explicit.
13. There were, it is true, some political influences which affected
the development of psychology in Russia, both before and after the
revolution, and which eventually were instrumental in establishing
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the Pavlovian approach as predominant. These influences would qualify
a Kuhnian analysis, but need not vitiate it, for two reasons. The
first is that Kuhn's analysis does not exclude consideration of
external pressures on the growth of a science, although such pressures
are not treated in his book (cf. Kuhn, 1962, p. xii). The second, and
more important, is that however much Pavlovian psychology may have been
dependent on political factors to establish it as the dominant approach
in later Soviet psychology, it has proved sufficiently viable there to
retain its predominance on scientific grounds. It thus contrasts
sharply with, say, Lysenkoist genetics, which became predominant on
political grounds in the apparent absence of any scientific merit. For
a review emphasizing the systematic character of modern Soviet psycho¬
logy in relation to Pavlov, see Anokhin (1968). A more comprehensive
synthesis of psychological theory, which draws heavily on Soviet
research and again emphasizes the role of Pavlov's work in its systematic
development, is made by Razran (1971).
1Zf. Bolles (1967), summarizing Hilgard and Marquis (19^0), notes:
...there was roughly a decade from about 1916, when Watson
first promoted conditioning, to at least 1926, during
which conditioning was accepted as a valid explanatory
device and sometimes even proposed as the basis for all
learning. All this time there was virtually no empirical
support for the claims made for conditioning (Bolles,
1967, p. 317).
15. See Humphrey (1951) for detailed discussion of and references to
the controversy. Humphrey argues persuasively that the discussion of
meanings in Titchener's counter-experiments begs the question, and that
it involves Titchener himself either in the stimulus error or in an
unacknowledged dependence on an imageless, meaning-carrying component
in thought. Furthermore, Mary Henle has shown that the stimulus error,
as Titchener conceived it, was inescapably present in his treatment of
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meaning in other contexts as well (Henle, 1971). Such results and
analyses go far to show that Titchener's sensationalistic hypothesis
was wrong, but not that it was meaningless or empirically sterile.
If anything, they suggest the opposite; as Popper (1959) points out
many times, the empirical status of a theory is rendered forever
secure by the act of its refutation.
16. The repudiation of Wundt's distinction was expressed most force¬
fully by Kantor (1921).
17. Such, at least, was Tolman's intent in introducing intervening
variables. However, as pointed out in Chapter 1, intervening
variables are almost impossible to anchor unambiguously to behaviour.
In his last theoretical statement, Tolman (1959, p. 1^8) acknowledged
the insurmountable difficulties involved in any rigorous use of
intervening variables in theory construction, and declared that "they
are merely an aid to thinking ('my thinking' if you will)."
18. If purposes, expectations, etc., can be considered as mental
entities, separate from the behaviour which they guide and direct, then
the behaviour itself can be freely regarded as elementaristic and
purposively neutral, without the intrinsic purposefulness revealed by
the behaviour thereby being denied.
19. Spielberger and DeNike (1966), discussing "theorists in the Hull-
Spence tradition", observe that
The model developed by these theorists was designed
to account for the behavior phenomena exhibited by
nonarticulate organisms or by humans in simple
learning situations in which the operation of higher
mental processes was minimal, for example, in eyelid
conditioning and rote learning. A major difference
between the views of descriptive i.e., Skinnerian
behaviorists and those of Hull and Spence is that
the latter never claimed that their theoretical
concepts would hold for complex verbal processes.
In his discussion of the postulates and methods of
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behaviorism nearly 2 decades ago, Spence (19^8,
p. 76) noted that:
...in dealing with the more complex types of
animal and human behavior, implicit emotional
responses, covert verbal responses and not
easily observable receptor-exposure and
postural adjustments will have to be
postulated...
and that:
It is in this realm of theorizing that the verbal
reports of human subjects are likely to be of
most use to the behavior theorist, for presumably
these reports can be made the basis on which to
postulate the occurrence of these inferred
entities.
20. The term was coined by Dijksterhuis (1961), to satisfy the need
for a noun corresponding to 'mechanistic' .
Footnotes to Chapter 3.
1 . For discussion of this epistemological separation see Burtt (1932)
or the summary in Mackenzie and Mackenzie (197k).
2. For instance, elementarism and associationism in British psychology
became temporarily unpopular with the rise to dominance of the Scottish
•common sense' school of Reid and Stewart. This development in
psychology paralleled the temporary decline in popularity of physical
atomism in Scottish chemistry, under the influence of Joseph Black.
Physical atomism was revived and extended in chemistry shortly after
the publication of Dalton's atomic theory in I80if, and the corresponding
psychological doctrine was revived in an extreme form by James Mill,
with the publication of his Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind,
in 1829. The correspondence is, at the very least, suggestive, although
in these instances it would be difficult to document any claim of direct
influenco.
3. Frank (19*f9a) points out that Mach's position has often been troated
by philosophical critics as equivalent to Berkeleyian idealism, to the
position that perceptions are the only real existents and hence that
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reality has a purely mental character. Such an interpretation is
evidently unfair to Mach. His claim was that perceptions are, not all
of reality, but all that is available to us; thus, talk of anything
existing independent of perception is empirically meaningless. The
motto for Mach's position would not be Berkeley*s esse est percipi—
to be is to be perceived; but rather cognoscendi est percipi—to be
known is to be perceived. The interpretation of Mach's analysis as
idealistic or, at best, psychologistic, seemed to be the main basis
for the rejection of Mach in the implementation of positivism as an
explicit programme for psychology (cf. Stevens, 1939).
/f. It can be seen that this positivist repudiation of metaphysics
would tend to foster impatience with the subtle distinctions between
alternative metaphysical systems, since they are all equally meaning¬
less; or at least it would do so for those positivists whose concern
with metaphysics was purely negative (i.e., unlike Duhem). In deal¬
ing with metaphysical positions, therefore, anti-metaphysical
positivists might be expected to choose the simplest, or most clearly
expressed, or (for the sake of emphasis) most extreme of a set of
metaphysical formulations and make it stand, and fall, for the whole
set. Carnap (1932), for instance, singles out Heidegger's undeniably
obtuse analyses of Being as representative of all speculative metaphysics,
and shows the empirical emptiness of Heidegger's statements rather
easily.
5. This empirically unwarrantable character of the affirmation of the
truth or falsity of a scientific system thus proceeds, in the present
instance, from the non- or trans-empirical character of reality as
defined. It will be shown in detail later that this unwarrantable
character of the affirmation follows also, although relatedly, from the
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limitations of logic when applied to the interpretation and
characterization of phenomena.
6. Cf. Einstein's aphorism, "God is subtle, but He is not malicious,"
and his biographer's comment:
With these words he was to crystallize his view that
complex though the laws of nature might be, difficult
though they were to understand, they were yet under¬
standable by human reason (Clark, 1972, p. 38).
Einstein's conception of the world was complex however, if not
contradictory, and he cannot be cited as an unequivocal exponent of
any view of science. As Frank comments:
Roughly speaking, we may distinguish, according to Max
Planck, two conflicting conceptions in the philosophy
of science: the metaphysical and the positivistic
conception. Each of these regards Einstein as its chief
advocate and most distinguished witness (Frank; 19^+9b,
p. 271).
7. For example, in I8if7 Hermann Helmholtz, in his classic paper *0n
the conservation of force'~tho paper in which he promulgated the
conservation principle—stated:
The task of physical science is finally to reduce all
phenomena to forces of attraction and repulsion the
intensity of which is dependent only upon the mutual
distance of material bodies. Only if this problem is
solved are we sure that nature is conceivable (quoted
in Frank, 19^9a, p. 213).
Similarly, Emil du Bois-Reymond, a founding member with Helmholtz of
the heavily materialistic Berlin Physical Society, observed in 1872
in his (at the time) equally famous paper, 'On the limitations of
natural scionco':
The cognition of nature is the reduction of changes in
the material world to the motions of atoms, acted upon
by central forces, independent of time...It is a psycho¬
logical fact of experience that wherever such a reduction
is successfully carried through our need for causality
feels satisfied for the time being (quoted in Frank,
19if9a, p. 213).
Frank, who strongly disapproves of any such enshrining of scientific
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theories, comments on these two passages:
Is this not an amazing fact in the history of the human
mind? As Newton set up his theory the introduction of
the central forces of attraction was regarded as a
particularly weak point of this theory. It was accused
of requiring the introduction of an element that is
philosophically absurd. But what happened about a
hundred years later? It was claimed as a "psychologic
fact" that just the same thing—the reduction of a
group of phenomena to the action of central forces-
satisfies our need for causal understanding. And the
derivation of physical theorems from the action of these
forces, which were formerly condemned as unconceivable,
was now the guarantee that nature is conceivable (Frank,
1949a, pp. 213-214).
8. In his unauthorized introduction to Copernicus' treatise on the
heliocentric hypothesis; see Koestler (1959) for discussion.
9. Newton's disclaimer, made in his Opticks, is well known:
To tell us that every species of thing is endowed with
an occult specific quality by which it acts and produces
manifest effects, is to tell us nothing: But to derive
two or three general principles of motion from phenomena,
and afterwards to tell us how the properties and actions
of all corporeal things follow from those manifest
properties, would be a very great step in philosophy,
though the causes of those principles were not yet
discovered: and therefore I scruple not, to propose the
principles of motion above-mentioned, they being of very
general extent, and leave their causes to be found out
(quoted in Burtt, 1932, p. 219).
10. Others, such as Leibniz, remained unconvinced to the end,
raising substantive objections to Newton's fundamental concepts that,
in retrospect, seem prophetic (see Koyre, 1957, for discussion).
11. The putative impossibility of an experimental application of
introspection (founded on the ineffability of the ego) was the basis
on which Kant rejected the possibility of a scientific psychology.
It has been conjectured (by Turner, 1967) that Kant might therefore
have had no objection to a psychology based strictly on the study of
behaviour. It is an interesting conjecture, and may well be correct;
it seems likely, however, that Kant might have had severe doubts about
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how much such a science could accomplish, doubts amounting perhaps
to a conviction of its triviality.
Footnotes to Chapter b.
1. It would be well to differentiate here at least three possible
meanings of 'objective'. Two of them were mentioned briefly in
Chapter 2. In the first sense, 'objective' means 'free from bias' or
•concerned with observable events, whatever they might be'; the
antithesis is 'subjective', meaning 'biased'. In the second sense,
less easy to define, 'objective* refers to the use of observational and
logical methods supposedly derived from physics, with a corollary that
any phenomena not amenable to investigation with these methods are
ephemeral and not a proper subject of science. This is the sense that
I dubbed •objectivist• in Chapter 2; the antithesis is 'subjective' or
'mentalist', here meaning 'concerned with unobservable inner entities
or processes', and is approximately synonymous with 'mystical' (cf.
footnote 7 to Chapter 1). In the third sense, 'objective' means
'external to the perceiving organism' or 'publically observable'; the
antithesis is again 'subjective', this time meaning 'dependent on the
private experience of the observer'. This third sense is the only one
among the three given which is merely descriptive, that is, in which
'objective' and 'subjective' are not terms of approval and abuse
respectively. In this third, descriptive sense, all the introspective
methods are subjective. Unless otherwise stated, 'objective' and
•subjective' will be used in this descriptive sense throughout the
present chapter. If the first, evaluative sense is overlaid on the
third, descriptive sense, the result is the second, which purports to
be both evaluative and descriptive.
2. It should be clear that the introspective psychologies of, say,
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Wundt, Kiilpe, and Titchener, were not guilty of this fallacy, at
least so far as they were confined to the study of human introspective
psychology. The introspection carried out by these psychologists was
anything but casual and, more important, was not assumed to provide any
easy, immediate, or incontrovertible information about the mind's
contents and operations.
3. Boring underscores this point, observing that "Romanes lacked a
satisfactory classification of human faculties with which to work. He
was thrown back upon Locke and the associationists for his terms
(Boring, 1950a, p. k7k) •"
if. The claim that we all make use of the analogy in inferring conscious¬
ness in other persons is another of those hangovers from Cartesian
philosophy for which Descartes cannot be held wholly responsible . In
practice, it seems to be rarely if ever true that we infer consciousness
in this way. It is more likely the case that, except when we are acting
as philosophers, we do not rationally infer consciousness or sentience
in other persons at all, so much as uncritically assume it in the course
of the socialization process—although it is certainly something less
sophisticated than the consciousness of the philosophers that we assume
by these means. This insight was reached independently by Comte,
Wittgenstein, G. H. Mead, and (in an elliptical fashion) Skinner. It
is not, however, an insight that can even yet command universal accept¬
ance, and certainly not one that we can fault Romanes for lacking.
5. This minimization of the experimenter's subjectivity as an analytical
tool has no bearing, of course, on the status or the resolution of such
questions as whether other organisms are conscious, and if so which
ones, and what their mental lives are like, etc.—questions which the
analogy was supposed to be used to answer, but which in fact it was
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incapable of answering. It is often claimed that these questions
are meaningless. They may or may not be, but in any case the point
to be established here is simply that they cannot be resolved through
application of the analogy. Whether there are any other methods that
could resolve them is certainly dubious, but that is only to say that
it is questionable. This entire discussion, however, might seem
otiose to those who have rejected any consideration of subjectivity,
and who are thus satisfied with rejecting these questions as meaning¬
less and with rejecting the method of analogical inference as a mis¬
guided attempt to answer meaningless questions. Here the point is that
such rejection in principle is by no means universally accepted among
psychologists, and is becoming less widespread (cf. Chapter 1); that
such an in principle rejection cannot itself be rigorously justified
(cf. Chapter 5); and that it is not in any case necessary as a basis
on which to reject Romanes' specific kind of concern with the subjective
experience of other species, as the present discussion attempts to
show at length.
6. Neither of these examples is taken from Romanes' writings. Rather,
they refer to the later controversies in behaviourist psychology over
transposition and cognitive maps, respectively.
7. On this matter see also footnote 9 to this chapter, below. Romanes'
analysis was particularly weak on this point, that is, in the establish¬
ment of just what a given piece of behaviour could serve as evidence for.
It is equally weak on the matter of accurate observation of the
behaviours themselves. Both of these limitations follow chiefly from
his almost total reliance on anecdotal reports, and together they render
his particular findings of little lasting scientific value. I have not
otherwise criticized Romanes' work for its reliance on anecdotes,
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although this is the criticism most often brought against it. The
point is that no such criticism is really necessary, once the minimal
value of Romanes' data has been initially established. Romanes was
well aware of the dangers inherent in the anecdotal method, which was
in deservedly poor repute at the time he was writing, and he tried to
take great care not to fall into the habits of the "anecdote mongers".
Nevertheless, he felt that if he applied the strictest available
criteria of selectivity to such reports as reached him, the resulting
data would be of at least some use in suggesting evolutionary trends,
even if many or most of the particular conclusions had to be revised
following detailed experimental investigation. While the worth of
Romanes* data was even less than he expected, he was surely right, in
this case, in making do with the best materials to hand. The value
of his contribution never lay in the supposed accuracy of the behavioural
observations which he compiled; rather, as he realized, it lay in the
insights suggested by, and the further research stimulated by, his
systematization of the currently available information and misinformation.
Furthermore, it may be noted that despite the poor quality of Romanes'
reportage by our standards, it was considerably more cautious and
accurate than any other such compilations to that date, or indeed until
several years later.
8. Yet another reason for insisting that the mental or psychic inferenda
be specified independent of subjective experience is that otherwise they
will be dependent solely on the subjectivity, not even of mankind in
general, but of the individual experimenter. Since different persons
differ in regard to their assimilation of experience, their character¬
istic ways of solving problems, etc., any attribution of mind based
solely on reflection on one's personal consciousness would amount to
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universalizing one's individuality, and thus to making personality
differences the chief source of theoretical differences. We may
suspect that differences in theory are sometimes dependent on
differences of personality in any case of course, but it is not a
tendency which we would usually want to institutionalize.
9. Besides the general desire for scientific rigour, and the need to
counter the still prevalent tendency to anthropomorphism in the
interpretation of animal behaviour, there was a theoretical basis for
the canon. If "higher psychical faculties" evolve from lower ones,
then on evolutionary principles they must become incorporated into the
species as a result of environmental pressures which render them of
some use, that is, which render them of selective advantage or survival
value to the organisms which possess them. Now, there are doubtless
many activities (responding differentially to written or verbal commands
to "stop" or "go" for example) which can be controlled by either higher
or lower faculties, that is, in this case, either on the basis of
linguistic competence or on that of reinforced stimulus discrimination.
If we see an animal performing such an activity, we cannot tell whether
the activity is being controlled by higher or lower faculties. We can,
however, judge unequivocally that the necessity for performance of this
specific activity was never, in the evolutionary history of the species,
the occasion for development or assimilation of the higher faculties,
since ex hypothesi the lower ones can control it perfectly well.
Development of higher faculties in this connection would consequently
have been of no selective advantage to the organism; therefore, if they
were to develop, they could be expected to be swamped in the genetic
pool of the species. Thus, performance of such an activity, however
it is governed in a specific instance, cannot serve as evidence for the
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operation of the higher faculties even on the most generous interpre¬
tation; for had it not been necessary for the animal to perform some
other activity unmanageable by the lower faculties the higher faculty
in question would presumably never have evolved.
10. Hobhouse receives about a dozen incidental references in the three
enormous and comprehensive volumes of Comparative Psychology by Warden,
Jenkins, and Warner (1935), with almost no discussion of his findings
or theories. His work is not mentioned at all in what remains a
standard text, the Principles of Animal Psychology by Maier and
Schneirla (1935). It is given one incidental reference in Boring's
History (1929; unchanged in the 1950 edition).
11. It may be recalled that Titchener, after studying with Wundt at
Leipzig, could not secure any position in experimental psychology in
Britain, and was therefore forced to go to what he considered the
colonies—Cornell—to gain employment. Titchener, of course, played
only a negative role in the transformation of American psychology
from a Wundtian to a functionalist stance.
12 . James wrote:
The dilemma in regard to the nervous system seems, in
short, to be of the following kind. We may construct
one which will react infallibly and certainly, but it
will then be capable of reacting to very few changes
in the environment—it will fail to be adapted to the
rest. We may, on the other hand, construct a nervous
system potentially adapted to respond to an infinite
variety of minute features in the situation; but its
fallibility will then be as great as its elaboration.
We can never be sure that its equilibrium will be
upset in the appropriate direction. In short, a high
brain may do many things, and may do each of them at
a very slight hint. But its hair-trigger organization
makes of it a happy-go-lucky, hit-or-miss affair. It
is likely to do the crazy as the sane thing at any
given moment. A low brain does few things, and in
doing them perfectly forfeits all other use...Now let
consciousness only be what it seems to itself, and it
will help an instable brain to compass its proper ends.
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The movements of the brain per se yield the means of
attaining these ends mechanically, but only out of a
lot of other ends, if so they may be called, which
are not the proper ones of the animal, but often quite
opposed. The brain is an instrument of possibilities,
but of no certainties. But the consciousness, with its
own ends present to it, and knowing also well which
possibilities lead thereto and which away, will, if
endowed with causal efficacy, reinforce the favorable
possibilities and repress the unfavorable or indifferent
ones (James, 1890, I, pp. 1^0-142).
13. Again, it was not totally without opposition that this equation
was made, or that the consciousness of introspective psychology was
retained in functionalism. Dewey (1896) stressed the complete
integration of consciousness with stimulation from the environment
on the one hand and with adaptive responses on the other. Experience,
he maintained, could not be characterized outside the context of an
individual's needs and actions; equally, 'stimulus' and 'response' could
not be characterized independently of each other. Stimulus and response
comprised a single integrated series, while consciousness was not some¬
thing separate which integrated them, but rather that which established
the integration as unique to the requirements of a specific individual.
Dewey was thus attempting in part to overcome the subject-object
distinction basic to much of Western thought, by arguing that before
our world-view becomes shaped by philosophical abstractions, objects
are given in perception primarily in terms of their relevance or
relation to the perceiver, rather than as independent existents. There
is some small irony in that Dewey's paper is sometimes cited as the
founding of functionaliom (e.g., by Boring, 1950a). In fact, while
Dewey had considerable influence on the movement, largely through his
personal influence on Angell, and while his 1896 paper certainly
helped draw attention to considerations of biological functioning in
consciousness, his principal efforts in the paper to reconstitute the
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notions of stimulus and response had almost no systematic influence.
14. It may seem arbitrary to read Thorndike out of the functionalist
camp, and in a sense it is; it is arbitrary to put him anywhere.
Thorndike was a sufficiently individualistic thinker that it is
difficult to categorize him at all; Watson was disinclined to let him
count as a behaviourist either. Assimilating him to the British move¬
ment in comparative psychology is purely a matter of convenience, due
to the thematic and conceptual similarities that have been discussed.
Thorndike eventually came to describe himself as a •connectionist'
(Thorndike, 19^9), partly, one suspects, because the term had not been
appropriated by anybody else.
15. There was also a direct thematic relationship between experimental
introspection and the kind of comparative psychology characterized by
the exclusive employment of subjective inferences, although the relation¬
ship was not a very extensive one. Wundt (see footnote 1? to this
chapter) made systematic attempts to interpret the conscious experience
of animals by means of the analogy, although he did not regard the
endeavour as rigorously scientific. Titchener was never actively
engaged in comparative research, but gave his blessing to such work so
long as it was based on use of the analogy (Titchener, 191*f). Titchener's
student, Washburn, vigorously promoted an introspective type of
comparative psychology as late as 1936. In her compendium of research
on The Animal Mind, Washburn first made the standard disclaimer
concerning use of the analogy, a disclaimer notable only in that it was
more emphatic than any made previously by the defenders of the analogy.
Whether...our inferences are made on the basis of words
or of actions, they are all necessarily made on the
hypothesis that human minds are built on the same
pattern, that what a given word or action would mean
for my mind, this it means also for my neighbour's mind.
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If this hypothesis be uncertain when applied to our
fellow human beings, it fails us utterly when we
turn to the lower animals. If my neighbour's mind
is a mystery to me, how great is the mystery which
looks out of the eyes of a dog, and how insoluable
the problem presented by the mind of an invertebrate
animal, an ant or a spider (Washburn, 1936, p. 2).
She then concluded, as Romanes had done, that however dubious any
inferences based on the analogy might be, they had to be better than
the alternative, which was to say nothing at all; and launched a few
pages later into a serious discussion of the subjective experience of
amoeba.
16. It is mere speculation, but it is possible that functionalist
comparative psychology might have taken a different course if Dewey's
attempt to reconstruct the subject-object relation had been more
successful (cf. footnote 13 to this chapter). The fundamental point of
his analysis, again, wao that the constitution of a physical event as
a stimulus is dependent on the organism that it is a stimulus for. The
stimulus-as-perceived is thus not a function simply of its physical
properties and of the sensory apparatus of the percipient, but equally
and codeterminately of the motivations, life-style, and ecological
niche of the percipient. We are inclined today to treat such determinants
of perception as distortions of the information embodied in the stimulus
event, but they could equally be regarded as merely comprising part of
the relationship between physical event and percipient, no less than
the percipient's particular sensory apparatus does. The effect that
Dewey's analysis might concoivably have had would have been to obviate
the sensationalism, and all that went with it, in functionalist
comparative psychology by directing attention to the environment as it
exists for the organism rather than as existing independently and being
reflected, well or poorly, in the animal's consciousness. Such a
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development, had it occurred, would almost certainly have been
interesting. It would probably have been nearly as unlike the
trends in British comparative psychology as discussed here, as it
would have been unlike what actually happened on the American scene.
It would perhaps have been most comparable with the kind of study on
the umwelt. or perceptual world, carried out by von Uexktill (e.g.,
1926, 1957).
17. Wundt's Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology (1892) contained
analyses of the ideas and actions of animals which were similar in
some respects to Small's, and, for that matter, to Romanes', but
considerably more fanciful than either. He dwelled at length, for
instance, on the reasoning processes in spiders. His account was not,
however, so sensationalistic as Small's, in that it made extensive
use of what has been called here subjective inferences to mental
operations. The result, unfortunately, was so wildly speculative
that Wundt's analyses came to be cited as cautionary tales, illustrat¬
ing the fate of those who ignored the canon of parsimony (e.g., by
Washburn, 1936) .
18. Watson's 1907 paper was the last in which he made any inferences
to subjective experiences. His polemical 1913 paper was based on
lectures which he had delivered the previous year.
19. One could speculate on the distant influence of faculty psychology
on the development of comparative psychology in Britain, in keeping
such a 'faculty' conception of mind available for consideration. There
is nothing inherently unscientific about faculty psychology—Guilford's
work on the structure of the intellect is faculty psychology—unless
it is combined with the nominalist fallacy that to name something is
to explain it. That faculty psychology had a continuing influence in
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British psychology—through Gall, Spencer, and Bain—has been shown
by R. M. Young (1970).
20. In particular, the faculty conception of mind, which was quite
widespread in American pedagogy before the introduction of the intro¬
spective 'new psychology', was employed almost exclusively for the
inculcation of moral and religious precepts.
21. The irony would have been even more pointed if the British
approach to comparative psychology had continued to develop and to
stimulate further progress in the field. Unfortunately, it did not
do so, for reasons that are complex and not altogether clear. The
main one seems to be that there never developed an autonomous
scientific tradition of comparative psychology in Britain. The writers
mentioned, and others, all wrote comparative psychology as part of an
overall evolutionary synthesis, or in order to propound general
principles that would have applicability to social philosophy, ethics,
metaphysics, etc. To a surprising and commendable extent, such general
considerations were kept out of the comparative psychology writings
themselves; but when their cogency faded after the widespread acceptance
of Darwinian principles they did not come to be replaced by purely
scientific considerations as a basis on which to do research in the
field. The general lack of support for experimental psychology in
Britain at the time is doubtless implicated in the failure of an
independent scientific tradition to develop specifically in comparative
psychology.
22. James' speculations on the selective functions of consciousness,
as quoted in footnote 12 to this chapter, are a general kind of
subjective inference to mental operations. They were of such a sort,
therefore, that they could not be taken up and elaborated in the
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context of 'objectified' experimentation on animal consciousness
performed by means of minimal, subjective inferences.
23. Behaviourism thus was deterministic from the beginning, but it
implied a determinism of environmental events, as did psychoanalysis,
rather than of physical processes. The ambivalence in later behaviourist
theorizing about physiological reductive explanation stems in part from
this.
2.1+. Angell (1913) testified to the difference between comparative
psychology and the rest of psychology in this respect, in a paper
written independently of Watson's (1913a) polemic. He judged that
introspection and introspective formulations might eventually have to
be dropped from comparative psychology, but thought that it would be
very unwise to eliminate them from human psychology.
25. For the sake of retaining some perspective in the face of this
kind of argument, we may remind ourselves that neither of Watson's
claims stands up to examination—the physical sciences are neither so
reliable, nor the introspective psychological ones so unreliable, as he
maintained. For the extent and limitations of inter-experimenter
reliability in introspective psychology, see the brief discussion in
Chapter 2, above, and the longer one in Humphrey (1951) on which it is
based. For the highly comparable extent and limitations of inter-
experimenter reliability in the physical sciences, and the ad hominem
explanations sometimes offered when replicability does not obtain, see
Kuhn (1962) or Polanyi (1958). Watson's claim on behalf of physics is,
of course, quite consonant with and typical of a positivist or other¬
wise methodological conception of science.
26. Watson's argument was in this context directed specifically against
that version of the phylogenetic continuity hypothesis that sought to
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lift animals up (by maintaining that they have nascent higher
faculties) rather than to pull man down (by maintaining that he has
only highly developed lower faculties). The more general application
of the argument to instincts is fairly apparent however, and was made
by Watson himself (e.g., 1924, Chapter 5) as well as, more notoriously,
by his student Kuo (e.g., 1924).
27. Herrnstein (1972) has shown in some detail how the conception of
•instincts1 became transformed into that of 'drives' throughout the
course of behaviourism.
Footnotes to Chapter 3.
1. As the quotation indicates, Cattell's statement reflects already
established laboratory practice, but Woodworth (1931) affirms that it
was the first attempt, so far as he could determine, to justify such
practice systematically.
2. It was, of course, not just neobehaviourism that was affected, but
also, and by extension, other approaches to psychology as well. Lewin's
(1936, 1938) attempts to construct a formal (and often hypothetico-
deductive) field-theoretical account of behaviour while remaining
firmly within a gestalt orientation provide what is perhaps the most
notable example. But while the 'new view' of science and the hypothetico-
deductive prescription had some considerable influence throughout
psychology, it was specifically within neobehaviourism that they had
their greatest influence and that their promise was most eagerly taken
up. Furthermore, it was largely due to their fervent advocacy by
neobehaviourists that these principles came to have such a widespread
influence; it is primarily in this respect that behaviourism may be
said to have established the standards and models for theorizing
throughout psychology.
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3. It is worth pointing out that the sarcasm is not at all justified.
The logical positivist principles and techniques adopted within
neobehaviourism, for the fulfillment of the scientific programme
originally enunciated within classical behaviourism, were certainly
highly abstract and rarefied, and had at times only a tenuous contact
with actual scientific practice; but such a judgment can often be made
about the theoretical and methodological apparatus, whether it works
or not, of any advanced science. Even on the basis of its goals as
Koch describes them, neobehaviourism can be seen as the only systematic,
extensive, and detailed attempt ever made to fulfill Leibniz1 dream of
a universal calculus; to fulfill it, furthermore, in the context of
ongoing scientific inquiry, where if accomplished it could do most good,
rather than in that of the 'rational reconstruction' of an already
completed theoretical structure, where in the absence of extension to
just such ongoing inquiry, it could be little more than ornamentative;
and to fulfill it, finally, through a sophisticated combination of
logical and empirical operations and manipulations, so that it could be
applied to the characterization of the world of contingent facts
without impugning their contingent and independent character. Had the
attempt been successful, the 'strange expectation' which Koch speaks
of, that the extent to which a hypothesis was intuitively acceptable
(i.e., 'plausible') was of little consequence, would have been
perfectly valid. The failure of the attempt, both in practice and in
principle, may stimulate a reappraisal of the limits of scientific
technique, may perhaps provide the basis for some further enlightenment,
and may occasion some sense of wonder; but it seems odd to take it as
grounds for our scorn.
k. It may be taken as a rule of thumb that, in an age in which
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scientific theories are generally thought of as being •materialistic1,
the mark of a sincerely positivist orientation is the repudiation of
the absolute status of materialist, as well as of idealist, theories.
Thus Frank (19A-9a) characterized materialistic physical theories
(such as those of Helmholtz and du Bois-Reymond) and scholastic
philosophy as jointly and equally constituting the principal conceptual
excesses which logical positivism was pledged to combat. Similarly,
Hull (1937) criticized the behaviourist A. P. Weiss and the physicist
Arthur Eddington equally, the former for his faith in reductive
materialism, the latter for his faith in transcendental idealism—and
both for their faith, as being the basis on which they each maintained
adherence to their preferred positions to an extent greater than could
be justified on rigorously scientific grounds.
5. It should be clear, and if not it should be made clear, that the
examination made here and in Chapter 3 makes no pretence of being
either a complete or a definitive critique of positivism in general or
of logical positivism and related movements in particular. The aim is
much more modest, although significant enough: it is to assess the
potential adequacy, for the specific purposes for which they were
initially designed, of the kinds of decision procedures developed
within such movements. Those initial purposes were a) the ensuring of
the rigorously empirical character of scientific statements, concepts,
and theories, b) the construction of rigorous procedures for testing
the validity (as well, that is, as the empirical status) of such
statements, etc., and c) derivatively, but most importantly, the
synthesis of these procedures into a completed logical framework which
would be adequate to characterize and hence to regulate scientific
inquiry. Thus, the analysis made here has nothing to say about the
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internal constitution or philosophical merit of any of the positlvist
formulations to be considered, except insofar as these considerations
are specifically relevant to the extrinsic task addressed by such
formulations. Similarly, it is only formulations which are, or which
were designed to be, applicable to the analysis and regulation of
scientific inquiry which will be mentioned at all; as a result, the
bulk of the most important contributions of the positivist tradition
to logic, mathematics, and philosophy will receive no mention.
These considerations may serve to mitigate somewhat the
presumptiveness involved in attempting to assess in just over 50
pages what is, after all, a dominant movement in the contemporary
philosophy of science. What makes the enterprise possible at all is
that for the most part it is not original. Most of the logical
considerations to be adduced here are merely cited from earlier analyses.
Many of the specific implications for the conduct of scientific practice
are likewise borrowed from previous work. The relationship of the
analysis given here, and of the point of view which it expresses and
which has informed this monograph throughout, to earlier work in the
history and philosophy of science, is described later. What is in any
way original in the present analysis, or sketch of an analysis, is the
way in which it attempts to systematize the various findings in terms
of their overall implications for the practice of science and for the
relationship of methodological analyses in general to such practice.
6. Cf. Kolakowski's formulation of this same requirement, as stated
in Chapter 3, stipulating that a theoretical system incorporating
abstractions
...must also be such that we do not forget that these
abstractions are no more or less than means, human
creations that serve to organise experience but that
are not entitled to lay claim to any separate existence
(Kolakowski, 1972, p. 15).
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7. The conclusion to Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
(1777) states:
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles,
what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any
volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance;
let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning
concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any
experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and
existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it
can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion (Hume,
1777; Selby-Bigge ed., p. 165; italics in the original).
8. Logical positivists, who at least initially tended to prefer a
verificationist approach, were inclined to talk about empiricist
criteria of meaning. Falsificationists, taking their lead from
Popper (1934), preferred to talk about criteria of demarcation between
science and other forms of quite possibly meaningful discourse. The
difference does not really amount to much however, since as already
shown any empiricist criterion of meaning is stipulative, hence
conventionalist, hence no more than demarcative. Popper's criterion
of demarcation is thus not different in kind from logical positivist
criteria of meaning; it is just more accurately named.
9. The point was made even better by the Scottish chemist Joseph Black
in 1803: "A nice adaptation of conditions will make almost any hypo¬
thesis agree with the phenomena. This will please the imagination but
does not advance our understanding (quoted in Popper, 1959, p. 82)."
10. Duhem (1914) found it necessary to appeal to the eventual 'good
sense' of scientists as the basis for choosing between theories.
The day arrives when good sense comes out so clearly in
favor of one of the two sides that the other side gives
up the struggle even though pure logic would not forbid
its continuation (Duhem, 1914, p. 218).
11 . In his most recent book, Popper (1972) adopts a kind of loose
Platonic realism. In his most influential writings on the philosophy
of science (Popper, 1959), however, his commitment to epistemological
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realism was hardly at all reflected in his logical and methodological
analyses. He now explains his diffidence as being due to his
uncertainty regarding the coherence of a consistently realistic out¬
look, an uncertainty that was finally resolved for him upon gaining a
more detailed understanding of Tarski's theory of truth.
12. Popper's considerable influence among some scientists is based on
the belief that the logical asymmetry between induction and deduction
renders conclusive disproof possible, so that the adoption of falsifi-
cationism makes it possible to achieve sure and certain knowledge of
what is not the case, at least (e.g., Medawar, 1967). Such a belief
rests on a basic misinterpretation of Popper. There are at least
three reasons why knowledge gained through empirical and logical
operations is not incontrovertible. The first is the logical Invalidity
of induction. The second is the availability of conventionalist or ad
hoc stratagems for 'immunizing' a theory against disproof. The third
is the relativity of concepts; observations cannot refute a theory,
only statements based on them can; but statements embody concepts and
concepts exemplify theories or world-views; hence theories of a highly
general sort at least are among the determinants of observation-statements.
The asymmetry of induction and deduction resolves only the first of these.
The other two can be dealt with, Popper maintains, but only stipulatively,
and thus never absolutely.
13. Strictly speaking, what is assumed is not invariance but independence,
i.e., that changes in the value of the operationally defined property
or concept are independent of and unrelated to changes in the values of
the undesignated 'background' variables. This qualification does not
affect the argument.
14. Bridgman's claim was that:
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Reflection on the situation after the event shows that
it should not have needed the new experimental facts
which led to relativity to convince us of the inadequacy
of our previous concepts, but that a sufficiently shrewd
analysis should have prepared us for at least the
possibility of what Einstein did...We should now make it
our business to understand so thoroughly the character
of our permanent mental relations to nature that another
change in our attitude, such as that due to Einstein,
shall be forever impossible (Bridgman, 1927, pp. 1-2).
13. Much the name point has been elegantly made by Seligman (19b9)
in the context of psychological experimentation, making use of more
examples and less analysis.
16. This is not to deny that gratuities can sometimes be valuable,
that a random selection among possibilities may at times disclose a
relevant variable. The point is simply that while we may welcome the
effects of chance when they are favourable, we do not depend on
chance as the sole or the main source of our hypotheses.
17. This recourse to operational definitions may seem to contradict
what was said earlier on the subject, concerning the subordination of
operational analysis to theoretical considerations in the context of
construction. It is perfectly true that the choice of variables and
limits with respect to which the operational analysis is carried out
is no more inherent in the problem situation within the context of
reconstruction that it is anywhere else, nor is the analysis necessarily
any more complete in this context. The point here is only that the
content of the old theory need not place any limitations on what
variables and limits can be considered significant to emphasize in
the context of reconstruction. The basis on which the choice is made
is irrelevant to the significance and import of the resulting analysis,
but the variables and limits selected can be expected to be arbitrary
with respect to—not entailed by—the old theory, since otherwise they
would already have been emphasized in the context of construction.
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18. Cf. Planck* s gloomy conclusion that "New scientific truth does
not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light
but rather because its opponents eventually die (quoted in Boring,
1963, p. 2-k7)
19. In fact, the present account bears close comparison with Kuhn's,
and many of the basic ideas advanced here can be mapped onto Kuhn's
analysis. The 'fundamental insights' exemplified by a theory
correspond, at least roughly, to a 'paradigm', the 'context of
construction' to periods of 'normal science', the 'context of
reconstruction' to periods of 'crisis' and 'revolution', etc. Both
accounts, furthermore, come to the same conclusion regarding the
tenability of the distinction between the contexts of discovery and
justification. There are many minor differences between the two
accounts, concerning, for instance, the magnitude of the shift in
attention necessary to constitute the beginning of a revolution or of
the context of reconstruction, respectively. These are not fundamental,
but I would not attempt to extend the present account of scientific
cycles to the fine structure of science in the way that Kuhn does in
his analysis. Furthermore, the present account, focusing as it does
on the relationships between scientists and the contents of scientific
disciplines, does not imply the uniqueness or singularity of the focus
of commitment (theory, paradigm) so strongly as does Kuhn's.
The moot important difference between Kuhn's account and mine,
however, concerns the level of operation of the factors responsible for
paradigm- or context-shifts. Even here, the difference is mainly one
of emphasis. A persistent misinterpretation of Kuhn's analysis has
been that his account of normal science and of scientific revolutions
makes scientific progress dependent in large part on mob psychology
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(Lakatos, 1970), irrationalism (Feyerabend, 1970), or catastrophism
(Toulmin, 1970). These charges are levied because the factors which
Kuhn cites as constitutive of the progress of science (paradigms,
puzzle-solving, etc.) are not clearly operative at the level at which
scientists make scientific decisions; that is, they are not clearly
related to the factors ostensibly involved in such decisions. Such
factors appear, at least to some critics, to be superordinate causal
factors, independent of the methodological canons of science, shaping
the destiny of science and scientists in a way over which the scientists
themselves, acting as scientists, have little or no control (see
Toulmin, 1970, for the clearest statement of this charge). Kuhn (1970b)
has abjured and refuted the charges at length. It may be admitted,
nevertheless, that his account sometimes gives at least the impression
of positing such autonomous forces operating independently according
to a kind of Hegelian dialectic—and that although this impression is
mistaken it is one that can be avoided only with considerable care and
attention to details. Furthermore, what has most attracted attention
to Kuhn's account is its wide-ranging and broadly integrative historical
sweep; the basis for its appeal is thus not highly conducive to a
focus on details (this consideration does not, admittedly, provide an
explanation for misinterpretations made by professional historians and
philosophers of science).
The present account may serve as a complement to Kuhn's in this
one respect, by emphasizing what might loosely be called the 'semantics'
of scientific research (its relation to 'things') in contrast to its
sociology. The factors which necessitate commitment to scientific
realism (cf. 'acceptance of a paradigm') in the context of construction
directly arise from and relate to the exigencies associated with
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interpreting and selecting empirical data and relating them to a
theory. In the context of construction, a realist orientation can be
justified, individually for each scientist who maintains it, as the
best means for extending and systematizing the results of scientific
inquiry; the justification requires reference to the content of the
scientific field and to the problems involved in extending it, but not
to the ethos of the community of practitioners. This feature of the
prooont account is proposed as a complement to Kuhn's, rathor than as
an alternativo, because, again, the difference is primarily one of
emphasis rather than one of substance. Both Kuhn's account and mine
imply that the conduct of science will be characterized by commitment,
occasional devaluation of the claims of logic, and selective blindness.
But neither implies irrationalism, unless 'reason' is equated with
'logic'; and it has been apparent for some time that no such equation
can be made..
20. A list of intellectual sources, hov/ever, as opposed to strictly
thematic onos, would have to include the cogent analyses of Popper
(esp. 1959, 1963) at its head. The account given here stems in large
part from an attempt to work out the implications of Popper's well
known dictum that "We learn from our mistakes." This account diverges
from Popper's in substance, of course, principally because I am
convinced (and have tried implicitly to show) that the attempt to
equate 'mistakes' with (or subordinate them to) 'false statements'
is erroneous. It is only people, and not statements, that make mistakes,
and people cannot be separated from their mistakes in any way that is
both simple and fruitful. The way that we learn from mistakes—either
our own or comebody else's—is not by establishing a procedure for
exposing them as quickly as possible but, on the contrary, by pressing
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them on as far as possible until their mistaken character becomes
self-evident. In such a way the value of the mistaken procedure, as
well as that which makes it mistaken, can be determined. Such a course
of action cannot, however, be codified as a set of explicit rules or
criteria, because it requires and depends upon the selective blindness
and concomitant selective intensity of focus entailed by commitment to
the truth of a preferred position.
21. As pointed out in Chapter 2, the various neobehaviourist theories
each had preferred areas of application, sets of problems which they
were particularly well designed to handle. It was in connection with
the claims of each to generality that competition and experimental
criticism were concentrated.
22. According to the distinction between intervening variables and
hypothetical constructs proposed by MacCorquodale and Meehl (19^8),
the former comprise mere labels for an observed functional relationship.
They are entirely specified by the independent and dependent variables
in terms of which they are defined, and have no status apart from a
summary descriptive one. Hypothetical constructs, by contrast, have
•excess meaning' over and above the operations involved in their
specification (e.g., as members of a postulate set), and thus refer to
entities or processes presumed to function independently, outside the
theory. The contrast is not so great as it seems, however, for
hypothetical constructs arc supposed to bo permitted to function
within a theory only insofar as their characteristics are specified
in the postulates of the theory. Like other theoretical illata,
therefore, hypothetical constructs and intervening variables alike are
required to have their theory-relevant meaning specified, albeit in
different ways, entirely within the theory.
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23. It was on this basis that V/atson declared Wundt's introspective
psychology to be infused with "the religious niind-body problem" (see
the quotation on p.61).
2£f. The pragmatist writings of James and Dewey were not closely
addressed at first to scientific concerns; they could be appreciated
as kin to explicitly positivist analyses of science only by those
already engaged in the latter (as recounted by Frank, 19^9^). Pierce's
writings were very close both in spirit and in detail to later logical
positivist analyses (Ayer, 1968), but were almost completely unknown
before their publication as collected papers in the 1930s.
25. Again, cf. Watson's statement that behaviourism "may never make
a pretense of being a system. Indeed systems in every scientific
field are out of date (192/*; 1961 ed., p. 18)." The complete
quotation appears on p. 67.
Footnotes to Chapter 6.
1. It might be worth pointing out that Skinner's version of operationism,
as depicted in his contribution to the Psychological Review Symposium
on Operationism (Skinner, 19^5), is different from both Bridgman's and
Stevens'; the latter's is an extension of Tolman's definitional
procedure for intervening variables and is most typical in neobehaviour-
ism. As described previously, Bridgman's operationism requires a
statement of the operations involved in measuring the quantity of
something. Stevens' requires a statement of the observations stipulated
as necessary for postulating or inferring its existence or presence.
Skinner's operationism, by contrast, requires a description of the
circumstances under which the name of the thing is emitted, or, more
generally, of the situation in which a concept is employed. Skinner's
operationism is thus, like his theories, more explicitly descriptive
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than that typical of the other varieties of neobehaviourism.
2. The two sets of discriminated responses are not completely
comparable in this experiment, since for the first set reinforcement
is available on every trial—the discrimination is between two S+'s—
while for the second set reinforcement is available only on those
correctly discriminated trials in which the dog runs down the runway--
the discrimination is between an S+ and an S-. This consideration
does not materially affect the argument however; the factorial design
is crucial here as permitting the systematic varying of the parameters.
3. The fact that the discriminated tonal sources were vertically
rather than horizontally separated precludes any easy recourse to
orienting responses as accounting for the differential ease of
discrimination.
if. It might be objected that such experiments as these do not
demonstrate the invalidity of the assumption of environmental
generality, but rather show that the modifications in descriptive
terminology necessary for application of the assumption have not been
met. That is, such experiments indicate that the modifications
necessary for extrapolating the descriptive schema to other specific
controlled environments have not been sufficiently made, but do not
indicate that if ouch modifications were to be made the resulting
descriptive schema would fail to be applicable to all environments.
This objection may be valid in principle, but it undercuts itself in
that it is possible to simulate any given feature of the natural
environment, apart from its complexity, in some kind of controlled
operant environment or Skinner box. If the modifications necessary
for extrapolating the descriptive schema had to be established and
validated separately for every possible variety of Skinner box, the
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requirement would amount to that of validating the descriptive
schema separately for every separable feature of the environment, and
hence would negate the assumption of generality itself.
5. The same judgment applies to the systematizations of the other
neobehaviourists of course, insofar as they claimed that they were
discovering perfectly general laws of behaviour. With regard to
application of learning theory principles, however, the judgment does
not apply quite so sharply to the others as to Skinner, inasmuch as
they did not extend their experimental analyses to cover the fine grain
of human behaviour in nearly so extreme a manner as Skinner has done.
The schematic analyses of human behaviour advanced by the 'neo-neobehaviour-
ists' (e.g., Dollard & Miller, 1950) are more self-consciously
metaphorical and tentative than Skinner's.
6. However, it is true that Skinner was, of all the neobehaviourists,
the most consistent and assertive in declaring the positivist character
of his psychology (in Skinner, 1938).
7. This statement is obviously an elliptical rephrasing of Hume's
phenomenalistic definition of causality as a 'constant conjunction of
events' . The point of this way of putting it, as will be seen, relates
to how we go about specifying an 'event' as having occurred on two
separate occasions.
8. It may be worth noticing also in this regard that Skinner's serious
interest in developing and refining the techniques of behaviour
therapy—a term, incidentally, which Skinner seems to have coined—
antedates the interest of many other behaviourist psychologists
(Skinner & Lindsley, 195'+), and was expressed well before Wolpe's
first (1958) systematic writings appeared, although after Wolpe began
practicing the art and reporting case studies (1952).
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9. Very much lesser in some cases, it is true, because few
experimental psychologists, apart from some of those influenced by
Skinner, are systematically directed toward considering the detailod
observation of the behaviour of their experimental subjects as the
most important part of their professional activity.
10. The only informative discussion which I have seen on the subject
of the interpenetration—rather than the possibility of coexistence—
of phenomenology and behaviourism is that of Day (1970). Day does not
go so far as to suggest, however, that the incorporation of a
phenomenological viewpoint into behaviourism could take place or has
taken place at as basic a level as I have represented it.
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The past few years have seen a mounting disillusionment with and rejection
of behaviourism as a basis for psychology. This mounting disillusionment manifests
itself in many different forms: the publication of increasingly trenchant conceptual
and methodological critiques of behaviourism (11, 23, 21, /,2), the intensification
of philosophical debate on behaviourism (e.g., 46), the attrition in the ranks of both
well-known and unknown behaviourists (e.g., Sigmund Koch, (leorge Miller,
(). II. Mowrer, I). S. Palermo), the strong and vigorous development of the so-
called "third force in Psychology" of lingers, Maslow, and others (26, 33, 34), and
perhaps most importantly, a gradual change in the kind of articles published in
the hitherto mainstream behaviouristic journals.1
Behaviouristically oriented psychologists have, in some cases, been quick to
sense and respond to the attack. Such works as Kantor's Scientific evolution of
psychology (16), Ksper's A history of psychology (9), Skinner's Contingencies of
reinforcement: A theoretical analysis (39), and Smith's Behavior and conscious
experience (40) all attempt to show that behaviourism, or something very like
behaviourism, is the only possible scientific orientation for psychology, and that
it can quite robustly serve as a guide to any and all psychological phenomena.
But these works, too, are evidence in themselves of the decline of behaviourism.
They all are defensive works, and they all promote brands of "behaviourism"
which are nearly unrecognizable. Skinner's radical behaviourist credo (39), re¬
printed in part form an earlier work (38), was originally described as "so extra¬
ordinarily libertarian . . . that one begins to wonder what the actual defining char¬
acteristics of the behaviourist thesis or the behaviourist method might be in his
particular case (S. Koch, quoted in 46, !>• 9<S)." The other three books promote
various forms of closer relationship between psychology and biology, in the avowed
hope that such closer connections will cleanse behaviourism (and psychology) of
the last traces of psychic fictions. It is taken as almost an article of faith that, a new
and indomitable behaviourism will emerge from this process.
The question arises: if behaviourism is surrendering its hegemony, however
unwillingly, how has it come to be forced to do so? Palermo (30) suggests that the
downfall of behaviourism began in earnest with a dissertation by Kucnne (20),
in which she showed that, for any behaviourist theory, there were unaccountable
differences in verbal transposition behaviour between younger and older children.
Palermo's claim at first appears unfounded; accomodation to more anomalous
phenomena than Kuenne's had cheerfully been made within the behaviourist,
framework before Kuenne published.
'In a discussion of a symposium on imagery in children's learning recently published in the
1'sychological Bulletin (SO), i). S. Palermo observes "Some 15 years ago, when I was a year from
completing my graduate work, . . . proposing a symposium on imagery at. a psychological convention
might have been considered a joke. Most, hard-nosed experimental psychologists probably would
not even have set aside their copies of Modern horning theory . . . long enough to notice such a sym¬
posium."
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Palermo's claim makes more sense, however, in the light of the general his¬
torical analysis he provides. His article is of interest as one of the first explicitly
"post-Kuhnian" analyses in psychology. T. S. Kuhn's theory of scientific progress
(21) is by now well known; "normal" or everyday scientific activity in a given
field is guided by a paradigm, or outstanding scientific achievement, which im¬
plicitly defines the methodology, conceptual structure, and problem areas of scien¬
tific research. This paradigm-based research is devoted to solving specific problems
related to, and following from, the paradigm. Eventually one or more research
problems of central importance to the paradigm proves intractable to paradigm-
based research. These "anomalies" provoke a "crisis-state" in research; unsatis¬
factory attempts are made to resolve the anomalies by means of ad hoc additions
to the paradigm-based theory, the paradigm comes to be severely questioned, and
research proceeds on a relatively undirected basis for a time. Finally the anomaly
is solved, at least in part by a non-paradigm-based piece of research; this achieve¬
ment, or one following from it, forms the basis for the next paradigm.
Palermo has accepted Kuhn's analysis and applied it to pychology. Behaviour¬
ism is a paradigm-based research programme with classical conditioning (or, later,
S-ll conceptualizations) as its paradigmatic heart. Research was stimulated and
guided by this paradigm into the familiar channels of S-R learning theories, drive-
reduction theories of motivation, mechanical "mediating response" theories of
memory and cognition, etc. The frontiers of behaviourist experimentation and
theorizing were in the fields of complex human functioning, and ambitious attempts
to extend behaviouristie theories to these fields were made by such pioneers as
Miller and Dollard (8, 27), Rotter (36), Bandura and Walters (/), and Staats and
Staats (41)- Predictably, it was in these frontier areas that major experimental
anomalies began to appear. The first was that of Kuennc (20), but Palermo goes
on to specify others coming from the work of Harlow on curiosity and love (13,
14), Rock and Estcs on one trial learning (10, 32), Olds on brain stimulation (29),
etc. The work of Chomsky (e.g., 7) marks, according to Palermo, the first signs
of the emergence of a new paradigm, one characterized by a "mentalistic and
rationalistic, orientation (30, p. 41 f>)."
Palermo's analysis is simple, rational, and consistent with a growing trend to
view the succession of scientific hegemonies as determined more by factors relating
to the sociology of science than by those relating to scientific activity itself. The
selection of Kucnne's dissertation as the beginning of the end for behaviourism
makes more sense when viewed from the standpoint of Palermo's extension of
Kuhn's theory. Kucnnc was working within the behaviourist framework, at a
behaviourist laboratory, and should have found good behaviourist answers. In¬
stead, ". . . older children did not transpose in the same manner as the younger
children. The latter behaved in much the same way as rats, as expected from the
theory current at the time, but there was something peculiar and theoretically
difficult to handle about the older children (30, p. 41(1)." If behaviourism is, in
Kuhn's sense, a paradigm, then Kuenne's findings must be, in Kuhn's sense, an
anomaly. The identification of Kuenne's work as a serious anomaly, that is, as the
starting point of the crisis, cannot be made until after the crisis is in full progress
of course, but this limitation on identification is customary.
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Is behaviourism, or the foundat ion of behaviourism, most appropriately viewed
as a paradigm? At first sight it would seem so. Thorndike's puzzle-box studies
and Pavlov's classical conditioning experiments appear to fit Kuhn's description
of a paradigm as "one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some
particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation
for its further practice {21, p. 10)." They seem, furthermore, to have two character¬
istics Ivuhn considers essential in a paradigm. "Their achievement was sufficiently
unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing
modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave
all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve {21, p. 10)."
Still, there is a fundamental difference in scientific status between Thorndike's
and Pavlov's researches, and the research achievements that Kuhn provides as
examples of paradigms. The difference has to do with the relative importance of
the substantive and the methodological components of the scientific achievements.
The significance of the paradigm as a scientific achievement is that it solves a
problem: it answers particular questions about the world and is, primarily, a major
substantive contribution to its field. Matters of methodology, conceptual orien¬
tation, and the definition of important problem areas are determined implicitly
by the paradigm. Whether the proponents of the new paradigm attempt to legis¬
late methodology or not, it is the paradigm itself that both stimulates and justifies
any methodological development.
The paradigm, then, is first and foremost, a major substantive scientific
achievement. Py a process of implication and even of direct modelling, the para¬
digm has a major effect on the entire structure of the field. Put, each effect it has
is justified by reference to the substantive significance of the paradigm achievement,
a significance which necessarily antedates the effects justified by it. Paradigms,
that is, are defined by their content, not by their methodology. This point deserves
some emphasis, because it does not describe the way behaviourism developed.
It is questionable whether there was a crisis in psychological research when
Thorndikc published "Animal intelligence" in 1S9S (43)- There certainly was one
by the fime Watson published "Psychology as the bchaviorist views if," in 19111
(47), and his adoption of Pavlovian conditioning principles in 1910 (48) was spe¬
cifically intended to resolve this crisis. Put neither Thorndike's researches, nor
Pavlov's as Watson used them, answered any major questions or solved any sub¬
stantive! problems in psychology. Instead, they proclaimed that human and animal
functioning could be understood in a particular way, and promised that the use of
a correct, methodology would make psychology into a genuine science. Thorndike's
and Pavlov's results were never of principal importance (indeed, in the case of
Pavlov, they have always been difficult to replicate); it was their techniques, and
the principles that, followed from their techniques, that became central.
The revolution that produced behaviourism was, in short, a methodological
revolution. Pehaviourism was not born /rom a solution, even a tentative solution,
to a major problem. It was born rather of an uncompromising faith in a particular
objective methodology, a faith that (as is well known) required the rejection and
denial of those phenomena and foci of research which could not be made com¬
patible with the methodology.
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Legislation thus played a rather larger role in the development of behaviour-
istie psychology than in the development of those sciences it tried to imitate.
There was no outstanding achievement to refer hack to as proof of the worth of
the behaviourist approach, and as a source of methodological principles. The
methodology itself was the starting point, and was justified only by appeal to the
future and to other "objective" sciences.
The same factors that made legislation necessary, however, also made it
ineffective. The hegemony of behaviourism has always been rather loose, as well
as geographically isolated. Debate over fundamentals was never resolved. The
lack of justification for the extreme methodological tenets of Watson forced be¬
haviourism to become "neo-" very swiftly. Tolman's first exposition of "purposive
behaviourism"—in effect, teleological behaviourism—appeared in 1922 (44), just
six years after Watson began to promote Pavlovian conditioning principles. Tol¬
man's Purposive behavior in animals and men (45), ten years later, went most of
the way towards introducing mentalism. In the same year, Cannon's The wisdom
of the body (6) climaxed his refutation of Watson's peripheralism. Environmentalism
is often t hought to have remained central to behaviouristie formulations somewhat
longer. Even so, Hull in his Principles of behavior (15) was forced to list a dozen
autonomous drives, and to imply that his list might well be incomplete. A list of
primary drives that encompasses hunger, thirst, sex, maternal drive, and drives
resulting from needs for air, to avoid pain, to maintain body temperature, to
defecate, micturate, rest, sleep, and be active (15, pp. 59-60), treads perilously
close to instinctivism.
Environmentalism, peripheralism, the rejection of telcological explanation
and mentalism all these supposed fundamentals of behaviourism wore abandoned
or greatly modified long before behaviourism passed its heyday. Rejection of them
took place within the behaviourist tradition, but on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis.
They were abandoned, not through a process of growth and development of the
behaviourist paradigm, but through a reluctant and gradual response to the in¬
adequacy of a methodology that had never had significant substantive justification.
In summary, behaviourism was not in anything like Ivuhn's sense, a paradigm.
It did not have a paradigmatic base, and it did not have the power to settle funda¬
mental issues that is essential for the practice of paradigm-based normal science.
The Function and Dysfunction of Positivism
in the Development of Scientific Systems
If behaviourism was not based on a paradigm, then what was it based on, and
how did it come to its predominant status? It is widely recognized that behaviour¬
ism did not at first succeed entirely on its own merits. It was "one of those ideas
that are blessed at birth by the Zeitgeist (2, p. 32)." "Psychology was all ready for
behaviourism . .. the times were ripe for more objectivity in psychology, and Watson
was the agent of the times (4, p. 642)." The essence of behaviourism was, as implied
above, its adoption of objective methods and orientations avowedly analogous to
those of the physical sciences. And those orientations, at the time, emphasized
mathematical and provisional nature of physical constructs; under the spur of the
collapse of the Newtonian world-view they rejected any reference of constructs to
a "metaphysical" underlying reality. The orientation of physics at the time was,
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in a word, highly positivistic, and it was the adoption of this positivism, which
was becoming an immensely popular and influential philosophical and scientific
movement, that greatly helped ensure behaviourism's success.
It was this adoption of positivism that gave behaviourism, not just its empha¬
sis 011 observables, but its rejection of anything purporting to lie behind the observ-
ables. At first the fact that it was positivism that psychology was adopting from
physics was little recognized; following the introduction of Bridgman's opera-
tionism (5) the adoption of positivism became conscious and systematic. Opera-
tionism has always been taken more seriously in psychology than in physics. It
was of great assistance in the development of neo-behaviourism, since it seemed to
permit, while keeping staunchly within an objective and positivist framework,
the introduction of any level of concept so long as the concept could be "opera¬
tionally defined". Both the success and the characteristics of the behaviourist
programme are thus largely attributable to the acceptance within psychology of a
natural-science-based positivism. Positivism in psychology, however, is still some¬
thing very different, from positivism in physics, and this difference is of central
importance to an understanding of behaviourism.
The development of positivism as an internal process within a scientific disci¬
pline is a cyclical historical phenomenon with a determinable social function (cf. 19).
Its central characteristic is a systematic suspension of judgment concerning the
reality of a particular explanatory system. Its function seems to la; that of easing
the transition from one explanatory system to another which replaces it. Positivism
may arise when an old system, which is accepted and believed, comes to have its
validity questioned; it makes possible the response to criticism that the system
under attack is justified as a scientific system by its pragmatic success (by suc¬
cessfully predicting phenomena) rather than by its metaphysical success (by
accurately reflecting reality). Positivism flowers when a new system is proposed
to replace the old one; the resistance to accepting a new explanatory schema with
potentially revolutionary metaphysical implications is at least as great as the
reluctance to abandon the old one. Whether the proponents of the new system are
positivistically oriented or not seems to make little difference. The claim comes to
be made for the new system that it, too, is justified pragmatically,2 that it is a
mistake to see it as requiring a change in world-view. As the new system becomes
accepted and commonplace, its positivism is tacitly and gradually abandoned;
its principles for describing and accounting for phenomena come to be taken as
descriptions of real processes. The positivistic approach to a system may never
entirely die out, even after the system has become widely accepted, and is always
considered a respectable, if somewhat overly cautious, scientific attitude. Its
incidence in science, however, is very low during the period that the system is
fully accepted. Positivism has philosophical roots, of course, in skeptical cpiste-
mology, and may continue to stimulate activity in philosophy throughout the
"realistic" period of acceptance of a scientific system.
Examples of positivism are readily available in the history of science. Both
the Eudoxian (heavenly spheres) and the Ptolemaic (equants and epicycles) theories
'From the standpoint of Kuhn's theory, such a claim must always be unjustified. The old theory,
at the time of its death, is always able to do more than the new theory at the time of its birth.
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of astronomy were proposed simply as mathematical devices to "save the phenom¬
ena"—to enable prediction of the observed motions of the planets without regard
to their hypothetical actual behaviour. This early positivism was given rational
support by the argument that it was impossible to make astronomy a natural
science since its objects were totally inaccessible to close observation and experi¬
ment; therefore, any statements concerning the "real" nature of the stars and their
motions could not even in principle be justified. Nevertheless, an amalgam of the
Eudoxian and the Ptolemaic theories gradually came to be considered true, rather
than merely efficient. Copernicus, in his turn, believed in his heliocentric hypothesis,
but much of the early defense of his system emphasized a positivistic justification
similar to the ancient one (85). Newton was never satisfied with the account he
gave of gravitation, and cautioned his readers to consider his formulation as merely
a mathematical description. They did not do so, and gravity slowly became accepted
as a fundamental property of matter.
The emergence of positivism towards the end of the nineteenth century dis¬
plays a similar pattern. A few physicists, such as Ostwald and Priestley, had
resolutely kept to a positivist conception of Dalton's atomic theory. In general,
however, although the scientific temper of the period was aggressively tough-
minded, it was a tough-mindedness of materialism rather than of positivism. A
thoroughgoing positivism started to be widely acceptable only with the publication
of Mach's Science of mechanics (24) in 1883 (Eng. tr. 1893). The acceptance of
Mach's positivism and of the doctrines that followed from it was based on the
gradual buildup of anomalies, and the gradual loss of faith, in the Newtonian
scientific system. The theories quantum mechanics and relativity theory—that
followed from all these anomalies have continued frequently to be presented as
positivistically based theories (although Einstein's own distaste for positivism is
well known). Koyre, however, confidently predicts that the "positivist phase of
renouncement" will once again give way to a realism (19). There are indications
that he is right, that physicists are increasingly coming to assign greater realistic
significance to their postulates (22, 28).
Psychological positivism, then, was adopted from a science wherein it re¬
currently appears as a symptom and concomitant of revolutionary change. Hut
the revolutionary change is always from one world-system that has become in¬
adequate to another developed to redress the inadequacies. In behaviouristie
psychology this could have happened but did not. The Wundtian, elementaristie,
associationistic, paradigm was proving inadequate and a Darwinian functionalist
paradigm for a time seemed to be the replacement. However, the Darwinian
emphasis on unconscious wellsprings of behaviour and on instinctual mechanisms
was unacceptable to the dogmatic objectivism of developing behaviourism. Posi¬
tivism lost, in its transition from physics, its function of masking and rationalizing
underlying entities, and served instead to abolish them. The Darwinian paradigm
was instead exploited by Ereud and, much later, by the ethologist.s. The Darwinian
approach did not disappear altogether in America of course, but was used only by
those, such as MeDougall and Yerkes, who eventually came to reject the behaviour¬
ist orthodoxy. Darwinism in American psychology thus never achieved the status
of a paradigm and never realized its potential.
The mainstream of American psychology thus placed itself in the curious
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position of adopting a methodology appropriate to paradigm shifts, while the manner
of adoption entailed having no paradigm to shift to. This is the failure of behaviour¬
ism, that it had no world-view to grow up into, to guide research, to provide sub¬
stance to its orthodoxy; it restricted itself instead to a methodology which is pro¬
ductive only when there is a world-view beneath it, waiting to emerge.
This is not to say that behaviourism was entirely without underlying, guiding,
metaphysical principles. It had them, and they were the same elementaristic,
associationistic ones derived from British empiricism as were present in the rejected
Wundtian paradigm. However, the possible implications of these principles for a
new model of the nature of psychological processes could not be realized, because
they had become so widespread, vague, and generally disseminated throughout
the scientific culture that their substance had been reduced to the general method¬
ological maxim of "analyze everything into its components." This reduction of
the metaphysical principles to the level of methodological maxims was reinforced,
of course, by the growing positivism of the scientific culture. In addition, the kind
of philosophical positivism which was starting to develop at the time, and which
eventually became the logical positivism of the early Vienna circle, was itself
inclined strongly towards the same kind of empiricist olementarism (S). The
principles did influence much behaviourist research, but they were notyessential to
behaviourism, and could be tacitly abandoned when necessary, as the elementarism
was abandoned in Tolman's theory. They served to give the appearance of content
to the positivist orthodoxy, but they expressed no new principles or insights, and
were never sufficiently strong or stimulating to initiate an emergence from the
positivism.
Positivism as Scientific Orthodoxy
Serious consequences arise when positivism is institutionalized as the assumed
content of a discipline. The development of the discipline is restricted, since the
positivist orthodoxy, like all orthodoxies, resists change that is anything but a
development of itself. Since positivism is substantively empty, a positivist ortho¬
doxy resists any genuine development. It has two important defenses against
change.
First, the orthodoxy has an effective criticism available to counter any proposed
world-view. By the tenets of positivism, which are taken to be the tenets of science,
any world-view is meaningless (unverifiable), and hence unscientific. This criticism
of any non-positivistic position, that it is unscientific, is simple to apply and is
sufficient to invalidate any such position in the judgment of all those who accept
the orthodoxy.
Second, since a positivist orthodoxy has no substantive core, it is not falsi-
fiable; that is, any empirically verifiable statement is consistent with it. The ortho¬
doxy is thus totally pluralistic, and any finding that seems anomalous to a theory
consistent with the orthodoxy can in fact be accomodated within it.
The combination of these two defense mechanisms provides a devasting
defense against any scientific system that challenges the orthodoxy: the empirical
findings of the challenging system can be accomodated within the orthodoxy3,
3It is very difficult for any position to be entirely content-free. Iri practice, therefore, an additional
technique is employed of ignoring empirical findings that cannot be assimilated.
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and the theoretical formulations, to the extent that they are not compatible with
a positivistic orientation, can be dismissed as unscientific.
These defensive reactions are familiar occurrences within behaviourism. They
are the basis for much of the behaviourist criticism of psychoanalytic theory (e.g.,
37); the attempt of Dollard and Miller (8) to translate Freudian theory into S-R
terms was explicitly designed so as to accomodate the range of Freudian findings
within a behaviourist framework while rejecting the unique components of Freudian
theory as unscientific. Maltzman provides an explicit version of this defense, or
counter-attack, in discussing behaviourist vs. cognitive (i.e., mentalistic) treat¬
ments of awareness in verbal conditioning.
No cognitive psychologist has made any discoveries, obtained any empirical
laws, uncovered new experimental variables which logically could not bo
treated within some behaviourist theory. . . . The difference between the
cognitive psychologist and the behaviourist is in the logical status of their
respective theories. For the behaviourist awareness is a defined concept. For
the cognitive psychologist awareness is a primitive or undefined term, despite
disclaimers about operational definitions and converging operations. . . . Psy¬
chology can manage without such a dinij an sich {25, p. 102-3).
In this double-barreled, almost sophistic technique of reply to criticism,
behaviourism is rather similar to its philosophical cousin linguistic philosophy,
which could be identified as another modern case of positivism institutionalized
as the pseudo-content of a discipline (ef. 12). It is the imperviousness to substantive
criticism of behaviourism that gives significance to the remark of Koch: "I suspect
that there is a class of positions that are wrong but not refutable and that be¬
haviourism may be in such a class (17, p. 6)." Koch relates his remark separately
to the metaphysical and to the methodological aspects of behaviourism. The
analysis presented above, however, implies that the methodological and meta¬
physical components cannot be considered separately, or even be properly identified
apart from each other, for behaviourism has succeeded in making its methodology
into a kind of metaphysic.
The resistance of behaviourism to change and criticism has not, of course,
made change impossible or criticism ineffective. What it has done is to delay
change, and for a time to force criticism and change to be piecemeal. It has strongly
hindered the development of a new paradigm. Its techniques for doing so, from the
defensive viewpoint, were described above. From the viewpoint of the initiators of
change, it has also done so by providing little specifically to react against. Be¬
haviourism's anomalies are not Kuhn's anomalies; ad hoc additions designed to
counter the anomalies are very difficult to distinguish from apparently genuine
extensions of theory. Behaviourism has thus not only failed to provide an adequate
systematization within psychology. It has even failed to present central problems
for the attention of a possible successor.
The decline of behaviourism is not being ushered in by the growth of anomalies,
by the appearance of a new paradigm that gives the anomalies a more central
position.4 Instead, a growing awareness of the emptiness of the behaviourist pro-
4As was the case, for instance, in the development of gestalt psychology out of structuralism.
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gramme is giving rise within the behaviourist ranks to a feeling of weariness and
disillusionment. At the same time, the tentative programmes instituted by those
working independently of the behaviourist orthodoxy are beginning to bear fruit
and to attract more and more workers. Common to behaviourists and others is
the feeling that behaviourism has simply failed to make good its promise.
It seems necessary, therefore, for American psychology to revert to an ex¬
plicitly pre-paradigm position for a time. Behaviourism, during the period of its
domination, prevented the development of a paradigm, and none of the recent
competing schools is yet in a position to advance one. The conclusion of Koch (IS),
that the unity and scientific coherence produced by adherence to a paradigm are
impossible within psychology, is obviously premature. His conclusion is based on
the assumption that behaviourism, despite its fundamental inadequacies, is a
scientific system, and that the failure of behaviourism to become systematically
viable must therefore preclude scientific coherence and unification on the part of
any successor. In contrast, the analysis presented here concludes that behaviour¬
ism is not a scientific system and has hitherto prevented one from developing.
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